CONTRACEPTIVE COERCION: FAMILY PLANNING AND POPULATION POLICY IN NASSER-ERA EGYPT

MADELINE SMITH¹

INTRODUCTION

A woman's access to family planning methods and her ability to decide when she is ready to have children are important for both physical and mental well-being and benefits the future of her community, as healthy women are the bearers of the next generation. However, family planning programs of the Nasser regime in post-1952 Egypt – implemented during an era of intense restructuring and state-building following the end of British colonial rule – undermined reproductive freedom and transformed a seemingly individual matter into a concern of the state and foreign bodies as Egyptian and American officials sought to combat population growth. The coercion seen in these programs evoked criticism, suspicion, and opposition across the population as the regime, in conjunction with foreign organizations, embarked upon a vigorous program of social reform.

Throughout Nasser's regime, the family and the individual increasingly become the target of state interventions and reforms that sought to establish a new modernity. A chief concern of the regime was the nation's rapidly growing population due to high fertility and low infant mortality rates, which was seen as an issue of developing countries that placed Egypt at a disadvantage. The regime's commitment to social reform and the restructuring of a socialist nation placed population control at the forefront of Nasser's concerns, which led to the implementation of a vigorous family planning program in 1966, as stipulated by the 1962 *Charter for National Action*, a document outlining the emerging plan

¹ Madeline Smith is a freshman at the University of Pennsylvania, where she is pursuing a major in biology and a minor in Arabic and Islamic studies. Her research interests include women in Islamic society, global healthcare policy, and reproductive health.

for the formation of an Arab Socialist state.² Such efforts brought reproduction, fertility, and contraception into the public realm; women soon became objects of population policy and were given little platform to voice their opinion on, while family planning became a national concern and the use of birth control emerged as a duty of citizenship.

The Nasser-regime family planning program was met with avid support from many, including physicians, American non-governmental organizations, and of course, governmental figures concerned with ameliorating the perceived “backwardness” of Egyptian society. However, many conservative and religious groups argued that family planning should be an individual choice within the boundaries of marriage, but not one inspired by self-interest or promiscuity, with a chief complaint being that the state’s family planning initiatives were overly focused on distribution of contraception, rather than education of women and families.³ This article will begin by introducing the rise and development of aid programs in post-colonial Egypt and analyze the origins of family planning initiatives during the Nasser regime following the implementation of the 1962 Charter for National Action. In doing this, I will examine the role that foreign beneficiaries, namely American organizations such as the Ford Foundation’s Population Council, had in Egyptian state programs. Subsequent sections will discuss the reactions said campaigns caused across the country – in the form of suspicion and criticism – through the lense of social and religious stigma surrounding contraceptive use in Egypt. Finally, I will discuss the importance of women’s health as an individual endeavour that should be driven not by force or political duty, but by education and encouragement of women across socio-economic divides to seek services and make informed decisions free of coercion.

To support my argument, I draw from contemporary literature, as well as literature produced during the Nasser regime that reflects the opinions of both scholars and those who spoke out against state family planning programs. In addition, I incorporate demographic data on contraceptive use and population published by the United Nations and other sources in order to analyze the trends and effectiveness in family planning methods following the implementation of

² Bier, Laura. “”The Family Is a Factory”: Gender, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Reproduction in Postwar Egypt.” *Feminist Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 404-32.

³ Ali, Kamran Asdar, *Planning the Family In Egypt : New Bodies, New Selves*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002.

these programs.

THE NASSER REGIME AND THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF POPULATION POLICY

Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power on July 23, 1952, following a nearly bloodless military coup and overthrow of the monarchy. Though Egypt's status as a British protectorate was dissolved in 1922 following nearly forty years of British imperial rule, the British had maintained a strong grip over the Egyptian monarchy and continued to play a decisive role in Egyptian politics.⁴ Nasser and the "Free Officers" – armed with the goal of ruling for the people, rather than the wealthy elite – seized control of the government, forced the king to abdicate, and established a Republic for the first time in Egypt's history.

The Nasser regime can be conceptualized and separated into three distinct phases spanning his nineteen years in power. The first stage of the military regime, lasting from 1952-1956, operated with the intention of restructuring the government to create a mobilized, independent, and industrialized society.⁵ Following the abolition of the monarchy and establishment of the new Republic of Egypt, Nasser began to replace the traditional political elites with men of more specific trades, such as officers, engineers, economists, and technocrats. Along with this reassignment of power came new agrarian reforms that undermined the existing economic superiority of wealthy capitalists and redistributed land to small landowners. The second stage began in 1956, with Nasser's official appointment as President.⁶ This period coincided with the Suez Crisis, and thus political goals spanning these years were focused on economic planning and industrial reform. By the beginning of the third stage, beginning in 1961, the military regime had already nationalized most all banks, heavy industry, and insurance, while key economic processes were now state-owned.⁷ This created a program of centralized control, management, and ownership that placed the state machine at the center of every decision, rather than the people. With

⁴ Mansfield, Peter. *Nasser's Egypt*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965, 40.

⁵ Abdel-Malek, Anouar. *Egypt; Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change Under Nasser*. [1st American ed.] New York: Random House, 1968, iix-xi.

⁶ "Timeline: Egypt's 1952 revolution." *Gulf News*, United Arab Emirates: 24 July 2013. Infotrac Newsstand, Accessed 5 Dec. 2017.

⁷ Abdel-Malek, Anouar. *Egypt; Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change Under Nasser*. [1st American ed.] New York: Random House, 1968, xv.

rudimentary restructuring and financing taken care of, Nasser turned to focus his efforts on a new program of social reform whose main goal was to increase and support advancements already made in the nationalization of industry and power of the state. The third stage of the regime, spanning six years from 1961-1970, will be the focus of this paper, as it was during those years that the *Charter for National Action* – outlining a series of initiatives to form an Arab Socialist state, including family planning policies – was conceived, drafted, and put into motion.

On June 30th, 1962, Egypt's National Congress for Popular Powers approved President Nasser's *Charter for National Action*, introducing a new direction for national growth that was clearly outlined with specific methods and aims for achieving such goals.⁸ This doctrinal document was composed of ten chapters addressing topics including the necessity of revolution, true democracy, social reform, and foreign policy. Of these sections, eight dealt with domestic affairs and immediate problems facing Egyptian society. This confirms Nasser's priority of internal growth and expansion through economic, ideological, social, and political means, rather than through foreign policy. For the purposes of this analysis, I will focus on Section VII of the Charter, titled "Production and Society."

The seventh section of the Charter focuses on the means by which production and society interrelate, in which production includes agriculture, hydraulics, consumer-good industries, mining, and quarrying. Production emerged as the true test of dynamic Arab power; Nasser considered it the key to ending underdevelopment and national struggle, and used it to compare the nation's success to more industrialized states. However, the Charter states that the task of production is threatened immensely by population growth, which constitutes the "most dangerous obstacle" facing the Egyptian people in their drive towards raising the standard of production in an effective and efficient way.⁹ In order to overcome such an obstacle, Nasser stipulates methods of organizing the family along scientific lines in conjunction with increasing production:

While the attempts at family planning with aim of facing the problem of the increasing population, deserve the most sincere efforts supported by modern scientific methods, the need for the most rapid and efficient drive towards the increase of production necessitates that this problem should be taken into consideration in the process of production, regardless of the effects which may

⁸ The Revolution In Twelve Years, 1952-1964. Cairo: Information Dept., 1964, 12.

⁹ Nasser, Gamal Abdel, Draft of the Charter, May 21, 1962. [Cairo], 1962, 53.

result from the experiment of family planning.¹⁰

Though the above section only offers two brief phrases regarding family planning with rather indirect wording, it is the first governmental endorsement of contraception in Egyptian history.¹¹ While historically significant, the language of this section alters the perceived purpose of birth control. Rather than being a way to create healthy women and happy families, acting as a tool of female empowerment, birth control is identified as a way to combat population growth and benefit the prosperity of Egyptian industry. Essentially, the ability to control, or limit, the birth rate directly corresponds to the profitability of industry, agriculture, and the state's economy.

Chapter VII of the Charter also addresses the place of foreign aid in Egyptian social growth, and states that "foreign aid, regardless of source, is accepted in order of priority as follows: unconditional aid, unconditional loans, and finally, foreign investment for limited periods."¹² In this case, foreign aid was viewed as a sort of tax on countries with colonial pasts, as a way to compensate for past exploitation of peoples. This discussion will become relevant in later sections that address the place of foreign beneficiaries in family planning policy.

THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPANTS ON CONTRACEPTIVE POLICY AND DISTRIBUTION

The nature of population policy in Egyptian policy changed over the course of the early 20th century. At the time of draft of the charter, the population was increasing by nearly 2.5% annually – a significant increase over the 1.41% rate noted in the 1947 census.¹³ The first discussion of population policy occurred in the late 1920s; however, King Ahmed Fuad I blocked reforms that could be seen as reducing the country's large peasant population in favor of a pro-natalist policy. Again, in the 1930s and '40s, reformers in Egypt and abroad began to raise concern about the rapidly increasing population, though

¹⁰ Nasser, Gamal Abdel, Draft of the Charter, May 21, 1962. [Cairo], 1962, 53.

¹¹ Horton, Alan W. "The Charter for National Action of the UAR: A Résumé of the Complete Document." *Northeast Africa Series* 4, no. 5 (July 1962): 16.

¹² *Ibid.*, 15.

¹³ Bier, Laura. "'The Family Is a Factory': Gender, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Reproduction in Postwar Egypt." *Feminist Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 407.

this discussion manifested itself only in brief debates and did not inspire any policy change. After the Free Officers established the military regime in 1952, the state saw a large population as an indicator of military power.¹⁴ It was not until Nasser's presidency and subsequent implementation of social reform that any population policy was introduced.

The Nasser regime's new approach to population control was in part inspired by foreign bodies, notably American organizations. Following the end of World War II, U.S. policymakers began expressing their concern over the containment of communism and focusing on the economic and social atmospheres of countries in the Global South – especially those that had recently gained independence from European colonialism. The United States feared that rapidly growing populations in these countries would cause social, political, and economic destabilization of their developing post-colonial government that would leave these countries more susceptible to communist influence and disrupt the balance of power.¹⁵ This concern inspired the creation of many organizations, such as the International Planned Parenthood Foundation (IPPF), and the Population Council of the Ford Foundation.

The international organizations that operated in Egypt during the Nasser era fell into three categories: international donor agencies, such as the World Bank and United States Agency for International Development (USAID); private donors; and NGOs, such as the IPPF.¹⁶ NGOs held a particularly influential position in the realization of Nasser's family planning policy, since they provided technical information to educate government officials and direct services, such as access to contraception.

While NGO's in theory have the strategic advantage of being free from the interests or constraints of a particular governmental agency, it is important to acknowledge that discussions on their autonomy are often polarized, with some arguing their greatest advantage is their independence from national governments,¹⁷

¹⁴ Jain, Anrudh, ed. *Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico*. New York: The Population Council, 1998.

¹⁵ Bier, Laura. "'The Family Is a Factory': Gender, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Reproduction in Postwar Egypt." *Feminist Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 408.

¹⁶ Jain, Anrudh, ed. *Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico*. New York: The Population Council, 1998, 7.

¹⁷ Esman, Milton. *Management Dimensions of Development Perspectives and Strategies*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1991.

and others pointing to the concept that NGO's are "dependant on governments for funding, while governments have come to depend on these NGO's as 'delivery vehicles,'" ¹⁸ Though seemingly contradictory, these viewpoints both hold true. In the case of Egypt, the porosity of NGOs to multiple actors, including USAID, which funded many Egyptian NGO's and was launched in 1961 just prior to the initial discussion of state planning policy, offered the U.S. a global platform to intervene with population growth. ¹⁹ At the same time, it is important not to conflate the reach and interests of American NGO's and the U.S. government—it was rather that high ranking government officials and those in control of various foreign aid initiatives shared similar goals, as argued by Dr. Maha M. Abdelrahman in her discussion on the politics of NGOs in Egypt. ²⁰

Many of these NGOs were IPPF affiliates, such as the Egyptian Family Planning Association (EFPA). The EFPA initiated family planning efforts as early as 1961. However, it was not until 1966 that Egypt's National Family Planning Program was officially launched, signaling the creation of 1,991 clinics in governmental health bureaus, rural areas, and combined maternal-children's health centers. By 1968, the policy's operational base had grown to 2,631 clinics, which served over 230,000 women. ²¹ These clinics functioned through the Egyptian Ministry of Health, but received much of their funding from private donors, including the partnership between the Ford Foundation and the Population Council (PC). The Ford Foundation funded the PC through a series of grants and planted offices in Cairo that served to oversee the distribution of contraceptive devices and monitor programs. The Population Council, whose headquarters were located in New York, possessed the medical and demographic specialists necessary to advise the Ford Foundation in return. ²² This joint partnership funded a series of initiatives in Egypt throughout the 1950s, 60s,

¹⁸ Saxby, John. "Who Owns Private Aid Agencies?," in Sogge et al. *Compassion and Calculation. The Business of Private Foreign Aid*. Chicago: Pluto Press, 1996, 36.

¹⁹ Ben Néfissa, Sarah. *NGOs and Governance In the Arab World*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2005. 171

²⁰ Abdelrahman, Maha M. *Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs In Egypt*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2004.

²¹ H.K. Toppozada, "Progress and Problems of Family Planning in the United Arab Republic," *Demography* 5, no. 2 (1968): 592-94.

²² Baron, Beth. "The Origins of Family Planning: Aziza Hussein, American Experts, and the Egyptian State." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 42.

and 70s, which stressed the medical side of family planning and promoted research on new technologies, rather than the education of women and families.

During the first few years of family planning efforts, clinics focused on the distribution of oral contraceptives, diaphragms, and condoms, as opposed to injections or IUDs, which were still considered experimental. An early request to the Population Council from Egypt was for 12,000 diaphragms and 12,000 foam tablets in 1958.²³ However, American organizations and individuals, notably the PC's demographics director W. Parker Mauldin, began to push IUDs as "more modern," despite their developing credibility and tendency to cause bleeding and infection due to the insertion process. A decision to offer cash incentives to physicians who favored IUDs over other methods sparked a controversy amongst Egyptians and Americans alike. However, the system was approved and adopted in 1965, and IUDs continued to be the favored device amongst clinics.²⁴ IUDs provide passive contraception after an initial activation event, and can be effective for several years at a time. While they are the right choice for many, they eliminate the participation of the female subject when utilized under coercive conditions, such as those seen in government-run clinics where education was not the focal point. Even though women were not forced to get IUDs, I argue that a lack of knowledge, explanation, and discussion surrounding the clinics' distribution of IUDs at such high volumes indicates the contraceptive's coercive usage. On the other hand, pills, diaphragms, and condoms can be utilised at the discretion of the woman, thus giving her more autonomy over her own reproductive decisions. In addition, active forms of birth control can be stopped at any point (such as when a woman is ready to become fertile again). American organizations' extreme push for IUDs reflect their interest in halting population growth over the health and reproductive freedom of women.

SOCIETAL RESPONSE: CONTESTATION AND UNCERTAINTY

In this section, I discuss two distinct societal responses which are critical in analysing the Egyptian public's view of the family planning policy – one that comes from a more culturally traditional perspective, and one that comes from a

²³ Mauldin, W. Parker, PC Office Memorandum, "Family Planning Activities in Egypt," June 30, 1958

²⁴ Baron, Beth. "The Origins of Family Planning: Aziza Hussein, American Experts, and the Egyptian State." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 42.

feminist perspective. While a woman's fertility was viewed with social acceptance and respect in Egyptian culture, contraceptive use often incited fears of sterilization and was criticized for undermining the purpose of marriage in Islam, which is to create a nurturing family and raise children.²⁵ For many, childbirth is a celebrated event and reflects upon the health of both a woman and her marriage, and a successful pregnancy can fulfill a perceived feminine duty and continue a father's name. This opinion is reflected in the literature of Shaykh al-Azhar Muhammad Shaltout, a professor at al-Azhar University during the Nasser regime, who identified state sponsored family planning as "repugnant to the natural law of the universe, which is for growth."²⁶ Furthermore, in a predominately agrarian society where marriage was considered an economic necessity, children were an economic asset due to their ability to help with labor and care for their elders; thus, a large measure of the status of women was derived from her childbearing potential.²⁷ For couples who held this religious and cultural sentiment close to heart, birth control and Egypt's vigorous family planning programs would be at intense odds with their values.

On the other hand, many women saw the program as an attack on their autonomy and ability to make informed decisions regarding their fertility. While Egyptian feminist activist groups did not outwardly criticize the state's approach to population control, they emphasized the importance of education as an integral component of a family planning program, in contrast to the state's focus on distribution. The role of educating women was taken on by several female activist groups operating in Egypt, who, through the first few decades of the family planning policy sought to educate women and their partners in making informed decisions surrounding birth control. One of the most influential proponents of these programs was Aziza Hussein, an Egyptian diplomat and population expert. In 1966, she worked with Egyptian officials in developing the family planning policy and founded the Family Planning Association in 1967.²⁸

²⁵ Bier, Laura. "'The Family Is a Factory': Gender, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Reproduction in Postwar Egypt." *Feminist Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 424.

²⁶ Quoted in Badran, Margot. "Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt Laura Bier." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 10, no. 2 (2014): 134.

²⁷ El Hamamsy, Laila. "Belief Systems and Family Planning in Peasant Societies". SRC Reprint Series. 1958

²⁸ Talhami, Ghada. *Historical Dictionary of Women in the Middle East and North Africa*.

While Hussein and other women's organizations supported programs grounded in community building from a social angle, government officials stressed a medical approach that they saw as more effective in meeting their goals of state-building and modernization. Hussein was eager to collaborate with the state in order to create a private family planning program that would supplement the state's public programs, and merge the social and medical aspects of family planning.²⁹ Female reformers such as Hussein initially held an influential position in advocating birth control distribution and family planning policies, and shared goals of decreasing population growth through work with foreign beneficiaries; however, they were eventually overpowered by the state's intense focus on increasing distribution, rather than education and thus had little platform to voice their dissent with the trajectory of such programs. Also voicing a disappointment with the lack of educational initiatives was Soha Abdel Kader, who in the Report on the Status of Egyptian Women from 1900-1973 presented to the Ford Foundation in Cairo, argued that the program, conducted through 3,000 health facilities had "failed to communicate the concept of family planning in its broad sense to the public and has met with least success in the peasant communities."³⁰ This assessment further indicates the shared sentiment amongst educated females, who viewed regime's inability to successfully implement the program a result of its focus on having many facilities rather than advancing women's health and population control by education.

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: POPULATION THROUGHOUT THE 20TH CENTURY

While Egypt saw a temporary decrease in growth rate throughout the 60s, the population underwent a drastic and continuous increase from 1975-1990, reaching its peak at 3.1 percent in 1980.³¹ This pattern was likely the result of a less active family planning program throughout the 70s following the end of Nasser's presidency. After the October War of 1973, the government released an official population statement and 10 year plan; however, its objectives quickly fell

Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2012, 173, ProQuest Ebook Central.

²⁹ Baron, Beth. "The Origins of Family Planning: Aziza Hussein, American Experts, and the Egyptian State." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 42.

³⁰ Abdel Kader, Soha. *A Report On the Status of Egyptian Women, 1900-1973*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Social Research Center, 1973, 55.

³¹ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision*, DVD Edition

to the sidelines. The policy merely reiterated what had already been noted twenty years prior regarding the impending doom of an increasing population, and the plan placed several tasks ahead of demographic goals, including an increased standard of living, mechanization of agriculture and industry, and improving education.³² Without any clear objectives and a lack of commitment from officials, this program was not sustained or pursued in any vigorous fashion. In 1980, the Egyptian government released a second policy, the “National Strategy Framework for Population, Human Resource Development, and the Family Planning Program,” which outlined clear goals and numerical targets.³³ Reflecting on shortcomings of policies from previous decades, the plan put a greater emphasis on citizens’ freedom to participate in family planning. Population control became a paramount policy objective for many countries such as India and China in the 1990s, and, as a result, the United Nations coordinated an International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994. Following this conference of global leaders, Egypt created a consolidated Ministry of Health and Population,³⁴ which indicated the government’s increasing emphasis on population control among national interests.

In recent years, Egypt has seen a continuation of birth control usage amongst married couples, though the population growth rate continues to fluctuate without a clear or consistent decrease. Among a group of reproductive age women sampled from neighborhoods near family planning clinics, 93 percent expressed support for family planning measures, while only 40 percent were currently practicing contraception.^{35,36} From an international standpoint, the focus of UN Population Fund (UNFPA) projects in Egypt has shifted from family planning to a broader concept of reproductive health that includes the

³² Jain, Anrudh, ed. *Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico*. New York: The Population Council, 1998, 24.

³³ National Population Council. *Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS), 1992 preliminary report*. Cairo: 1993.

³⁴ Jain, Anrudh, ed. *Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico*. New York: The Population Council, 1998, 25.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

³⁶ According to a 2015 report published by the UN on trends in world contraceptive use, the world average rate of contraceptive use is 64%. Throughout the continent of Africa, this rate is 33% and in North America 75%.

needs and rights of youth, however, most field programs in Egypt continue to focus their efforts on family planning for married women alone. There have been some efforts by the UNFPA to address youth reproductive health featuring advocacy and education with the goal of raising awareness and encouraging dialogue.³⁷ Clear objectives and a willingness to educate and empower women are the most important factors in a successful state population policy. While government engagement is crucial for access to family planning, reproductive health should be a personal endeavour driven by educated and informed decisions; I argue that if family planning programs had emphasized education so that women were empowered to make decisions about their bodies and their families, these programs would have had the additional effect of recognizing women's equal citizenship. The battle over the country's population policy and future family planning programs – and, in turn a successful relationship between the Egyptian state and its female citizens – relies heavily on a strong, long-term commitment to recognizing and sustaining these factors.

CONCLUSION

The family planning programs implemented throughout the Nasser regime should have granted women a new role in Egyptian society as political bodies; by endorsing contraception as the chief form of population control, Egyptian officials inadvertently began to assert the fact that women held the autonomy to control and, in turn, remediate what was deemed the greatest threat to Egyptian industry and upward growth. Had the efforts of female reform groups – focused on the empowerment of women and their reproductive choices – been successful, a different future may have been possible. However, as I demonstrate, the program implemented by the state was not sufficiently grounded in social impact and community building, which undermined the state's goal of social growth and upward momentum. Although aimed at the realisation of prosperity and well-being of the people, the promises outlined in the charter and the goals of growth as a whole were beyond the scope of the regime's abilities and were left unaddressed. The understanding of reproductive freedom as an individual endeavour empowers women and allows them the autonomy to become active participants in their

³⁷ Khalil, Tawhida, Juliette Boog, and Rania Salem. "Addressing the Reproductive Health Needs and Rights of Young People since ICPD: The Contribution of UNFPA and IPPF, an Egypt Country Evaluation Report," 2003, 9.

own lives and society as a whole. Through this historical analysis, I show how reproduction can be seen as a matter of nation building as well as a means of participation and redefined citizenship. Unfortunately, in Egypt, reproduction was not considered through the lens of individual freedom and was instead a missed opportunity for the advancement of women in Nasser's Egyptian society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdel-Malek, Anouar. *Egypt; Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change Under Nasser*. [1st American ed.] New York: Random House, 1968.
- Abdel Kader, Soha. *A Report On the Status of Egyptian Women, 1900-1973*. Cairo: American University in Cairo, Social Research Center, 1973.
- Abdelrahman, Maha M. *Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs In Egypt*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2004.
- Ali, Kamran Asdar, *Planning the Family In Egypt: New Bodies, New Selves*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002.
- Badran, Margot. "Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 10, no. 2 (2014): 152-55.
- Baron, Beth. "The Origins of Family Planning: Aziza Hussein, American Experts, and the Egyptian State." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2008).
- Ben Néfissa, Sarah. *NGOs and Governance In the Arab World*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2005.
- Bier, Laura. "'The Family Is a Factory': Gender, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Reproduction in Postwar Egypt." *Feminist Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 404-32.
- El Hamamsy, Laila. "Belief Systems and Family Planning in Peasant Societies". SRC Reprint Series. 1958.
- Esman, Milton. *Management Dimensions of Development Perspectives and Strategies*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1991.
- H.K. Toppozada, "Progress and Problems of Family Planning in the United Arab

Republic,” *Demography* 5, no. 2 (1968): 592-94.

Horton, Alan W. “The Charter for National Action of the UAR: A Résumé of the Complete Document.” *Northeast Africa Series* 4, no. 5 (July 1962). <http://www.icwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AWH-5.pdf>.

Jain, Anrudh, ed. *Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico*. New York: The Population Council, 1998.

Jankowski, James P. *Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

Kaufman, Joan. “Measuring Reproductive Health: From Contraceptive Prevalence to Human Development Indicators.” In *Reproductive Health and Human Rights: The Way Forward*, edited by Reichenbach Laura and Roseman Mindy Jane,. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.

Khalil, Tawhida, Juliette Boog, and Rania Salem. “Addressing the Reproductive Health Needs and Rights of Young People since ICPD: The Contribution of UNFPA and IPPF, an Egypt Country Evaluation Report,” 2003.

Khattab, Hind A. S., Nabil Younis, and Huda Zurayk. *Women, Reproduction, and Health In Rural Egypt: The Giza Study*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999.

Mansfield, Peter, *Nasser’s Egypt*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965.

Mauldin, W. Parker, PC Office Memorandum, “Family Planning Activities in Egypt,” June 30, 1958.

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, *Draft of the Charter*, May 21, 1962. Cairo: 1962.

National Population Council. “Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS), 1992 Preliminary Report” Cairo: 1993

- Saxby, John. "Who Owns Private Aid Agencies?", in Sogge et al. *Compassion and Calculation. The Business of Private Foreign Aid*. Chicago: Pluto Press, 1996.
- Singh, Jyoti Shankar, *Creating a New Consensus On Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, Reproductive Rights, and Women's Empowerment*. 2nd ed. London: Earthscan, 2009.
- Tignor, Robert L., *Egypt : A Short History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. Accessed December 2, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central.
- "Timeline: Egypt's 1952 revolution." *Gulf News*, United Arab Emirates: 24 July 2013. Infotrac. Accessed 5 Dec. 2017.
- The Revolution In Twelve Years, 1952-1964*. Cairo: Information Dept., 1964.
- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. "Trends in Contraceptive Use Worldwide 2015," 2015.
- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision*, DVD Edition.