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The nations of Nigeria and India both have exceptionally diverse populations, endured the deliberate divide-and-rule strategies executed by British colonizers who sought thereby to exacerbate existing differences, and experienced peaceful transfers from colonial rule to independence. Despite these key similarities in certain aspects of their colonial and decolonization experiences, India and Nigeria have had very different levels of success in their efforts to create and maintain politically stable nation-states. Today, India is distinguished from other post-colonial independent nations for its political stability, demonstrated by its "set of stable political and legal institutions that has now remained more or less intact for over five decades" and a parliamentary democracy that has "remained more or less unchanged since India's independence and continues to function in an orderly fashion".[1] Nigeria, on the other hand, is an exemplar of third world political *in*stability, characterized as "highly nondemocratic and prone to using force" and plagued by recurrent coups and violent ethno-religious conflicts.[2] In this paper, I identify crucial differences between each country's pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial experiences that have contributed to such divergent political conditions today. Specifically, this paper surveys the types and structuring of diversity in each country; their experiences under British colonialism (including how their boundaries were determined, what

political and economic policies were implemented, and how they gained independence); and finally the important aspects that have colored their experiences since colonialism—including significant historical events, the geographic distribution of natural resources, and particular economic and political policies pursued.[i]

I argue that the source of India and Nigeria's divergent outcomes lies primarily in the structuring of their demographic diversity. India has had success in achieving political stability due to its diversity existing as "cross-cutting cleavages," a characteristic of society that is associated with political stability.[ii] A society with cross-cutting cleavages is a society in which political, ideological, ethnic, racial, religious, socioeconomic, or linguistic divisions cut across one another "such that individuals on opposite sides of one divisive issue are often allies on another issue".[3] And India, "with [its] multiple cleavages of religion, caste, tribe, region, and language slicing across each other," is indeed commonly considered to be "an outstanding example" of such a society.[4] To give a concrete example, it is not the case that all Hindus in India speak the same language, are of the same socio-economic class, and live in the same region. Additionally, having a common ancestral history and traditions, experiencing a unifying and nationalistic independence movement, and pursuing political and economic policies (both under colonial rule

INDIA HAS HAD SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING POLITICAL STABILITY DUE TO ITS DIVERSITY EXISTING AS 'CROSS-CUTTING CLEAVAGES'

NIGERIA'S STABILITY CONTINUES TO BE UNDERMINED BY REGIONAL COMPETITION AND VIOLENCE

and afterward) that had the effect of uniting the population has helped India.

In contrast, Nigeria's "overlapping cleavages"[iii]—being comprised of a population whose linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences overlap on top of one another and coincide with regional boundaries—have compromised its political stability. As scholar Okechukwu Iheduru describes, Nigeria's "250 ethnic groups, with their distinct (and mostly unintelligible) languages and cultural characteristics, are geographically separated".[5] Moreover, Nigeria's lack of common national history, unequal natural resource distribution, and promotion of regionalism over a strong central government via specific political and economic policies (both under colonialism and after gaining its independence) have helped produce a Nigeria whose stability continues to be undermined by regional competition and violence.

I conclude this paper by looking at the political approach taken by several Southeast Asian countries. It is true that several Southeast Asian countries have had success in achieving national political stability via a type of governance that emphasizes central planning under an authoritarian government. However, I propose that several preexisting characteristics of India and Nigeria, as well as some features of their current political structure, are such that this Southeast Asian "model" (as some have described it) would not necessarily be adaptable to or useful for

improving these nations' political stabilities.

HIGHLY DIVERSE NATIONAL POPULATIONS

Quantitatively Comparable Diversity: Certain key similarities exist between India and Nigeria; not least significant in terms of national political stability is the tremendous amount of diversity that has been and remains present within each nation. One source of diversity in India is race, as the country is divided between an "Aryan" race in the north and a "Dravidian" race in its southern regions.[6] Nigeria's ethnic diversity is significantly more varied. It has an ethnic makeup of 250 tribal groups, and about two-thirds of the population falls into one of three major ones (the Hausa-Falani, the Yoruba, and the Ibo), each of which is concentrated in its own distinct geographic region.[7] While Nigeria is characterized by considerable ethnic diversity, India exhibits comparable linguistic diversity. Over 200 languages are spoken throughout the country—many of which are mutually unintelligible—and this serves as the basis for India's linguistically determined regions. For their part, Nigerians also "speak more than 250 mutually unintelligible languages" that are also regionally concentrated.[8] Each country also has religion as a source of diversity: in India, there coexists a Hindu majority, a substantial Muslim minority, as well as Buddhists, Sikhs,

and Christians.[9] The Nigerian population is divided between a Muslim-dominated north and a primarily Christian population in the south. An additional, distinct source of diversity within India is caste (or *jati*): Indian society distinguishes between Brahmins, warriors, merchants, artisans/peasants, and untouchables as separate social castes. These distinctions were considerably more socially and politically significant during India's colonial past but retain a degree of political and social significance.[10]

Qualitatively Distinctive Diversity:
Despite the similarity that both nations are immensely diverse, a key difference for political stability lies in the geographic distribution of these differences. Though Indian states are organized around linguistic identities, in each state and city one can still find members of different religions and castes. This feature of differences being cross-cutting (and particularly that of cutting across geographic boundaries) prevents serious secessionist threats, which have had obvious implications in terms of promoting political stability.[ix] Nigeria, on the other hand, is comprised of a population whose cleavages overlap with each other and coincide with regional boundaries. Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups—almost each of which is associated with a distinct language and distinct cultural characteristics—are geographically separated.[11]

Such "overlapping" cleavages present problems for nations trying to maintain political stability because they promote identity-based politics, are a barrier to cooperation, present potential secessionist threats, and promote regional rivalries that often (particularly in Nigeria's case) grow into more violent conflicts. The nature of each nation's cleavages has thus been a crucial determinant of its subsequent political stability.[12]

British Colonial Legacies

*Ostensibly Similar British Colonial Legacies***:** Another key similarity between the two nations is a colonial legacy of British rule, specifically one that intentionally used a "divide-and-rule" strategy to highlight and reinforce each nation's preexisting cleavages and diffuse nationalism among the native population.[13] The use of the "divide-and-rule" tactic via direct rule has to be qualified in the case of both countries. However, the common outcome is that it served to politicize differences, which is the outcome that has had the most lasting political significance as it relates to stability of each country.

The case of British direct rule in India must be qualified because British influence in India actually began rather passively before it transitioned first to indirect rule in 1757 (after and due to the Battle of Plassey) and then became direct rule in 1857 (after and due to the Sepoy

Rebellion).[14] The particular timing of Britain's adoption of direct rule in India also influenced the character it took on, and it was a character that further encouraged the reinforcement of differences. Britain transitioned from indirect to direct rule as it was moving increasingly further away from feudalism and toward industrialization. The politicization of identities in colonial India thus took on the Enlightenment skew of placing heightened attention on measurement and identification, particularly in the context of gathering information via censuses of demographics, regions, and populations. This served to reinforce identities that previously had not necessarily existed—or at least were not yet politically significant—in India. In particular, Britain played up the racial differences between the North and South and also emphasized religious differences between Hindus and Muslims.[15]

The assertion that Nigeria experienced direct colonial rule by Britain also merits further explanation. Direct rule only applied to the southern regions of the country, while the northern region was controlled via indirect rule and was largely left to "native authorities," often Hausa-Faulani landlords.[16] The politically salient feature and consequence of direct rule for the purposes of this paper, however, is that of reinforcing and politicizing cleavages. I will argue that, despite allowing some indirect rule (which tends to be less divisive), these regionally differing forms of colonial rule in Nigeria reinforced the cleavages as much as or even more so than if direct rule had been universally applied.[17]

Cleavages within both India and Nigeria were not necessarily sources of conflict prior to them being intensified and politicized, which for these nations was a direct consequence of British colonial rule and its particular strategies. Indeed, the long "period of relatively peaceful coexistence between Hindus and Muslims" before Indian colonization is strong evidence that "the relationship between the two groups is not inherently a conflictual one".[18] Similar patterns can be witnessed in African countries that have now become paradigms for ethnic and religious violence, such as Rwanda and the Congo. However, it is because they are crosscutting that these cleavages have not seriously impacted the stability of present-day India, whereas their overlapping nature in Nigeria has greatly undermined its stability.

Crucial Differences between Colonial Experiences: <u>Drawing Boundaries</u> - Predating independence, a major difference in the way each nation's national boundaries were initially formed has had lasting implications on their relative successes in creating politically stable nation-states. Unlike Nigeria, India had a stronger foundation for a national consciousness due to the existence of a common civilization that had been

forged prior to its colonization. Indians can look to a shared, ancient history of dynasties that stretched across much of the subcontinent. These dynasties also helped to spread Hindu beliefs and practices with them, thereby establishing an early prevalence of Hinduism and making the caste structure and Hindu traditions universally recognizable.[v] These widespread traditions and shared history were immensely useful in providing Indian nationalist leaders with a foundation from which to draw a common national myth to unite the country during the subsequent independence movement.[vi]

This common myth stands in stark contrast to the complete lack of shared, unifying history in Nigeria, whose national boundaries are utterly artificial and whose diverse population was arbitrarily united, providing little ostensible rationale for nationhood. Nigeria's national boundaries were arbitrarily drawn by European powers during the 1885 Berlin Conference with a blatant disregard for the existing tribes, demography, or geography of the area, which has been a major source of the turmoil Nigeria experiences today.[19] The Berlin Conference set up two adjacent British protectorates in the area that now comprises Nigeria, one southern and one northern. 1914 saw another arbitrary regional unification, as these two ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse protectorates were formally amalgamated into one colony. Two differing systems of colonial political control (one direct, the other indirect) served to further exacerbate existing differences.[20]

The effects of this colonial legacy on Nigeria's present political unity are manifest. The South continues to have more secular laws while the North still retains some Sharia laws, and two models of suffrage are still preserved within each region, with the South allowing universal suffrage and the North only giving men the vote. The North-South divide is further evidenced by the fact that the regions received self-government at vastly different times, almost two years apart: the eastern and western regions (compositely the southern region) were granted self-government in 1957, while the northern region declined the offer until 1959.[21] These political differences are both an indicator and source of the political instability Nigeria currently experiences. Indeed, the amalgamation is still referred to as the "mistake of 1914" for the persistent problems it created.[22]

Political and Economic Policies - Specific political and economic policies implemented in each nation prior to independence have also had lasting implications on present political relations and stabilities. For example, prior to British influence in the region, the Mogul Empire (1526-1750s) set up a "federal" system of tribute in India. This federal system served to set up a central-regional political system that "contributed to the expansion of administrative bureaucracies as well as closer economic and political ties among the

Goodluck Jonathan, the president of Nigeria, whose power is undermined by stronger regional governments

diverse regions of the subcontinent," while still establishing the center as dominant in center-periphery relations. The legacy of this policy has aided in creating the political stability India now enjoys by promoting ties among regions as well as upholding the strength of the central government.[23] Similarly, British colonizers introduced the civil service to India and established "national and regional assemblies." These "provide[d] an institutional basis for parliamentary democracy in postcolonial India," as well as "systematized division of labor between central and provincial administrations, providing a bridge from the tributary system…to the institutions of modern day Indian federalism" that have served India so well since independence.[24]

Nigeria, on the other hand, underwent a series of administrative political reforms under Britain's direction prior to its independence that had the effect of reorganizing the nation into three regions corresponding to the North, West, and East. This reorganization merely reinforced and further politicized regional differences by laying the "foundation for the creation of new geographic identities" to overlay the preexisting primordial ones. Such politicization and overlaying of differences has largely contributed to the political competition along regional lines and the weakening of the central government that are such a major source of Nigeria's current political instability.[25] In 1951, Britain established a federal system in

Nigeria, which, unlike India's system that allowed for a structurally and administratively stronger central government, had the opposite effect of giving its regions more autonomy. This regional control also applied to control of resources, which has had particularly dire consequences to be explained in more depth further on.

In neither India's nor Nigeria's case was a lack of agency or strong leadership a chief cause of political instability. However, the incentive for strong *central* leadership has been and continues to be compromised by Nigeria's political structure. Effective leaders have been deterred from taking charge of the nation as a whole—which could encourage stability—preferring instead to seek control over the regional governments that are relatively stronger than the central one. For example, the leader and founder of one of Nigeria's major parties, Ahmadu Bello of the National People's Congress (NPC), declined the role of being Nigeria's first post-independence Prime Minister to instead become Premier of the northern region. Bello's decision is a testament to the relative importance and political power of Nigeria's regions, over and above the country at large.

The central government's weakness continues to pose major problems in Nigeria;[26] however, even the creation of central governmental institutions in Nigeria has had the effect of politicizing differences and reinforcing ethnic

cleavages. For example, after national parliaments gained importance as places where distribution of resources and money was decided, extreme ethnic mobilization ensued, evidenced by the fact that the emergent political parties were completely organized along ethnic lines.[vii] Furthermore, these divisive forms of "ethnic identity mobilization," in the words of Iheduru, have "spilled over into economic and social life…igniting often a more vicious interethnic competition, stereotypes, and mutual suspicion that persists to this day".[27]

Paths to Independence - Nigeria and India similarly experienced peaceful transfers of power from British colonial rule to independence and both adopted Western-style constitutions and established parliamentary governments upon gaining independence. However, the fact that India struggled through an independence movement to gain this independence, while Nigeria was simply granted it, has had important repercussions on their respective relative political stabilities.

The independence movement in India was an important nationalizing and unifying force, with lasting implications on India's present political stability, because it gave Indians another common source of national pride to look back to and draw upon. Indians were required to form a united front against their common colonial enemy, and the particular way in which this was done—largely due to the methods employed by Gandhi—helped to further unify the country. Gandhi, as

leader of the Indian National Congress (INC) that led India to independence, used a strategy of grassroots mobilization and organization. This method connected peasants with the members of the educated elite who led the movement. Indeed, in India's case, a source of initial divisions paradoxically became fuel for India's nationalist movement. The British, in their attempt to divide and rule, elevated Hindu Brahmins to key administrative posts, which required that they be educated; however, in one of colonialism's familiar ironies, these native educated elites became the new political leaders of the Indian independence movement.[28] Furthermore, Gandhi's "syncretist" method drew upon and combined universal Enlightenment ideals with nationalistic Hindu spiritualism. Gandhi drew upon Indians' shared histories and emphasized its universal elements, thereby creating a nationalistic movement that had widespread appeal for the entire nation.[29] It was helpful that India also had ancient history and traditions from which to draw a common national myth.

During India's independence movement, Britain's calculated efforts to exploit Muslim-Hindu tensions by calling for the Partition of Bengal in 1905 ironically backfired and instead had the effect of fueling greater resentment against the British for what was recognized as a deliberate divide-and-rule tactic. Indeed, rather than driving Indians apart, it "spur[red] greater activism across

India and [gave] more impetus to the budding independence movement"—even if it would later become a source of division and ultimately lead to the secession of Bangladesh.[30] The Bengali example is a testament to the strength of the Indian independence movement as a unifying and nationalizing force because it was able to overpower, for a time, such a strong cleavage.

This independence story stands in stark contrast to Nigeria's narrative. Nigeria experienced no similar independence movement, and therefore did not experience an equivalent unification or overcoming of cleavages. Instead, Nigeria was anticlimactically granted independence from and by Britain in the year 1960, making it one of fourteen African colonies to gain its independence in that year. Thus, Nigeria seemingly gained independence at a time when the international climate was conducive to it, rather than as a direct result of its own agitations. Nigeria was therefore never forced to unify and form a common national identity in the way that India was, and differences were merely swept under the rug, only to later resurface in highly destabilizing ways.

EXPERIENCES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Formative Events Upon Gaining Independence: Almost immediately upon gaining independence, India experienced a major threat to national unity and stability. The country prepared to divide along the borders of two of its rare overlapping cleavages to create a separate Pakistani nation with a Muslim majority (one in the west corresponding to the borders of present-day Pakistan and one in the east corresponding to present-day Bangladesh).[31] Though one might view India's Partition—particularly when considering the massive violence between Hindus and Muslims that accompanied it—as a mark of extreme political instability, interestingly, the partition has seemingly effectively dealt with India's overlapping cleavages. Indeed, the cleavages that remain are essentially cross-cutting (with the exception of Kashmir), rendering a relatively stable contemporary Indian nation.

Similarly, as a direct result of the same Hindu-Muslim riots that accompanied independence and generated "fears of destabilizing secessionist movements," Indian leaders felt compelled to give precedence to "the preservation of national unity" over states' rights. This fact is evidenced by the resultant Indian constitution that was "explicit in asserting the unity and primacy of the central government".[32] This central government's empowerment even prevented future secessionist threats by promoting participation *within* the framework of Indian federalism to accomplish regionally specific goals. For example, rather than continue to press for autonomy, the party that initially called for an autonomous state of "Dravidstan" in southern India decided

instead to focus on capturing a block of seats in the national Parliament to achieve its aims. In other words, party members chose to act from within and through India's federalist system.[33]

Thus, the partition not only dealt with two of India's cross-cutting religious cleavages, but it also promoted political stability by leading to a greater empowerment of the central government. Indeed, India has enjoyed relatively peaceful political relations and stability since then, whereas most of Nigeria's political instability both historically and today stems from its intense regional competition (often over resources), which might not exist had Nigeria similarly experienced partitions or secessions of particular regions. However, in Nigeria, partly due to unequal resource division, secession of any of the regions is highly unlikely. 1967 did see the *attempted* secession of Nigeria's Eastern Region, an attempt that "ballooned into a 30-month civil war…that caused more than two million Biafran deaths—mostly children".[34] This bloody conflict serves as further evidence of the instability and violence that is all too prevalent in Nigeria and of which ethno-regional competition is a direct cause.

Natural Resources: Paradoxically, Nigeria's heavy endowment with natural resources is the very reason secession, which is typically a very destabilizing event, is unlikely in Nigeria— yet, the existence of these natural resources is concurrently the chief source of its political instability. Nigeria is one of many in the ranks of those countries suffering from a "resource curse"— for Nigeria, it is primarily oil, referred to as "the curse of black gold".[35] Indeed, Nigeria possesses over six times the oil reserves that India possesses (U.S. EIA). In relative terms, Nigeria's sizeable oil resources are even more marked considering that India is over seven times as populous and over three and a half times as large geographically as Nigeria is.

Because India has never possessed a comparably abundant, coveted natural resource, its leaders have long been invested in its population being productive. Indeed, as Sil summarizes, "India's GDP growth has come from all sectors, ranging from agriculture and manufacturing to services and information technology".[36] Reliance on service sectors has also led the government to invest in its population's education, a trend not paralleled in Nigeria. Nigeria's leaders, on the other hand, have not needed to concern themselves with having a productive population. The result has been that strong relationships have not been promoted among leaders and the population at large because the population is often "bought off" using oil wealth in return for stability. Early Nigerian ruler Ibrahim Babangida, for example, was known for "buy[ing] off opposition…with state largesse and outright bribery," a practice that came to be known as "settlement" and that

became so ubiquitous as to be "turned into a national pastime by subsequent regimes".[37] Unsurprisingly, this practice of buying off opponents and disgruntled populations has led to instability in many cases when oil prices have fallen and oil wealth could not be used in such a way.

Despite abundant experience with domestic instability, Nigeria's leaders have not developed effective ways of dealing with restive populations and instead have resorted to—and continue to resort to—repression and violence.[38] Oil has been a further source of increased instability because oil resources are concentrated in the South. This further polarizes and reinforces ethno-regional identities and drives regional competition. Even though the natural resources that India possesses are also for the most part regionally concentrated (for example, its oil, natural gas, and uranium), this fact has not become a source of regional competition in India largely due to its strong central government that controls the allocation of its resources and the allocation of revenues from its resources.

Contrastingly, in Nigeria oil has contributed to unrest and instability revolving both around the high level of environmental destruction oil production creates and the way that the resulting revenue and resources are distributed. Often, this unrest arises among the smaller minority groups from whose land the oil is taken. Because of the structuring of Nigeria's diversity, with ethno-religious differences coinciding with regional boundaries, it is often the case that just one or a few tribes are affected by the oil extraction. These minority groups experience the worst ills of the associated environmental degradation but often share in little of the resultant economic rewards. One well-known example is the 1993 Ogoni uprising that led to the hanging by the Nigerian government of environmental activist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his colleagues. This minority group's uprising was precipitated by a combination of political marginalization by the government and environmental degradation by oil companies.[39] Similarly, there has been recent attention paid to the "ongoing political and social strife in Nigeria's delta region" revolving around the Royal Dutch Shell companies' oil extraction in the region.[40]

Political and Economic Policies: Each nation's political and economic policies undertaken upon decolonization have had lasting implications on their subsequent stabilities as well. Once independence was gained, India adopted a "third way" identity and mentality as Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India's first prime minister, set out to build the nation-state. This identity was nationalistic in character, celebrating India's identity as a leader of the non-aligned Third World in the Cold War.[41] India's essentially independent

foreign policy and "conscious efforts to balance elements of capitalism and socialism" provided Indians with "a sense of identity and pride within the international order during the years of the Cold War," a crucial period of India's national development.[42] Nehru's "third way" was also characterized by the state sector owning all heavy industry. Thus, unlike Nigeria, India's federalist system led to a strong center with control of the country's resources and, significantly, with the right to intervene in state affairs.[43]

Also significantly, Nehru's vision of the new Indian nation was characterized by secularism. Importantly, in the context of India, secularism implies opposition to communalism. As Sil writes, "Aside from the formal equality of all citizens before the law, secularism in India implies that politics should revolve around the interests of individuals rather than of groups identified by the communal ties of caste, region, or religion".[44] Thus, India's secularism has served to further deemphasize potentially divisive group identities in favor of more nationalistic principles centered on individuals.[viii] Also significant for the purposes of this paper, India's understanding of secularism has led to its institution of a "reservations" system, a formal system aimed at leveling the playing field for minorities and previously disadvantaged groups; Sil describes this system as "India's version of affirmative action".[45] This policy has thereby allowed India to accommodate in important ways its Muslim and other minority religious populations as well as members of its lowest castes. There is no comparable "reservations" system in Nigeria, for the protection or privileging of minority and disadvantaged groups, which perhaps partially explains the commonness of the extralegal actions taken by minority tribes (e.g., the aforementioned Ogoni uprising).

The particular importance of India's universal secularism becomes clearer when contrasted against Nigeria's legal framework. Within Nigeria, it is still a source of tension and confusion whether the state itself is secular or not,[46] and conflicts between secular and Shariah laws continue to create instability. Shariah law

was introduced to Nigeria's nine northern states in 2000 and 2001, and another three states have since instituted Shariah law for Muslims wishing to use them. Nigeria's other twenty-five states remain governed by secular law.[47] Indeed, these regionally differing legal systems are yet a further indication of the extreme primacy afforded to regionalism and of the lack of Nigerian national unity. They are also a source of instability, since the two law systems clash at times. This was observed quite recently, in July 2013, in a highly charged parliamentary debate over a constitutional amendment intended to set the age at which Nigerians can renounce their citizenship. This proposed amendment had wider implications because several Muslim representatives were concerned about conflicts with Shariah law, which decrees that a woman is of age when she gets married.[48] The debate sparked protests in the country due to its connection with child-marriage and age-of-consent laws—which have been a recurring source of tension, predating this particular parliamentary debate.[49]

In contrast, upon gaining independence Nigeria pursued a course that merely continued to build upon colonial legacies. Primordial identities and the dominance of local strong men were reinforced as regions retained and continue to retain their immense political power relative to the center. Nigeria has also retained its ethno-regional political parties and separate models of suffrage for the North and South. Even in its attempts to economically "minimize the vestiges of neocolonialism and the country's dependency" on foreign corporations through such measures as the Nigerian Indigenization Policy, the "most enduring consequence" of such policies has instead been "the politicization of Nigerian capitalism, in that one section of the country, the Yoruba, benefitted the most…and the worst hit were the Igbos." Furthermore, the mixed-economy policy only "became a conduit for capital accumulation by the political elite".[50] Thus, preexisting differences have merely been exacerbated by Nigeria's economic policies, which have layered socioeconomic disparities atop them.

As mentioned, Nigeria continues to lack

a strong central government, and acts made by the central government often generate discontent from significant proportions of the population. Hostility largely stems from mistrust of government leaders belonging to a different ethno-regional group, and this frequently lead to coups and violence. The persisting importance of ethno-regional parties is evidenced by the unofficial "zoning" agreement that has been adopted in Nigeria, providing for a rotation of the presidency every two terms between the North and the South. This practice demonstrates the "ethnic mistrust" embedded in Nigeria's pluralism that has "informed the need to assure every major group of a turn at the presidency and other top posts".[51] Today, local tribes are even more visible and active, especially in conflicts over oil (e.g., again, the aforementioned Ogoni uprising).

There has also been recurrent religious violence, including a sharp rise in Muslim extremism, which has been deeply troubling to national stability For example, over 500 people—mostly civilians—were massacred in March 2010, in the region that lay at the crossroads of Nigeria's Muslim north and predominantly Christian south. Sectarian violence in the region has killed thousands in the past decade.[52] The radical Muslim sect known as Boko Haram, an extremist group that represents Nigeria's biggest security threat and that is gaining in prominence, also recently bombed UN headquarters in Nigeria, in August 2011.[53] And, as recently as May 2013, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in a vast area of northeast Nigeria. He admitted in a nationally televised speech that "the nation had lost control of some villages and towns to extremist fighters," who had already killed more than 1,600 in the region in 2010 alone.[54] This speech was followed up less than a month later with thirteen more killings by Islamic extremists in the region.[55]

Final Thoughts: Applying the "East Asian Model" to India and Nigeria?

Recently, several East Asian countries have undergone rapid economic growth and have experienced remarkable political stability throughout the process. The achievements of these nations—most prominently the "Asian Tigers" of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong—have garnered attention, prompting discussion as to whether their practices may provide a generalizable model" that could be adopted and implemented by struggling developing nations elsewhere in the world.[ix] Notably, in the context of this paper, they have also experienced colonialism and are plagued by its common legacies—indeed, Singapore and Hong Kong even share with Nigeria and India a history of *British* colonization. (Alternatively,

Korea experienced Japanese colonization, and Taiwan had a number of colonizers, of which England was not one.) However, I assert that it is highly doubtful whether these nations could offer a model that could successfully be applied to Nigeria or India, given certain inherent features of these nations and certain structural features that now exist.

Firstly, the inherent and extreme diversity of Nigeria's and India's populations presents a potentially insurmountable obstacle to successfully implementing the East Asian model. Part of the reason the model—which is characterized by central planning under authoritarian rule—works well in East Asian countries is because it is functioning in a homogenous society, which makes trust of leaders less problematic and makes having unified goals (two essential prerequisites in order for this model to function) much easier. Furthermore, in India, which already has a functioning and relatively stable democracy based on coalition politics, one might question whether a move toward the East Asian model would even be an improvement. Rather, it seems regressive— at least from a traditional Western viewpoint— to move away from the current functioning democracy towards authoritarianism. Given India's diversity, coalition politics is both healthy and promotes stability. More authoritarian rule could be potentially destabilizing, leading certain groups to feel marginalized and minority voices to be overshadowed.

Nigeria, which shares with India the difficulties posed by heterogeneity in terms of its ability to effectively or constructively adopt the East Asian model, would have increased difficulty adopting this model because its diversity is organized regionally and is deeply competitive. This structure renders Nigeria's goals even less unified, and its overlapping cleavages further hinder trust of leaders.[x] Thus, while Nigeria could benefit from at least a slightly stronger central government (which adoption of the East Asian model would certainly provide) to ameliorate some of the problems that arise from its extreme regionalism, a lack of unified goals and a lack of trust would decrease the likelihood of the East Asian model's chances of success. It appears Nigeria must find a more uniquely tailored solution to its present economic and political shortcomings, lest its population continue to suffer the array of woes to which they continue to be too frequently subjected.[xi]