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Contents

Bridging the Gap – Towards a Transatlantic Approach to Reducing Inequality: A Policy Proposal <i>Sergio Mukherjee, University of Pennsylvania and Håvard Sandvik, Liberal Group, Norwegian Parliament</i>	4
How to Win Friends and Influence Institutions: Quantifying China's Influence on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization <i>Abigail C. Grace, Georgetown University</i>	16
Lasting and Expanding: An Analysis of the Islamic State's Incentive System <i>Isabelle Canaan, University of Oxford</i>	50
Child Care Policy and Female Labor Force Participation: A Comparison of Germany and Sweden <i>Analia Cuevas-Ferreras, Yale University</i>	101
The ASEAN Experience, Northeast Asia and Beyond: Free Trade and Economic Integration <i>Tan Aik Seng, National University of Singapore</i>	120
The Influence of Numbers and the Number of Influences: The Role of Female Quotas and Female Activism in Passing Gender-Based Violence Legislation in Sub-Saharan Africa <i>Gina Starfield, University of Oxford</i>	147
Advertisements	191

BRIDGING THE GAP – TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC APPROACH TO REDUCING INEQUALITY: A POLICY PROPOSAL

SERGIO MUKHERJEE AND HÅVARD SANDVIK¹

INTRODUCTION

We met Scott and Kerstin on different sides of the Atlantic. I met the former in Philadelphia on my way to a convenience store in the early hours of a busy morning when my work schedule benefited from a short coffee break. Håvard met Kerstin in Mannheim (Germany) at a local fast-food joint in the *Hauptbahnhof* of what was once a vibrant industrial town.

More than just worrying figures, the growing gap between those with high and low income speaks to the worrying realities of a sizeable and steadily increasing number of individuals who live in the shadows of rich societies. Although Scott and Kerstin are separated by an ocean, their daily struggles are strikingly similar and capture the human dimension of an issue policy makers in both North America and Europe can no longer ignore.

We argue that greater actions to make growth more inclusive ought to be part of a joint effort that addresses global and local inequalities. Development may certainly benefit from economic growth, but seeing growth as the ultimate goal in a developmental project² can easily miss the point that many rapidly

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² For a detailed discussion on this point, see Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen (2013) *An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions*. Or Sen's recent debates on the issue with economist Jagdish Bhagwati, as

growing countries in the last decades have not managed to reduce deep social inequalities and deprivations that confine citizens to vulnerable lives.³ Any starting point for discussions on inequality, growth, or development should not conflate the latter two.

Part of the problem is that an exclusive focus on growth, defined as the increase in a country's productive capacity by comparing the monetary value of the goods and services produced by a country (GDP) within two successive periods of time, overlooks the potential inequality of distribution and access to important social services, such as adequate schooling and healthcare. While it is true that the nature and extent of poverty and inequality vary across the world, both relative and extreme poverty restrict people to operate at the margins of society. As a result, people not only have limited access to resources but also become more prone to poor health, indebtedness, educational disadvantages, inadequate housing, and crime as shown by extensive empirical studies.⁴

Despite the overall wealth⁵ of the European Union (EU), socio-economic vulnerability within several member states is still at a relatively high level with nearly 1 in 7 people at risk of poverty. The figures are even higher for certain demographics such as children and the elderly.⁶ In the US, the number of poor people recently reached 46.2 million – a record-high, amounting to 15% of the population. In addition, 4 out of 5 Americans struggle with joblessness or rely on welfare for at least part of their lives, and to make matters worse, the income gap in the country between the richest 1% of Americans and the other 99% widened to a record figure last year⁷—such numbers give an elusive flavor to the American

well as earlier works such as *Growth Economics* (1970), published by Penguin.

³ Examples include developing and developed countries, such as India, South Africa, Israel, Romania, Bulgaria, US, UK etc.

⁴ The very consequences of growing income inequality may not be as straight-forward as one would think. Surveying part of a vast literature, we find ample empirical evidence to support the negative impact that income inequality has on life satisfaction (Hirschman and Rothschild 1973, Senik 2006, Alesina et al 2004, Schwarze and Harpfer 2007) as well as a significant effect on homicide and robbery (Fajnzylber et al. 2002), trust and civic cooperation Knack and Keefer (1997), probability of not enrolling in college (Acemoglu and Pischke 2001), indebtedness (Rajan 2010).

⁵ If seen as a single country, the EU would constitute the second largest economy in the world in nominal terms and PPP (purchasing power parity) with a GDP of approximately 16 trillion Euros in 2016.

⁶ EAPN: Poverty and Inequality in the European Union <<http://www.poverty.org.uk/summary/eapn.shtml>>

⁷ See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman (2016), "Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol 131(2), pages 519-

dream.

Among wealthier states, inequality first started to significantly increase in the late 1970s and early 1980s, notably in the United Kingdom and the United States. The 2000s witnessed a widening gap between rich and poor, not only in high-inequality countries such as the United States, but also in historically low-inequality countries, such as Germany, Denmark, and Sweden.⁸ Globally, by 2011, the richest 20 percent of the world's population controlled 80 percent of global income.⁹ Even if not every country is growing increasingly unequal, the point is that enough of them are, including developing regions, the US and parts of Europe. The sheer scale of deprivation and vulnerability that afflicts so many people is enough to warrant a serious and well-coordinated agenda to combat this issue. Rhetorically, the impetus seems to be there as articulated by President Obama last year: "The United States will join with our allies to eradicate such extreme poverty in the next two decades."¹⁰ At present, however, there are still plenty of gaps, including those between collective coordination between official intention and concrete action.

THE RISKS OF OMISSION AND THE TRADE-OFFS OF TRADE

By failing to ensure that economic growth is an inclusive process that embraces both the advantaged and the disadvantaged in society, the threat to stability, social cohesion, and progress will continue to loom large both for transatlantic partners and the world at large. Evidence pointing to higher incidence of violent crimes in more unequal societies and the higher rate of emotional and physical violence experienced by children living in more unequal places are just two examples of several dimensions that limit social stability.

578. For a less technical overview, see "US income inequality at record high" BBC News (September 10, 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24039202> as well as Emanuel Saez (2013) *Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States* (Updated with 2012 preliminary estimates). UC Berkeley


⁸ OECD (2008): Growing unequal? Income distribution and poverty in OECD countries, OECD, Paris

⁹ Mark Furness and Mario Negre (2012) Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Briefing Paper 14/2012 «Can the EU confront inequality in developing countries?» p. 1

¹⁰ President Obama, 2013 State of the Union Address.

Figure 1:

Children Experience More Conflict in More Unequal Societies




11, 13 & 15 yr olds fighting, bullying, and finding peers not kind & helpful

Wilkinson & Pickett, *The Spirit Level* (2009)

www.equalitytrust.org.uk

Figure 2:

Homicide Rates are Higher in More Unequal Rich Countries




Source: Wilkinson & Pickett, *The Spirit Level* (2009)

www.equalitytrust.org.uk

Among countries that until recently were set to play a pivotal role in the global economy, we notice vast and persistent inequalities (see figure 3). Skewed income distribution coupled with shaky social foundations (See figures 1-2) stand in the way of sustained economic progress and the immediate stability of the social terrain in which millions attempt to live meaningful lives.

Figure 3:



INEQUALITY AND THE 21ST CENTURY

The final decade of the 20th century and the first of the 21st were shaped by an initial enthusiasm for multilateral removal of trade barriers followed by the eventual disillusionment with the Doha round of negotiations in the WTO. In parallel, the past decade has offered a strategic re-think of development aid in Europe, as the emergence of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the stagnation of less trade-oriented countries seemed to uphold the Washington consensus.¹¹ The challenge seemed no longer how to equitably distribute the benefits of resources, but to further remove the obstacles that ensure the kind of unbridled growth so celebrated, at least initially, in places like India and China. The debate in South Africa confirmed this attitude when much praise was directed at Finance Minister Trevor Manuel for ensuring macroeco-

¹¹ Jim O'Neill (2011), *The Growth Map: Economic opportunity in the BRICs and beyond*, New York: Portfolio/Penguin.

nomic stability at the expense of increasing inequality.

In this context, the two leading mantras, *aid* and *trade*, were posited in diametrically opposite corners with no space for confluence. In the process, Europe's own past successes, including the development of one of the most inclusive growth projects the world has ever seen, were forgotten in favor of a developmental policy that increasingly rested on the notion that trade, if left unfettered, would solve all challenges and level the playing field. Not surprisingly, in the EU's "Agenda for Change", inequality is only mentioned once, and even then, in the context of trade.¹² Even the EU aid commissioner had been forced to take a backseat to the Trade Commissioner in view of the latter's renewed commitment to the benefits of growth through trade.

Globally too, the fields are far from leveled, including in places like India that embraced economic liberalization in the early 90s and prided itself for being until recent times the fastest growing democracy in the world. As Nobel laureate, Amartya Sen, and Jean Drèze remind us, while India today might be staggeringly wealthier in a GDP per capita outlook than twenty years ago, it still lags behind in many social indicators in when compared to its South Asian neighbors.¹³ The same can be said of the development in South Africa. China, on the other hand, has focused to some extent on inequality-redressing-focused policies, as has Brazil over the past ten years. The results have been a steadily expanding middle class in both countries, reduced inequalities, and lessons for the rest of the world, including the transatlantic partners to which we now turn.¹⁴

LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH

Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are commonly associated with Latin America. In the Brazilian case, they started at the municipal level while the first large-scale program (known as *Oportunidades*¹⁵) took place in Mexico. At their core, CCTs' goals include the reduction of poverty and inequality by combining monetary benefits with incentives for inoculation and education while restricting child labor. Since its establishment 10 years ago, Brazil's *Bolsa Familia* (family grant) program

¹² Mark Furness and Mario Negre (2012) Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Briefing Paper 14/2012 «Can the EU confront inequality in developing countries?» p. 2

¹³ See Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (Nov. 14th, 2011) «Putting Growth in Its Place» Outlook Magazine.

¹⁴ Benedicte Bull (2013) «Bistand, likhet og nyliberal dårskap» in *Morgenbladet* (24 October 2013)

¹⁵ Its predecessor, Progressa, was created in 1997.

is credited for reducing by 15% the country's notoriously high income inequality and for lowering the percentage of those living in extreme poverty from 8% in 2001 to 4.7% in 2011.¹⁶

While cash provides instant economic relief, the built-in conditionalities advance medium to long term social investments in human capital aimed at helping families transcend cycles of poverty in through intergenerational social mobility. Latin America's innovation,¹⁷ moving from unconditional cash transfers to conditional ones serves as an example to developed and developing countries alike. What started locally has since spread to different parts of the world, including New York City. CCTs' appeal is based on a track record of success that includes their relative low cost and the general reliability of transfer. Brazil's *Bolsa Familia*, the largest CCT to date of its kind, costs less than 0.5% of GDP. Critics and criticisms exist including an alleged rural bias since urban setting present a host of additional challenges (including higher rates of crime) that goes beyond the existential needs that the program manages to address in the countryside. Far from being a magic bullet, CCTs are in our view a welcome, and improvable, step in the direction of social protection and inclusion. They are also proof that policy innovations can be exported and implemented in different contexts where individuals suffer from similar structural challenges. We thus believe that transatlantic partners can draw inspiration from the model to foster a new kind of social contract within their own societies to better address inequality during a period in which more traditional forms of aid are contested.

DOES AID NEED HELP?

Within Europe, development aid has suffered a major blow as a result of the global economic crisis. In some countries, such as Greece, aid was reduced by 17 % from 2011 to 2012.¹⁸ For major donors such as France, national aid budgets have also been slashed. EU member states might remain the largest donor group in the world, but their input is diminishing and being re-directed towards the promotion of growth in GDP per capita rather than in reducing inequality.


¹⁶ Add reference of new book on Bolsa Familia

¹⁷ While Brazil has done much to address the evil of inequality, it is worth noting that socio-economic challenges still remain that were subject of recent manifestations across the country.

¹⁸ OECD (2011) "Aid to poor countries slips further as governments tighten budgets" <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbudgets.htm>

Solidarity, once a hallmark of European progressiveness, has been put to a test as bailouts and generous loans have made headlines in most net-giver countries. In addition, one witnesses a growing dismissal of traditional development aid across the region. In Germany, Angela Merkel's has in her second term already restructured development funds and directed them towards growth, benefiting German companies in the process.¹⁹ Meanwhile, inequality in the country has been on the rise in the last 10 years²⁰.

Figure 4:



In neighboring Netherlands, the Ministry of Trade recently merged with that the Ministry of Development on the basis that they “should seize the opportunity to let aid encourage much larger private investment and trade activities that benefit both people and the environment, create jobs and transfer knowledge and skills.” The change in Dutch discourse reflects a more general disillusionment with traditional development aid. Nevertheless, over-emphasizing the role of the market, as Minister Ploumen risks, might translate into growth at the cost of higher inequality. The European model of the past, including the liberal Dutch approach of Minister

¹⁹ Peter Carstens (2013), Herkules und die Hirse-Schüsseln“ on FAZ.net <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/entwicklungspolitik-herkules-und-die-hirse-schuesseln-12223838.html>

²⁰ Germany's Gini coefficient has gone from 0.25 in the year 2000 to 0.29 by 2010. For further details see: IW - Inequality Watch (2013) *The Evolution of Income Inequalities in Germany*.

Ploumen's own party, had been key to ensuring intergenerational social mobility. This is the model we believe the Netherlands and the EU more generally could do well to underscore at home and collaboratively export to countries abroad.

THE ROAD FORWARD

As Europe and North America continue to shape a multipolar economic world, the need for stability and inclusion is ever present. Their lack of a concerted effort combined with a conceptual inertia that thus far has failed to prioritize distribution at the expense of growth has marginalized the issue of inequality away from the transatlantic radar screen. If transatlanticism is to live up to its promise of shaping the 21st century as much as it has the 20th, governments and multilateral organizations must take an approach to both local and global inequality that is mindful of the risks of neglecting this issue.

In addition, by pursuing a coordinated developmental agenda that expands their attention from continuous growth to both poverty and inequality reduction, North America and Europe can benefit from the individual strengths of each continent's approach to official development aid (ODA) as well as from successful programs world-wide, as the Brazilian case described above. More specifically, USAID's strong global record of working with grassroots organizations and establishing long-term ties with local actors could help European initiatives to address inequality and poverty-reduction from the bottom-up. At the same time, the efficient coordination of development policy, which we see at the EU level, could be a model for a stronger transatlantic cooperation. Before this step, however, a transatlantic declaration, similar to the Paris declaration by EU members on development aid could help define a common set of development priorities that go beyond President Obama's well intentioned vision. Ultimately, it is by working together that both sides of the Atlantic will bridge local, as well as global, socio-economic gaps.

As we await newer policies, Scott and Kerstin remind us that delays have real impacts. "At least I got these jobs, you know?" Scott says with a sigh of relief. "It could be worse."

But it should be much better.

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HOW TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE INSTITUTIONS: QUANTIFYING CHINA'S INFLUENCE ON THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

ABIGAIL GRACE¹

INTRODUCTION

Following the People's Republic of China's "Reform and Opening Up" (*gaige kai-fang*) ushered in by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China's participation in international organizations has dramatically increased.² These organizations cover a range of issues, and include institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank. However, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a notable departure from these aforementioned institutions. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in June 2001 by the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.³ The SCO, created and led solely by Asian countries, is the first case in which the PRC has independently developed a multilateral organization.

Though China's active participation in this organization is apparent given the PRC's emphasis on the organization in its biennial defense strategies, how Chinese foreign policy priorities affect the policies of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has yet to be fully explored. Given the PRC's historical tendency to

¹ Abigail Grace wrote this paper as a Senior at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service while majoring in International Politics: Security Studies. This piece was written to fulfill the Asian Studies Certificate's thesis requirement.

² Ann Kent, "China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations." *Global Governance* 8, no. 3 (2002): 343-64.

³ Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Shanghai, China. 2001.

eschew foreign involvement in domestic security matters, China's decision to enlist the support of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to combat domestic terrorism within Xinjiang (China's westernmost territory which borders other SCO member states) raises interesting questions about how China views the SCO in comparison to other Asian regional multilateral security organizations. Based on a quantitative analysis of official Chinese Defense White Papers and counterterrorism treaties ratified by the SCO and ASEAN+1, it is clear that Chinese foreign policy objectives ultimately drive the SCO's policy goals.⁴ Contrary to the claims of equality among states within the SCO, the following findings indicate that Chinese foreign policy objectives play a large role in how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization frames controversial issues such as regional prosperity and cooperation, domestic terrorism within the PRC, and shared regional challenges.

Establishing that the PRC has an outsized influence on the SCO's policy objectives is critical for two primary reasons. First, if China does drive the SCO's priorities, then it is fundamentally violating its own, self-constructed goal of "cooperation...and seeking consensus instead of imposing one's own will on others," outlined concurrently with the SCO's establishment in the White Paper *China's National Defense in 2000*.⁵ Given that the SCO is primarily comprised of states that have only gained independence within the past 25 years, a China-driven agenda would eliminate key venues for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to advance their own respective policy objectives. Secondly, the SCO likely represents a model for future Chinese-led multilateral organization. Given the recent establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the SCO's recent proposals on cyber-sovereignty to the United Nations, it is increasingly likely that the PRC will use similar platforms when engaging with the international community in the coming years. Quantifying the degree to which the SCO is a tool of Chinese foreign policy will have telling implications for future Chinese multilateral engagement not just with Central Asia, but with the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

⁴ At times, ASEAN+1 can refer to dialogue between ASEAN and either China, India, South Korea, or Japan. However, all references to ASEAN+1 in this piece solely refer to ASEAN/China dialogue.

⁵ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2000*, Beijing, China. 2000.

Methodologically, this paper utilizes a frequency analysis of ten key phrases. Each of these phrases not only has strictly definitional meanings (e.g. peace, harmony, terrorism) but also carries policy connotations. For example, when CCP officials refer to harmony they are not only implying that the region has an absence of direct conflict, but also invoking traditional Confucian ideas on the international order.⁶ Phrases included in this analysis were directly selected from a review of official Chinese Defense White Papers. Chinese Defense White Papers are published by the State Council Information Office, and their content is overseen by the Central Military Commission, the Ministry of National Defense, and the State Council. These White Papers are regarded to be the most authoritative sources of Chinese defense policy.⁷ The implication of this quantitative analysis is that when regional multilateral organizations such as ASEAN+1 and the SCO choose to employ one of these ten phrases, they are accepting the Chinese connotations associated with the phrase in addition to the base definition of the word itself. Following the quantitative results, which demonstrate that SCO documents have dramatically higher rates of identified key phrases, a qualitative review of corresponding passages is employed to support the initial findings.

This analysis overwhelmingly supports the hypothesis that Chinese foreign policy objectives shape official SCO doctrine far more than ASEAN+1 doctrine. Key phrases such as good neighbor (睦邻, *mulin*), harmony (和谐, *hexie*), and separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*), occur at dramatically higher rates in SCO treaties than in ASEAN+1 treaties, despite the fact that the selected documents were written within months of one another and address relatively similar objectives. Further qualitative analysis reveals that these phrases are associated with politically sensitive topics, such as countering Western influence in Asia, collective regional security, and domestic separatism within the PRC—thus incentivizing China to frame these issues in a way that is favorable to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The SCO's decision to utilize nearly identical language to official PRC defense white papers clearly demonstrates that CCP foreign policy objectives play an outsized role in determining SCO priorities. Therefore, it is apparent that the PRC is able to leverage its influence on the SCO to ensure that sensitive issues

⁶ Gilbert Rozman, "Invocations of Chinese Traditions in International Relations." *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 17, no. 1, (2012): 111-24.

⁷ Caitlin Campbell, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. "Highlights from China's New Defense White Paper, 'China's Military Strategy.'" Washington, DC. 2015.

are framed in line with CCP objectives.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The PRC has pursued multiple strategies for global engagement since the state's initial founding in 1949. Maoist China, characterized by isolationism and its relative pariah status within the international community, rarely engaged with foreign powers. This provided a critical window of opportunity for the United States to develop alliances with states throughout the Pacific, and for the original founding states of ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) to form a collective security organization in part based on resisting communism's spread.⁸ Throughout China's isolationist period and Deng Xiaoping's tenure, present-day Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were still governed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Therefore, the United States and other Western nations were able to exert little, if any, substantive influence on the region.

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, newly independent Central Asian states had not yet been brought into the West's sphere of influence. This provided the PRC with a window of opportunity to engage with the region prior to the entry of any other geo-political power. In April of 1996, the Shanghai Five was founded by the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Tajikistan to demilitarize and clearly delineate borders within Central Asia. This initial multilateral engagement represented a crucial first step for the PRC to engage meaningfully with its newly formed neighbors. Due to the relative success of the Shanghai Five, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was subsequently founded in June 2001 by members of the Shanghai Five and the Republic of Uzbekistan.⁹ The SCO is unique in that the relatively recent emergence of a distinct

⁸ For information on US maritime dominance in the Pacific, see: George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. For information a general overview of ASEAN and the ARF, see: Alice D. Ba, "China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-century Asia." *Asian Survey* **43**, no. 4 (July/August 2003): 622-47.; also, Hiro Katsuma, *ASEAN's Cooperative Security Enterprise: Norms and Interests in the ASEAN Regional Forum*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

⁹ Shanghai Five. *Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions*. Shanghai, China.

Central Asian political region allowed post-reform China to shape the structure of the SCO in a way that inherently favors a Chinese view of international organizations. This view is best exhibited by the PRC's *New Security Concept*, a 2002 document outlining China's vision of regional and international security in the 21st century. The *New Security Concept* is rooted in five key tenets which state that states should:

- 1) Cooperate on the basis on the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, and other widely accepted norms.
- 2) Resolve territorial disputes through peaceful negotiation.
- 3) Reform and improve existing international economic and international financial institutions for mutual benefit and common development.
- 4) Place emphasis on non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and transnational crime. Oppose foreign invasion and safeguard territorial integrity.
- 5) Promote disarmament, the elimination of WMD, and adhere to non-proliferation standards.¹⁰

Significant academic debate surrounds China's relative influence within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In part, this debate stems from the fact that the charter of the SCO emphasizes equality among member states regardless of the relative power of the state in question.¹¹

ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. ASEAN's initial key objectives were to resist the spread of communism and accelerate economic growth among member countries. The remaining member states: Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia ascended between 1984 and 1999 as the Cold War thawed. In sharp contrast with the SCO, ASEAN's organizational framework was in place decades before all member states reinstituted diplomatic relations with the PRC. Therefore, though the SCO and ASEAN have relatively similar aims of regional security cooperation and economic

1996. Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Shanghai, China. 2001.

¹⁰ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept*, Beijing, China. 2002.

¹¹ Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Shanghai, China. 2001.

empowerment, the creation of rules of engagement prior to instating diplomatic ties with the PRC and absence of a hegemon within ASEAN create a notably different dynamic between the two regional organizations. ASEAN's nearly fifty-year history has enabled the organization to build relatively robust institutions capable of translating ministerial-level decisions to operational action. Additionally, ASEAN's historic ties with the West also provide an interesting point of comparison. From ASEAN's founding until the early 1990s, ASEAN member states enjoyed the support of America's military to protect its territorial claims and aid its suppression of internal communist factions. However, with the end of the Cold War, American military aid to organizations such as ASEAN decreased, creating a relative power vacuum within the region.¹² With this shift, China-ASEAN relations have grown; in fact, China's active participation in Sino-ASEAN bilateral dialogues and the ASEAN Regional Forum (a regional dialogue that includes ASEAN nations as well as China, the United States, Japan, and South Korea, among others) has closely mirrored its rate of overall engagement levels with other international organizations.¹³ By 1991, all ASEAN nations had normalized relations with China, thus laying the groundwork for the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum and additional ASEAN+1 engagement. As such, ASEAN+1 treaties and documents have been selected as a comparative case to analyze the PRC's influence on the SCO.

CURRENT POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Today, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN are at relatively divergent points within their organizational life-cycle. The SCO is undoubtedly on a trajectory of organizational growth, adding India and Pakistan as member states in June 2016. With this expansion of their mandate, the organization is now better positioned to address the severe economic needs of relatively resource-rich but industrially under-developed member states, such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Since its founding, the SCO has been characterized by the stark dividing line between SCO states with regional hegemon aspirations, such as

¹² Alice D. Ba, "China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-century Asia." *Asian Survey* 43, no. 4 (July/August 2003): 622-47.

¹³ Ann Kent, "China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations." *Global Governance* 8, no. 3 (2002): 343-64.

China and Russia, and smaller member states such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that do not have the political or economic capital to substantively alter the relatively stagnant post-Soviet geo-political landscape of Central Asia. In contrast to multilateral organizations such as ASEAN that also seek to strengthen member states' domestic institutions, SCO treaties and agreements remain focused on either promoting broad-based regional economic growth or collective action against non-state actor security risks, such as transnational terrorist threats. However, there is still much room for institutional diversification and strengthening, and the expansion of operational-level initiatives. Though the SCO will host international cultural symposiums and annual ministerial-level meetings, there is little evidence of organizational initiatives tricking down to an operational level and altering the status quo within any member states' domestic operating procedures.

In contrast, no clear regional hegemon exists among the ASEAN member states. Though industrialization and economic modernization in Southeast Asia has been well underway throughout the organization's existence, as time has progressed, ASEAN has attempted to remain relevant and serve as a conduit to foster agreement on relatively complex economic and political issues. ASEAN member states have diligently worked to adopt policies encouraging regional integration, such as a free trade zone among all member countries. Additionally, the organization has sought to diversify the range of issues addressed by ASEAN, devoting resources to distinct initiatives designed to improve regional human rights, humanitarian assistance, and raise the standard of living for all individuals residing in ASEAN member states.¹⁴ Undoubtedly, ASEAN's long-standing institutional history, demonstrated capacity to address regional issues, and relative success integrating Southeast Asia's economy has enabled the organization to grow and diversify. Despite this relative organizational success, Southeast Asian member countries are facing notable geopolitical challenges. China's increased bellicose action in the South China Sea, Cambodia's continued advocacy for Chinese positions within ASEAN internal discussions, and Duterte's recent ascension to the Philippine's presidency have contributed to international speculation of factionalism emerging within the region. Some have begun to question if ASEAN's nearly fifty-year history of successful multilateral engagement is threatened by an increasingly assertive China. Though the PRC is in no means an official member of ASEAN, its inter-

¹⁴ Association of Southeast Asian Nations. *ASEAN Community 2016 Fact Sheet*. Jakarta, Indonesia. 2016.

ests and policies remain a large shadow over the comparatively smaller ASEAN states.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The People's Republic of China's Regional Security Objectives

Through a review of China's stated regional security goals and previous scholarly analyses of China's influence on the SCO and ASEAN, a greater understanding of the PRC's influence on the SCO can be gained.

In order to ascertain whether or not the PRC is successfully influencing the SCO to adopt policy positions favorable to China, it is important to understand what China's regional security objectives are. China's regional security goals are well documented throughout its biennial white papers issued under the title *China's National Defense*. A cursory review of the papers issued from 2000 to 2015 reveal five key reappearing policy priorities relevant to an analysis of regional multilateral security organizations.¹⁵ This analysis will focus on these five regional security objectives that appear within SCO and ASEAN+1 treaties and documents:

1. Maintaining regional stability within Asia
2. Championing the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"
3. Countering Western influence within the region
4. Obtaining "regional hegemon" status, especially in the maritime arena
5. Eliminating separatism, extremism, and terrorism within China's borders

Maintaining regional stability within Asia is undoubtedly a key priority of the PRC. In the latest white paper, PRC officials write that, "a prosperous and stable world would provide China with opportunities," underscoring the country's commitment to collective development among regional partners.¹⁶ Additionally, China pledges adherence to the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" in ev-

¹⁵ See *China's National Defense in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2015*. cited throughout this work.

¹⁶ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2015*, Beijing, China. 2015.

ery defense strategy issued from 2000 to 2010, and alludes to it in the 2015 strategy. These principles champion non-interference on all levels—internal matters, issues of sovereignty, and territorial integrity.¹⁷

China's commitment to countering Western influence within the region is both recurrent and thinly veiled. In 2015, CCP leaders wrote, "China will... pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, [and] oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms."¹⁸ However, the PRC's own attempts to attain regional hegemonism, especially within the maritime arena, are readily apparent. PRC depictions of rival territorial claims to disputed zones within the South China Sea are especially bellicose. PRC leadership in *China's National Defense in 2015* writes:

On the issues concerning China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied...It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests.¹⁹

This intense focus on safe-guarding China's regional hegemonism is coupled with the PRC's determination to eliminate domestic terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Combatting the terrorism, separatism, and extremism (also referred to as "three evils") is a heavily prioritized objective in all of China's defense strategies issued from 2000 to 2015. In the most recent strategy, these three evils are categorized as "rampant threats."²⁰

Analysis of China's Influence on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The successful chartering of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was largely a result of Chinese diplomatic initiatives in Central Asia. The PRC, realizing that the

¹⁷ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept*, Beijing, China. 2002.

¹⁸ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2015*, Beijing, China. 2015.

¹⁹ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2015*, Beijing, China. 2015.

²⁰ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2015*, Beijing, China. 2015.

Shanghai Five was limited by its concrete objectives of resolving border disputes, saw an opportunity to expand the initial collective to a more robust, formalized international organization. Given the PRC's active role in the SCO's creation, many onlookers have viewed the SCO as an instrument for the PRC to advance their own foreign policy objectives within Central Asia.

The PRC's decision to proactively forge multilateral ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a departure from the PRC's status quo in the 1990s of avoiding formalized multilateral commitments when possible.²¹ This has Bates Gill, among others, to speculate that China's engagement with the SCO was not representative of the country embracing multilateral norms, but rather a calculated move to advance China's interests in Central Asia.²² Wu Guoguang and Helen Lansdowne posit that China's embrace of multilateralism within Central Asia is indicative of the PRC's goal (first outlined in the 2002 *New Security Concept* White Paper) to engender multipolarity within the international system and counter potential Western influence in Central Asia.²³ Chien-peng Chung outlines a similar rationale for the PRC's decision multilaterally engage with Central Asia. He attributes China's engagement with the SCO to their attempts to pilot a form of "new regionalism" based on partnerships rather than alliances.²⁴ Wu and Lansdowne, Gill, and Chung all utilize a qualitative approach, relying upon their own readings of PRC and SCO strategies to reach these conclusions. Joel Wuthnow et. al concludes that China is likely to select "high engagement" and "institution shaping" postures that allow the PRC to engage in multilateral interactions that are not only accepted by the international community, but also

²¹ Bates Gill, "China's New Security Multilateralism and Its Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region." In *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, 210. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2004.

²² Bates Gill, "China's New Security Multilateralism and Its Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region." In *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, 208. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2004.

²³ Guogang Wu and Helen Lansdowne. "International Multilateralism with Chinese Characteristics: Attitude Changes, Policy Imperatives, and Regional Impacts." In *China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security*, 3-18. New York, NY: Routledge, 2008.

²⁴ Chien-Peng Chung, "The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China's Changing Influence in Central Asia." *The China Quarterly*, 2004, 989-1009.

allow it to advance its own policy priorities.²⁵

In contrast to the Wu and Lansdowne, Gill, and Chung, CCP-aligned scholars wholly reject the assertion that the SCO is an instrument for China to advance its objectives within the region. Zhao Huasheng, Professor and Director for the Center of Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, writes:

China helps maintain the political balance and coordinate member countries' interests. China cares about maintaining equality in the SCO, especially between large countries and small ones. When dealing with internal problems, China tries to avoid exerting pressure and consults with other member countries to reach consensus. These measures strengthen the solidarity of the SCO.²⁶

Zhao's view, representative of the CCP's general response to allegations of exerting undue influence on the SCO's policies, highlights the PRC's belief that the SCO is ultimately a consensus-building organization. Zhang Yunling, Director of International Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, also emphasizes that SCO-led initiatives, such as the recent "One Belt, One Road" economic project, are not created solely to benefit the PRC. Rather, he insists that these initiatives equally benefit all member countries.²⁷ The emphasis on equality between larger and smaller states directly contradicts Wu and Lansdowne, Gill, Wuthnow, and Chung's readings of China's influence on the SCO.

METHODOLOGY

While the Western scholars discussed above have identified the SCO as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy, China-based academicians and the CCP have denounced this viewpoint. Little has been done to quantify Westerners scholars' assertions and draw comparative conclusions between China's involvement in the

²⁵ Joel Wuthnow, Xin Li, and Lingling Qi. "Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies in China's Multilateral Diplomacy." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 17, no. 3 (July 20, 2012): 269-90.

²⁶ Huasheng Zhao, "China's View of and Expectations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization." *Asian Survey* 53, no. 3 (2013): 436-60.

²⁷ Yunling Zhang, "One Belt, One Road: A Chinese View." *Global Asia* 10, no. 3 (October/November 2015): 8-12.

SCO and its involvement in other regional multilateral organizations. Therefore, in an effort to provide more robust and conclusive evidence supporting Wu and Lansdowne, Gill, Wuthnow et al, and Chung's claims that China influences the policy of the SCO, this study takes a quantitative approach to understanding China's influence on the SCO's policies and objectives. A frequency analysis of ten "key phrases" reappearing within *China's National Defense* White Papers will be conducted on four key SCO documents. In an effort to compare the PRC's influence on the SCO versus other regional multilateral security organizations, three ASEAN+1 documents will also be examined for the frequency of these phrases. When regional multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN+1 and the SCO choose to employ one of these ten phrases, they are accepting the connotations associated with the phrase. The acceptance of the phrase's connotations also can be viewed as an implicit endorsement of related PRC policy. After results from the frequency analysis are obtained, this study will examine which phrases have the highest occurrences in SCO documents and ASEAN+1 documents.

These ten "key phrases" were not selected at random. All phrases are explicitly tied to the list of previously identified Chinese regional security objectives. As evidenced in the data shown in Figure 2, these phrases appear at extremely high rates in foundational Chinese governance documents. Their high-levels of repetition across decades of official defense policy documents demonstrates that policymakers within China deem them to be unique and critical to Chinese interests. Furthermore, this study's methodology is grounded in the premise that the inclusion of a particular policy-oriented phrase does not just reflect the adoption of the PRC's policy, but also whatever connotations are associated with the phrase. The below chart lists all phrases that this analysis will search for, their English translations, and the connotations associated with the phrase. Connotations associated with the below phrases were derived from a review of these phrases usage within *China's National Defense* White Papers issued from 2000-present.²⁸ Eleven documents indicative of the PRC, SCO, and ASEAN's positions on regional security issues were selected for analysis. These documents are grouped into three over-arching categories: *China's National Defense* White Papers, a biennial publication documenting China's military and defense priorities; Shanghai Cooperation Organization statements and treaties; and ASEAN+1

²⁸ All translations are the work of the author. Both the original Chinese documents and English translations provided by the PRC were utilized to determine phrases' connotations

treaties and statements. All selected documents have a general emphasis on regional defense and security cooperation. Examined documents were either originally published in Mandarin, or a translation in Mandarin was produced concurrently with the treaties' signing. A complete listing of documents, their respective publication dates, and their associated categorization is located in Appendix One.

Skeptics of this approach could argue that these terms, such as peace (和平, *heping*) mutual trust (互信, *huxin*), and struggle (挑战, *tiaozhan*) could be as highly valued by other member states as they are by the PRC. However, the concluding qualitative portion of this review seeks to demonstrate why these ten phrases carry an outsized influence for the Chinese government. Therefore, the final component of this study will put these findings in conversation with the examined document as a whole. What objective was the identified phrase advancing within the treaty or statement? How does this priority correlate to the PRC's key regional security objectives? Does the occurrence of this word lend credence to the overall argument that the PRC is shaping the policies and priorities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? While the frequency of these phrases demonstrates that Chinese interlocutors are able to exert discursive influence on treaties issued by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, qualitative analysis shows the policy implications of these phrases generates significant gains for Chinese government positions on contested issues. Conversely, the absence of these phrases in ASEAN+1 documents alludes that, though China might seek to influence ASEAN and its member states, ASEAN's relatively robust institutional framework does not enable China to substantively alter member states positions on controversial security issues.

Figure 1: Selected Phrases, Their Translations, and Their Connotations

Phrase	Translation	Connotation
睦邻 mulin	Good neighbor	This phrase is generally associated with China's "good neighbor" policy. China's "good neighbor" policy is associated with the <i>Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence</i> which call for a new form of state-to-state relations (see above description on pg. 10.)
互信 huxin	Mutual Trust	This phrase is generally associated with the <i>Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence</i> which include a call to eliminate external international influences on domestic matters.
互尊 huzun	Mutual Respect	This phrase is generally associated with the <i>Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence</i> which call for a new form of state-to-state relations that falls outside of pre-established Western standards.
和平 heping	Peace	This phrase is generally associated with maintaining regional stability.
和谐 hexie	Harmony	In addition to being associated with maintaining regional stability within Asia, this phrase is also associated with countering Western hegemony within the region.
恐怖主义 kongbu zhuyi	Terrorism	This phrase is associated with the PRC's efforts to combat domestic terrorism, separatism, and extremism (also known as the "three evils.")
分裂主义 fenlie zhuyi	Separatism	This phrase is associated with the PRC's efforts to combat domestic terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Selecting this phrase also has a connotation of opposing Taiwanese, Tibetan, and Xinjiang independence from the PRC.
极端主义 jidian zhuyi	Extremism	This phrase is associated with the PRC's efforts to combat domestic terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Selecting this phrase also has a connotation of Islamic influence within Xinjiang.
挑战 tiaozhan	Struggle	This phrase is closely associated with actions subject to military influences. When used in a multilateral setting, it has connotations of all parties opposing similar forces of hegemony and regional instability.
威胁 weixie	Threat	This phrase is closely associated with actions subject to military influences. When used in a multilateral setting, it has connotations of all parties opposing similar forces of hegemony and regional instability.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The below findings overwhelmingly support the hypothesis that key foreign policy phrases used by the PRC within their own domestic documents occur at dramatically higher rates in SCO documents than in ASEAN+1 documents. Each key phrase identified within *China's National Defense* White Papers occurred within at least one, if not all, of the three selected SCO documents. The same did not hold for ASEAN+1 documents. Phrases that are notably omitted from all ASEAN+1 documents include mutual respect (互尊 *huzun*), separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*), extremism (极端主义, *jiduan zhuyi*), and threat (威胁, *weixie*). The phrase good neighbor (睦邻, *mulin*) only makes one appearance throughout examined ASEAN+1 documents. This stands in stark contrast to SCO documents, which, when taking into account the vast differences in length between *China's National Defense* White Papers and SCO documents examined, had similar usage rates for most key phrases. The below table lists key phrases' rate of appearance within each of the eleven selected documents.

Figure 2: Key Phrases Frequency Within Selected Documents

	Good neigh- borliness	Mutual Trust	Mutual Respect	Peace	Harmony	Terrorism	Separatism	Extremism	Struggle	Threat
China's National Defense in 2000	2	5	1	62	0	3	1	1	3	14
China's National Defense in 2006	3	4	0	22	4	3	3	3	4	11
China's National Defense in 2008	3	10	0	31	3	5	2	2	6	14
China's National Defense in 2010	3	20	0	53	5	5	1	1	8	16
Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2	4	2	3	0	1	1	1	1	2
Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	4	1	2	5	1	2	2	2	1	2
The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism	0	0	0	2	0	5	5	5	0	2
Statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	2	10
Joint Statement of the China-ASEAN Commemorative Summit	0	1	0	10	0	0	0	0	2	0
Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues	1	1	0	3	0	2	0	0	1	0
2010 Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-AN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity	0	2	0	10	1	1	0	0	1	0

The preceding table demonstrates that phrases of political importance to the PRC appear at dramatically higher rates in SCO documents than in ASEAN+1 documents. The above findings' impact is made even clearer when looking at which key phrases appear within SCO and ASEAN+1 documents. The below chart indicates that SCO documents contain key phrases that span the entire spectrum of regional security objectives. SCO documents discuss common threats and struggles. The signing parties frequently invoke language on their mutual respect and trust for one another. Quite notably, the SCO documents include numerous references to combatting separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*) and extremism (极端主义, *jiduan zhuyi*). Inclusion of these phrases indicates adherence to the belief that China is facing serious challenges to its sovereignty in Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet—a contentious position in the international sphere. In the selection of SCO documents, parties also included references to harmony (和谐, *hexie*), previously identified as a term that can harken back to Confucian conceptions of the world order. Overwhelmingly, SCO states affirm their commitment to be a good neighbor (睦邻, *mulin*) to one another.

Notably, the key phrase most frequently reappearing in ASEAN+1 documents is peace (和平, *heping*). This phrase is most closely associated with the PRC's desire to retain regional stability within Asia. Undeniably, this is one of China and ASEAN's largest shared priorities. A primary objective of ASEAN is to support peace within Asia.²⁹ Regional turmoil, such as a violent escalation of territorial disputes within South China Sea, would present large costs to both China and ASEAN. Their collective cooperation on this issue only stands to benefit both actors. Thus, the recurrence of peace (和平, *heping*) should not be read entirely as ASEAN submitting to Chinese policy objectives and priorities. Rather, it should indicate that both actors recognize that their strongest collective interest is peace. Accordingly, references to maintaining regional piece within Asia are quite prevalent throughout ASEAN's treaties and documents.

²⁹ "Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)." Nuclear Threat Initiative. October 21, 2015. Accessed March 13, 2016.

Figure 3: Frequency of Key Phrases in SCO & ASEAN+1 Documents





Figure 4 provides interesting insight on the relative frequency of key phrase utilization between selected SCO documents and *China's National Defense White Papers*. The first two selected SCO documents, “*The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism*” and “*Statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime*,” predictably have much higher utilization of phrases characteristically used within strictly military and counter-terrorism contexts: terrorism (恐怖主义, *kongbu zhuyi*) and threat (威胁, *weixie*). However, both the “*Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*” and the “*Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*” have similar usage rates of phrases such as peace (和平, *heping*) harmony (和谐, *hexie*), mutual trust (互信, *huxin*), struggle (挑战, *tiaozhan*), and threat (威胁, *weixie*). These phrases are connected with Chinese regional security objectives as diverse as maintaining regional stability within Asia, championing the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” and the PRC’s quest to obtain the status of “regional hegemon.”

The quantitative evidence provided not only demonstrates that “key phrases” appear more frequently within SCO documents than in ASEAN+1 documents, but further analysis also indicates that the phrases that do appear within ASEAN+1 documents are not solely Chinese foreign policy objectives. Rather, ASEAN+1 documents emphasize key phrases that advance the objectives of both actors, while SCO documents relative frequency of key phrases closely mirrors key elements of many *China's National Defense White Papers*.

Figure 4: Relative Frequency of Key Phrases in SCO Documents and *China's National Defense White Papers*



QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The quantitative figures clearly suggest that SCO treaties are subject to a greater degree of influence from the PRC than ASEAN+1 documents are. However, similarities between *China's National Defense White Papers* and SCO treaties are even more dramatic when viewed side-by-side. The following three cases represent examples of near identical language in *China's National Defense White Papers* and SCO treaties.³⁰ While it is reasonable to assume that there might be some parallels among these documents, these cases transcend mere similarity and, when viewed in conjunction with the above results, create a compelling argument that the SCO is an instrument of Chinese foreign policy rather than a wholly independent international organization composed of equals.

Case One: Countering Western Influence in the Region

The PRC has a clear interest in countering Western influence in East and Central Asia. Continued erosion of American power enables China to position itself as a regional hegemon within the larger Asia-Pacific region. Language within *China's National Defense in 2000* and *The Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization* includes clear condemnations of heavy-handed external influences, which are thinly-veiled references to the United States' quest to influence Asian domestic policies (for example, the United States' continued support of Taiwan.) Furthermore, the documents' prioritization of "mutual respect" indicates that both signatories claim to prioritize weaker states' rights to independently devise policies. Finally, both documents heavily prioritize cooperation among states. This reinforces previous conclusions that Chinese multilateralism in Central Asia is primarily devised to increase interaction and solidify bonds among included countries.

China's National Defense in 2000

China maintains that the multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region should be oriented toward and characterized by mutual respect instead of the strong bullying the weak, cooperation instead of

³⁰ To maintain consistency in translation, all documents below are the official English translation of the original Chinese documents. Translations were obtained from the PRC's State Information Council and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Secretariat.

confrontation, and seeking consensus instead of imposing one's own will on others.³¹

Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Unity and cooperation [is] realized through mutual respect and confidence by countries with different civilization backgrounds and traditional cultures...The SCO adheres to the principle of non-alignment, does not target any other country or region, and is open to the outside. It is ready to develop various forms of dialogue, exchanges and cooperation with other countries, international and regional organizations.³²

When reading these two paragraphs in tandem, it is clear that the 2001 *Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization* has heavily borrowed many of its objectives and theories from *China's National Defense in 2000*. Ideas of mutual respect (互尊, *huzun*), non-alignment, cooperation, consensus, and collective dialogue are readily present in both documents. In fact, it is fairly apparent that the two paragraphs seek to advance one consistent approach to multilateral engagement. This approach, at face value, prioritizes collective consensus building and incorporating the contributions of all involved parties. This inclusion is particularly notable, given that the findings of this analysis support the hypothesis that the SCO's policies and priorities are heavily influence by Chinese foreign policy initiatives. It is particularly fitting and rather ironic that China's claim to prioritize consensus-building, equal interaction among all states is replicated within the SCO's founding document.

Case Two: Maintaining Regional Stability and Territorial Sovereignty

China's National Defense in 2006 and the SCO's *Treaty on Long-term Good Neighborliness*... show striking similarities when outlining states' commitment to maintaining territorial sovereignty. Even more notable, the below definition

³¹ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2000*, Beijing, China. 2000.

³² Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Shanghai, China. 2001.

of territorial sovereignty and subsequent adherence to the CCP point-of-view that Taiwan is unequivocally a part of China, runs counter to the vast majority of non-Chinese depictions of the Taiwanese territorial dispute. In addition to the below depiction of territorial sovereignty leaving no room for Taiwanese independence, it also safeguards Chinese territorial control of Tibet and Xinjiang.

China's National Defense in 2006

The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their activities remains a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for "Taiwan independence," the Taiwan authorities aim at creating "de jure Taiwan independence" through "constitutional reform," thus still posing a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

The United States has reiterated many times that it will adhere to the "one China" policy... But, it continues to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan, and has strengthened its military ties with Taiwan. A small number of countries have stirred up a racket about a "China threat," and intensified their preventive strategy against China and strove to hold its progress in check.³³

Treaty on Long-Term Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation among member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The Contracting Parties, respecting principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, shall take measures to prevent on their territories any activity incompatible with these principles.

The Contracting Parties shall not participate in alliances or organizations directed against other Contracting Parties and shall not support any actions hostile to other Contracting Parties.

The Contracting Parties shall respect the principle of inviolability of borders and make active efforts to build confidence in border regions in the military sphere, determined to make the borders with each other borders of eternal

³³ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2006*, Beijing, China. 2006.

peace and friendship.³⁴

The SCO's *Treaty on Long-term Good Neighborliness...* insistence that member states respect the "inviolability of borders" also carries interesting implications for Xinjiang—China's westernmost region. Xinjiang borders numerous SCO member states, and has long been plagued by the Uyghur ethnic group's separatist activity. That the SCO's *Treaty on Long-term Good Neighborliness...* binds signatories to oppose Uyghur, Taiwanese, and Tibetan separatism within their own borders represents a stunning commitment to PRC policies on the part of SCO member states. Furthermore, the recurrence of the key phrases: good neighbor (睦邻, *mulin*), peace (和平, *heping*), and separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*) are indicative of overarching policy similarities between official CCP and SCO policies.

Case Three: Opposing Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism

In addition to containing similar language when describing states' obligation to counter Western influence within the region and the importance of safeguarding states' territorial sovereignty, official Chinese White Papers and foundational SCO documents contain similar language on combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Grouping these three phrases together is a distinctly CCP creation. Referred to as "the three evils" (三股势力, *sangu shili*) within Chinese documents, using the phrases terrorism (恐怖主义, *kongbu zhuyi*), separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*), and extremism (极端主义, *jiduan zhuyi*) in tandem allows the CCP to brand separatism in Xinjiang province as extremist Islamic terrorism that's closely connected to the resurgence in global terrorism seen post-9/11.³⁵ Many pro-Uyghur human rights groups based in America and other

³⁴ Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Treaty on Long-Term Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 2007.

³⁵ For examples of CCP-led connections between Uyghur separatism and Islamic extremism, see:

"Beijing Inflicts a Defeat on Al-Qaeda." *South China Morning Post*, January 25, 2007.

"Chinese FM Calls for United Front to Fight Terrorism." Xinhua. November 15, 2015. Accessed February 06, 2016.

Western nations find the connection between Uyghur separatism and Islamic extremist terrorism to be inauthentic and opportunistic.³⁶

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning primarily the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of friendly relations and cooperation among States; aware of the fact that terrorism, separatism and extremism constitute a threat to international peace and security...recognizing that these phenomena seriously threaten territorial integrity and security of the Parties as well as their political, economic and social stability³⁷

China's National Defense in 2002

China opposes all forms of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Regarding maintenance of public order and social stability in accordance with the law as their important duty, the Chinese armed forces will strike hard at terrorist activities of any kind, crush infiltration and sabotaging activities by hostile forces, and crack down on all criminal activities that threaten public order, so

"Shanghai Cooperation Organization Official: Terrorism in Xinjiang Is a Close Variant of International Terrorism." Xinhua. June 09, 2014. Accessed March 2, 2016.

³⁶ For examples, see:

Amnesty International. *China: Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region*. Publication. 018th ed. Vol. 17. London: Amnesty International, 1999, 10.

Amnesty International. *People's Republic of China China's Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region*. Publication. 010th ed. Vol. 17. London: Amnesty International, 2002.

FIDH—International Federation for Human Rights, Antonie Bernand, Michelle Kissenkoetter, David Knaute, and Vanessa Rizk, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Vehicle for Human Rights Violations*. Paris, France, August 2012).

³⁷ Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism*. June 15, 2002.

as to promote social stability and harmony.³⁸

The above paragraphs both acknowledge that threats derived from terrorism, separatism, and extremism harm member states' internal stability. While the notion that terrorism harms a states ability to preserve "political, economic, and social stability," is hardly controversial, the SCO's willingness to use all three phrases: terrorism (恐怖主义, kongbu zhuyi), separatism (分裂主义, fenlie zhuyi), and extremism (极端主义, jiduan zhuyi), together is notable. In all ASEAN+1 documents, only the more internationally-accepted phrase, terrorism (恐怖主义, kongbu zhuyi), was included within the *Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues*, which was also written in 2002. The SCO's utilization of separatism (分裂主义, fenlie zhuyi) and extremism (极端主义, jiduan zhuyi) represents a tacit endorsement of PRC official policies connecting Uyghur separatism to the broader phenomenon of Islamic extremism. Furthermore, it demonstrates adherence to the CCP point-of-view, that one is not solely a "separatist," "terrorist," or "extremist"—but by definition, all three in tandem.

CONCLUSION

Presently, there is no comprehensive and universally accepted framework that enables observers to parse out the relative influence of state actors within multilateral organizations. Given that many of these organizations' dialogues and official meetings are closed to onlookers, researchers are primarily left with documents produced during meetings to ascertain the inner workings of multilateral organizations. Though difficult, discerning which state influences the policies and priorities of a multilateral organization can yield great benefits to those seeking to understand not only the organization's behavior, but also member states' approaches to participating in multilateral organizations. Given that China has only within the past few decades begun to meaningfully engage with multilateral organizations, and that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the first multilateral organization that the PRC has spearheaded, it is important to understand how China will approach its role as the leader of a multilateral organization. This

³⁸ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2002*, Beijing, China. 2002.

analysis has used quantitative and qualitative approaches to demonstrate that contrary to claims of state equality within Chinese-led multilateral organizations, PRC policies are more heavily represented within official SCO treaties and documents than in other, comparable regional multilateral organizations.

Quantitatively, a frequency analysis was conducted on the occurrence rates of ten key phrases within eleven selected documents. The eleven selected documents represented a sampling of ASEAN+1, SCO, and *China's National Defense* official treaties and White Papers. Additionally, all documents were originally written (or concurrently signed) in Mandarin. Evidence demonstrated that, while non-controversial terms such as peace (和平, *heping*) occurred at similar rates in all three document categories, terms that were more politically charged, such as separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*), and extremism (极端主义, *jiduan zhuyi*), occurred at dramatically higher rates in SCO documents than in ASEAN+1 documents. Furthermore, phrases such as good neighbor (睦邻, *mulin*), and mutual respect (互尊 *huzun*), that require a higher degree of cooperation and engagement, appeared at drastically higher rates in SCO documents than in ASEAN+1 documents. Additionally, SCO documents were more likely to emphasize shared struggles (挑战, *tiaozhan*), and threats (威胁, *weixie*) than ASEAN+1 documents were. This indicates that SCO member states can more readily identify shared challenges to the stability of states within the organization. Holistically, quantitative evidence indicates that SCO documents have an unquestionably higher utilization rate of the ten identified key phrases. This, in turn, signals that the PRC has a greater ability to insert their policy initiatives into official SCO documents.

Qualitatively, this analysis utilizes three case studies to provide in-text evidence of the overwhelming similarities between SCO documents and *China's National Defense* White Papers. Three relatively controversial topics were selected: countering Western influence in the region; maintaining regional stability and territorial integrity; and opposing terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Within each case study, an excerpt from *China's National Defense* advocating for a point-of-view not commonly held within the international sphere, was excerpted and compared to a similar excerpt from an official SCO document. In all three cases, SCO documents unquestionably advocated for controversial positions, including: eschewing alignment with the United States, opposing self-determination for Taiwan, and branding political separatists in Xinjiang radical Islamic extremists. This qualitative support for the quantitative findings revealed in the first portion of the analysis underscore that the PRC is driving the policy initiatives of the SCO.

The findings of this analysis have broad implications for future study of the SCO and Chinese behavior in multilateral organizations founded by the PRC. Presently, the SCO has not been conclusively shown to be primarily a tool of Chinese foreign policy. However, the evidence outlined above should give pause to those who hold the opinion that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russia have equal say in determining the SCO's policy objectives. The degree to which the SCO's treaties and declarations are binding should also be further considered. If the PRC has an outsized influence on the writing of treaties that require other member states to take certain courses of action, are they unduly coercing smaller, neighboring states? How does this affect the PRC's bid to establish itself as the unchallengeable regional hegemon? Given that India and Pakistan recently acceded to SCO as full member states in June 2016, this raises questions about whether or not the PRC will still be able to exert as much influence on SCO policy. If they are able to retain this level of influence, will India and Pakistan agree to take on relatively controversial positions? Furthermore, the SCO's joint submission of new standards for international cyber sovereignty to the United Nations should be further examined at a later date. Will the PRC continue to use the SCO as a platform to advocate for its preferred course of action within the larger international community?

Given current regional dynamics within Southeast Asia, it is also important to note that the PRC was unable to exert substantive discursive influence on ASEAN+1 documents. Part of this is likely attributable to the fact that China was key broker of the SCO's creation and institutional framework while it is only an occasional participant in ASEAN's internal discussions. However, the fact that the PRC has designed the SCO to be an effective mouthpiece for Chinese positions is notable in and of itself. Onlookers concerned about potential Chinese efforts to replicate this effort within the Southeast Asian political landscape could review official ASEAN+1 treaties and agreements to identify tangible indicators of increased Sinification. More importantly, observers should pay close attention to any attempts to alter norms or operating procedures within ASEAN in a way that could preference PRC interests. Resolutions blocked by Cambodia and the Philippines should be heavily scrutinized by other member ASEAN states. If Chinese influence inhibits the organization from taking collective action to advance the majority of member states' interests, then ASEAN's overall effectiveness could significantly decrease, potentially harming member

states' economic outlook and the rights of individuals living within member states. Outside of the SCO and ASEAN, the PRC has recently formed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It remains to be seen whether or not the PRC will pursue a similar strategy within that multilateral organization, or if Chinese officials will allow for greater input from member states. Given the United Kingdom and Australia's membership in the AIIB, it is likely that China will not be able to pursue a strategy as aggressively anti-Western as seen in the SCO. However, to what extent other revisionist positions and methods are employed is yet to be determined.

However, perhaps the most fascinating conclusion derived from this analysis is the PRC's readily visible hypocrisy in their categorization of the SCO as an organization comprised of equals. Perhaps the PRC's shift away from overtly pledging to adhere to the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* within issues of *China's National Defense* from 2010-present indicates that the it no longer intends to maintain a status equal to other, smaller participating states in multilateral organizations. Though the PRC claims that their form of "democratized international relations" allows for equal input from all actors, the analysis above has demonstrated that the SCO's policy agenda is driven by the PRC. When evaluating the future of Chinese multilateral engagement, it is important to distinguish between differing forms of Chinese multilateral engagement. The nature of their engagement should be evaluated based on which organization they are engaging with and what member states are represented within the group. Contrary to Chinese claims, the SCO's objectives are largely influenced by Chinese policy objectives. Evidence demonstrates that the PRC is able to leverage its influence on the SCO and ensure that sensitive issues are framed in line with CCP objectives.

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APPENDIX 1: DOCUMENT CATEGORIZATION

Document	Year Published	Categorization
China's National Defense in 2000	2000	Official PRC White Paper
China's National Defense in 2006	2006	Official PRC White Paper
China's National Defense in 2008	2008	Official PRC White Paper
China's National Defense in 2010	2010	Official PRC White Paper
Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2002	Official SCO Document
The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism	2002	Official SCO Document
Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2007	Official SCO Document
Statement and Plan of Action by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime	2009	Official SCO Document
Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues	2002	Official ASEAN+1 Document
Joint Statement of the China-ASEAN Commemorative Summit	2006	Official ASEAN+1 Document
2010 Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity	2010	Official ASEAN+1 Document

LASTING AND EXPANDING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE'S INCENTIVE SYSTEM

ISABELLE CANAAN¹

INTRODUCTION

In the past five years, millions of people have lost their homes, loved ones, and lives.² The Syrian territory is now a battlefield, contested by multiple actors. The rise of the Islamic State underscores the hopeless nature of this bloody quagmire. The speed at which the Islamic State has captured and held territory, as well as the degree to which it has dominated the Western psyche and monopolized Western fears, has been met with both shock and panic. Newspapers headlines scream about the unique and terrifying threat of the Islamic State and the imminent destruction of the West at its hands. But at its core the Islamic State is, like any other organization, dependent on manpower and materials. Control of large population centers and the constant recruitment of new members are essential for the Islamic State's continued success and the expansion of its caliphate, especially in the face of increased military opposition from its adversaries and the on-going drain of its resources from the use of suicide bombings and military campaigns.

The collective action problem burdens the Islamic State. Broadly defined, the collective action problem states that an organization cannot inspire mass mobilization with ease.³ Why would someone participate when the costs are so high and the benefits are so low? For example, an individual deciding whether or not to join the Islamic State must consider (consciously or not) the free rider problem and the fact that individual contribution is not pivotal, while also confronting fears about the risks associated with participation.⁴

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² Ben Taub, "The Assad Filed", *The New Yorker* (2016).

³ Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, "How 'Free' Is Free Riding in Civil Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem." *World Politics* 59 (2007): 178

⁴ Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, (Cambridge,

The Islamic State has repackaged and re-worked techniques to alleviate the collective action problem in a highly successful and visible way, publically recruiting both locally and internationally. I will examine how the Islamic State exploits security considerations and individual-level grievances, all while mobilizing community and patronage networks to attract new recruits. In doing so, I will critically assess how effectively the existing literature on incentive systems captures the Islamic State.

In the past decades, scholarship has focused on insurgency groups' incentive structures to better understand individuals' motivations for joining them. During a conflict, the leadership on each side try to out-maneuver their opponents in controlling the unarmed and unaffiliated masses. When it comes to Syria, violence proliferates amongst multiple actors. Notably, the Islamic State is competing with the Russian and Iranian-backed Bashar al-Assad Syrian regime, the United States-backed Iraqi government, the Free Syrian Army, the Kurds, and the al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front. Each of these groups has carved out small areas of influence, semi-order, and pseudo-sovereignty, which they use as springboards for their territorial and political objectives.

With the globalization of conflict and the technological revolution, the methods of recruiting have broadened significantly. These changes are particularly evident in the Islamic State's recruitment of foreign fighters. Foreigners have historically played a role in conflicts, famously in the Spanish Civil War and the Greek War of Independence, but never to the extent made possible by modern telecommunications technology.⁵ The Syrian situation recalls these prior instances; especially as the foreign jihadi and foreign fighter phenomena have evolved into an essential and highly visible element of the conflict.

As the Islamic State targets a variety of audiences, it is pertinent to ask how the Islamic State's incentive system works. Although it must be acknowledged that there is extreme variation in the type of actor and the intensity of participation within each audience, I am interested in exploring the general trends that differ in this targeted process. Namely: How does the Islamic State repack-age oft-used mechanisms, like material benefits or protection, in successful and potentially new ways? How does it change, morph, and redefine itself in relation

Cambridge University Press, 2006), 42.

⁵ Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), 211.

to these different audiences?

In pursuit of a satisfactory answer to the above questions, I will examine three elements of the Islamic State's recruitment practices: 1) How the Islamic State's incentive system operates on both a local and global level, 2) Where there is overlap between these two audiences, and 3) Where distinctions arise. Additionally, I will examine how intentionally the core structure of the Islamic State actually promotes and propagates certain narratives. I focus my analysis on two specific locations as case studies for the Islamic State's audience. To evaluate local dynamics and describe how a conquering insurgency traditionally entices local actors to opt-in, I will focus on Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State's caliphate. To explore how the Islamic State fuses itself to pre-existing societal ills, I will study the incentive system at work in Belgium, namely the Molenbeek and Schaerbeek neighborhoods outside of Brussels. These areas have been labeled as safe-havens and hotbeds for jihadist activity and are where the Paris attacks of 2015 were planned.

Therefore, my project is aimed at unpacking the Islamic State's networks and incentive system and looking primarily at how it overcomes the collective action problem on a multi-tiered level; both in terms of the local Syrian-Iraqi community (specifically in Raqqa) and in reference to the global community (using Molenbeek and Schaerbeek as exemplars). This paper presents a nuanced account of what "membership" at its core entails, and how its intensity ebbs and flows between Raqqa and Belgium. In confronting previous literature, I hope to demonstrate that the audience to which the Islamic State directs itself is wide and varied in motivations and roles, as well as undermine the simple narrative of ideological impetus as the sole motivating factor.

Literature Review

I will assess the strategies and actions of the Islamic State in reference to these seven mechanisms: contingency and sovereignty, protection and security, material benefits and club goods, individual level incentives, social focal points and community, patronage networks and quotidian relationships, and ideological commitment. While I am limiting my study to a discussion of these seven mechanisms, I acknowledge that scholarship has explored and identified other mechanisms, but have chosen these seven mechanisms as, in my opinion, they encompass the largest swathe of scholarship.

Contingency and Sovereignty

As Ana Arjona and Stathis Kalyvas discuss in their article, “Rebelling Against Rebellion,” when a ruling group has a monopoly over violence and the power of the purse, it permits them to control the use of selective violence, the dispersion of information, quotidian norms and rituals, and the economic market.⁶ In order to survive, individuals living under the new sovereignty of an insurgent group must shift their preferences to align with those of the sovereign.

By functioning, as a would-be state, an insurgent organization establishes a bureaucratic apparatus that commands local presence. In this narrative, control signals credibility, allows for the allocation of goods and services, facilitates direct monitoring and population control, monopolizes socialization, and, as argued by Arjona and Kalyvas, is a self-reinforcing dynamic of legitimacy.⁷ Sovereignty, at its most basic, therefore, incentivizes individuals to comply with the group in charge.⁸

Protection and Security

As asserted by Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein in their article “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War”, the desire and necessity to improve one’s own security drives decision-making in times of anarchy and conflict. Security considerations can also explain why individuals join certain factions in times of war.⁹

Similarly, Kalyvas and Kocher argue that non-participation is not costless. It is their estimation that, in irregular wars, especially where the state actor employs indiscriminant, retaliatory violent tactics, civilians are directly implicated and more likely to be victims of incredible violence.¹⁰ Thus, participation in the terrorist organization actually improves an individual’s odds of survival

⁶ Ana M. Arjona and Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Rebelling Against Rebellion: Comparing Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Recruitment.” *Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity* (2009), 13.

⁷ Ibid, 12.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War,” *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 2 (2008), 449.

¹⁰ Kalyvas and Kocher (2008), 186.

because combatants are both better equipped to deal with threats as members of the group and because cooperation buys protection.¹¹

Material Benefits and Club Goods

Incentives like material motivations and benefits often persuade individuals to join organizations. In order to rapidly attract followers, many groups use material resources as selective incentives and “club goods”, conditional on loyalty and membership. Organizations with control over a territory (and thus, its economic apparatuses and markets) use goods to force membership. By positioning themselves as the sole providers of goods and services, these organizations can socially isolate civilians who do not opt-in.¹² Membership is required in order to gain access to even the most basic everyday goods, like bread and electricity.¹³

In his book *The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, Jeremy Weinstein examines how insurgent groups form, highlighting groups that use material resources to rapidly attract followers to overcome collective action problems. He describes these “consumer groups” as organizations that entice opportunists and loyalists by promising luxury items, like cars, scarce Western goods, and tax exemptions - deemed “club goods.”¹⁴ Greed is a motivator for active loyalty and membership. Per Weinstein’s assessment, those attracted by material goods lack ideological commitment and community ties, remaining involved only as long as it is materially beneficial.¹⁵

Individual Level Incentives

When assessing individualist logic, it is important to avoid the assumption that individuals are merely actors manipulated by the state or the organization at large. As Kalyvas argues, “The locus of agency is as likely to be at the bottom as at the top, so civilians cannot be treated as passive, manipulated, or invisible actors; indeed, they often manipulate central actors to settle their own conflicts.”¹⁶ An individual’s rea-

¹¹ Ibid, 191.

¹² Eli Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism* (Boston: MIT Press, 2011), 83.

¹³ Weinstein (2006), 9.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid, 10.

¹⁶ Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian-Skrede Gleditsch, and Halyard Buhaug, *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 21.

sons for mobilization are often highly personal and unrelated to the over-arching ideological vision of an organization. Building on Kalyvas's conclusions about the agency of individuals, membership in a successful organization, especially one in charge of the mechanism of coercion and control, can function as an opportunity to increase social position and self-worth. Individuals desire power to settle local scores, for example: taking revenge, engaging in personal feuds, obtaining local power, and eliminating-off local rivals.¹⁷

Social Focal Points and Communities

As argued by Timur Kuran, most individuals are threshold-based actors, meaning that, if they were to see their peers joining, they would feel more inclined to do the same.¹⁸ Mechanisms such as accessible information, status rewards, and norms of reciprocity motivate more and more people to mobilize.

The community-level analysis is further championed by Roger Petersen, who defines communities according to the following essential five conditions; direct relations between members, relations that are many-sided (with economic, social, and cultural components), norms of reciprocity acknowledged amongst members, rough equality of material conditions, and a common set of beliefs and values.¹⁹ Since mobilization and opting into participation involves the acceptance of risk, strong communities can play a role in mitigating fears.²⁰

Social focal points, which serve as indicators for individuals of the general opinions of the community, are manipulated and controlled by the ruling group.²¹ In line with Kuran and Petersen's assessments, individuals use the actions of their fellow community members as reference points on which to base action or inaction.

Patronage Networks and Quotidian Relationships

Patronage networks structure trust and information between individuals. An

¹⁷ John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'" *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000), 43.

¹⁸ Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989." *World Politics* 44, no. 1 (1991), 21.

¹⁹ Roger D. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 16.

²⁰ Ibid, 15.

²¹ Ibid, 22.

incoming power often attempts to integrate itself into pre-existing patronage networks, using them to achieve its objectives. On a micro and familial level, patronage networks help organize participation as they permit face-to-face contact and visible touch-points of belief and trust. According to Sarah Parkinson, quotidian and familial networks often serve as the blueprints onto which insurgent goals are pasted.²² Consequently, social ties provide a way of layering new organizations atop older relations, and thus combining local and wide-reaching objectives.

Ideological Commitment

Finally, as Jeremy Weinstein argues, ideological commitment to a group's goals and sense of duty to join can push individuals to aid in the cause.²³ He argues that religious extremism drives insurgents to incur greater dangers in the name of God. In this narrative, there is a coupling of rational calculus and ideological fervor – sacrifice is presented as a logical step towards promised salvation.²⁴ In her book *Peripheral Visions*, Lisa Wedeen discusses how Islam becomes highly political, describing how “Movements are political in the sense that they aspire to render all aspects of Muslims lives a means of realizing God's will.”²⁵

THEORY

All armed groups face the problem of mobilization, as they must provide a persuasive answer to the question: “Why should I fight and die for you?”²⁶ In its' answer, the group must overcome the collective action problem, a problem of coordination between principals and agents, and a time-consistency problem for the acquisition of benefits and rewards by those who mobilize.²⁷ Unlike previous theories and the rhetoric of mainstream media, that often spout one silver bullet reason for mobilization, or overemphasize the importance of ideological and radicalization without paying appropriate attention to the extreme variation in motivation or

²² Sarah Elizabeth Parkinson, “Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-Risk Mobilization and Social Networks in War.” *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 3 (2013), 419.

²³ Weinstein (2006), 10.

²⁴ Nichole Argo, “Why Flight?: Examining Self-Interested Versus Communally-Oriented Motivations in Palestinian Resistance and Rebellion”, *Security Studies* 18, no. 4 (2009), 656-657.

²⁵ Lisa Wedeen, *Peripheral Visions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 156.

²⁶ Anthony Vinci, “The ‘Problems of Mobilization’ and the Analysis of Armed Groups”, *Parameters* 36 no. 1 (2006), 51.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 52.

the constant coupling and uncoupling of local and global dynamics, I assert that the Islamic State's use of mobilization techniques in accordance with its' differing audiences has fundamentally redefined understandings of both membership and participation.

From the above toolkit of potential incentives to mobilize, the Islamic State picks and chooses based on audience - ensuring a narrative with powerful resonance. For those in the seized territories, the Islamic State employs sovereignty and contingency, security considerations, material goods, individual-level incentives, community-level incentives, and ideology to varying degree. However, the assessments of the previous literature, especially its presentation of conflicts and communal norms as static, do not fully capture the tendencies at place. For those in the seized territories, the Islamic State employs sovereignty and contingency, security considerations, material goods, individual-level incentives, community-level incentives, and ideology to varying degree. However, the assessments of the previous literature, especially its presentation of conflicts and communal norms as static, do not fully capture the tendencies at place. When conceptualizing participation under these conditions, I want to emphasize that the participation of the majority of Syrians in the seized territories, though deemed voluntary in the literature, is actually a question of survival. Joining the Islamic State is about choosing the best among a collection of terrible options. The perceived order provided by Islamic State is actually a product of fear and anxiety. As Mousab Alhamadee, a Syrian writer originally from Hama describes, the Islamic State controlled areas are "hostile environment[s] not just for minorities, but for a broad swathe of citizens."²⁸

When assessed in the foreign fighter context, security and protection must function differently. Target audiences abroad - namely those the Islamic State aims to recruit (loyalists) or inspire (sympathizers) - are not subject to the same present and physical day-to-day danger as those in the seized territories. Separated and insulated from the anarchic conditions that rage in Syria, they do not naturally assume survival and utility maximization roles that prioritize immediate security overall. In other words, joining the organization does not boil down to a life-or-death consideration. The same promise of immediate physical

²⁸ Avi Asher-Schapiro and Sam Heller, "How Five Years of War Has Fractured Syria Into Four States." *Vice News* (2016)

security made to citizens in Raqqa should not be enough to convince foreigners, who arguably have more to lose by going to Syria than staying at home in Belgium. The following sections of the paper will illuminate this claim. Firstly, I will describe the choice of the two case studies, and then will examine the evidence to support my claim, demonstrating the variation between what resonates in Raqqa versus what resonates in Belgium.

CASE SELECTION

In order to assess my hypothesized theory, I will use the cases of Raqqa and Molenbeek and Schaerbeek. While obviously each population in itself includes high levels of variation, as well as multiple other interesting distinctions, these cases have been chosen for a particular reason in regards to the multi-faceted nature of the Islamic State. The Islamic State has positioned itself as not only a dually oriented organization, but also one that promises to fulfill multiple roles - structuring a society and providing goods and services as a state does and directing military action. The “state” aspect of the Islamic State must not be taken for granted, and in choosing to assess both Raqqa and Belgium, I hope to explore the full dynamics of statehood at play.

The Islamic State is not the first transnational organization to preach its message abroad. Al-Qaeda, for example, recruited and targeted foreign audiences, using the Internet to reach far-flung potential jihadists.²⁹ The Islamic State has built on these past attempts at transnational recruitment with a specific combination and marketing of incentives that has drawn, by some estimates, between 27,000 and 31,000 foreigners to the Islamic State.³⁰ This level of support massively outstrips the high-water marks of both their organizational predecessors and contemporary competitors. Coupled with on-the-ground alliances and membership of conquered people in Iraq and Syria, the success of recruiting efforts contributes to the ongoing longevity and expansion of the Islamic State.

On the choice of Molenbeek and Schaerbeek – I recognize that these are not the only places from which foreign Islamic State fighters originate, nor are they the sole areas where attacks on foreign soil are planned. However, because they are

²⁹ J.M. Berger and Jessica Stern, “ISIS and the Foreign-Fighter Phenomenon”, *The Atlantic* (2015)

³⁰ The Soufan Group, “Foreign Fighters: An Updates Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq (2015), 4.

the hometowns of the Abaaoud and Abdelsalem brothers, the masterminds and perpetrators of the recent attacks in Paris and Belgium, Molenbeek and Schaerbeek, and have therefore become the face of the foreign fighter and foreign jihadi syndrome.³¹

Concerning Raqqa, there is little information available when it comes to daily dynamics and procedures. I am, to some degree, beholden to the image of Raqqa that the Islamic State wants to distribute. Outside of Islamic State propaganda, it is very difficult to even partially access objective information on how that society functions. Therefore, I recognize the speculative nature of my analysis and hope that, as more information is revealed and as the society opens up, my primary claims are re-assessed.

EVIDENCE

Raqqa:

In Raqqa, tactics associated with contingency and sovereignty, material benefits and club goods, individual level incentives, social focal points and communities, patronage networks, and ideological commitment are employed. However, security concerns underlie each of these mechanisms.

Contingency and Sovereignty

The use of highly public and visible punishments betrays the Islamic State's anxiety - a need to control and coerce that is in no way organic. It is a constant and omnipresent reminder of the organization. In Raqqa, stability is just oppression by another name. These seized communities have little choice but to acquiesce, when the only alternatives are the ruthless Assad regime and the perceived hapless Free Syrian Army.³²

An International Crisis Group report further unpacks the relationship between disorder and the Islamic State. It asserts that the initial expansion of the group is a product of the instability of war, as the organization exploited opportunities and vacancies left behind by the Assad regime's loss of regional

³¹ Andrew Higgins and Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, "In Suspects' Brussels Neighborhood, a History of Petty Crimes and Missed Chances.", *New York Times* (2015).

³² International Crisis Group Special Report, "Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State" *International Crisis Group* (2016), 29.

control, state-wide monopoly of violence, and hegemony.³³ The report contends that, “The lack of avenues for peaceful dissent and opportunities for young people make many societies vulnerable to [Islamic State] recruitment, even if it lures only tiny minorities.³⁴ Individuals in the seized territories continue cooperation with the Islamic State because of the promise of some stability in an otherwise anarchic world. Yet this sense of stability should not be over-stated, as it is deeply situational and relative.

The Islamic State is hyper-aware of its powerful position, deliberately constructing an image of effective governance in its propaganda. For example, in the fourth issue of the Islamic State’s newsletter, “Dabiq,” there is a whole section titled, “A Window into the Islamic State,” which shows images of services, such as the restoration of electricity, care for the elderly, street cleaning, and medical services apparently provided by the group to residents in Raqqa.³⁵ These newsletters are printed in English, German, French, and Russian, among other languages.³⁶ However, they are not released in Arabic. Since these newsletters are directed towards an outward audience, it could be argued that they are intended to court potential foreign fighters. To the outside world, the Islamic State portrays itself as a functioning state. But how would the promise of these goods and services incentivize Westerners to join when they hail from societies that already provide these services absent the presence of fear and terror? Perhaps the Islamic State does not intend to use this type of propaganda for foreign recruitment purposes. Instead, in curating its image as a deeply entrenched state-like entity, the Islamic State hopes to inspire fear in its enemies abroad.

This propaganda constructs a perception of the Islamic State as stable, ordered, and deeply institutionalized with apparently significant local support. It appears to the undiscerning eye as a legitimate organization. By Arjona and Kalyvas’s argument, legitimacy is a self-reinforcing dynamic that improves with increased participation and control. I argue, however, that longevity – or even power – do not immediately translate to legitimacy. One need look no further for an example than the Assad family, which was brutally in power for over forty years, yet whose legitimacy was still questioned.

The question of legitimacy is raised anew for the seized territories. The Is-

³³ Ibid, 11.

³⁴ Ibid, 22.

³⁵ “The Failed Crusade”, *Dabiq* 4 (2014), 4.

³⁶ Berger and Stern (2015).

lamic State at its core is essentially an Iraqi organization.³⁷ In Syria and in Raqqa, for example, the leadership is predominantly Iraqi and foreign. The question remains, how then would Arjona and Kalyvas's mechanism of legitimacy function, especially in light of the influx of foreign fighters who are, by all accounts, given preferential treatment by the group?³⁸

Instead, when it comes to the seized populations, as long as the Islamic State positions itself as stable in relation to the actors with whom it competes and continues to use fear as a conduit for order, it need not be a fully functioning or legitimate government to force local participation. Although one can question whether or not individuals in the seized territories actually shift their preferences to align with those of the Islamic State, – yet it is clear that many comply in order to survive. Finally, the Islamic State's attempts to present itself as an effective bureaucratic and state-like entity should not be misconstrued as a credible incentive for foreigners to join. While certain individuals may travel to Syria for these reasons, this type of propaganda is, in my opinion, oriented towards a different audience; the greater global audience at large. The Islamic State's propaganda is not meant for consumption by potential foreign fighters, but rather designed to inspire fear abroad.

Protection and Security

Particularly in the case of the Syrian crisis, where there are multiple armed actors, fuzzy alliances, and the frequent swapping of cities, violence is omnipresent and unselective. In his *Syrian Notebook*, Jonathan Littell observes that there was “Hardly a day without death or a wounded person, whatever the neighborhood.”³⁹

The Assad regime is certainly a state wielding indiscriminate and unselective violence. Littell, in another description of violence perpetrated by the Assad regime, recounts how the regime snipers “...shot at kids” and “killed a mentally handicapped person.”⁴⁰ The Assad regime has pursued a scorched earth poli-

³⁷ Richard Barrett and Joanne J. Myers, “Foreign Fighters in Syria” Lecture (2014)

³⁸ Robert Smith and Stacey Vanek Smith, “Episode 667: Auditing ISIS”, *NPR Planet Money* (2016), 6:30.

³⁹ Jonathan Littell, *Syrian Notebooks: Inside the Homs Uprising* (Verso: 2015), 207.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 163 and 165

cy, employing chemical weapons and barrel bombs against civilian populations.⁴¹ Ziad Hamoud, in an interview with Robin Yassin-Kassab, alludes to Kalyvas and Kocher's assertions about the dangers of being a non-combatant, saying, "The safest place to live is near the front line. In the civilian areas away from the battle - this is where the barrel bombs drop...For the regime, the battle against the civil and political alternative is more important than the military battle."⁴²

The regime's monopoly of violence and security, however, is distributed unequally over the national territory. On a local level, each particular group, from the Free Syrian Army, to the Kurdish forces, to the Islamic State, exercises varying degrees of control. Raqqa is currently under the rule of the Islamic State and, thus, to ensure security, citizens cooperate with the group. Only those who participate are assured protection under its semi-secure umbrella created by its monopoly of violence. Since free-riding not only excludes an individual from that security but also acts as a direct danger to their person, individuals are incentivized to opt-in to participation.⁴³

The Islamic State has been very public in asserting its apparent power and dominion over Raqqa. After taking the city in December 2013, Islamic State fighters displayed the corpses of regime soldiers in downtown Raqqa, their heads mounted on fence posts.⁴⁴ To further establish itself as the unquestioned guarantor of security, the Islamic State tortured and murdered a well-liked rebel leader and doctor.⁴⁵ Furthermore, armed men known as the Hisbah, who act at once as morality police and surveillance apparatus, patrol the city.⁴⁶ Through all of these mechanisms, the Islamic State has aimed to position itself as the only force that can protect an individual, thereby incentivizing participation.

Beyond monopolizing violence, the Islamic State is also the safeguard of jurisprudence, law, and order. Through shariah courts and local alliances, the Islamic State has rendered its norms as the laws of the land.⁴⁷ In Raqqa, the Islamic State organized a judicial system. Its judges fill a variety of purposes, both impos-

⁴¹ Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila al-Shami, *Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War* (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 138.

⁴² Ibid, 106.

⁴³ Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), 185.

⁴⁴ VICE News, "The Islamic State (Full Length)", *VICE News Show* (2014), 6:30.

⁴⁵ Christoph Reuter, "The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of the Islamic State", *SpiegelOnline* (2015).

⁴⁶ VICE News (2014), 18:29.

⁴⁷ Quinn Mecham, "How much of a state is the Islamic State?" *Washington Post* (2015)

ing harsh punishments for crimes against shariah, and also acting as arbitrators who settle more mundane disputes like farming quarrels.⁴⁸ If one wants to be favored in the court system, one at least has to be a complicit member of the organization. Cooperation with the Islamic State serves a utilitarian purpose as protection and justice are only extended to those who pledge allegiance.

Despite the evidence presented above, the relationship between security and the Islamic State is not so simple. The Islamic State positions itself as a safety guarantor while simultaneously courting violent responses from foreign enemies. In many of its execution videos, the Islamic State explicitly threatens the West – calling on sympathizers everywhere to engage in inspired attacks. These same videos include the beheadings of Western hostages. In a propaganda video released by the Islamic State, a foreign fighter from Australia challenges Western Coalition Forces to “bring every nation that you wish to us...it means nothing to ⁴⁹us...bring your planes” – one of many examples of the organization deliberately antagonizing the West.⁵⁰ This calls into question the protection services that the Islamic State apparently offers to citizens of Raqqa. How can an organization claim to be a protector while also deliberately inviting attacks and violence?

The Islamic State’s messianic worldview, evident through the use of “Dabiq” as the title of their newsletters, also underscores the paradox in the protection and security incentive offered. The introduction of the first issue of “Dabiq” explains that the magazine is named for “Dabiq in the northern countryside of Halab (Aleppo) in Sham. This place was mentioned in a hadith describing some of the events of the Malahim (what is sometimes referred to as Armageddon in English). One of the greatest battles between the Muslims and the crusaders will take place near Dabiq.”⁵¹ As is evident, under the messianic world-view, security and stability are in no way the end game.

When assessed in the foreign fighter context, security and protection must function differently. Target audiences abroad – namely those the Islamic State aims to recruit (loyalists) or inspire (sympathizers) – are not subject to the

⁴⁸ VICE News (2014), 27:53 and 28:43.

⁴⁹ Adam Withnall “Isis releases new execution video as it warns of Doomsday attack on UK”, *Independent* (2016).

⁵⁰ Hannah Strange “‘Bring Everything You Want to Us’: Australian Teen Runaway Reemerges Online ISIS Video.” *VICE News* (2004)

⁵¹ “The Return of Khilafah, *Dabiq* 1 (2014), 3.

same present and physical day-to-day danger as those in the seized territories. Separated and insulated from the anarchic conditions that rage in Syria, they do not naturally assume survival and utility maximization roles that prioritize immediate security overall. In other words, joining the organization does not boil down to a life-or-death consideration. The same promise of immediate physical security made to citizens in Raqqa should not be enough to convince foreigners, who arguably have more to lose by going to Syria than staying at home in Belgium.

Material Benefits and Club Goods

Material goods are certainly important to the Syrian context, as constant war has deprived the population of normal and dependable resources, let alone luxury and comfort items. However, it is important to challenge Weinstein's assertions about the power of material goods. In a book review of Weinstein, Stathis Kalyvas discusses the holes in Weinstein's argument. Namely, Kalyvas contends that Weinstein's argument about the utility of material goods in recruitment does not take into account interactions between rebels and civilians or interactions between rebels and state forces.⁵²

With the first of these two exclusions, Weinstein undermines the individual agency of civilians. Civilians, according to Kalyvas, have a much greater ability to demonstrate displeasure than Weinstein allows.⁵³ For example, civilians can flee. As evident from Peter Neumann's article "Victims, Perpetrators, and Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors," defections from the Islamic State are not uncommon. Neumann interviews fifty-eight people who defected from the Islamic State, presenting four key narratives that problematize the group's image of absolute power and unity.⁵⁴ Individuals in Syria, therefore, do have agency and choice. Furthermore, in omitting the importance of the state, Weinstein does not acknowledge that realities change throughout the course of a conflict. As Kalyvas points out, for Weinstein, only initial endowments matter and personal preferences are static in nature.⁵⁵ Keeping these criticisms in mind, I want to further nuance Weinstein's assertion of greed as a mobilizer.

⁵² Stathis N. Kalyvas Book Review of "Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence" by Jeremy Weinstein, *Sage Publications: Comparative Political Studies* 40, n. 9 (2007), 1147.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 1147.

⁵⁴ Peter Neumann, "Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors", *The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence* (2015), 3.

⁵⁵ Kalyvas (2007), 1148.

When it comes to the Islamic State, material goods are employed on two levels. The Islamic State needs the majority of the population to at least passively collaborate and support the organization. Its robustness depends on taxing the population, so it must convince the majority of the community not to flee. On a different level, the Islamic State looks to recruit those who want to play an active role in the organization. Material goods are dangled in front of both audiences as a means to persuade, with greed considerations especially targeted towards those in the latter audience.

Upon conquering Raqqa, the Islamic State took administrative control of the city, establishing outreach centers, courts, and controlling services such as water, electricity, and bakeries.⁵⁶ The Islamic State is now in charge of industries, municipal services, and facilities through which it controls health services, shelter, education, and, more notably, bread prices.⁵⁷ Bread, especially, is essential to both establishing and maintaining authority. When taking Manbij, a city northeast of Aleppo, proper management of the city's grain distribution was essential to the Islamic State maintaining control.⁵⁸ In this same vein, in Raqqa, the Islamic State highly regulates bread prices, keeping them lower than pre-war standards so as to pacify the masses.⁵⁹ The Islamic State also manages all humanitarian services in Raqqa.⁶⁰

For citizens of Raqqa, the most minimal level of survival is impossible without collaborating with the Islamic State in some capacity. This type of collaboration and membership does not fit neatly into Weinstein's assessment. People trying to survive are not greedy, but desperate. Furthermore, the power of selective incentives and club goods is still up-for-debate. As highlighted by Elisabeth Wood's book, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*, it is actually much easier than the theories assume for citizens to free-ride despite an organization's attempt to use material goods as selective incentives.⁶¹ Until further information is available from Raqqa and interviews can be conducted with

⁵⁶ Charles C. Caris and Samuel Reynolds, "ISIS Governance in Syria", *Institute of War* (2014)

⁵⁷ Charles Lister, "Jihadi Rivalry: The Islamic State Challenges al-Qaida", *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper 16* (2016), 27.

⁵⁸ Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami (2016), 128.

⁵⁹ Lister (2016), 27.

⁶⁰ Caris and Reynolds (2016)

⁶¹ Elisabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 12.

citizens, the power of selective incentives and club goods in forcing widespread low-level participation should not be over-stated.

Two of the largest generators of revenue for the Islamic State are bribes and taxes (Planet Money). The Islamic State promotes its strict taxation system as a form of “zakat”, one of the Five Pillars of Islam that is akin to tithing in Catholicism (Rosenberg, Kulish, and Meyers 2015). The Islamic State set up an expansive bureaucracy to manage this stream of revenue. The Diwan al-Khadamat and the Diwan al-Rikaz, for example, are both offices in Raqqa that oversee the collection of a cleaning tax and smuggling taxes (Rosenberg, Kulish, and Meyers 2015). Also operating in Raqqa, the Zakat Bureau collects money from the wealthy, promising to redistribute it for the greater good of the community (VICE 2014, 32:43).

Confiscations and taxes together make up over 70% of the Islamic State’s revenue in some areas of Syria (Smith and Vanek Smith 2016, 9:50 and 13:40). According to a 2014 New York Times article entitled “Life in a Jihadist Capital: Order with a Darker Side,” Raqqa’s Credit Bank has become the caliphate’s tax authority (Hubbard and NYT employee 2014). Employees from this bank collect a tax of \$20 from every shop-owner every two months for electricity, water, and security (Hubbard and NYT employee 2014). In return, many shop-owners are given an official stamped receipt with the Islamic State’s logo (Hubbard and NYT employee 2014). The Islamic State even regulates the looting of artifacts, with a specific ministry designated to register and tax all discovered and smuggled antiquities (Smith and Vanek Smith 2016, 11:07).

However, not all of the taxes levied by the Islamic State are so systematic. Since the Islamic State controls all, it can arbitrarily levy taxes.⁶² As one former resident of Dier ez-Zor testified, Islamic State officials would often just show up at his door demanding money and were known to stop people on the street and ask for money.⁶³ For non-Islamic State fighters, there is no other option but to pay these taxes wherever and whenever they are levied.

Against this backdrop, the economic might of the Islamic State, while broadly used to pacify the masses, is also specifically marketed and directed at potential local fighters.⁶⁴ In Raqqa, there are two kinds of goods – those for Islamic State fighters, and those for civilians. Staples are expensive and, especially under

⁶² Smith and Vanek-Smith (2016), 14:23 and 14:40.

⁶³ Ibid, 13:53 and 14:29.

⁶⁴ Azadeh Moaveni, “ISIS Women and Enforces in Syria Recount Collaboration, Anguish, and Escape” *New York Times* (2015)

the stringent tax and zakat laws, the ordinary citizen does not have money to purchase luxury goods.⁶⁵

In Raqqa, those who join as loyalists and active participants are exempt from the harshest taxes, as well as rewarded with a salary and luxury items. The Islamic State uses these benefits to entice people to embed themselves more deeply into the organization, both in fighting positions and as members of the propaganda or media apparatus. In a political landscape like Syria, where there are a plethora of groups vying for the loyalty of local fighters in brief alliances, individuals weigh material and economic benefits when deciding for whom to fight.⁶⁶ The Islamic State has a massive advantage in this regard, paying fighters between \$330 and \$400, more than other Syrian rebel groups or the Syrian army.⁶⁷ In addition, the Islamic State promises food, luxury goods, cars, fuel, internet access, and even sex with Yazidi women for active participants.⁶⁸

While the incentive system of the Islamic State in the seized territories specifically targeted at fighters certainly displays tendencies in line with Weinstein's conception of greed, it holds less explanatory power for recruitment in the foreign context. Individuals in Belgium fit into neither of the two manners in which the Islamic State's use of material goods as selective incentives in the seized territories. Instead, the "greed" that operates within the foreign fighter phenomenon is greed for power and self-worth, as described in the section that follows.

Individual Level

In Raqqa, alignment with the Islamic State is a status-associated opportunity, as active members are awarded greater movement, freedom, and power. In order to credibly entice individuals and then integrate them into its system, the Islamic State positions itself as an organization that anoints and approves winners. For example, the Islamic State stages local religious competitions with monetary prizes as a means of promoting more active local buy-in.⁶⁹ These competitions are used

⁶⁵ Smith and Vanek-Smith (2016), 7:18.

⁶⁶ Vera Mironova, Loubna Mrie, and Sam Whitt, "Islamists at a Glance: Why Do Rebel Fighters Join Islamist Groups? (The Reasons May Have Less to do with Religiosity than You Might Think) *Political Violence @ a Glance* (2014).

⁶⁷ S.B. "Where the Islamic State gets its money" *The Economist* (2015)

⁶⁸ Smith and Vanek-Smith (2016), 6:30.

⁶⁹ Patrick Cockburn "Life under Isis: Why I deserted the 'Islamic State' rather than take part in executions, beheadings, and rape - the story of a former jihadi" *Independent* (2015).

as stages on which the Islamic State can proselytize and promote its ideological mission. For example, one Islamic State fighter from Falluja decided to join the organization despite the fact that his family fled. When discussing his motivations, he mentions that, as a child, he had won two prizes in competitions hosted by the Islamic State on religious topics and felt that he would benefit and thrive under the group.⁷⁰

The Islamic State also undermines the pre-war socio-economic hierarchy. As Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila al-Shami put it, under the Islamic State, “peasants can rise to power without anything.”⁷¹ The social prestige factor corresponds with agency. The evaluation of agency must be done on a gradient. Many of those who take a more active role in the Islamic State are not power-hungry, but rather join in order to recover some semblance of self-worth. This nuance is especially interesting when applied to the troubling question of why women join the Islamic State. At first glance, one would assume that the Islamic State’s strict doctrine, which is highly restrictive to women (as it rejects all of the reforms that have been extended to women since the time of the *rashidun*) would deter females from taking committed participation.⁷² Despite this quandary, the Islamic State has created a space for women to take an active role in the Islamic State’s security and administrative apparatus in Raqqa.

Before Syria was engulfed in complete chaos, women were, albeit unequally across time and space, beginning to enjoy the benefits of modern society. Generally speaking, the three generations previous to the war saw the highest level of female independence in contemporary Syrian history, as women mixed freely with men and, in many places, socialized, and studied together.⁷³ Before the war, Raqqa was, like many Syrian cities, mixed. While on the one hand it was on the more conservative end of the spectrum, with most women wearing “abayas” and veils, it was also home to many Alawi civil servants. As did women generally, female residents of Raqqa were beginning to enjoy the effects of independence, attending college in increasing numbers and having greater freedom to choose their own spouses.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami (2016), 138.

⁷² Berman (2011), 90.

⁷³ Moaveni (2015).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

Upon taking Raqqa, the Islamic State violently consolidated authority and enforced its radical doctrine, which restricted female freedom of movement and opportunity, re-relegating women to the confines of their homes.⁷⁵ The Islamic State already treats Syrians as second-class citizens when compared to foreign fighters, but Syrian women have been pushed even further down the social ladder, viewed as property.⁷⁶

The New York Times recently profiled three female former Raqqa residents - Dua, Aws, and Asma. These three women were members of the Khansaa Brigade, the all-women's morality police. When discussing their motivations for joining, all three mentioned their desire to win freedom of movement and income in a situation where they had otherwise been stripped of self-determination.⁷⁷ Being part of the Brigade gave them something to do, as well as power and money.⁷⁸ Especially against the backdrop of the widespread dogmatic restrictions on women employed by the Islamic State, the Khansaa Brigade provides some unrestricted opportunities. Since the Islamic State is the sole actor with the capacity for opportunity provision, it is necessary for those most marginalized and constrained by the strict society to join, in order to retain any individual freedoms.

Social Focal Points

In the Syrian case, the transition of the conflict from one of united Syrian nationalism to the current sectarian nightmare was a deliberate act of the Assad regime. As the International Crisis Group report emphasizes, the regime intentionally escalated and radicalized the initially peaceful conflict through “publicized violence, divisive sectarian discourse, [pitted] the ruling Alawite and other minorities against the Sunni majority, [escalated] collective punishment [and released] jailed radicals.”⁷⁹ The regime manipulated social focal points, emphasizing the use of mosques and Friday prayer ceremonies as gathering places so as to stir up communal tensions and fears along sectarian lines.⁸⁰

The Islamic State has followed the regime's example, controlling the public space and using it as a constant reminder of power. Community indicators, such

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ International Crisis Group Special Report (2016), 7.

⁸⁰ Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami (2016), 91.

as caliphate celebrations in Raqqa's square or public pledges of allegiance to the Islamic State leaders, are widespread.⁸¹ Punishment for those who disobey is also public. In Raqqa, for example, a man convicted of murder was crucified and displayed in the public square, his body left to rot as a warning to other residents.⁸² These public displays of power operate as community indicators intended to influence the actions of threshold-based actors.

However, the importance of these social indicators in motivating participation in the seized territories is up for debate. Unlike typical insurgencies that build from the ground up (for which motivating first-movers is a challenge), the Islamic State in Raqqa is a conquering power.⁸³ It does not need to motivate first movers, but rather force widespread compliance and at least low-level collaboration.

Patronage Networks

In Raqqa, the Islamic State mapped itself onto the social and organizational life of the city, so any social triggers were controlled and pushed by the group itself. When expanding, the Islamic State looks to incentivize powerful families, local rebel groups, and tribal leaders.⁸⁴ Through its Tribal Bureau, the Islamic State exploits tribal divisions, infiltrating clans, and playing them off against each other.⁸⁵ The Islamic State again acknowledges this deliberate strategy in its propaganda. In the first issue of "Dabiq," the Islamic State lists the benefits (such as the return of rights and property to rightful owners) it has provided to local tribal leaders and dignitaries.⁸⁶ As do most states, in integrating itself into pre-existing grassroots structures, the Islamic State attempts to legitimize its mission and transform local networks into effective tools of recruitment.

The Islamic State also mobilizes familial networks. As Sarah Parkinson theorizes, individuals take cues from the actions of family members or trusted friends, often following them into mobilization, cooperation, and collaboration.

⁸¹ VICE News (2014), 14:44 and 17:20.

⁸² Ibid, 28:00.

⁸³ Petersen (2001), 2.

⁸⁴ Reuter, 2015.

⁸⁵ International Crisis Group Special Report (2016), 17.

⁸⁶ "The Return of Khilafah, *Dabiq* 1 (2014), 13-16.

tion.⁸⁷ I will use the role of women in the seized territories to highlight the influence of pre-war relationships and networks.

Returning to the three women profiled by *The New York Times*, the participation of Aws, Dua, and Asma was also impacted by familial and patronage networks. As their families and loved ones became further integrated into the Islamic State, these women began to opt-in as well. Dua and Aws were actually cousins and joined shortly following each other.⁸⁸

Before becoming members of the Khansaa Brigade, Dua and Aws both married foreign fighters; effectively marrying into the organization.⁸⁹ When describing why they decided to marry, both women discussed the social prestige and freedom considerations aforementioned. Yet, they also said that they did so for their family's sake.⁹⁰ This demonstrates how family life in Raqqa has been exported, now indiscernibly intertwined with the organization. The Islamic State tapped into pre-existing kinship and familial networks, using them as a low-commitment way to ramp up participation.

To some degree, by intentionally infiltrating pre-existing community networks, the Islamic State attempts to deflate the space between Weinstein's greed and grievance argument. In Weinstein's categorization, a group mobilizes either through ideology or through greed. In the latter category, fighters enticed by material goods lack community-level ties and are more likely to be undisciplined in relation to the community.⁹¹ However, the Islamic State intentionally took over networks in seized communities, perhaps in an attempt to mitigate the potential drawbacks of its foreigner-dominated leadership core. Thus, the Islamic State demonstrates that the use of material benefits and the mobilization of community ties are not mutually exclusive.

Ideological Commitment

In the case of Syria, sectarian divisions were enflamed by the regime. As Monzer al-Sallal put it, "The regime created the conditions to make it happen."⁹² The initial protests in Syria were organized around Friday prayers, not for their religious

⁸⁷ Parkinson (2013), 430.

⁸⁸ Moaveni (2015)

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ Weinstein (2006), 10.

⁹² Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami (2016), 108.

symbolism, but rather because these were the visible public spaces where people gathered.⁹³ For many, prayer was where the collective will and energy was formed and took shape, so it was only natural to begin organizing in these spaces.⁹⁴ Yet, as a result of regime brutality, religious divisions were reinforced.⁹⁵ According to one survey, 60% of people who joined Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq claimed they joined because they wanted to build an Islamist state and felt a sense of obligation to help the people.⁹⁶

The ideological commitment of an individual, even if fleeting or weak at first, is often amplified by in-group bias. In their article “Explaining Support for Combatants During Wartime,” Jason Lyall et al. demonstrate that, when an individual identifies as part of a group, and shares norms and practices with this group, he or she is more likely to view their actions favorably.⁹⁷ Retaliation against this in-group can actually further harden ideological commitments and push individuals to feel a duty or an obligation to act.⁹⁸ These in-group dynamics allow for a further “othering” of the enemy, as well as a dismissal of all those who do not actively join as traitorous or disloyal. Wedeen also underlines the importance of social factors and categories when it comes to the creation of the “other”. In her argument, “categories are iterated in antagonistic relation to other categories.”⁹⁹

The Islamic State has latched onto this tendency, setting itself apart ideologically from other actors in the region primarily through a strict adherence to “takfir”. Takfir is the dismissal of persons or groups appearing to be Muslim as non-Muslim either because they are tyrants, serving tyrants or operating in foreign interests, or improperly practicing the faith.¹⁰⁰ The takfir label permits the Islamic State to kill other Muslims without violating the Qur’anic rule in which

⁹³ Ben Taub, “The Assad Files”, *The New Yorker* (2016).

⁹⁴ Little (2015), 182

⁹⁵ Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami (2016), 109.

⁹⁶ Mironova et al. (2014).

⁹⁷ Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai “Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan” *American Political Science Review* 107 n. 4 (2013), 679.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 681.

⁹⁹ Lisa Wedeen, *Peripheral Visions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 167.

¹⁰⁰ Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami (2016), 26.

a Muslim cannot kill another.¹⁰¹

Belgium:

Since residents in Belgium do not need to worry about physical security in the same way as residents in Raqqa, other techniques resonate more powerfully, namely; material benefits and club goods, social focal points, patronage networks, and ideological commitment.

Protection and Security

When assessed in the foreign fighter context, security and protection must function differently. Target audiences abroad – namely those the Islamic State aims to recruit (loyalists) or inspire (sympathizers) – are not subject to the same present and physical day-to-day danger as those in the seized territories. Separated and insulated from the anarchic conditions that rage in Syria, they do not naturally assume survival and utility maximization roles that prioritize immediate security overall. In other words, joining the organization does not boil down to a life-or-death consideration. The same promise of immediate physical security made to citizens in Raqqa should not be enough to convince foreigners, who arguably have more to lose by going to Syria than staying at home in Belgium.

Material Benefits and Club Goods

Against this backdrop, the economic might of the Islamic State, while broadly used to pacify the masses, is also specifically marketed and directed at potential local fighters.¹⁰² In Raqqa, there are two kinds of goods – those for Islamic State fighters, and those for civilians. Staples are expensive and, especially under the stringent tax and zakat laws, the ordinary citizen does not have money to purchase luxury goods.¹⁰³

In Raqqa, those who join as loyalists and active participants are exempt from the harshest taxes, as well as rewarded with a salary and luxury items. The Islamic State uses these benefits to entice people to embed themselves more deeply into the organization, both in fighting positions and as members of the propaganda or media apparatus. In a political landscape like Syria, where there are a plethora of

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Moaveni (2015).

¹⁰³ Smith and Vanek-Smith (2016), 7:18.

groups vying for the loyalty of local fighters in brief alliances, individuals weigh material and economic benefits when deciding for whom to fight.¹⁰⁴ The Islamic State has a massive advantage in this regard, paying fighters between \$330 and \$400, more than other Syrian rebel groups or the Syrian army.¹⁰⁵ In addition, the Islamic State promises food, luxury goods, cars, fuel, internet access, and even sex with Yazidi women for active participants.¹⁰⁶

While the incentive system of the Islamic State in the seized territories specifically targeted at fighters certainly displays tendencies in line with Weinstein's conception of greed, it holds less explanatory power for recruitment in the foreign context. Individuals in Belgium fit into neither of the two manners in which the Islamic State's use of material goods as selective incentives in the seized territories. Instead, the "greed" that operates within the foreign fighter phenomenon is greed for power and self-worth, as described in the section that follows.

Individual Level Incentives

For foreign fighters coming from Belgium, the personal agenda narrative operates differently. For the thousands of foreign fighters (the majority of whom are adolescents) leaving behind family and comfort in Europe for carnage in Syria, grievances cited as motivation are also often personal and local. However, because their association with the region and with the conflict is temporally brief, they do not have age-old and long-held grievances against the regime. Personal difficulties such as failing out of school or getting into skirmishes with the police can leave these individuals feeling ill at ease and excluded.¹⁰⁷ For many of these teenagers, the decision to go to the Islamic State can be as much an act of defiance against societal conventions and familial norms as it is an opportunity to gain recognition and personal fulfillment.

In the Belgian context, foreign fighters often cite disengagement and failures of the society at-large as reasons for traveling. A historically conservative Christian country, Belgium, since the mid-2000s, has pivoted towards secular-

¹⁰⁴ Mironova et al. (2016).

¹⁰⁵ S.B. (2015).

¹⁰⁶ Smith and Vanek-Smith (2016), 6:30.

¹⁰⁷ Oliver Roy, "What is the driving force behind jihadist terrorism? A scientific perspective on the causes/circumstances of joining the scene" *BKA Autumn Conference* (2015), 11.

ism and the privatization of religion.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, the Muslim population in Belgium has doubled over the past ten years, and foreigners are now the majority populations in the major Belgian cities of Antwerp and Brussels.¹⁰⁹ As a newly secular nation, the Belgian government is supposed to grant money equally to communities of different faiths. However, despite the large numbers of Muslims in the Belgian population, Muslim communities do not consistently receive the government subsidies to which they are entitled.¹¹⁰ Instead, the government and the non-Muslim population treat these Muslims communities, although deeply embedded into the structure and quotidian life in Belgium, as “others”. These tensions most notably came to a head when the Belgian government banned the veil in 2012, leading to an explosion of anger in Muslim neighborhoods and a sense of further isolation and frustration.¹¹¹ In the aftermath of this incident, as many as 60% of Muslim youths by some estimates do not feel that they will ever be integrated into Belgian society, with 50% identifying themselves as victims of racism.¹¹²

In the Schaerbeek neighborhood, the third poorest community in Belgium, racism against Middle Eastern and Muslim members has been rampant for many decades. During the 1986 mayoral race, a candidate donned ethnic Moroccan clothes and rode a camel around the central square, declaring, “In 20 years all of Schaerbeek will look like this unless you vote for me.”¹¹³ This same candidate won the election and stayed in power for 19 years.

Yet, the increase of Muslim social and economic presence in Belgium has not translated into an increase in political parties dedicated to Muslim interests. In fact, multiple attempts to form a successful Islamist or Muslim immigrant-based political party have failed. The most successful Islamist party to date in Belgium is

¹⁰⁸ Theodoros Koutroubas, Ward Vloeberghs, and Zeynep Yanasmayan, “Political, Religious, and Ethnic Radicalisation among Muslims in Belgium” *MICROCON Policy Working Paper 5* (2009), 6.

¹⁰⁹ Sarah Teich, “Islamic Radicalization in Belgium”, *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism* (2015), 8.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 13.

¹¹¹ Michael Birnbaum, “Why is tiny Belgium Europe’s jihad recruiting hub?” *Washington Post* (2015).

¹¹² Ibid, 11.

¹¹³ Alissa J. Rubin, “Radicalization of a Promising Student Turned Bomb Maker in Brussels” *New York Times* (2016).

the Islam Party, which elected two representatives to Parliament in 2012.¹¹⁴ Outside of this party, there is a lack of political representation specifically dedicated to the interests of the immigrant community.

On one hand, one could view this as a logical indication of higher levels of assimilation and integration into Belgium by these immigrant communities, many of which are in their second and third generations. In this story, these communities consider themselves Belgian and do not see a need for parties that speak to a singular dimension of their identity. On the other hand, the lack of political outlet intensifies tendencies towards extremism and radicalism, and allows those feelings to fester in un-policed and privatized networks, especially in closed neighborhoods that are over 50% Muslims.¹¹⁵ Even for those who escape these lower income neighborhoods by excelling in schools, their prospects at university are bleak. Muslims are even more of a minority at higher education institutions.¹¹⁶ Therefore, feelings of isolation and a lack of belonging are seemingly pervasive at various socio-economic levels.

It follows then that second and third generation Muslim immigrants in Belgium (the demographic that provides the most foreign fighters) have antagonistic relationships with their surroundings. As one foreign fighter put it, the “lure of extremism can be very powerful when you grow up in a world where media and everyone around you seems to mock and insult your culture.”¹¹⁷ This sense of self in relation to culture however, must be challenged. As Lisa Wedeen puts it, there is “no such thing as a self prior to social interaction: selves are produced and continually reproduced in relation to others.”¹¹⁸ These young Belgians were not born with the sense of culture they reference, but rather, like all others, it was learned. Their classification as “others” occurred as a result of deliberate Belgian state policy, with daily interactions, routines, and identifications reinforcing their self-conceptions of being Muslim. Their cultural beliefs were both thrust upon them by the state and hardened by opportunistic Islamist networks.

To these individuals, the Islamic State offers many of the elements that

¹¹⁴ Teich (2015), 18.

¹¹⁵ Koutroubas et al. (2009), 6.

¹¹⁶ Rubin (2016).

¹¹⁷ Abdelkader Benali, “The Anger of Europe’s Young Marginalized Muslims”, *New York Times* (2015).

¹¹⁸ Wedeen (2008), 182.

Belgium does not: perspective, belonging, fraternity, respect, recognition, and heroism.¹¹⁹ The Islamic State, in its promoted shows of strength, presents itself as a dominant, victorious organization.¹²⁰ Its power is seductive. Guns, salaries, jobs, brotherhood, sex, and spoils of war – all are extended by the Islamic State.¹²¹ Reporters like Katrin Bennhold have likened journeying to Syria to joining a gang – it is just another opportunity for individuals to gain respect and power.¹²²

The role of teenage angst and youth revolt is important here. Against the backdrop of Belgian secularism, conservative Islam and Salafism are the counter-culture – the hijab, a symbol of rebellion.¹²³ Being Muslim is an identity outside the boundaries of state control.¹²⁴ For teenagers and young people who feel wronged and excluded by their society, radical Islam and traveling to Syria is one way to rebel against their parents and states.¹²⁵ By rebelling, they join a group of demonstrated winners who extend to them legitimacy, status, and, most importantly, recognizable power.

Even if an individual is not actively angry and antagonistic towards the Belgian state, personal incentives, such as thrill-seeking, are still cited as motivation by foreign fighters. For many, joining the Islamic State is not so much an act of rebellion as one motivated by boredom. Compared to the complacency of everyday life, the Islamic State offers adventures.¹²⁶ For these people, “jihadi is cool” and an escape to Syria is an outlet for adventurism and thrill-seeking.¹²⁷

Individuals are incentivized to join the Islamic State for the same reasons that they would do drugs, or commit suicide.¹²⁸ Many foreign fighters travel to Syria because they are motivated by a desire to break out of the banality of every-

¹¹⁹ Rik Coolsaet, “What drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the Belgian Case”, *Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations Paper No. 75* (2015), 19.

¹²⁰ J.M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter”, *Atlantic* (2014).

¹²¹ Don Winslow, “What ISIS Learned from the Cartels”, *Daily Beast* (2015).

¹²² Katrin Bennhold, “Jihad and Girl Power: How ISIS Lured 3 London Girls” *New York Times* (2015).

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Nicole Falkenhayer, “The Figure of the Muslim in Europe”, *Making the British Muslim: Representations of the Rushdie Affair and Figures of the War-on-Terror Decade* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014), 169.

¹²⁵ Bennhold (2015).

¹²⁶ Berger and Stern (2015).

¹²⁷ Coolsaet (2015), 17.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 18.

day life in Belgium, to see the world, and what else is out there.¹²⁹

At first glance, it is difficult to accept that thrill-seeking and adventurism is enough of a motivator to bridge the major mobilization barriers that exist. It is pertinent to ask whether or not these personal reasons are enough to push an individual to undertake the potential risks and costs of joining an organization. There surely must be another way for a young disenchanted Belgian youth to combat boredom. Therefore, a critical eye must be turned towards this narrative. At the same time, it is also important to remember that these foreign fighters have no personal experience with conflict or war. Their perception of the situation in Syria is manipulated and controlled by the Islamic State's propaganda, the romanticism of conflict, and the emphasis on heroism displayed by the media. As a result, the journey seems deceptively easy, while the resulting benefits look very alluring.

Social Focal Points

In regards to the foreign fighters, the concept of community has been re-defined. In line with the Islamic "ummah" (understood as "community of believers"), the Islamic State has attempted to export a sense of community globally.¹³⁰ The Islamic State's propaganda materials make this evident. In the first issue of "Dabiq", in a section entitled, "Glad Tidings for the Muslim Ummah," after a list of member ethnicities, it reads "Allah brought their hearts together, and thus, they became brothers... Their blood mixed and became one, under a single flag and goal... enjoying this blessing, the blessing of faithful brotherhood."¹³¹ The newsletter continues in a section labeled, "A Call to Hijrah (Emigration)" by calling all Muslims to "rush... to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians and Iraq is not for the Iraqis."¹³²

Intentionally, the Islamic State pushes the narrative of the ummah, a global and abstract duty that is unconstrained by nationality.¹³³ Externally, potential foreign recruits see the media's coverage of the large-scale events happening

¹²⁹ Sami Moubayed, *Under the Black Flag: At the Frontier of the New Jihad*. (I.B. Taurus, 2015), 154.

¹³⁰ Roy (2015), 10.

¹³¹ "The Return of Khilafah, *Dabiq* 1 (2014), 7.

¹³² Ibid, 11.

¹³³ Roy (2015), 10.

in the world and use these as their social focal points. In turn, their obligation for individual jihad to avenge the threatened ummah is fed.¹³⁴ By traveling to the Islamic State and fulfilling their role to the community, in many ways, foreign fighters gain access to feelings of full membership.

Patronage Networks and Quotidian Relationships

Patronage networks and quotidian relations play an even greater role in the recruitment of foreign fighters. Without local networks that allow easy access to these opportunities, individual sentiments of the disenchanted Belgian youth remain untapped. Unfortunately, in Belgium, there are deep patronage and community networks. These organizations provide the means for dissatisfied youth to travel to fight, and also protect against defection or last-minute doubts. The feelings of isolation first occur at a personal level. When individuals make contact with a specific in-group, groupthink gradually solidifies previously held personal grievances into an unquestioned system of beliefs that necessitates action.¹³⁵

The socialization process for these foreign fighters begins here, within neighborhoods like Molenbeek and Schaerbeek and organizations like Shariah-4Belgium. In these environments, personal grievances find a home and are mobilized and socialized through pre-existing networks. When first faced with the influx of Middle Eastern and Muslim immigrants, the Belgian government permitted the formation of self-contained ethnic ghettos, in which members felt no connection with the society as a whole.¹³⁶ As one Belgian government official put it, these neighborhoods have become a “little box....closed-eyes box.”¹³⁷

The privatization of religion and the government’s inability to properly fulfill its responsibilities towards this community left a convenient space that other organizations filled.¹³⁸ As religion has no place in public life in Belgium, Islam was pushed into ghettos, radicalized, and alienated.¹³⁹ Residents of Molenbeek, a city outside of Brussels that is 80% Muslim, often consider their neighborhood as set

¹³⁴ Berger and Stern (2015).

¹³⁵ Coolsaet (2015), 6.

¹³⁶ Steven Erlanger, “Blaming Policy, Not Islam, for Belgium’s Radicalized Youth”, *New York Times* (2016).

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Alex Schulman, “Stockholm Syndrome: Radical Islam and the European Response,” *Human Rights Review* (2009), 481.

¹³⁹ Paul Joseph Watson, “Radicalized Muslim Ghettos Could Be Source of more Terror Attacks”, *INFOWARS* (2015).

apart from the rest of Belgium.¹⁴⁰ The city suffers from a simplistic multiculturalist understanding of space.¹⁴¹ Here, on the urban periphery and absent any long-term vision for integration and assimilation, anger towards the central state and the central Belgian identity festers.¹⁴² With the youth unemployment rate of 40%, twenty-two known mosques, and a dense population, pessimism rules in Molenbeek. Despite having been present on European soil for two or three generations and having acquired Belgian nationality, many families in Molenbeek are still considered, and consider themselves, migrants.¹⁴³

While current Islamist organizations have certainly seized the opportunities presented by this discontent, radical networks in Belgium are not new. In the 1990s, Bassam Ayachi, a Franco-Syrian former restaurant owner, founded the Belgian Islamic Center in Molenbeek.¹⁴⁴ This organization promoted the same ascetically rigid Salafism as the Islamic State. Today, these isolated neighborhoods are where organizations like Shariah4Belgium thrive.

A public and highly visible radical Salafist organization dedicated in-name to campaigning peacefully for an Islamist state, Shariah4Belgium has been linked with sending people to train militarily in Syria and Iraq.¹⁴⁵ Inspired by Shariah4UK and led by Fouad Belkacem, a second-generation Moroccan-Belgian, the organization is aimed at establishing Shariah law everywhere (Taub 2015).¹⁴⁶ However, since 2012 and following skirmishes and mayhem in the aftermath of the banning of the veil, Shariah4Belgium has been designated an illegal organization by the Belgian government. Belkacem himself is on trial for encouraging and aiding dozens of Belgian citizens to travel to Syria in order to join jihadist groups.¹⁴⁷ However, the Shariah4Belgium network continues to operate in Molenbeek and throughout Belgium with relative impunity.

¹⁴⁰ Sergio Castano Riano, "The Political Influence of Islam in Belgium", *The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies - Partecipazione e Conflitto* 7, no. 10 (2014), 145.

¹⁴¹ Alex Tickell, "Islamic State and the Paris Attacks: Terror, Culture and Urban Infrastructure", *Planned Violence* (2016).

¹⁴² Teich (2015), 10.

¹⁴³ Coolsaet (2015), 14.

¹⁴⁴ Higgins and de Freytas-Tamura (2016).

¹⁴⁵ James Brandon, "Belgium: Trial Uncovers Europe's Forgotten Jihadists" *The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor* 8, no. 4 (2015), 1.

¹⁴⁶ Ben Taub, "Journey to Jihad", *The New Yorker* (2015).

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

Networks such as Shariah4Belgium are key to the high rates of transmission of Belgian foreign fighters. Belgium is the biggest per capita contributor to the foreign fighter phenomenon, with forty individuals per million population traveling to Iraq and Syria.¹⁴⁸ Shariah4Belgium creates a logical path for would-be jihadists, providing transportation and touch-points along the way.¹⁴⁹ The organization identifies and recruits individuals, socializing them in a deliberate strategy of groupthink, incubating and propagating their initial highly personal incentives. After identifying potential recruits, many with only a superficial understanding of religion, Shariah4Belgium invites them to a six month program of ideological training, dividing the world into two camps and showing videos of martyrs so as to inspire feelings of obligation and duty (Taub 2015).¹⁵⁰ This network becomes a place in which one can air personal grievances, providing disenchanted youth with the legitimacy and the tools necessary to act on feelings that previously existed to them alone.

Relationships and partnerships of jihad and shariah are formed on the streets and within the mosques of Shariah4Belgium. Shariah4Belgium politicizes the youth's previously established personal grievances, maps them onto a common and global network, and connects individuals together in a shared duty.¹⁵¹ As a result, broadly speaking, the decision to leave is an impulsive response to join a local network (that then socializes and politicizes personal preferences and grievances).¹⁵²

Ideological Commitment

When it comes to the recruitment of foreigners, ideology plays a different role. As previously discussed, one way the Islamic State uses ideology is through the active exportation of the ummah. Religion is a pretext in which recruits discuss their duty, using ideological rhetoric publicly and citing religious obligation as justification for joining the Islamic State. As Yves Goldstein, who grew up in Molenbeek and is a member of the Belgian government says, "They believe in nothing. But Islam is the way they find to express, to crystallize their radicalization."¹⁵³ Foreign

¹⁴⁸ Selina Sykes, "Belgium was warned about Molenbeek extremist hotbed 10 YEARS before Brussels attacks", *Express.co.uk* (2016).

¹⁴⁹ Birnbaum (2015).

¹⁵⁰ Taub (2015)

¹⁵¹ Coolsaet (2015), 6.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Erlanger (2016).

fighters often discuss their responsibility to “protect the Muslims, their wealth, health, and religion.”¹⁵⁴ Individuals in Belgium, many of whom either were not raised Muslim or who had lapsed from the faith, have never been to Syria and are not of Syrian origin, discuss how they must do something to stop their brothers and sisters from being raped, tortured, and killed.¹⁵⁵

Through the networks of organizations like Shariah4Belgium in neighborhoods like Molenbeek, recruiters give potential recruits an ideological framework through which they can pursue their personal agendas. By using the threat to the global ummah as a rallying cry, and by giving these disenfranchised youths the language of extremism to express their personal discontent, the Islamic State has internationalized the concept of community (Hegghammer 2010/2011, 73).¹⁵⁶

Finally, many foreign fighters have a history of delinquency, drug use, and living in sinful opposition to Islam. For example, Salah Abdelsalem, the mastermind of the Paris attacks, is a former drug dealer and onetime bar owner who committed to an ascetic life just prior to his involvement in the attack.¹⁵⁷ For individuals like this, the opportunity to start over and to regain religious authority and salvation is attractive. They have sinned in the past, they have not lived the life of good Muslims, and they now have the opportunity to start over whilst simultaneously fulfilling personal desires.¹⁵⁸

CONCLUSION

The study of the literature and the application of incentive systems scholarship to the Islamic State makes evident that there are many different motivations that push participation at both a local and international level. The Islamic State’s slogan is *baqiya wa tatamadad*, which translates to “lasting and expanding.”¹⁵⁹ The only way that Islamic State can fulfill this objective is to continue to moti-

¹⁵⁴ Robert Mackey, “A Dutch ISIS Fighter Takes Question on Tumblr”, *New York Times*, (2015).

¹⁵⁵ Adam Goldman, “An American family saved their son from joining the Islamic State. Now he might go to prison” *Washington Post*, (2015).

¹⁵⁶ Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters” *International Security* 35 n. 3 (2010/2011), 73.

¹⁵⁷ Higgins and de Freytas-Tamura (2016).

¹⁵⁸ Ami Khan, “Al Qaeda’s New Front: Jihadi Rap” *POLITO Magazine* (2014).

¹⁵⁹ Lina Khatib, “Why ISIS Keeps Expanding” *Carnegie Middle East Center* (2015).

vate participation. In confronting the collective action problem, the Islamic State adapts previously identified incentives, orienting them differently towards each audience

In this study, I have attempted to present a more complete picture of why local Syrians engage in, at the least, basic complicity with the Islamic State. Yet, I want to reaffirm a note of caution that I sounded in the introduction. For all intents and purposes, Raqqa is an unknown quantity. The information available is limited at best and any information is biased - either released by the Islamic State itself or by defectors who, because of feelings of complicity or personal guilt, have incentives to manipulate their narratives. Hopefully, the situation de-escalates soon. When this occurs, on-the-ground dynamics should be re-assessed.

The wide global audience (made even wider by the Internet and social media) is a large population of untapped potential for the Islamic State, but with it comes a unique burden and challenge to the mobilization narratives and incentive system. In response to the questions “Why should I fight and die for you? Why should I join you when the costs of participation are so high relative to the tangible costs of non-participation?”, the Islamic State must fashion a new answer.¹⁶⁰ The Islamic State mobilizes individual level incentives, tapping into personal grievances, local motivations and networks, and presenting itself as the most worthwhile alternative to a boring life. It promises not only salvation in the afterlife, but also salvation from the malaise of current life. In this paper, I aimed to present an overview of mechanisms pushing participation at the international level. However, more work must be done in this regard. The intentions of these adolescents who leave safety to fight and die are unknowable and impossible to generalize.

Regardless, the simplistic narrative about ideological radicalization must be avoided. A simplified understanding and hardening of the “us versus them” sentiment reinforces the in-group bias being socialized within these disenfranchised teenagers. For these foreigners, reasons for mobilization are often grounded in their experience back at home – in Belgium and in the rest of the West. I encourage further research into how historical tendencies in Belgium, as well as the nation’s initial response to the alarming rate of Belgian foreign fighter transmission, have impacted mobilization.

With this project, I hope to demonstrate that no part of the Syrian conflict is static. Terms like “membership”, “culture”, and “order” fluctuate and are

¹⁶⁰ Vinci (2006), 51.

re-defined as conditions change. An incentive that may function one day in one capacity may be rendered unimportant the next. Therefore, I urge other scholars to maintain a constant study of the mechanisms at play for they are constantly in flux.

Finally, while this project focused on the Islamic State, the active role and continued brutality of the Assad regime should not and cannot be ignored. The emergence of the Islamic State and the incentives to which it appeals were not created in a vacuum. Especially in Raqqa, the regime is responsible for many the openings of which the Islamic State takes advantage. Building off of what I have tried to do in this project, future studies must address the role that the state plays.

The death toll in Syria is placed as high as almost half a million, with the rate of killing escalating each year (Taub 2016).¹⁶¹ Brutality and anarchy has hollowed out the country, with nearly 5 million Syrians displaced externally (Taub 2016).¹⁶² This conflict is not isolated to the region; it has entangled the world. Understanding the Islamic State's ability to last and expand is one of many steps necessary to effectively respond to the conflict.

¹⁶¹ Taub (2016).

¹⁶² Ibid.

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CHILD CARE POLICY AND FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: A COMPARISON OF GERMANY AND SWEDEN

ANALIA CUEVAS-FERRERAS¹

INTRODUCTION: MARKET ECONOMY THEORY AND LABOR MARKETS

Labor markets have traditionally been regarded as the product of a demand and supply of labor.² In *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, political economists Peter A. Hall and David Soskice put forth two types of economies whose variant organization and structures lead them to experience distinct hiring incentives, which can impact the configuration of a country's labor market leading to gendered hiring practices. On the one hand, there are Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), which are free market economies "characterized by a relatively decentralized system of industrial relations."³ LMEs' decentralization and lack of government-regulated unionization give them the flexibility "to move their resources around in search of higher returns, ... to acquire switchable assets, such as general skills."⁴ In LMEs, the lack of specialization and of strong collective bargaining allows for the hiring of women because a potential break in their career for child rearing can be easily managed by seeking other readily available workers and jobs as needed. Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), on the other hand, "rely on formal institutions to regulate the market and coordinate the interaction of firms."⁵ In this type of economy, there is a strong government

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² "Labour Market Definition," *The Economic Times*, accessed April 1, 2016, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/labour-market>.

³ Peter A. Hall and Soskice, eds., "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in *Varieties of Capitalism* (Oxford University Press), 1–68, accessed March 31, 2016, <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~phall/VofCIntro.pdf>.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Edmund Heery and Mike Noon, *A Dictionary of Human Resource Management*, 2nd

regulation of markets and policies bolster high unionization. Bound by unions and a need to develop industry-specific skills that are developed over time, CMEs are incentivized to provide job security and invest in human capital that will become more valuable in time. However, investing in highly specialized workers disincentivizes CMEs from hiring women due to the perception that women are more likely to interrupt their jobs and thus, affect efficiency in production.

Given the different modes of production, LMEs are expected to have higher Female Labor Force Participation (FLFP) than CMEs due to the latter's propensity to statistical discrimination and hiring rigidity against women. This expectation is supported by the data as visible in Figure 1, which reveals that four of the five countries with the highest FLFP rates are LMEs. However, the data also reveals that there is room for variation in FLFP within CMEs, notably with Sweden making the top five, which directly contradicts CME disincentives to hire women.

The question is then: why are there disparities in FLFP amongst CMEs, when, in theory, states with CMEs should be equally affected by statistical discrimination and incentives against hiring women? I will argue that the way the welfare state is structured is one important endogenous facet of that can influence FLFP. The main premise of this essay is that Germany's status as a Conservative welfare regime and Sweden's status as a Social Democratic welfare regime determine whether the state upholds the male-breadwinner model or an egalitarian contract between men and women, respectively. A critical analysis of Child Care Policies in light of Gøsta Esping-Andersen's typology will be used to illustrate the differences in welfare regime types that can affect FLFP.

STUDY DESIGN AND METHOD

One of the main goals of this paper is to be able to draw meaningful conclusions about the way the Conservative and Social Democratic welfare regimes organize the social contract between men and women. Germany and Sweden's status as the quintessential Conservative and Social Democratic Welfare Regimes, respectively, allows for a comparison with these broader implications. Additionally, similarities across production and labor market organizations such as CMEs but

ed. (Oxford University Press, 2008), <http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199298761.001.0001/acref-9780199298761>.

differences in outcomes allows for a connection to be drawn between the welfare structures and these disparities. I chose Child Care Policy because it is a policy area where Germany and Sweden operate in fundamentally different ways, likely as a result of their welfare regime structure, and also a policy whether there are strong implications for FLFP.

First, I will define the Conservative Welfare Regime and Social Democratic Welfare Regime and how their defining characteristics shape their respective ideal social contract between men and women. Secondly, I will provide a detailed description and analysis of Sweden and Germany's stance in three aspects of Child Care policy: public spending priorities, the implementation of specific measures that either foment or discourage FLFP, and statements by elected officials. This three-part examination of quantitative and qualitative data will allow for a comprehensive view of the policy area revealing the two governments' interest in upholding different social contracts between men and women. Thirdly, I will evaluate the ways in which German policy has shifted in recent years under the push for gender equality and the implications this has for the Conservative gender contract. In conclusion, I will offer a consideration of the implications these different social contracts may have in the realm of gender equality.

TYPOLOGIES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

In *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Gøsta Esping-Andersen argues that there are three distinct types of welfare regimes: Social Democratic, Liberal and Conservative regimes.⁶ There are several differences between the Conservative regime and the Social Democratic regime.⁷ According to Esping-Andersen, a Conservative Welfare State is characterized by its emphasis on the role of the family as the main welfare provider. Scholars concur that “*conservative* indicates the dominance of the family and corporate interest groups.”⁸ Consequently, Conservative Welfare regimes have focused on championing the male breadwinner model as a way to guarantee the livelihood of the family unit. Günther Schmid claims that this is a re-

⁶ Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).

⁷ For the purposes of this essay, I will only describe Conservative and Social Democratic regimes as they relate to the social contract between the family and the social contract between men and women.

⁸ Günther Schmid, *Full Employment in Europe: Managing Labour Market Transitions and Risks* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008).

sult of the assumption of “basic differences between men and women,” resulting in a “clear role division of work: the male ‘breadwinner’ and the ‘housewife.’”⁹ Conversely, the Social Democratic welfare regime is focused on the individual as the center of production. It assumes the diametrical opposite about men and women and in this case, “the gender contract is based on the principle of gender sameness, which means it is assumed that the genders have no basic differences to be considered in social and employment policies.”¹⁰ These differences between the two regimes are summarized in Table 1.

The different social contracts dictate what each gender is expected to contribute within the family unit. In the case of Germany, it means that the conservative model would theoretically expect women to be domestic caretakers and men to be financial providers, while in Sweden’s case, people of both genders would be expected to be productive members of society and a part of the workforce. Now I will consider whether Sweden and Germany exemplify these social contracts in the policies they have employed.

I. Public Spending Priorities

At first sight, both Germany and Sweden appear to have a robust interest in supporting the family unit. Both states allocate more than the OECD average of 2.55% of GDP towards family benefits.¹¹ However, Sweden and Germany allocate funding towards different kinds of family benefits. While Sweden’s public spending is divided solely between cash and services, Germany’s public spending is allocated almost evenly three ways between tax breaks, cash benefits, and services, as pictured in Figures 2 and 3 in the appendix. Germany’s choice to allocate almost a third of their spending on family benefits to joint tax breaks for married couples is significant in that it strongly reflects the Conservative Welfare Regime’s interest in upholding the male breadwinner model. Tax breaks given to families that engage in ‘income splitting,’ where there is one high-earning spouse and one low-earning spouse “gives a disadvantage to dual-earner families with two somewhat equal wages.”¹² By choosing to provide joint tax breaks instead

⁹ Ibid., 77.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ “PF1.1: Public Spending on Family Benefits” (OECD, September 19, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF1_1_Public_spending_on_family_benefits_Oct2013.pdf.

¹² “Child and Family Tax Benefits in Germany,” accessed April 3, 2016, <http://www.tulane>.

of enforcing individual tax breaks, Germany “discourages part-time workers,” which are overwhelmingly women, relegating them to the domestic sphere. In comparison, instead of providing families with tax breaks, Sweden spends almost two-thirds of their funds on the direct provision of childcare services. This choice strongly reflects the Social Democratic regimes’ focus on an egalitarian social contract by ensuring that families have an incentive to place their children in public childcare and thereby, encouraging a dual-earner household. By not giving families the choice to receive money in exchange for childcare services, it prevents a dynamic where women are encouraged to care for children as their contribution to the household.

II. Specific Government Measures

The allocation of funds towards joint tax breaks is but one of the many ways in which the German government has discouraged women from entering the labor market. When faced with labor shortages, the German government “made strong efforts to meet its labour shortage by the recruitment of foreign ‘guest-workers’ rather than by integrating married women into the labour market.”¹³ Additionally, they chose to incentivize women to take on mini-jobs, which was “a very particular German institution that provides incentives to keep monthly earnings below 450 Euro.”¹⁴ Mini Jobs were first implemented in the 1960s “in order to encourage housewives to take up at least a small part-time job, and to solve the problem of labour shortages in several industries.”¹⁵ These two choices reveal the Conservative Welfare regime’s strong interest in enforcing the male breadwinner model and ensuring that German women stay in the home and care for the children. This is not to suggest that the policy is negative, as many women might have welcomed mini jobs as a way to be productive and fulfill their motherly duties. However, the policy does reveal a government interest in keeping women in the home to in lieu of having them work full-time. For Germany, women’s role as caretakers took precedence over their employment in the labor market. Up until the 1960s, Sweden, too, had

edu/-rouxbee/soci626/germany/_pbaliga/childfamilytaxbenefits.htm.

¹³ Ingela K. Naumann, “Child Care and Feminism in West Germany and Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s,” *Journal of European Social Policy* 15, no. 1 (February 1, 2005): 47–63, doi:10.1177/0958928705049162.

¹⁴ Claudia Weinkopf, “Women’s Employment in Germany,” *Revue de l’OFCE*, no. 133 (March 1, 2014): 189–214.

¹⁵ Ibid.

a variation of the male breadwinner model in place, “displaying more egalitarian features than the German gender regime which can perhaps be traced back to a strong agrarian tradition and late industrialization.”¹⁶ However, by contrast, Katrin Bennhold points out that when faced with the same problems of labor shortage “Sweden...made a strategic decision to get more women into the work force in the booming 1960s.”¹⁷ The decision to encourage women to work reflects the Social Democratic regimes’ interest in fomenting an egalitarian social contract between men and women as a primary focus. The Swedish preferences of either integrating or omitting women from the workforce were corresponded by either the provision of childcare or availability of part-time jobs. In the face of economic depression and low birth rates, an influential report by Hinnefors “painted a threatening picture of looming economic stagnation or recession... and noted that the huge reserve of married women who could be mobilized.”¹⁸ The message was heeded by many parts of society, including women who were strong advocates for childcare and against the hiring of foreign workers in the 1960s, laying the groundwork for future reform. Consequently, Sweden employed widespread family policy reforms in the 1970s, which resulted in the implementation of universal preschools. The National Pre-School Act was implemented in 1975, making local authorities accountable for providing public childcare. Daycare was guaranteed for any child between the ages of one and five and enrollment increased throughout the decades. By the year 2005, daycares enrolled 90% of children between one and five.¹⁹ This emphasis on the provision of public child-

¹⁶ Naumann, “Child Care and Feminism in West Germany and Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s.”

¹⁷ Katrin Bennhold, “In Sweden, Men Can Have It All,” *The New York Times*, June 9, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/europe/10iht-sweden.html>. governments of all political hues in Sweden have legislated to give women equal rights at work — and men equal rights at home.

¹⁸ Naumann, “Child Care and Feminism in West Germany and Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s.”

¹⁹ Sven Bremberg, “A Perfect 10: Why Sweden Comes out on Top in Early Child Development Programming,” *Paediatrics & Child Health* 14, no. 10 (December 2009): 677–80. Crisis in the Population Question, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal outlined many of the features that were later assessed by the United Nations Children’s Fund. Three aspects may have affected the implementation of Myrdal’s ideas. First, the Social Democratic Party has been in power for 85% of the time since 1932. They often had to form coalitions with other parties that supported a nonpartisan stance. Second, according to evidence from the World Values Survey, Swedes are more individualistic than people in any of the other 64 societies included in that

care demonstrated a commitment to both the promotion of “child-bearing while also allowing for individual liberty, especially for women.”²⁰ Inherent in these policies is an emphasis on mothers’ ability to be at liberty to decide.

In contrast, the political conversation in Germany was governed by conservative experts who “unremittingly warned ... ‘institutional care’ would have serious and detrimental effects on its psychological and moral development,” focusing their arguments on the well being of children.²¹ In line with that point of view, German feminists and women’s organizations were not concerned with obtaining child care services as they “considered it best if mothers took care of their own children.”²² Thus, it becomes clear that the German government’s interest in expanding part-time employment was largely accommodating to many German women who sought economic independence but also to maintain their traditional role as housewife within the male-breadwinner social contract.

III. Family Policy Rhetoric

In the 1960s, German working mothers were often characterized as *Rabenmütter*, which directly translates into ‘uncaring mother’ and refers to mothers who “selfishly abandon their toddlers to pursue careers,” or as *Heimchen am Herd*, which is a phrase that represents a mother happy to stay home with the children.²³ This kind of language was not only commonplace at the community levels but also utilized government campaigns where “the family ministry attacked working mothers as

study. The State is expected to create social conditions on equal terms for individuals to realize their own goals. Finally, schools and other social services are managed by 290 semi-independent municipalities. Thus, reforms can be tested in a few municipalities before others follow suit.”,

²⁰ Ibid. Crisis in the Population Question, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal outlined many of the features that were later assessed by the United Nations Children’s Fund. Three aspects may have affected the implementation of Myrdal’s ideas. First, the Social Democratic Party has been in power for 85% of the time since 1932. They often had to form coalitions with other parties that supported a nonpartisan stance. Second, according to evidence from the World Values Survey, Swedes are more individualistic than people in any of the other 64 societies included in that study. The State is expected to create social conditions on equal terms for individuals to realize their own goals. Finally, schools and other social services are managed by 290 semi-independent municipalities. Thus, reforms can be tested in a few municipalities before others follow suit.

²¹ Naumann, “Child Care and Feminism in West Germany and Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s.”

²² Ibid.

²³ “Fighting over the Kinder,” *The Economist*, August 17, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21583676-cr-ches-trump-euro-and-much-else-german-election-campaign-fighting-over-kinder>.

greedy ‘double earners’ pursuing egoistic interests rather than fulfilling their family duties.”²⁴ Inherent in these terms is a conservative moral judgment of German mothers that strongly indicts those that would opt to put their children in government provided care.

Table 1

	Social Democratic Welfare Regime	Conservative Welfare Regime
Countries	Sweden , Denmark, Norway	Germany , Italy, Belgium, France, Ireland
Relationship between the Market and the Family	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support of the double-earner dual-career family. - Emphasis on individual rights. - Promotion of female employment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The labor market is centered on the male breadwinner. - Job protection is central to production. - Strong gender-segmentation in the workforce due to link between benefits and employment. - Barriers to workforce entry for women due to firing costs.
Social Contract Upheld between Men and Women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Based on egalitarian principles. - “Acknowledging gender differences that require positive policies that foster equal opportunity.”¹ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Under the male Breadwinner model, the male partner is expected to provide a source of income while the female partner is expected to contribute in child-rearing and household care.

In more recent times, German politicians have tried to shift the language surrounding childcare by arguing it provides women with choices. In 2012, Angela Merkel, Christian Democratic chancellor of Germany speaks of stay at home mother or part-time work as “an essential part of our policy of freedom of

²⁴ Naumann, “Child Care and Feminism in West Germany and Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s.”

choice.”²⁵ Similarly, Dorothee Bar, the Christian Democratic Party’s spokeswoman for family issues, considers the new family allowance a way to “make sure that families can choose if they want to give their children to daycare or educate them at home.”²⁶ Referring to the extensive list of entitlements, former German family minister Kristina Schröder argues that variation in the types of entitlements allows for an accommodation of “every conceivable situation in life and thus gives parents choice.”²⁷ These statements reflect a shift from directly suggesting that staying at home with the children is the morally correct thing to do to discretely upholding that same belief through a believed access to choice. Nevertheless, in general, German politicians’ statements continue to uphold policies that reflect “traditional ideas of motherhood,” which as of late have been the object of serious debate on Germany.²⁸

On the other hand, the rhetoric surrounding childcare in Sweden is different in that instead of emphasizing that a mother’s care is the best thing for a child, there is a stronger focus on the many benefits a child receives from attending public daycare. Additionally, and perhaps interestingly, instead of placing an emphasis on the idea of choice, Swedish politicians stress the importance of the woman’s right to work. In an interview with Swedish Ambassador to Korea, Anne Höglund, she expressed the belief that “childcare services of high quality [are] provided to ensure women’s right to work” as a means for “economic independence for their decision-making power.”²⁹ Throughout the interview, Höglund places a strong emphasis on the importance of women’s competitiveness vis-à-vis men.³⁰ Similarly, in a speech to the United Nations, Minister for Children and the Elderly and Minister for Gender Equality Åsa Regnér said that “access to affordable child care services...[has] been essential for women’s and men’s participation in

²⁵ “Pay to Stay at Home,” *The Economist*, May 5, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21554245>.

²⁶ Sara Malm, “Germany to Pay Stay-at-Home Parents Extra Benefits for Keeping Toddlers out of State Daycare,” *Dailymail*, accessed April 4, 2016, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2190259/Germany-pay-stay-home-parents-extra-benefits-keeping-toddlers-state-daycare.html>.

²⁷ “Fighting over the Kinder.”

²⁸ “Pay to Stay at Home.”

²⁹ “Interview: Ambassador Anne Höglund of Sweden | SwedenAbroad,” accessed April 4, 2016, <http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-GB/Embassies/Seoul/Current-affairs/News/Interview-Ambassador-Anne-Hoglund-of-Sweden-Gender-Equality-Needs-No-Arguments---The-Womens-News-sys/>.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

the labour market.”³¹ The two women’s constant allusion to “life balance of both women and men” and an “equal distribution between women and men” in all social areas reflects the Social Democratic welfare regimes’ interest in upholding an egalitarian social contract between men and women.

RECENT SHIFTS IN FAMILY POLICY

Throughout the past decade, Germany has implemented several policies with the potential to shift German policy away from the traditional male-breadwinner social contract between men and women. One example is the 1992 implementation of a policy that guaranteed full-time child-care for children of at least 3 years. Subsequently, on August 1st, 2013, German progressives introduced a bill to guarantee children at least 1 year old with government subsidized care.³² This policy signals a move towards a more Social Democratic conception of the social contract between men and women by seeking to afford women that want to work full-time the ability to do so. However, while the policy has been instituted, the expected outcomes have not been met. A report conducted by the Ministry for Families, Seniors, Women and Youth found that “there are child care facilities for 27.6% of the children under 3”³³ due to a lack of infrastructure and personnel.³⁴ The expressed interest in providing childcare has not been met with actual resources; thus far, they are unfulfilled words that have not allowed women to choose full time employment in lieu of their full or part-time child-rearing responsibilities.

Furthermore, German conservatives have countered these progressive policies with policies that would create contradictory effects and hark back on the traditional breadwinner-housewife model. One such example was the 2013 proposal of “a new monthly payment of \$130... to parents who choose not to use a subsidized crèche.”³⁵ Similarly, as of July 1st 2015, the German government

³¹ “Speech by Minister Åsa Regnér at Commission on the Status of Women 2016,” Text, *Regeringskansliet*, (March 16, 2016), <http://www.government.se/speeches/2016/03/speech-by-asa-regner-at-commission-on-the-status-of-women-2016/>.

³² “Fighting over the Kinder.”

³³ Weinkopf, “Women’s Employment in Germany.”

³⁴ Fiederike Heine and Speigel, “Germany Promises Daycare for All Parents,” *ABC News*, August 4, 2013, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/place-germany-promises-daycare-parents/story?id=19847116>.

³⁵ “Fighting over the Kinder.”

implemented the Parental Allowance Plus, which is provided to parents either working part-time or with no income after a child has been born, once again discouraging a dual-earner family arrangement.³⁶ Consequently, it becomes clear that while the German government has pledged their support for providing child-care, there still remains much debate as to women's role in the family and strong support for policies that discourage women from taking advantage of child-care resources. What side will win out remains to be seen, but what *is* likely is that any changes in the conservative nature of the German welfare state are bound to be gradual.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GENDER EQUALITY AND FEMALE CHOICE

Some would argue that these findings regarding the male-breadwinner and egalitarian social contract have an almost obvious general applicability to the principles of gender equality. Caroline Weinkopf, for example, argues that “despite an increasing female participation rate, gender inequality in terms of working time and hourly pay, for instance, is still very pronounced” in Germany.³⁷ Conversely, many would regard Sweden as a pillar of gender equality, often alluding to their commitment to gender equality is visible in a plethora of ways. From paid paternity leave to the fact that “cleaning products rarely feature women as homemakers,” the effort to avoid relegating women to the private sphere runs deep in Sweden.³⁸ However, others may see the Swedish emphasis on the ‘right to work’ as limiting female choice. Ingela Neumann makes a noteworthy argument when pointing out that “German feminist politics does not fit with the assumptions about women's interests underlying most feminist research on welfare states.”³⁹ For some women, being relieved of family duties cannot necessarily be paralleled to gender equality, as many women feel that staying home with their children is the best option for their child and/or they enjoy taking care of their children. In fact, according to the World Economic Forum, “fewer than half of German women want to see a change

³⁶ “Germany: A Modern Family Policy for a Compatible Partnership of Family and Career and for Economically Stable Families - European Platform for Investing in Children (EPIC) - European Union” (European Platform for Investing in Children (EPIC) - European Union), accessed March 30, 2016, http://europa.eu/epic/countries/germany/index_en.htm.

³⁷ Weinkopf, “Women's Employment in Germany.”

³⁸ Bennhold, “In Sweden, Men Can Have It All.” governments of all political hues in Sweden have legislated to give women equal rights at work — and men equal rights at home.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/europe/10iht-sweden>.

³⁹ Naumann, “Child Care and Feminism in West Germany and Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s.”

in the prevalent division of gender roles.”⁴⁰ This raises an interesting dilemma: Do current day-care and child rearing policies reflect German women’s wishes? If not, are efforts aimed at fostering gender equality and fomenting FLFP justified?

In this essay, I do seek not to pass moral judgment on which social contract is morally correct or on what type of early care is best for the development of children, but merely to lay out the differences between systems and consider how those differences affect women’s entry into the labor market. Some may believe that public childcare is the best option for children to develop strong social skills while others maintain that state interference in childcare can negatively impact the bonds between children and their parents. However, one aspect that often goes undisputed in discussions regarding gender equality is the importance of choice. One might argue if German women were actually deeply interested in joining the labor force, they could do so within the parameters of choice that Angela Merkel and German politicians describe. In the case of Germany, it is possible that “up to a specific level of employment, women can do without official alternatives,” meaning that women are able to seek childcare beyond government provisions.⁴¹ However, Monique Kramer finds that beyond these lower levels “a critical level state intervention is necessary and can then even act as a catalyst” for female employment, thus arguing that “a new ideal of care has to replace the old full-time mother care model.”⁴² Ultimately, state intervention and provision might be necessary in order to give women an actual unencumbered choice to work.

CONCLUSION

The main premise of this paper is that a state’s welfare regime identity impacts the way they view the gender contract, which in turn influences government policy, leading to varied outcomes (in this case affecting FLFP). I argue that the Conservative Welfare designation of the social contract under a male breadwinner and female housewife model led Germany to employ policies discouraging

⁴⁰ Katinka Barysch, “Why Do so Few German Mothers Go back to Work?,” *World Economic Forum*, accessed April 4, 2016, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/04/german-women-feel-need-choose-kids-career>.

⁴¹ Monique Kremer, *How Welfare States Care : Culture, Gender and Parenting in Europe* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), <http://dare.uva.nl/aup/nl/record/216794>.

⁴² Ibid.

FLFP. Conversely, the Social Democratic Welfare regime's definition of the social contract as a relationship where both parties are equal contributors to society led Sweden to shape policies towards the encouragement of female entry to the labor market. A comprehensive analysis of three aspects of childcare policy reveals that both states have largely invested in upholding two very different social contracts, ultimately contributing to differences in German and Swedish FLFP illustrated in Figure 4. In Germany, public spending, government policies and political rhetoric were overwhelmingly in support of a male-breadwinner female-housewife social contract while in Sweden, all three aspects sought to uphold an egalitarian contract of equality between men and women. Ultimately, Esping-Andersen's typology can be used to explain differences in Welfare Regime notions of the gender contract and to explain variances across labor markets within Coordinated Market Economies.

APPENDIX

Figure 1







Figure 2

Source: OECD Family Database – PF1.1 Public Spending on Family Benefits

Figure 3

Source: OECD Family Database – PF1.1 Public Spending on Family Benefits

Figure 4



Source: ILOSTAT - European Labor Force Survey

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THE ASEAN EXPERIENCE, NORTHEAST ASIA AND BEYOND: FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

TAN AIK SENG¹

INTRODUCTION

Economic regionalism has been an observable phenomenon worldwide. Many countries around the world pursue some degree of economic integration with neighbouring countries, in the hopes of capitalizing on the benefits of such an arrangement. At the turn of the 21st century, there already existed various regional economic institutions, including the highly integrated Eurozone in Europe and the East African Community (EAC) for continental Africa. This is in addition to a proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between countries, which can be regional or cross regional in nature. Many Asian countries, including South Korea, China and Singapore, have also been active participants in these economic processes, with many FTAs signed intra and inter-region. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),² recognizing the preponderant benefits that can be derived from trade ties, have been among the most vocal advocates of economic regionalism, an institution that goes beyond bilateral FTAs. Unlike bilateral FTAs, regional institutions include more than just two parties, thereby enabling more countries to benefit from trade together. Against this backdrop, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is currently being implemented incrementally by all member states, according to a chronological roadmap. The AEC is expected to deliver substantial economic gains to all

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² The ASEAN countries are Singapore, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei and Vietnam.

member countries, including increased access to regionally produced goods, better allocation of capital resources and overall improvement of economic well-being to the people in ASEAN. Yet, the creation of the AEC did not come without its obstacles. Much effort was – and continues to be – channeled towards coordination, alignment of interests and resolution of conflicts. As is encountered even in the Eurozone and the EAC mentioned earlier, all regional economic institutions have to overcome various establishment and maintenance problems that can hinder the efficacy and effectiveness of such institutions. Thus far, the AEC appears to be coping with these barriers well. If it can do so successfully, the economic benefits accrued to member countries will be considerable.

Economic integration provides promise of improving societal welfare through market mechanisms, but also closer inter-state ties and improved intra-regional peace and stability. Much scholarship has been devoted towards exploring the political difficulties that undergird economic integration. Tensions from historical or ideological issues have been attributed as problems that hinder cooperation.³ Therefore, a common line of argumentation could hold that resolving these political problems must occur prior to cooperation between these states. However, evidence on this count is inconclusive. For example, the United States (U.S) and China were able to set aside ideological differences, despite decades of tension, in favour of cooperating against the Soviet Union. This implies that the tangible benefits from economic integration could provide the motivation to isolating or resolving major political differences. If there are clear material benefits at stake, as in the Soviet threat of the 1970s, there are reasonable grounds to posit that states may be willing to pursue self-interest before considering less immediate and non-threatening problems, such as ideology. As this paper will show, the AEC is a powerful force promoting peace in the Southeast Asian region. Greater labour mobility within this region, coupled with the material gains from collective economic growth are major stabilizers that mitigate unnecessary conflict. In other words, national behaviour increasingly adapts to ensure that economic development is prioritized. If a government cannot guarantee its people security in their basic material needs, then there can be no foundation to pursuing higher-level, abstract goals such as ideological legitimization.

³ Rafael Reuveny and Heejoon Kang, "Bilateral trade and political conflict/cooperation: do goods matter?," *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 5 (1998): 581-602. See also Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.)

Assuming the logic of economic integration holds true, Northeast Asia stands to profit immensely if the region creates a similarly structured economic institution. As such, this paper argues that Northeast Asia's ability to increase economic integration's viability can be greatly enhanced by understanding how ASEAN has approached the creation of the AEC. There are both economic and political-security benefits which can greatly enhance the attractiveness of creating a "Northeast Asian Economic Community" (NAEC). In the first section of this paper, I perform a case study of ASEAN to better understand the actual and potential benefits of the AEC's creation, followed by a distillation of lessons that can be learnt, pertaining to how major barriers to successful economic integration have been - and are still being - mitigated. The second section will then proceed to examine the benefits of forming the NAEC and suggest how, by way of the ASEAN experience, significant barriers to economic integration can be overcome to increase the possibility of successfully creating the envisaged NAEC. The final part of this paper will articulate the possibility of a more encompassing East Asian economic community, contingent on the success of the AEC and NAEC.

I - THE ASEAN WAY TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Historically, Southeast Asia was a major node in the international trade network, exposed to major movements of goods between different nations around the world. Following post-colonialism, however, many member countries turned to import-substitution industrialization in order to develop their economies. In recent decades, more countries have increasingly embraced the idea of free trade, persuaded by the benefits that it can provide. The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was conceptualised in 2003, following the meeting of ASEAN heads-of-state in Indonesia, and is part of a larger concept of regional integration.⁴ The AEC aims to create a common economic platform that will facilitate the participation and trade of ASEAN member countries. Its main pillars are: 1) a single market and production base; 2) a competitive economic region; 3) equitable economic development; and 4) integration into the global economy.⁵ With

⁴ ASEAN, *Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint*, ASEAN Website, January 2008, Accessed May 1, 2015, <http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-10.pdf>.

⁵ Ibid.

the integration of the AEC, the total value of the economic market is estimated at US\$2.3 trillion.⁶ As a large market with considerable promise, the AEC is an attractive region for robust economic growth. It is in this regard that many countries have been convinced to participate in the AEC, as the tangible and rational benefits accrued to each country will go a long way in promoting the economic health and societal welfare of their respective countries.

How the AEC benefits its member countries

First, the AEC provides countries with incentives to align their production bases according to their comparative advantages. For many Southeast Asian countries, most countries retain a large agrarian base, with only a few having successfully transitioned to a more capital-intensive economy.⁷ For example, Singapore and Malaysia are the leading economies in the region and both have considerable infrastructure tailored to meet the needs of a more knowledge-based, high-value economy. This is aligned with their comparative advantages, especially so for Singapore. Public universities, such as the National University of Singapore and Nanyang Technological University, have consistently been recognized for academic excellence in various world rankings, while other technical and vocational training institutes provide Singaporeans with the needed skills that employers from MNCs look for.^{8 9} As a result, Singapore in general has emerged as a strong and competitive economy. On the other hand, the Philippines, with a large agrarian base, is presently much poorer than Singapore. Without specialization, it will be difficult for the Philippines to achieve economies of scale via large-scale efficient production of goods according to their comparative advantage in primary products, such

⁶ KPMG, *The ASEAN Economic Community 2015: On the Road to Real Business Impact*, June 2014, Accessed May 5, 2015, <http://www.kpmg.com/SG/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Tax-Itax-The-ASEAN-Economic-Community-2015.pdf>.

⁷ Quah, Jon ST, *Public Administration Singapore Style*, Vol. 19 (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, 2010).

⁸ Based on the QS University Rankings, the National University of Singapore and Nanyang Technological University, were respectively ranked 12th and 13th in the 2016 edition.

⁹ J.S. K. Yip & Sim, W.K, *Evolution of Educational Excellence: 25 Years of Education in the Republic of Singapore* (Singapore: Longman, 1990).

as agricultural goods.¹⁰ The AEC aims to address this by encouraging economies to re-align according to their strengths. In doing so, other trading partners within the AEC will benefit from lower prices, thereby enhancing consumer welfare.

Second, the AEC effectively creates an integrated market for 611 million consumers.¹¹ A large consumer base will be advantageous to many firms located within member countries, as their product reach will be greater than before. Where successful integration without significant trade barriers prevails, social welfare improves as raw material and final product prices are not unnecessarily distorted. It is little wonder, therefore, that many countries are receptive of the AEC since this will increase both domestic consumption and export expenditure, enhancing the interest of their respective business sectors. Consumers in the AEC will be exposed to even more product choice, variety and nature at a higher level of quantity and quality. Already, benefits have been apparent. For example, Jollibee, a fast food restaurant chain from the Philippines, has successfully expanded its operations into nine of the ten ASEAN nations as a result of lower trade and investment barriers. Today, its operations are worth a total of US\$866 million.¹² The presence of a large market is also effective in attracting foreign direct investment from other parts of the world. This sentiment was captured in a survey by the US Chamber of Commerce, which polled and discovered that 54% of American firms have plans that involve expanding into ASEAN.¹³ Such investments can go a long way in strengthening the regional economy even further, thereby enhancing the overall returns to integration. Specifically, more jobs can be created and economic development achieved. Effectively, consumers will benefit alongside business and every country is moved along in this cycle of economic prosperity.

Third, the AEC's success can promote greater regional peace and ameliorate security-related challenges. Economic competition has often been im-

¹⁰ Ana Shohibul, "Revealed comparative advantage measure: ASEAN-China trade flows," *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development* 4, no. 7 (2013): 140.

¹¹ ASEAN, *Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint*.

¹² ASEAN, *Thinking Globally, Prospering Regionally: ASEAN Economic Community 2015*, ASEAN Website, April 2014, Accessed May 1, 2015, <http://asean.org/storage/2016/06/4.-March-2015-Thinking-Globally-Prospering-Regionally-%E2%80%93-The-AEC-2015-Messaging-for-Our-Future-2nd-Reprint.pdf>. http://www.asean.org/images/resources/2014/May/AECKeyMessagesBooklet_FINAL30Apr2014.pdf.

¹³ Ibid.

plicated in political conflicts among states (Le Billon, 2004). The presence of the AEC provides all states with positive security externalities, specifically, a buffer against unnecessary conflict caused by economic fundamentals. Under conditions of shared economic growth and prioritized economic cooperation, the benefits of a successful AEC will be enjoyed by all ASEAN states. Fostering an economic community can also provide additional benefits to regional peace, following economic liberalism. According to economic interdependence theory, states that form a network of cross-border cutting economic ties will be more disposed towards peace and less towards conflict. If the theory is true, the presence of the AEC will be a major driver of regional peace in ASEAN. While no studies have been conducted in ASEAN yet, economic interdependence theory tentatively has some support from research conducted by Russett and Oneal, who established the presence of a positive relationship between trade and peace.¹⁴ This is salient, as ASEAN leaders such as Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong have identified growing nationalism as a threat to regional stability.¹⁵ Integration in the economic sphere, in turn, can serve as a viable launch pad for better and more stable political and social relations across the region. Building a stable and powerful AEC will be advantageous to promoting peace in Southeast Asia, a goal that is desirable in the context of greater political conflict among East Asian states. This being achieved, peace in Southeast Asia will be a good base to enhance peace in the greater East Asia region.

Lessons from the ASEAN Experience

Following the above, it is apparent that economic cooperation is desirable as it provides economies access to a larger market, fosters economic competitiveness and carries positive security externalities. Together, these attractive 'push' factors encourage states to seek out such an arrangement. Against this backdrop, there is cautious optimism that Northeast Asia can achieve similar results, if a similar economic community can be mooted. Should major economies such as China,

¹⁴ Bruce Russett, and John R. Oneal, "The Kantian peace: The pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations," *World Politics* 52, no. 1 (1999): 1-37.

¹⁵ Hetty Musfirah Abdul Khamid, "Prosperity of Asia dependent on factors not economic in nature: PM Lee," *Channel NewsAsia*, April 11, 2015, Accessed May 5, 2015, <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/prosperity-of-asia/1777396.html>.

Taiwan, Japan and South Korea come together to form a coherent economic multi-lateral institution, there is a high chance that these countries can enjoy the economic benefits that AEC member states will share. Yet, such communities are not naturally formed, owing to various barriers that can discourage countries from associating into an economic community. This section will enumerate three major difficulties associated with national-level economic organizations. Every multi-member organization is prone to conflict among constituent members owing to different priorities, norms and domestic needs. ASEAN is no stranger to these issues. Specifically, the issues under discussion are: 1) the dumping of excess produced goods in other countries' markets; 2) the extent of protectionism that hinders full economic integration; and 3) undesirable labour-side effects caused by labour mobility.

Dumping

Countries able to manufacture cheaper goods tend to export such goods overseas upon saturation of the local market, leading to greater competition and declining profitability of recipient country firms. This condition, known as dumping, is a recurrent problem found in economic zones with members being in different stages of economic development.¹⁶ Assuming free trade and a country X with a strong comparative advantage in good A, compared to countries Y and Z, the latter two countries will experience an influx of good A from X, leading to an outcompeting of domestic producers in Y and Z who lack the level of efficiency needed to provide similar goods at more competitive rates. This has been a problem faced in various regions, whereby the movement of goods according to comparative advantage has meant a decrease in earnings from domestic industries, who are unable to compete with more efficient producers from other countries. As a result, this phenomenon of dumping causes domestic producers to be squeezed out of the production market, leading to negative effects on the economy's production capacity as a whole. Of greater salience in politics, the marginalization of local sectors in business can foment greater resentment and demands placed on the government to protect their interests better. Should the government heed this call and respond in favour of their businesses, the resultant

¹⁶ Thomas J. Prusa, "On the spread and impact of anti-dumping," *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économie* 34, no. 3 (2001): 591-611.

situation can be detrimental to the overall fabric of the regional outfit writ-large.

In ASEAN, this problem of dumping has been averted by negotiating and re-aligning comparative advantages while embracing the overall enhancing effects on consumer surplus. The ASEAN institution leverages greatly on such conciliatory negotiation mechanisms that aim to produce consensus among member states.¹⁷ This minimizes any consequent disagreements that can impede successful policy implementation. According to an ANZ Bank analyst, the ASEAN countries will likely structure their economies to match their resource endowments, with Singapore and Malaysia developing “into service and financial hubs for the region” while Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam move into middle-end manufacturing, while Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, will leverage on its physical resources for lower-value manufacturing.¹⁸ This indicates that no particular industry will see inefficient and large-scale production of any goods or services. Instead, countries largely avoid the narrow concentration of industrial efforts on similar products and focus on their niche areas of production. Hence, this reduces any surplus production needing to be ‘dumped’ in regional markets.

Protectionism

Economic integration can be greatly hindered when member countries refuse to abide by agreed upon regulations permitting movement of goods and services across borders. This is commonly done by raising barriers to mobility, a practice officially known as protectionism. Traditional protectionist measures include tariffs and quotas on foreign imports, while modern protectionist measures typically involve regulations on product content requirements.¹⁹ Countries may adopt protectionism so as to protect their domestic industries from more efficient foreign competitors, which may have repercussions on domestic employment. Another reason for protectionism may be to pander to business groups with powerful influence and ties with politicians.²⁰ Such businesses understandably do not wish to

¹⁷ Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, identity, and institution-building: From the ‘ASEAN way’ to the ‘Asia-Pacific way’,” *The Pacific Review* 10, no. 3 (1997): 319-346.

¹⁸ Patrick John Lim, “10 to 15 years before ASEAN economic community becomes fully integrated: ANZ,” *Channel NewsAsia*, April 24, 2015, Accessed May 1, 2015. <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/singapore/10-to-15-years-before/1805076.html>.

¹⁹ The Economist, “Protectionism: the Hidden Persuaders,” *The Economist*, October 12, 2013, Accessed May 1, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21587381-protectionism-can-take-many-forms-not-all-them-obvious-hidden-persuaders>.

²⁰ Anusha Chari and Nandini Gupta, “Incumbents and protectionism: The political economy of

see an erosion of profits, which competition brings about generally. Still, despite such justifications, protectionist measures militate against the creation of an integrated and accessible economic community. These barriers prevent free flow of goods and services from one country to another, contradicting the basic tenet of economic integration.

ASEAN countries have tackled this problem by collaboratively building consensus about the disavowing of protectionism. This was embodied most clearly in the communique released after the ASEAN Summit in 2015, whereby ASEAN affirmed its commitment to eliminating trade tariffs, of which nearly 96% have been eliminated.²¹ Incrementally, every country has been reducing restrictions on competition in protected sectors such as banking, which is a major source of revenue for economies. The commitment to protectionism can be seen in agreements signed within the AEC, including the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA). The ACIA institutionalizes each country's commitment to liberalize their business sectors and this has "eased restrictions to cross-border trade."²² This is supplemented by the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, a "legal framework to realize the free flow of goods within the AEC." Consequently, much progress has been made in the AEC, whereby more than "70% of intra-regional trade" now has zero tariffs across 80 sub-sectors.²³ With more time given, the rate of further liberalization is expected to increase given the continued commitment of political leaders to the AEC's cause.

Undesirable labor effects

Labor movement can be both a source of benefit and conflict to the receiving society, which may not always embrace foreigner inflows. This poses a formidable obstacle to any plans for full-scale economic integration, since any failure to

foreign entry liberalization," *Journal of Financial Economics* 88, no. 3 (2008): 633-656.

²¹ Najib Razak, *Chairman's Statement of the 26th ASEAN Summit*, ASEAN Website, April 27, 2015, Accessed May 1, 2015. http://www.asean.org/images/2015/april/26th_asean_summit/Chairman%20Statement%2026th%20ASEAN%20Summit_final.pdf.

²² ASEAN, *Thinking Globally, Prospering Regionally*, 6.

²³ Balboa, J.D & G. Wignaraja. "ASEAN economic community 2015: what is next?." *Asia Pathways*. December 12, 2014. Accessed May 1, 2015. <http://www.asiapathways-adbi.org/2014/12/asean-economic-community-2015-what-is-next/>.

permit free labour flow can go against a fundamental tenet of a shared economic community. In theory, free labour flow is beneficial because it can correct any asymmetry in the labour market by ensuring that workers move to where they are in demand from places where they are currently unemployed due to undersupply of jobs.²⁴ Furthermore, these workers are likely to have received education and training in their home countries prior to movement to other countries, being a big advantage to the latter. Such prior training greatly reduces the need to equip these workers with basic skills, a source of cost savings for the receiving country. However, labour factors, despite their advantages for the receiving economy, interact with socio-cultural cleavages at the same time. Locals may perceive foreigners to be taking their jobs, fomenting greater resentment as a result. How have affected ASEAN countries dealt with this? To provide a more detailed analysis, here this paper examines a single case, Singapore, in detail.

Being an advanced economy, Singapore is attractive to many foreign workers around the world. This ranges from lower-value employment such as in construction and the service industry, of which most workers tend to be from neighbouring ASEAN countries and South Asia, to high-value employment in sectors such as banking and Information Technology (IT).²⁵ Such workers can come from any part of the world, with the critical distinction being their professional qualifications and experience. Due to rapid development, alignment with comparative advantage, and a small labour force, Singapore has relied on foreigners to fill gaps in the various sectors, with most of them found in the lower-value sectors.²⁶ The reason for this is that, since Singapore's only valuable resource endowment is human capital, such capital must be upgraded to be of higher value in order to sustain the economy's development.²⁷ As such, labour shortages are found more in the sectors of construction and ancillary public services such as cleaning.

However, Singaporean society has not taken well to such measures and has displayed occasional resistance to the foreign labour policy of the government.

²⁴ Marc Lieberman and Robert Hall, *Economics: Principles and Applications*, (Australia, South-Western: Cengage Learning, 2013).

²⁵ Brenda SA. Yeoh, "Bifurcated labour: the unequal incorporation of transmigrants in Singapore," *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie* 97, no. 1 (2006): 31.

²⁶ Chew Soon-Beng and Rosalind Chew, "Immigration and foreign labour in Singapore," *ASEAN Economic Bulletin* (1995): 191-200.

²⁷ Neo Boon Siong and Geraldine Chen, *Dynamic Governance: Embedding Culture, Capabilities & Change in Singapore*, (New Jersey: New Scientific Press, 2007).

This has sometimes translated into strong pressure on elected politicians to manage the policy better by slowing down the rate of uptake. As society's support is essential to any public policy, the state is unable to ignore public opinion. To this end, Singapore has been more careful and calibrated in its approach to foreign worker inflows. There are categories of employment that require different skill sets, and are open to different nationalities.²⁸ In labour intensive sectors, the government does not appear to be intervening extensively, since such labour flows are transient and do not significantly pose problems to society. For the professional sectors, depending on deemed merit and worthiness, foreigners are eligible for Permanent Resident status or Singaporean citizenship itself. It is in this domain that discernible change is apparent, with majority beneficiaries being other ASEAN countries, while those from South Asia and other regions are in the minority. In 2013 for example, 55.3% of new PRs were from ASEAN countries while 34.6% came from other Asian countries such as India and China.²⁹

On the societal frontier, the government has become more active in its drive to clarify the misconceptions related to foreign workers taking jobs away from locals, backed up with actual policies to lend such messages more credence. For example, companies must list openings for certain jobs one month prior to opening them up to foreigners.³⁰ In addition, the number of foreign workers allowed for hire by a company is determined by a pre-set ratio of local to foreign labour.³¹ This means that firms must hire local workers before they can be allowed to hire foreigners. Together, these policies aim to assuage public concerns by showing that the government is monitoring labour inflows and ensuring no undesirable side effects on society writ large. This is a strategy that dovetails with larger AEC goals. Singapore has continued to privilege AEC partners in its for-

²⁸ Yeoh, "Transmigrants in Singapore."

²⁹ National Population and Talent Division, Prime Minister's Office [Singapore], 2014 *Population in Brief*, accessed May 1, 2015, <http://www.nptd.gov.sg/portals/0/news/population-in-brief-2014.pdf>.

³⁰ Teo Xuanwei, "Firms must now post job listings for Singaporeans on MOM site," *TODAY Newspaper*, September 23, 2013, Accessed May 5, 2015, <http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/firms-must-now-post-job-listings-singaporeans-mom-site>.

³¹ Toh Yong Chuan, "Budget 2013: foreign worker levies to go up, quotas for services and marine sectors cut," February 25, 2013, Accessed May 5, 2015, <http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/singapore/story/budget-2013-foreign-worker-levies-go-quotas-services-and-marine-sector>.

eign labour policies, as seen in the above proxy indicator of majority ASEAN PR and citizenship grants, supporting the AEC's eventual ideal of free labour mobility. In this regard, there are positive steps being taken to ensure that, despite societal resistance, Singapore's cooperation and compliance with AEC goals are not compromised, but have been managed in order to ensure smooth policy development and acceptance.

II - NORTHEAST ASIA'S LEARNING FROM THE ASEAN EXPERIENCE

Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia

The Northeast Asia region is usually seen as disparate from Southeast Asia in terms of traditions, economics, and international relations. Yet there exist some key similarities between the two regions. In today's geopolitical context, the Northeast Asia region includes Japan, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea and China. These countries are largely different in scale, as well as economic and political power. Also, the countries are of different levels of development with countries like Japan ranked among the most developed nations in the world, China as a rising industrial economic power, and countries such as North Korea ranked among the least developed nations in the world.³² This condition of different stages of development is similar to Southeast Asia, where countries can also be approximately classified as belonging to different levels of economic development and factor endowments.

The different stages of the Northeast Asian states' economic development indicate that they can also benefit by re-aligning their economic bases according to their comparative strengths, just like AEC countries could do. China like has a large labour force, allowing it to have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries. South Korea and Japan have advanced industrial technologies, although the costs of production are markedly higher than in neighbouring countries. But greater alignment according to their comparative advantage in high value technology goods will benefit the region through specialization and trade. However, free trade is still a work-in-progress, since the current regional trade system in Northeast Asia is characterized by significant transaction costs in terms of tariffs and legal restrictions.³³ This reduces the region's collective productivity and lowers

³² Kent Calder and Min Ye, *The Making of Northeast Asia*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

³³ Ramesh Chand, *Free Trade Area in Asia*, (Academic Foundation, 2006).

the efficiency of resource allocation. Northeast Asian countries ought therefore to re-align their economic means of production according to their comparative advantages, as the AEC has managed to do. In this manner, countries can benefit from exchange of production factors such as labour and also intermediate and final goods and services. This will increase the whole region's productivity and economic efficiency, ultimately benefitting all member states' societies in the long run through more sensible resource allocation.

Secondly, an NAEC will benefit from the same enlarged consumer market size, as has been the case for ASEAN. Theoretically, the benefits for the former should be similar to the latter. For example, there will be greater foreign direct investment inflow, since investors usually favor an integrated market that is much larger and potential. Northeast Asia is even larger than Southeast Asia in economic scale. The effects will be even more significant in Northeast Asia due to its large demographic size of 1.5 billion people, accounting for 20% of the world's population (Seliger, 2002). This NAEC integrated market will increase the region's competitiveness as a whole against the rest of the world. The integrated consumer markets also allow companies to generate more values, while benefitting the people in the form of greater product variety, lower prices and higher incomes from shared economic growth.

Thirdly, an economic community can help to maintain regional peace and ameliorate security-related challenges in Northeast Asia. Just as the presence of the AEC has provided positive security externalities against unnecessary regional conflicts, a common economic community can effectively reduce political tension and ensures peace in Northeast Asia. The economic interdependence theory explains that as two countries become more economically interrelated while trade increases and economic connections deepen, it is less likely for conflicts to break out between the two states. Economic interdependence increases social interdependence, making countries more closely connected with one another and increasing the cost of conflict. In Northeast Asia, the use of economy to promote peace is not new. China has long sought to increase its economic interdependence with Taiwan, hoping to achieve reunification in the future.³⁴ It welcomes Taiwanese businessmen to invest in Mainland China and has also

³⁴ Douglas B. Fuller, "The Cross-Strait economic relationship's impact on development in Taiwan and China: Adversaries and partners," *Asian Survey* 48, no. 2 (2008): 239-264.

signed many economic cooperation agreements with Taiwan. The increasing economic interdependence across the strait has been very effective in improving the amity and stability between the two. In fact, many scholars have argued that closer economic relations between North and South Korea is the more promising option in achieving reunification.³⁵ Integration into one economic community can in this way promote better relations between different Northeast Asian countries and stabilize the region.

AEC lessons in Northeast Asia

As discussed above, the three main problems encountered during the process of creating AEC are: 1) the dumping of excess produced goods in other countries' markets; 2) the extent of protectionism that hinders full economic integration; and 3) undesirable labour-side effects caused by labour mobility. Because of the similarities between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, these problems can also be expected when creating the Northeast Asia economic community. The lessons learnt by AEC are thus highly valuable to Northeast Asia and can serve as suitable guidelines steering the latter towards integration.

Dumping is one of the most serious concerns when countries establish free trade ties. Countries able to manufacture goods at much lower prices tend to export such goods to foreign markets for more sales. Because of their cost leadership, they are able to out-compete less efficient producers from the receiving country, leading to structural unemployment and a tandem rise in animosity towards the exporting country. Dumping is a perennial concern among many countries in Asia.³⁶ In Northeast Asia, China's low labor cost and abundant manufacturing capabilities have allowed it to have a comparative advantage in production of materials such as steel, which has been argued to be 'dumped' in the European and American markets. In the AEC, this problem of dumping has been averted by negotiating and re-aligning comparative advantages while embracing the overall enhancing effects on consumer surplus. As countries re-align themselves according to competitive advantages, they will not compete with others in their less efficient industries. They avoid narrow concentration of industrial efforts on similar products and focus on their niche areas of production. This

³⁵ Koh, Il-Dong. "Korea's reunification from the perspective of Northeast Asia's economic integration." *Journal of Economic Integration* 27, no. 2 (2012): 274-279.

³⁶ Prusa, "Anti-dumping."

reduces any surplus production needing to be ‘dumped’ in regional markets. Inefficient producers should be incentivized to divert their capital to other industries in which the country can build a comparative advantage. If Northeast Asia is able to delineate industries they are most suited for economically, then the long-term benefits of greater economic integration will outweigh the short-term costs, such as structural unemployment.

Protectionism is another issue hindering the successful implementation of economic community. When member countries refuse to follow economic agreements and restrict entrance of foreign goods and services, they largely reduce the efficiency of the whole community. These trade barriers prevent free flow of goods and services and endanger the foundation of economic integration. Countries may use protectionism to protect domestic industries from foreign competitors or because of lobbying by business groups with powerful influence and ties to politicians.³⁷ Japan has frequently set up import restrictions on goods made in China and prevented foreign competition in sectors such as the consumer groceries sector. A relevant lesson from the AEC is how all member countries have collectively developed a consensus to disavow protectionism, based on comparative advantage logic. As earlier mentioned, member states have signed various agreements to prevent protectionist actions by any member state towards others in the AEC. If Northeast Asia can collectively reject the use of protectionism policies, disregarding protectionism’s political popularity, the regional consensus can increase the likelihood of an NAEC’s establishment.

The other problem is uncontrolled labor movement within the economic community. In theory, free labour moves from places where they are currently unemployed or lower paid to other places with better job prospects (Lieberman and Hall, 2013). When foreign workers, especially low skilled workers with limited education, enter a society largely different from theirs, they are unlikely to integrate well in the host society for reasons such as cultural differences. In addition, some locals tend to see foreigners as unnecessary competitors fighting for the same jobs that they need. For example, Chinese immigrant workers have caused some conflicts and discontentment in various Japanese and South Korean cities that they work in. In AEC countries like Singapore, this problem is overcome by careful planning by the government. The Singapore government actively monitors the amount of foreign labor needed in each industry, thereby ensuring there

³⁷ Chari and Gupta, “Incumbents and protectionism.”

is a local-foreign job balance that does not alienate its own citizens, while still benefitting from the skills and experience that foreign workers bring along with them. This experience is very helpful to the Japanese government when creating NAEC, since controlling the rate of Chinese worker entry sends a signal to citizens that the government is aware of the associated problems and is actively managing the issue. Greater acceptance of foreign workers within Northeast Asia, while requiring incremental and gradual efforts, is a desirable outcome that will facilitate the chances of regional economic integration.

Other Problems in Creating a Northeast Asia Economic Community

The problems experienced by Southeast Asia can help Northeast Asia better plan the creation of their own economic community. But there are also some unique Northeast Asian problems that have not been experienced by the AEC, which may still need to be addressed. This paper will not engage these alternative problems in detail, since the focus is on the path towards greater economic integration. While resolving these issues can promote the growth of an NEAC, it is equally viable that this causality may be *reversed*. Greater economic integration, perhaps, can provide the preliminary basis for Northeast Asian countries to work these other issues out.

The first problem is the lack of formal political institutions in Northeast Asia to facilitate the creation and functioning of a common economic community. The notion of establishing an NAEC was initially floated in 2001, when South Korea president Kim Dae-Jung raised the idea of a regional economic community.³⁸ However, this idea has never been achieved. Leaders of Northeast Asian countries mention it almost every year, but there remains no concrete plans for such a community yet. In Southeast Asia, the structure of ASEAN is very important as it creates necessary institutions and platforms for all countries to discuss their individual interests and reach agreements. However, there is no comparable regional organization encompassing all Northeast Asian countries. Still, there are existing regional platforms that can be leveraged upon to provide the medium for negotiation. For example, the East Asia Summit, established by Japan, is a suitable arena for all stakeholders to participate in. The ASEAN+3

³⁸ Bernhard Seliger, "Economic integration in northeast Asia: Preconditions and possible trajectories," *Global Economic Review* 31, no. 4 (2002): 17-38.

summit, which includes all ASEAN states, China, Japan and South Korea, is another prospective platform that can facilitate discussions and work out differences between these three largest Northeast Asian states.

Secondly, the inter-state politics of Northeast Asia is much more complicated than that of Southeast Asia. The United States, as a major actor in Northeast Asia, engages in multipolar policy in the region under a 'hubs and spokes' model, in which all countries are bilaterally tied to the U.S.³⁹ Hence, it will be difficult for states allied to the U.S, namely Taiwan, South Korea and Japan to act without American support. Nonetheless, although this barrier to economic integration is significant, it is not by any means insurmountable. As the American government has indicated on various occasions, it welcomes China to play a larger role in the region, although subject to the latter abiding by international rules and regulations. If China is able to indicate its commitment to upholding such institutions, then American support may be forthcoming, raising the chances of economic integration. Economic integration will benefit the said countries, which should therefore merit American support, assuming the U.S truly wants to help its allies economically develop. Should the U.S value political goals more than the material interests of its Asian allies, then there exists little reason for Taiwan, South Korea and Japan to forsake material benefits simply to please the American government. The logic of economic integration, if objectively presented, provides Northeast Asian states with more economic benefits, at the expense of minor political cost.

Thus far, economic integration has been proposed as a way to enhance the economies of the various Northeast Asian states, according to various theories such as the model of comparative advantage. While there are various barriers in Northeast Asia that can hinder the development of an economic community, it has been argued that such barriers are surmountable, given sufficient political will. The benefits from economic cooperation can provide reasonable grounds for member countries to work towards resolving their political differences, since it is only from doing so that an economic community can hope to be sustained and strengthened over time. Following economic liberalism theory, greater mutual interdependence through an economic community can provide states with

³⁹ John G. Ikenberry, "American hegemony and East Asian order," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58, no. 3 (2004): 353-367.

the motivation and the mechanism to resolve their problems, thereby increasing the attractiveness of an NAEC.

III – BEYOND NORTHEAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE FUTURE OF PAN-EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

The successful creation of an NAEC, alongside the AEC, can be powerful drivers of a more closely integrated East Asia. The enhanced preponderance of East Asia as a counterweight to other major economies in the world can augur in an even more formidable era of collective economic gains to member economies. Fortunately, the possibilities of doing so are not without existing mechanisms to utilize, with the most important of all being the ASEAN+3 outfit as mentioned in an earlier section. This potential platform for cross sub-regional ties formation will be expounded on, following some preliminary thoughts on the issue's salience.

The creation of an 'East Asian Economic Community' can provide for a more stable and peaceful environment for member countries in East Asia. This can be useful in moderating the degree of conflict among member nations. Different communities of people may seek association (and dissociation) on the bases of primordial affiliation, ideology, security interests or economic ties. An East Asian Economic Community may pose the most unproblematic means for East Asian states to associate in this realm of affairs. The other means of association do not appeal to these countries for the following reasons. Primordially, Samuel Huntington identified different civilizations in the Asia region.⁴⁰ For example, much of the Sinic civilization is different from the Japanese civilization. In Southeast Asia, the two main Austroasiatic and Austronesian groupings are even further apart from these civilizations in Northeast Asia, than they are in relation to each other.⁴¹ What this indicates is that the "imagination" of a community, following Benedict Anderson proves more difficult since cultural stocks are largely different.⁴² Ideologically, Asia is noted for its diversity of political systems and structures that closely follow behind. Fareed Zakaria classifies Singapore and Malaysia as "illiberal democracies"; North Korea and China remain communist states; Taiwan and Japan are liberal de-

⁴⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008).

⁴¹ Clark D. Neher, *Southeast Asia: Crossroads of the World* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010).

⁴² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Books, 2006).

mocracies; and Thailand and Myanmar are influenced by military rule.⁴³⁴⁴ Since ideology proves a polarizing issue amongst peoples, as Andrew Heywood notes, it is expected that ideological association cannot be satisfactorily achieved.⁴⁵ In the aspect of security, the particular nature and organization of intra-regional state-to-state relations militate against any semblance of collective security arrangements or cooperation. More specifically, this is due to the maintenance of the 'hubs and spokes' model, which links Japan, South Korea and Taiwan close to the United States, with China perceived as a competitor for power in the region.⁴⁶ China's increasing military power can provoke a Hobbesian response from Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. This is due to the insecurity, as realists posit, that the latter three countries feel about China's 'aggression.'⁴⁷ Furthermore, the presence of the United States, with its strong bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea, renders any regional security ties foreseeably unfeasible. As such, security interests also fail to provide a common platform for cooperation.

It is in this regard that economic ties prove most valuable for giving East Asian states some cause to seek association. Following the wave of globalization, every East Asian state (save for North Korea) has successfully integrated into the global economy as willing and active participants. Insofar as every actor in the association is guaranteed and receives the economic benefits promised under the organization's collaboration, there are clear game-like and straightforward ways of seeking assurance that cooperation is being valued over competition. Economics today largely follow the global liberal market model, rendering all participants familiar with such an idea. This is important, since such familiarity through an active participation in the global economy organized along these lines ensure that all participants are clear about the processes and outcomes involved, making the tasks of monitoring easier to accomplish. Consequently, there is less likelihood of suspicion arising, vis-à-vis security cooperation.

⁴³ Fareed Zakaria, "The rise of illiberal democracy," *Foreign Affairs* (1997): 22-43.

⁴⁴ Myanmar appears to be transiting towards a more democratic political system, following elections held in 2015. Nonetheless, the military still wields considerable influence as many legislative seats are reserved for the army.

⁴⁵ Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

⁴⁶ Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the US alliance system in Asia," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010): 158-196.

⁴⁷ June Teufel Dreyer, "China's power and will: The PRC's military strength and grand strategy," *Orbis* 51, no. 4 (2007): 651-664.

Still, a reminder is in order – nationalism appears to be a powerful force driving the behaviors and actions of many societies in Asia, which is not altogether a positive development for economic integration. As Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong shared, his biggest worry for Singapore today is a growing nationalism in the region⁴⁸. This is not threatening to Singapore alone, for clearly nationalism poses a danger to inter-state relations in the entire Asia region. For example, Japan and China continue to experience friction over wartime-related activities during World War II.⁴⁹ while the Philippines and China are also locked in a dispute over ownership of various islands in the South China Sea. These are inductive examples, but their repercussions on the region resound clearly and need to be well managed. Where irrational emotions and actions can be galvanized by the politicization of such psychological and nationalistic issues, the threat posed to economic integration is also considerable. As such, governments need to actively manage these issues, to prevent the threat of nationalistic rhetoric from derailing economic cooperation.

But a successfully created East Asian economic community will be of benefit to all member countries, should the above obstacles be resolved. The production base of East Asia's economy will be the aggregate of the AEC and the NAEC - greater movement of goods and capital can facilitate even more cohesive and mutually beneficial economic growth; and East Asia can also institutionalize a regional trading block rivaling those in Europe or North America, assuring it of greater gains than before. Where cooperation can be sought in the realm of economy, it is also conceivable that there are other effects that can enhance the overall attractiveness of integration. This is the ability to utilise economy as a platform for trust and confidence building, the successful outcome of which may serve the moderation of nationalistic tendencies and friction among states over territory or historical experiences. This is by no way easy, evidenced from Japan's ongoing dispute with China in spite of economic ties.⁵⁰ But this is precisely why we have highlighted the need for both sides, perhaps, to take reference from ASEAN's resort to negotiation and consensus building. Through peaceful and constructive dialogue, a common agreement on economic cooperation is not necessarily hindered by issues related to politics and culture as well. As such, every country in East Asia should play a

⁴⁸ Khalid, "PM Lee."

⁴⁹ He Yinan, "History, Chinese nationalism and the emerging Sino-Japanese conflict," *Journal of Contemporary China* 16, no. 50 (2007): 1-24.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

larger part in looking beyond short-term political interests and seek genuine long term gains which can only benefit all in the society. The object of government is to secure the greatest welfare for the greatest number of its citizens. This is an outcome an East Asian Economic Community may help to secure and it will rest *a priori* on the successful creation of the AEC and NAEC.

The presence of ASEAN+3 is a useful mechanism for coordinating the further integration of these two regions, since it is an institution with representation from both sub-regions. ASEAN+3 refers to all ASEAN member states, in addition to China, Japan and South Korea. Through this institution, East Asia as a whole can begin this task of seeking economic integration cross sub-region, if this is an end that all countries desire. Some successes have been evident, such as how greater financial cooperation was achieved in 2003 whereby the “number of bilateral [currency] swap arrangements” across the member countries doubled.⁵¹ Other than its role as a clearing house for information among regional leaders, it also serves as a site for negotiation and subsequent shaping of shared interests, which can be vital to any pact’s successful implementation and continuation. But an East Asian Economic Community still remains a long term ideal: in the short to middle term, effort should be devoted towards creating a durable and beneficial NAEC that enjoys buy-in from all member countries. Thereafter, the potential for an East Asia-wide equivalent can then be more concretely explored.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The ASEAN Economic Community provides a very good example of how successful economic integration in a diverse region can be pursued. An integrated economic regional outfit provides both powerful economic benefits and security externalities, which are goals that the AEC can help advance. Northeast Asia can also benefit from the creation of a Northeast Asian Economic Community, as earlier mentioned. To pave the way for success, three lessons can be gleaned and adapted by Northeast Asia to enhance an economic community’s viability. To that end, ASEAN’s emphasis on negotiation and consensus building has helped them to pursue economic integration. Specifically, the AEC’s ability to reduce

⁵¹ H Soeastro, “An ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN+3: how do They Fit Together?” *Pacific Economic Papers*, 338, 2003. <https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/41965/2/pep-338.pdf>.

the obstacles of dumping, protectionism and problems associated with mobility of labour were discussed. These are lessons relevant to Northeast Asia.

Based on the essential similarities between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, the benefits enjoyed by the latter can also be expected in Northeast Asia if a similar economic community is created there. The lessons learnt from AEC in dealing with dumping, protectionism, and unregulated labor movements are valuable experiences for Northeast Asia. Yet, the region has some unique problems that need to be resolved in order for an integrated economic community to be created. These problems include the lack of regional political institution and complicated international relations. Still, these problems can be resolved if member states can constructively utilise existing platforms, such as the East Asian Summit and the ASEAN+3 Summit. This paper has deliberately not engaged the political dimension of inter-state relations in detail, since much scholarly effort has been devoted towards explaining this aspect of the region's relational dynamics. Instead, this paper has sought to argue that economic integration can be a major stepping-stone that supplies and reinforces the logic of cooperation and regional peace. The economic route to regional stability may not come without its own limitations. However, in the absence of more feasible alternatives that are empirically superior, economic integration stands out as an option with great promise for future East Asian relations. If economics can facilitate regional peace, incentivize member states to set aside political differences and help to raise their collective societal happiness, then Northeast Asia should work towards greater economic integration – with some help from the AEC on how economic disputes can be reconciled through consensus building and concordant political will.

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THE INFLUENCE OF NUMBERS AND THE NUMBER OF INFLUENCES: THE ROLE OF FEMALE QUOTAS AND FEMALE ACTIVISM IN PASSING GENDER- BASED VIOLENCE LEGISLATION IN SUB- SAHARAN AFRICA

Using South Africa as a Case Study

GINA STARFIELD¹

INTRODUCTION

"One thing governments have got is legislation. Legislation has an impact. It affects millions of people in a country just by a stroke of a pen."

– Executive Director of UN Women, Dr. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, "Gender and Violence" Lecture, Yale University, November 6, 2015

In the 1900s, gender-based violence was commonplace throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Surveys conducted in the region revealed that over 40% of Ugandan, Zambian, and Kenyan women, and 60% of Tanzanian women experienced regular physical abuse.² Over 80% of married Nigerian women reported being verbally or physically abused by their husbands.³ In most countries, however, state assistance and legal protections were non-existent or nascent and very limited. In South Af-

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² Jewkes R. Wood K, "Violence, Rape, and Sexual Coercion: everyday love in a South African township," *Gender & Development*, 5(2), 1997, pp. 41-46.

³ O. Odunjinrin, "Wife battering in Nigeria," *Int J Gynaecol Obstet*, 41, 1993, pp. 159-164.

rica, for example, an abused woman could only seek state assistance through a “peace order.” She could submit a complaint of abuse to a magistrate, who could order the abuser to act peacefully towards the female complainant for up to six months.⁴ The order was merely a warning, with no provision for arrest and prosecution if breached.⁵ At the turn of the century, the tide shifted alongside the emergence of global gender equality norms. Sexual violence legislation in many Sub-Saharan African countries became more robust. Today, many governments have committed to creating laws that effectively punish and eradicate gender-based violence. Each year, Sub Saharan Africans countries commemorate International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women and the 16 Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence Campaign that follow, which commenced in 1991 and coordinated by the Center for Women’s Global Leadership.⁶

How did this drastic shift in the region take place? What specific factors, beyond global norms, led to several countries adopting significant gender-based violence legislation? This paper ascribes the change in large part to the involvement of female members of parliament (MPs) who had a history of activism in a strong feminist movement, and who subsequently entered the government through an electoral quota system. Drawing on data of gender-based violence legislation from 43 Sub-Saharan African countries and a case study of South Africa, this paper examines the effect of quota adoption and strong female activism in the passage of gender-based violence legislation.

THEORY

Scholars have furthered several competing theories to explain how stronger gender-based violence preventive legislation emerged in many Sub-Saharan African countries in the late 20th and early 21st century. The most prominent theory attributes legislation to the increase in female political representation. Strategic

⁴ Section 384, Criminal Procedure Act (Act no. 56 of 1955), “SOUTH AFRICA: The State Response to Domestic Violence and Rape,” by *Human Rights Watch*, 1995, available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Safricawm-02.htm#P491_115749.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ United Nations Women, “16 days of activism: 2015,” *UN WOMEN*, accessed 11/29/15, <http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/take-action/16-days-of-activism>.

Objective G of the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, constructed at The Fourth World Conference on Women, advised both the government and political parties reform electoral law so that women could participate fully in policy-making structures.⁷ Before the Action Plan only four countries worldwide, Argentina, Belgium, Nepal, and Uganda, had a constitutional and/or election law gender quota for national parliament.⁸ By 2006, approximately 40 countries had introduced gender quotas in elections to national parliaments and more than 50 countries' major political parties had adopted party quotas.⁹ Scholars maintain that increasing the number of female elected officials advanced women's rights and policy concerns, such as gender-based violence issues, because women tended to promote women's issues once elected to political office.¹⁰ Cross-country quantitative analysis of 103 countries between 1970 and 2006 by political scientist Li-Ju Chen confirms that, globally, quotas are positively correlated with policy outcomes that concern women, such as health and education.¹¹

Conversely, scholars S. Laurel Weldon and Mala Htun reason that feminist activism, rather than female quotas, lead to the adoption of stronger gender-based violence preventive legislation. Using an original dataset of social movements and violence against women policies in 70 countries over four decades, Weldon and Htun show that feminist mobilization in civil society by strong, local autonomous women's groups is the key to gender policy development.¹² According to them, intra-legislative political phenomena, such as leftist parties, economic factors like national wealth, and even women in government do not drive legislation.¹³ Women's movements and women's policy agencies are more effective venues for expression of women's viewpoint than the presence of certain women in legislatures because

⁷ Section G1 (190)(b)(d) and (191)(b), *Ibid.*

⁸ Drude Dahlerup and Lenita Freidenvall, "Quotas as a 'Fast Track' to Equal Representation for Women: Why Scandinavia is No Longer the Model," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* Vol. 7 No. 1, 2006, p. 9.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁰ Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, "Conceptualizing the Impact of Gender Quotas," in *Impact of Gender Quotas*, edited by Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 8.

¹¹ Li-Ju Chen, "Do Gender Quotas Influence Women's Representation and Policies?" *The European Journal of Comparative Economics* Vol. 7 No. 1, 2010, pp. 13-60.

¹² Mala Htun and S. Laurel Weldon, "The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change: Combating Violence against Women in Global Perspective, 1975-2005)," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 106 No. 3, 2012.

¹³ *Ibid.*

the former represent a multiplicity of female perspectives.¹⁴ Weldon finds that even where there are both female legislators and active women's movements, only autonomous movements engender gender-based violence initiatives, as the interactive effect between women's movements and the number of women in lower legislative houses in her 2002 study poorly predicts violence against female oriented policy outcomes.¹⁵

In analyzing gender outcomes in democratic transitions, political scientist Georgina Waylen argues that active, effective women's movements are a necessary, but insufficient condition for women's substantive representation. Examining the case of South Africa, Waylen ascribes successful legislative outcomes to a favorable political opportunity structure, namely the left leaning ideology of the ANC, and strategic organizing by key women actors, namely an effective alliance of feminists, activists, and academics with "sympathetic insiders" within government and parliament.¹⁶ Unlike Weldon, Waylen underscores the interactive effect between women's movements, academics, and legislators, highlighting the importance of communication and collaboration between the three groups. This paper challenges the conceptual validity of the conventional wisdom that quotas alone or activism alone lead to substantive representation. Acknowledging the importance of having both quotas and women's movements, this paper focuses on Waylen's "sympathetic insiders." Individual female legislators who have previously been on the outside and who have subsequently become "insiders" through quotas pass robust legislation and pave the way for future generations of parliamentarians to do so. To test the strength, scope, and generalizability of this theory, this paper quantitatively investigates the effect of quotas and female activism in feminist movements on the strength of gender-based violence legislation. The analysis confirms that activism is vital to achieving comprehensive legislation in Sub-Saharan African countries; quotas alone are not associated with strong gender-based violence legislation. Instead, as predicted by the interactive theory, it is countries that have both gender quotas and the feminist activism that

¹⁴ S. Laurel Weldon, "Beyond Bodies: Institutional Sources of Representation for Women in Democratic Policymaking," *The Journal of Politics* Vol. 64 No. 4, 2004, p. 4.

¹⁵ S. Laurel Weldon, *Protest, Policy, and the Problem of Violence Against Women: A Cross-National Comparison*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002, p. 102.

¹⁶ Georgina Waylen, "Women's Mobilization and Gender Outcomes in Transitions to Democracy The Case of South Africa," *Comparative Political Studies* Vol. 40 No. 5, 2007, p. 524.

are significantly more likely to adopt legislation against gender based violence. A case study on South Africa is developed to shed light on how exactly the combination of gender quotas and feminist activism come to result in stronger anti-gender based violence legislation.

QUANTITATIVE CROSS-CONTINENT TEST

This paper examines the strength of gender-based violence legislation in 43 Sub-Saharan African countries as reported in the 2014 Social Institutions and Gender Index. It tests the effect of having legislated and/or party quotas and female activism in these countries. This paper hypothesizes that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with quotas and activism will have stronger gender-based violence legislation. Comparatively, countries with no quotas, just quotas, or just activism will have weaker legislation than countries with both.

The first independent variable, quotas, are defined as legally binding commitments to place a certain number of women in governance structures, usually the national legislature. There are two prevailing types of quotas: legal quotas and voluntary party quotas. Legal quotas are mandated in a country's constitution or by law; they regulate the proceedings of all political parties and may prescribe sanctions for non-compliance.¹⁷ Legal quotas may consist of reserved seats to regulate the number of women elected or legal candidate quotas to set the proportion of women on candidate lists.¹⁸ Legal quotas may ensure representation at the subnational level and/or the national level in the lower house and/or the upper house. Voluntary party quotas are decided by one or more political parties in a country and are explicitly laid out in a political party's own internal regulations.¹⁹

After examining a country's quota system through the International IDEA/ Inter-parliamentary Union/Stockholm University Global Database of Quotas for Women and cross checking it with the Social Institutions and Gender Index database, this paper codes 1 for each country with voluntary party quotas or legislated quotas in the upper or lower house, and 0 for countries with no quotas or quotas only at the subnational level. As of 2014, there are 13 Sub-Saharan countries with-

¹⁷ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm University and Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Typology," *Quota Project: Global Database of Quotas for Women*, 2015, accessed 11/29/15, <http://www.quotaproject.org/faq.cfm>.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

out party or legal quotas at the national level. Sub-Saharan countries, however, are constantly changing their governance and national representation structures. Yet, legislation takes time to be drafted, commented on, and passed, as exemplified in the passage of the Domestic Violence Act in South Africa. Thus this paper measures whether or not a country had a quota before 2012 to allow a two to three-year lag period in legislation following quota adoption. Countries that adopted quotas in the years 2012, 2013, and 2014 were coded with a 0—the number of countries without quotas, therefore, totals 20.

This paper defines the independent variable of female activism as active participation in a feminist movement between 1990-2011. This paper follows Weldon and Htun's definition of a feminist movement as one coordinated to improve women's status and/or promote equality and/or end patriarchy. Although unlike Weldon and Htun, this paper recognizes women's organizations within political parties as feminist movements.²⁰ Similar to the method adopted by Weldon and Htun to measure the existence of women's and feminist movements, this paper searches web-based material, academic research, human rights reports, and news media through the ProQuest search site GenderWatch and the Swarthmore University Global Nonviolent Action Database. Just as Weldon and Htun find, there tended to be few disputes among country experts about the existence and inception of a women's movement, making coding relatively easy. This same method is also used to measure women's movement strength. In general, web-based data, media outlets, and academic research already tend to disparately favor strong movements over weaker ones. This paper, following Weldon and Htun, officially recognizes movements as strong if they are described in narrative accounts as strong, influential, powerful, and mobilizing widespread public support. Countries where women have organized nonviolent protests or where women activists have organized around gender-related issues between 1990 and 2011 are coded as having female activism (denoted as 1). Countries that have not had strong female organized nonviolent protests or significant mobilization of women around gender-related issues in this period are coded as having no female activism (denoted as 0).

As displayed in Table I, 25 countries in the dataset have strong female

²⁰ Appendix A: Definitions and Approach to Measuring Strong, Autonomous Feminist Movements, Htun and Weldon, "The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change."

activism and 18 do not. In the dataset, strong female activism was most commonly in the form of female civil society groups and female wings of political parties fighting for social, economic, and political equality and the termination of harmful traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation (FGM). For example, in the GenderWatch search for Burundi (coded as having female activism), three articles immediately surfaced. They detailed women's organizations publicly advocating for political equality and female non-governmental organizations working with the government to promote women's human rights.²¹ In the GenderWatch search for Gambia (coded as having female activism), two articles immediately surfaced about females successfully organizing to end the practice of FGM.²² In the Global Nonviolent Action Database search for Kenya (coded as having female activism), two references emerged of female led nonviolent campaigns: one in which female organizations, primarily those explicitly for mothers, protested to release political prisoners and press for democratic reform during 1992-1993; and one in which several female coalitions and non-governmental organizations led a sex strike during 2009 to protest government inaction.²³ Conversely, in the case of Congo-Brazzaville (coded as not having activism), there were no female led nonviolent protests and only one GenderWatch article referencing a relatively unknown women's organization, the Congolese Association of Women Heads of Households'.²⁴

²¹ Lilliane Nzibarenga, "Emerging from the ashes of conflict: The situation of women's human rights in Burundi," *Women's World* 42, 2007, <http://search.proquest.com/genderwatch/docview/236983088/8E61D528D45441D1PQ/1?accountid=15172>; Therese Ntahompagaze, "Burundi," *Women's World* 26, 2002, <http://search.proquest.com/genderwatch/docview/236983770/8E61D528D45441D1PQ/2?accountid=15172>; Anna S Sussman, "Peace Must Include Tough Rape Laws," *Herizons* 21.3, 2008, <http://search.proquest.com/genderwatch/docview/212355831/8E61D528D45441D1PQ/8?accountid=15172>.

²² Win News, "The Gambia: Harmful Traditional Practices," *Win News* 27.4, 2001, <http://search.proquest.com/genderwatch/docview/230988902/DE7D207D6190439DPQ/1?accountid=15172>; Women Envision, "Backlash Against FGM in Gambia and Egypt," *Women Envision* 51-52, 1997, <http://search.proquest.com/genderwatch/docview/213889279/5529459BAC6E4E15PQ/6?accountid=15172>.

²³ Swarthmore University, "Kenyan mothers win release of political prisoners and press for democratic reform, 1992-1993," *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, accessed 12/8/15, <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kenyan-mothers-win-release-political-prisoners-and-press-democratic-reform-1992-1993>; Swarthmore University, "Kenyan women sex strike against government's paralysis, 2009," *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, accessed 12/8/15, <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kenyan-women-sex-strike-against-governments-paralysis-2009>.

²⁴ Win News, "Congo Widow Victims of Violent African Traditions,"

As illustrated in Table I, Sub-Saharan African countries were placed in one of four categories: Quota Before 2012, Female Activism (Quota & Activism); Quota Before 2012, No Female Activism (Just Quota); No Quota Before 2012, Female Activism (Just Activism); and No Quota Before 2012, No Female Activism (No Quota & No Activism). 15 Sub-Saharan countries were found to have female activism and quotas (Quota & Activism); 10 to have activism without quotas (Just Activism); 8 to have quotas without activism (Just Quotas); and 10 to have neither quotas nor activism (No Quota & No Activism).

While female activists can promulgate the adoption of quotas, this paper attempts to code quotas and female activism independently in the model. Quota adoption is not always endogenous to female activism. In her 2011 study of the international community's effect on quota adoption, Sarah Sunn Bush explains that quotas can often be externally imposed or encouraged, rather than locally derived. States dependent on foreign aid may be forced to adopt quotas or may adopt them independently for signaling purposes to garner domestic and/or international legitimacy.²⁵ The somewhat balanced distribution between countries that have both quotas and activism and countries that have just quotas or have just activism may be reflective of Bush's finding. The coding of variables in the paper, however, makes it more likely for countries with both quotas and activism to have adopted quotas through activism. Measuring female organizing for political equality, among other female concerns, the female activism variable most often indicates a call for quota adoption on the ground. The impact of this difference between quotas adopted with internal support and quotas adopted primarily through influence of the international community will be revisited in the analysis of the results.

For the dependent variable, each country was matched with its attending gender-based violence legislation score. For purposes of this paper, gender-based violence legislation is defined as legislation reflected in a country's criminal or civil code that addresses any form of violence against women. The data quantifying the comprehensiveness and relative strength of gender-based legislation was derived directly from the 2014 Social Institutions and Gender Index. The

Win News 25.3, 1999, <http://search.proquest.com/genderwatch/docview/230974876/28E6627A52CA4AF9PQ/2?accountid=15172>.

²⁵ Sarah Sunn Bush, "International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures," *International Organization* 65, 2011, p. 13.

Index scored each of 108 countries on the comprehensiveness and strength of its domestic violence laws, rape laws, and sexual harassment laws respectively. While each issue area is distinctive, they all concern violence against women and could all vary on the basis of female activism and quota adoption. The 2014 Social Institutions and Gender Index scores 43 Sub-Saharan countries legislation on domestic violence, rape, and sexual harassment. The database gives each country a score of 0, .25, .5, .75, 1 for its laws relating to each issue area. A country earns a 0 when there is specific legislation in place to address the issue in question, the law is adequate overall, and there are no reported problems of implementation; a country earns a 0.25 when there is specific legislation in place to address the issue, the law is adequate overall, but there are reported problems of implementation; a country earns a 0.5 when there is specific legislation in place to address the issue, but the law is inadequate; a country earns a 0.75 when there is no specific legislation in place to address the issue, but there is evidence of legislation being planned or drafted; and a country earns a 1 when there is no legislation in place to address the issue in question (all scores are displayed in Table II).²⁶

To measure the effect of quotas and female activism on a country's gender-based violence legislation, a One-Way Anova test was conducted. The One-Way Anova test measures the difference in mean legislation scores between and within each of the four groups (No Quota & No Activism, Just Quota, Just Activism, Quota & Activism). The results of the One-Way Anova test are displayed in Tables III and IV. The difference in rape legislation scores and sexual harassment scores for the four groups is not statistically significant. The difference between the four groups in terms of domestic violence legislation scores, however, is statistically significant (Table IV, $p\text{-value}=.019$). The Bonferonni comparison (Table V) breaks down the One-Way Anova test. It determines whether the mean domestic violence legislation score for countries in the Quota & Activism group differs significantly from that of each of the other groups. The Quota & Activism group's mean legislation score is significantly different from the mean score of the Just Quota group (Table V, $p\text{-value}=.030$).

To further test whether quotas, female activism, and their interaction (Quota & Activism) are significant predictors of domestic violence legislation generally, this paper uses a crosstab chi-squared test. The chi-squared test determines

²⁶ Social Institutions & Gender Index, "Information about variables and data sources for the 2014 SIGI," OECD Development, 2015, accessed 11/29/15, <http://www.genderindex.org/data/>.

whether or not one can reject the null hypothesis that quotas, activism, or their combination individually do not have any effect on domestic violence legislation scores. As illustrated in Tables X and XI, having quotas is not a significant predictor of domestic violence legislation (Table XI, p -value = .694). Surprisingly, having both quotas and activism does not appear to be a significant predictor of legislation, either (Table XIII, p -value = .383). Activism alone, however, is a significant predictor of at the .1 level (Table IX, p -value = .082).

CROSS-CONTINENT ANALYSIS: RAPE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Based on the statistical tests, domestic violence legislation is the only type of legislation that differs significantly across countries in each of the four groups. Rape and sexual harassment legislation do not appear to differ across countries on the basis of quota implementation and female activism. With respect to rape, this finding is not altogether surprising. Relative to rape, domestic violence legislation likely has a significant trend because it is a more controversial, progressive issue area. Several Sub-Saharan African countries have had legislation outlawing rape in their penal and criminal codes for centuries. While certain rape legislation may be more progressive, including punishments specifically for intimate partner rape or gang rape, stranger rape is largely uncontroversial. The 2014 Social Institutions and Gender Index merely measured if rape was illegal in any form. Thus, in the coding process, not a single Sub-Saharan African country earned a score of 1 for rape legislation (Table II). Moreover, countries like South Africa, which adopted new, progressive and comprehensive rape laws in 2007 that recognize multiple forms of rape, and countries such as Guinea-Bissau, where rape, albeit spousal rape included, is merely criminalized in criminal codes, earned identical scores of .25.²⁷ It is possible that, if rape legislation were measured in terms of progressiveness, punishment, or specificity, significant differences would have emerged.

Conversely, significant differences between rape and domestic violence in Sub-Saharan Africa may be accounting for the results as they are presently calculated. Conducting a paired t -test between the domestic violence legislation

²⁷ Social Institutions & Gender Index, "Guinea-Bissau," OECD Development, 2015, accessed 11/29/15, <http://genderindex.org/country/guinea-bissau>.

scores and the rape legislation scores in the database, the mean domestic legislation score is significantly larger than the mean rape legislation score (Table VII, $p\text{-value}=0.002$). Unlike rape, domestic violence is more likely to directly conflict with many African non-doctrinal policies (customary law, religious law, custom, and tribal authority). Customary law is essential to many Sub-Saharan African countries and has been imbued with authority in many African constitutions. In matters such as marriage, inheritance, and traditional authority, however, customary law often discriminates against women. Practices such as bride price, guardianship, and inheritance place women under the rule of their husbands, brothers, and fathers.²⁸ Passing legislation that protects women from the men of their households and provides women with legal leverage directly contradicts the underlying principle of these customs. It is not surprising that their passage would require extra strength and mobilization on the part of women in government who have engaged in female activism.

With respect to sexual harassment, the finding is no less surprising. There were distinct measurement issues in the sexual harassment legislation similar to those in the rape measurements. While most countries in the database had specific legislation that addressed domestic violence alone, the legislation that addressed sexual harassment was part and parcel of larger reforms making sexual harassment illegal in certain settings. For example, in the case of Botswana, the Public Services Act (1999) makes sexual harassment specifically in public services a criminal offense.²⁹ The coding system did not take into account the varied contexts of sexual harassment legislation and merely coded a country as having legislation if sexual harassment was outlawed in at least one context. The measurement of sexual harassment legislation, therefore, may not be adequate. It is possible that, if the sexual legislation were measured in terms of the singularity of the law, the comprehensiveness of contexts, progressiveness, punishment, or specificity, differences would have emerged.

However, it is also possible that female legislators and female activism have no significant effect on sexual harassment because it is not a first order issue. Sexual harassment often does not escalate to the level of violence associated with rape and domestic violence. The violence component of sexual harassment legislation most

²⁸ Muna Ndulo, "African Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights," *Cornell University Law Faculty Publications*, 2011, pp. 88-89.

²⁹ Social Institutions & Gender Index, "Botswana," OECD Development, 2015, accessed 11/29/15, <http://genderindex.org/country/botswana>.

often deals with harassment in the workplace. It is not as painful, inescapable, or all encompassing as the physical and psychological brutality of domestic violence. As such, ending sexual harassment is frequently not a priority for female activists. In the countries coded as having female activism on the basis of the material contained in the GenderWatch search and the Swarthmore University Global Nonviolent Action Database, sexual harassment was never a focal point of activism and did not surface as a primary concern of the female activists. Marriage laws, land and property rights, education, FGM, and domestic violence were the most common concerns amongst female activists.

CROSS-CONTINENT ANALYSIS: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

If we limit the analysis to domestic violence legislation, having both activism and quotas is significantly better than having just quotas. According to the Bonferroni comparisons test (Table V), the mean domestic violence legislation score for countries in the Just Quota group (N=8, Mean=.9375) is significantly higher than the mean domestic violence legislation score for countries in the Quota & Activism group (N=15, Mean=.5000). As a score of 0 signaled specific, adequate legislation with no reported problems of implementation, lower means signify more comprehensive legislation. This result strongly indicates that, Sub-Saharan African countries with activism and quotas have significantly more comprehensive legislation than those with just quotas. In the chi-squared test, quotas irrespective of activism (N=20) are not a significant predictor of legislation (Table XI). While the combination of quotas and activism (N=15) is also insignificant (Table XIII), results do improve when activism is added to the model. The p-value gets smaller, more closely approaching significance at the .1 level, and the chi-squared variable increases (Table XIII). This result in conjunction with the Bonferonni comparison suggests that, in order for electoral quotas to engender successful legislation, it is beneficial for countries to have female activism.

Investigating why quotas themselves are insignificant, this paper first considers potential measurement issues in the quotas variable that may have caused any one country to skew results. In countries like Sudan and Somalia where there is current conflict, weak state capacity, and high unrest, it is not only difficult to obtain sound data on legislation and its implementation, but it is also highly unlikely that quotas are in effect. In Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Eritrea, voluntary party quotas and even legal

quotas have not been enforced. In Botswana, while the Botswana Congress Party and the Botswana National Front introduced 30% voluntary party quotas for women on electoral lists, both parties have not always met this target.³⁰ Similarly, while the Ivorian Public Front has had a 30% quota for women since 2001, the quota has not always been achieved in practice. In fact, the total percentage of women representatives fell from 21% in 2010 to 14% in 2011.³¹ In the DRC, there are no enforcement or monitoring mechanisms to ensure legal quotas are met. The electoral law does not provide any sanction for non-compliance with the parity principle and non-compliance does not necessitate the rejection of a candidate list.³² The DRC has, thus, consistently fallen short of equal representation. In the 2011 legislative elections, for example, women constituted roughly 12% of the total number of candidates and subsequently won only 9% of the seats in the National Assembly.³³ In Eritrea, despite the adoption of a legal quota for women in the lower house in 2001, no democratic elections have been held. The parliamentary elections scheduled for December 2001 were postponed indefinitely. As such, the quota provisions have not yet been implemented.³⁴ Measuring quota adoption, this paper codes Cote d'Ivoire, the DRC, Eritrea, and Somalia and Sudan, as having adopted quotas before 2012. Yet, as quotas have only been promised and not put into practice, gender-based violence legislation in these countries cannot be attributed to quota adoption. After dropping Sudan, Somalia, Botswana, Eritrea, DRC, and Cote d'Ivoire from the model and running the crosstab of the effect of quotas again, however, results remain insignificant (Table XV, p-value= .960).

To examine whether or not the type of quota adopted affects legislation, this paper tests the effect of four possible kinds of quotas adopted in Sub-Saharan African countries on domestic violence legislation. Running crosstab chi-squared

³⁰ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm University and Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Botswana," *Quota Project: Global Database of Quotas for Women*, 2015, accessed 11/29/15, <http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?country=34>.

³¹ Social Institutions & Gender Index, "Cote D'Ivoire," OECD Development, 2015, accessed 11/29/15, <http://genderindex.org/country/cote-d039ivoire>.

³² Article 13 (4) of the 2006 Electoral Law as amended in 2011, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm University and Inter-Parliamentary Union, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," *Quota Project: Global Database of Quotas for Women*, 2015, accessed 11/29/15, <http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?country=39>.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm University and Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Eritrea," *Quota Project: Global Database of Quotas for Women*, 2015, accessed 11/29/15, <http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?country=71>.

tests of party quotas and legal quotas (dropping Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea where quotas definitively are not implemented), this paper finds neither party quotas (Table XVII, $p\text{-value} = .602$) nor legal quotas (Table XIX, $p\text{-value} = .776$) to be significant predictors of domestic violence legislation. Moreover, neither legal quotas for the lower house (Table XXI, $p\text{-value} = .776$) nor legal quotas for the upper house (Table XXIII, $p\text{-value} = .233$) are significant predictors. These findings suggest quota adoption, irrespective of the type, does not significantly affect domestic violence legislation in Sub-Saharan countries.

This paper postulates that quotas generally, regardless of type, are insignificant because they do not ensure that women's voices are heard and women's concerns are championed. When a society adopts quotas as a means of signaling international and/or domestic legitimacy as Bush (2011) suggests, quotas may be mere tokens of equality. In those countries, the socio-political environment and societal values may be extremely patriarchal, adverse to female engagement in politics. Moreover, women in office may not necessarily favor strong gender-based violence preventive legislation, especially if they have not been exposed to activists' framing of the issue. As the Bonferonni comparison (Tables V) indicates, countries having both quotas and activism have significantly more comprehensive legislation than those with just quotas. This paper poses three potential explanations for this finding. First, countries that have both activism and quotas are likely to abide by quota requirements because they are internally adopted. Because the female activism variable captured women's organizing for political representation, countries with both were more likely to have internally adopted quotas with the aid of feminist activism. Second, countries that have both activism and quotas may generally have environments more conducive to female political participation and female-friendly legislation. Activism may widen the political space, pave the way for women's voices to be heard, and frame gender-based violence as focus area for female MPs. This reflects what Waylen calls an effective alliance of feminists, activists, and academics with "sympathetic insiders" within parliament and government. Third, countries that have both activism and quotas could have female MPs with strong backgrounds in female activism. The female MPs may be precisely those feminist activists that pressed for quotas.

It is possible, however, that quotas and activism may improve legislation because of the explanatory power of activism. In the chi-squared tests, activism is

the only variable that significantly predicts domestic violence legislation (Table IX, p -value = .082). This result supports Weldon and Htun's finding that strong female movements in civil society affect policy and legislative outcomes. Coalitions of female activists with strong community ties may be better positioned than female MPs to understand and lobby for female concerns. Activism over a long period of time may also engender legislation without quotas. Additionally, it is important to note that the quantitative tests do not fully account for timing and sequencing. Countries with better legislation regarding women's rights may encourage activism and quota adoption. The case study of South Africa addressed next accounts for this concern, confirming that most often both activism and quotas lead to more comprehensive female-centric legislation.

Overall, with 43 observations broken down further into groups of 15, 10, and 8 observations in the quantitative tests, it is difficult to be fully confident in the data. Each country carries a significant weight in the model. Any single country could be the driving force behind the trend or could be skewing the results. It is also possible that several country-specific variables not measured in the model have caused present trends in the data. For instance, the level of democratization and development could affect quota implementation, female activism, and domestic legislation. Undemocratic countries, with no civil and political liberties, may prohibit activism and will likely have legislation that is weak and/or does not represent popular opinion. Conversely, countries with more entrenched democratic principles, may have a more vibrant civil society and stronger legislation. Likewise, developed countries may be more likely to have female quotas, a more established civil society, and a more advanced legislative process conducive to female-friendly legislation. Conflict specific variables may affect results as well. In her newly published book, *Women and Power in Postconflict Africa*, scholar Aili Mari Tripp finds that post-conflict countries in Africa have twice as many women in legislatures and have passed twice the amount of female-friendly legislation as non-post conflict countries in the continent.³⁵ She explains that the post-conflict environment can disrupt gender roles and create opportunity structures for women to engage in politics.³⁶ This would open the space for increased female activism, female political representation and, ultimately, female-friendly legislation. She also

³⁵ Aili Mari Tripp, *Women and Power in Postconflict Africa*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

informs that post-conflict countries in Africa have high levels of international involvement.³⁷ International actors often press for international norms and could coerce or induce quota adoption, civil society development, and comprehensive legislation. Additionally, the level or intensity of gender-based violence in each country, largely affected by conflict, may also give rise to countries differing in the priority placed on gender-based violence in their legislative agendas. The likely influence of development, democracy, and post-conflict effects is a limitation of the current quantitative model. While the case study below allows for more confidence in the proposed theory, controlling for and testing the effects of development and democracy levels and post-conflict variables in future models will lead to further certainty.

CASE STUDY: SOUTH AFRICA

This paper uses in-depth study of South Africa to more closely examine the theory that both female activism and quotas promote the adoption of gender-based violence preventive legislation, specifically legislation that addresses domestic violence. This paper chose the case of South Africa because it is widely cited as a success story and extensively studied in scholarly accounts. Many consider South Africa to be the best-case scenario where quotas led to adoption of comprehensive domestic violence policy and legislation. Prior to quota adoption, legislation was negligible and, despite a high prevalence of gender inequality and violence against women, women's concerns were largely absent from law and policymaking. With quota adoption, however, female MPs entered the government after the process of democratization, promoted national gender machinery, and championed feminist concerns. Investigating South Africa through historical accounts, in-person interviews, and analyses of National Assembly debates, to determine which variables are most informative provides a nuanced picture through which to expand the theory. From the detailed case study, activism emerges as essential to each stage of the process. Female activist framing of gender as a central tenet of the larger liberation struggle heavily informed quota adoption, national gender machinery, and, ultimately, legislation. Having active female activists makes substantive representation of women's concerns through quotas more likely.

South Africa has a long history of oppression, violence, and political and

³⁷ Ibid.

social marginalization. From colonial times until the first free and fair elections of 1994, a system of apartheid segregated the country and reserved social, political, and economic rights in South Africa for white citizens.³⁸ While male anti-apartheid activists dominated the international spotlight, women mounted strong resistance to the apartheid regime. Female activists were crucial to the successful toppling of the apartheid government, engaging in mass action, female coalition building, and national mobilization long before their male counterparts, serving as the “backbone” of the movement.³⁹ In 1918, women within the main resistance party, the African National Congress (ANC), formed their own league, initially named the Bantu Women’s League and later called the ANC Women’s League (ANCWL).⁴⁰ When ANC activism accelerated in the 1950s with the Defiance Campaign to protest apartheid laws, women of the ANCWL participated in and led several protests across the country.⁴¹ Prominent female activists formed the Federation of South African Women (FSAW) in April 1954, a national women’s organization across party, color, and socio-economic lines.⁴² In its first meeting, FSAW adopted a Women’s Charter, expressly committing to the advancement of all women.⁴³ FSAW vowed to “teach men they cannot hope to liberate themselves from the evils of discrimination and prejudice as long as they fail to extend to women complete and unqualified equality in law and practice,”⁴⁴ framing gender as a central component of the larger effort to transcend social inequities instituted by the apartheid regime. FSAW led many anti-pass campaigns⁴⁵ across the country, its greatest accomplishment being the 1956 Women’s March. On August 9, 1956,

³⁸ Tom Lodge, “South Africa,” in *Compendium of Elections*, edited by Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima and David Pottie, EISA, 2002, available at <http://www.content.eisa.org.za/old-page/south-africa-historical-franchise-arrangements>.

³⁹ Hannah Evelyn Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament: From Resistance to Governance*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005, p. 145.

⁴⁰ Shireen Hassim, *The ANC Women’s League: Sex, gender and politics*, *A Jacana Pocket History*, Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd: South Africa, 2014, p. 9.

⁴¹ South African History Online, “The turbulent 1950s-Women as defiant activists,” accessed 11/29/15, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/turbulent-1950s-women-defiant-activists>.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Hassim, *ANCWL*, p. 33.

⁴⁴ Federation of South African Women, *Women’s Charter*, Johannesburg, 17 April 1954, available at <http://sahistory.org.za/topic/womens-charter>.

⁴⁵ Under pass laws used by the government to control movement of blacks, black South Africans were required to carry identity documents in a book called a “reference book” or “pass.”

commemorated today as Women's Day in South Africa, thousands of women from across the country flocked to the [Union Buildings in Pretoria](#) and presented a petition against pass laws to the head of the ruling party, The National Party (NP).⁴⁶

When the system of apartheid finally began to fissure, formal negotiations for transition began. As predicted by scholar Lisa Baldez' theory of female mobilization in democratic transition, women in South Africa mobilized on the basis of their gender identity in the transition to democracy because they had sufficient resources, experience framing issues, and were originally excluded from the agenda setting process.⁴⁷ In 1992, experienced women leaders from across South Africa, in over ninety organizations, united to ensure a place for women in the new democracy, forming the Women's National Coalition (WNC).⁴⁸ Led by ANCWL members, the WNC broadened the political arena to ensure female participation in negotiations and to caucus around gender issues crucial to the transition.⁴⁹ When negotiations for the interim constitution and bill of rights began, the multiparty body formed to negotiate the transition was male dominated. Through their collective action, however, women from the WNC convinced the formal body to allow each party's negotiating team one additional female. Women from across party lines worked with ANC women to incorporate gender equity and anti-discrimination practices into the new governance structure.⁵⁰ As a result, the 1993 interim Constitution eradicated all forms of social inequality, including gender.⁵¹ ANC women also pushed to alter the formal party rules and practices to increase their participation, representation, and influence, securing the 30% quota for women on the party's national election list beginning in the first free and fair election in 1994.⁵² As South Africa adopted a proportional rep-

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Lisa Baldez, "Women's Movements and Democratic Transition in Chile, Brazil, East Germany, and Poland," *Comparative Politics* Vol. 35 No. 3, 2003, pp. 253-272.

⁴⁸ Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament*, p. 38.

⁴⁹ Hill, "Redefining the Terms."

⁵⁰ Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament*, p. 40.

⁵¹ Republic of South Africa, Interim Constitution, 1993, Epilogue: "This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or *sex* [emphasis added]."

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

resentation system with closed party lists, this was a significant step.⁵³

Today, the Bill of Rights and the 1996 Constitution ensure women's rights, prohibit sex discrimination, and promote women's equality. National gender machinery, specific government structures and processes in the executive and legislative branches, promote and monitor progress toward gender equity. As illustrated in Figure I, both the executive and parliamentary bodies have defined channels of communication with female civil society organizations, ensuring continued representation of the female voice.⁵⁴ Female activists have taken advantage of this machinery and female quotas, entering parliament in droves. Following the 1994 election, women were significantly represented in all government structures, accounting for 15% of ministers and 56% of deputy ministers in the cabinet and 27.7% of parliamentary seats.⁵⁵ Although the "social" portfolios (health, welfare, housing) were assigned to women, women were also deputy ministers of "hard" portfolios (finance, and trade and industry).⁵⁶

With a strong female presence post-quota implementation, parliament passed the Domestic Violence Act (no. 118 of 1998). Gender-based violence plagued South Africa and domestic violence was rampant. The year the Act was debated in parliament, one in four South African women reported being assaulted by her boyfriend or husband every week; 80% of the violence women suffered was in their homes at the hands of the men who supposedly supported and loved them.⁵⁷ The Act significantly altered the legal protective framework available to these women. It broadened the international definition of "domestic-relationship" to include any relationship where persons of the same or opposite sex live or lived together.⁵⁸ When violent acts transpired, the Act implemented a system of "speedy redress." It instructed South African Police to render service as soon as possible, allowed peace officers to arrest a respondent at the scene without a warrant, called on courts to accept *ex parte* applications on behalf of a complainant for a protection order, and permitted courts to grant an interim order if they were satisfied

⁵³ PR Library, "Proportional Representation Voting Systems," accessed 11/29/15, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/BeginningReading/PRsystems.htm>.

⁵⁴ Waylen, pp. 535-536.

⁵⁵ Shireen Hassim, *Women's organizations and democracy in South Africa contesting authority*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006, pp. 185-188; Waylen, p. 534.

⁵⁶ Hassim, *Women's organizations*, p. 185.

⁵⁷ Dr. C P Mulder, Republic of South Africa, 1998 *Hansard Debates of the National Assembly*, 2nd Parliament: 2nd session: no.1, November 2, 1998, p. 7199.

⁵⁸ Devikaram Priscilla Jana, *Hansard*, November 2, 1998, p. 7202.

with *prima facie* evidence.⁵⁹ South African Police were required to inform complainants of their rights, formally defining their failure to do so as misconduct in terms of the South African Police Services Act.⁶⁰ Markedly, the Act also mandated that the state undertake financial assistance, when the complainant did not have the means to pay for the serving of documents, although no direct budget was set to implement this measure.⁶¹

While the Act passed with strong support from across party and gender lines, female MPs were the driving force behind the legislation. They engaged in agenda setting and brought national attention to the issue. In the first years of the new Parliament, gender equality was not a priority and gender equality bills languished in the South African Law Commission (SALC, the legislative drafting agency).⁶² The Minister of Welfare and Population Development Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi and the Deputy Minister of Justice Dr. Manto Tshabalala-Msiman took matters in their own hands. They spearheaded public education campaigns, organized workshops within the Department of Justice on dealing with cases involving violence against women, and collaborated heavily with civil society.⁶³ They helped form an ANC Women's Caucus to garner public support for gender-based issues in the legislature. The Caucus worked at the grassroots level, creating the Joint Civil Society-ANC Parliamentary Women's Caucus Campaign to End Violence Against Women and Children.⁶⁴ Because ANC women had previously worked alongside civil society members as activists in the liberation movement, they recognized the importance of continuing the partnership with those aligned with the cause. As Fraser-Moleketi explains, ANC female MPs and female ministers knew gender-based violence was an issue common to all women, regardless of race and class; they were prepared to fight for legislation

⁵⁹ Clause 2, Clause 3, *Domestic Violence Bill*, referred to by Mrs. D. Govender, Hansard, November 2, 1998, p. 7225.

⁶⁰ Devikaram Priscilla Jana, Hansard, November 2, 1998, p. 7203.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Hassim, Women's organizations, p. 200.

⁶³ Sheila Meintjes, "The Politics of Engagement: Women Transforming the Policy Process—Domestic Violence Legislation in South Africa," in No Shortcuts to Power: African Women in Politics and Policy Making, edited by Anne Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim, Zed Books, 2003, p. 151

⁶⁴ Pamela Shifman, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, and Viv, "Women in Parliament Caucus for Action to End Violence," *Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity*, No. 36, No to Violence, 1997, pp. 23-26.

and engage with civil society because they were informed by their past active involvement.⁶⁵

With respect to the legislation, female MPs ensured the Act met international standards and worked to draft and process the legislation in time for formal negotiations. The Joint Monitoring Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life and Status of Women (JMC), created in 1966 by then Speaker of the National Assembly, an ANCWL member and former WNC founder, monitored all legislation for gender sensitivity to ensure the government fully implemented responsibilities set forth in the CEDAW.⁶⁶ Under the leadership of former activist and female MP Pregs Govender, the JMC became a highly visible, consistent, and effective voice for women. It and promulgated domestic violence issue.⁶⁷ When it was clear the SALC would not have a draft bill proposed before the 1999 elections, Govender devised a strategy to ensure a gender-based violence bill entered the 1998 Parliamentary discussions.⁶⁸ With support from the ANC Women's Caucus, she bypassed the public hearing SALC process and, instead, allowed the public to comment on the draft bill at the parliamentary public hearings.⁶⁹ When the SALC rejected the bill because of its gender-specific legislation, Govender convinced others in parliament to edit and process the Bill for debate just before end of the first term of Parliament.⁷⁰

While scholar Shareen Hassim argues that the legislative gains made in the first five years of the democratically elected government can be attributed to notable women, "such as Pregs Govender, who would probably have been on the ANC list without a quota," voluntary party quotas were essential to getting these women in office.⁷¹ When interviewing Fraser-Moleketi, she divulged that after her involvement in the liberation movement, she and her husband agreed he would be in the provincial executive and legislature and she would spend more time with their children.⁷² Yet, when the ANC drafted its list, very clearly wanting a minimum of 30% women, party members approached Fraser-Moleketi. They wanted

⁶⁵ Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, interview with the author, November 15, 2015.

⁶⁶ Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament*, p. 138.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Meintjes, p. 155.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Hassim, *Women's organizations*, p. 200.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, interview with author, November 15, 2015.

capable women like her, who had been part of the movement in exile and who had worked internally with party structures, to sit in the National Assembly.⁷³ As Fraser-Moleketi explains, “Parliament was very receptive” because the Bill had the support of sympathetic, progressive men and, more importantly, a larger number of ANC women in the executive and the legislature.⁷⁴ Analyzing the November 2nd debate of the draft Bill, the importance of former female activists in the government is clear. Of the 490 members of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces at that time, 117 were women. All 117 had been involved in activism and had been members of one of the broad-based women’s coalitions, and 96 of the 117 were ANC members who had been elected through party quota.⁷⁵

CONCLUSION

Analyzing the long history of female activism, the adoption of party quotas by the ANC, and the passage of the 1998 Domestic Violence Act in South Africa, women in government who were anti-apartheid activists stand as beacons of change. During apartheid, women in South Africa formed interracial and inter-party coalitions to further gender equality. They framed female liberation as essential to the broader anti-apartheid struggle and solidified female representation in the agenda setting processes and in the formal government. When women entered the government in 1994, after the ANC party quota, they provided a strong support base through which to pass progressive, gender legislation. The Domestic Violence Act, in particular, can be exclusively accredited to the labor of Pregs Govender, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, and Dr. Manto Tshabalala-Msimang.

While conventional wisdom asserts that substantive legislation follows quota adoption, quotas alone were insufficient in the case South Africa and in other countries on the Continent. The results from the One-Way Anova test, the

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in National Parliaments: Situation as of 25 December 1997,” accessed 11/29/15, <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif251297.htm>; Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini, “Women Empowered – Women in Parliament in South Africa,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Handbook: Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, Stockholm, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2002.

Bonferonni comparison, and the chi-squared tests of the quantitative model in this paper indicate that successful domestic violence legislation depends on more than just quotas. Because domestic violence is most often a first order issue in conflict with customary African laws, passing it likely requires the specific skills of former activist female MPs in comparison with rape and sexual harassment legislation. Quotas themselves are insufficient. Having activism present too appears to make quotas more successful in achieving substantive legislation. While this paper offers several potential explanations for this finding, analyzing the finding in light of South Africa informs that female activism is likely important because of the expertise women acquire as activists. Women who have had first-hand experience coalition-building, framing gender issues, and fighting for their voices to be heard have the necessary wherewithal to pass domestic violence legislation. To more conclusively determine that women's activism experience is the driver of changes in legislation, one should control for development and democracy levels and post-conflict variables in future models.

Ultimately, though we can reasonably conclude that, with respect to domestic violence legislation, adopting quotas to ensure female representation in government will not guarantee legislation. The environment within which quotas are adopted matters. Having individual female legislators with experience organizing and framing gender issues will make for far more successful legislative initiatives. If these women are active, they can enter government through quotas, or even work alongside MPs from a civil society vantage point, to aid the passage of domestic violence legislation. Women who enter government, however, without this experience, merely because of a top-down adoption of an electoral quota, will not have the framing, mobilizing, and legislative tools to make significant change. Successful legislation cannot emanate from quotas alone.

Of course, legislation is merely a first step. In their interviews, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi and Charlene Smith both emphasized the importance of comprehensive policies, aggressive implementation, and attitude and mindset shifts. In her talk at Yale, Dr. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka advocated for a comprehensive approach on the part of the global community, local government and civil society members, and the individual, to end gender-based violence—"because causes are complex, the approach needs to be comprehensive."⁷⁶ In her Parliamentary address

⁷⁶ Dr. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, "Gender and Violence" Lecture, Yale University, November 6, 2015.

on the day that the Domestic Violence Bill was being negotiated, Dr. Manto Tshabalala-Msimang recognized, “we cannot change the mindsets and attitudes of the people through legislation alone.”⁷⁷ For real change in behavior to occur, shifts in individual consciousness are vital. As Smith commented, “you can’t legislate away gender-based violence.”⁷⁸ Despite significant strides, gender-based violence rates remain high in most Sub-Saharan African countries. In fact, since 2004, South Africa has had the highest incidence of recorded rape in the world.⁷⁹ This paper recommends further research of the components necessary for successful implementation of legislation, apart from passage of legislation. Legislation, however, should not be discounted. Legislation can entrench principles of equality and can set the framework for further interventions that work to eradicate violence. As Dr. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka articulated, legislation can affect “millions of people in a country just by a stroke of a pen.”

⁷⁷ Dr. Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, *Hansard*, November 2, 1998, p. 7180.

⁷⁸ Charlene Smith, interview with author, November 5, 2015.

⁷⁹ NationMaster, “Crime: Rape Rate: Countries Compared,” accessed 11/29/15, <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Crime/Rape-rate>.

APPENDIX

I. LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ANCWL	African National Congress Women's League
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
DEVAW	Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FSAW	Federation of South African Women
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
JMC	Joint Monitoring Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life And Status of Women
MP	Member of Parliament
NP	National Party
SALC	South African Law Commission
WNC	Women's National Coalition

II. FIGURES




Figure I: This figure depicts the national gender machinery currently present in the South African Government. FOSAD is the Forum of South Africa Directors-General. JMC on IQLSW is referenced in this paper merely as the JMC.

III. TABLES AND GRAPHS

Table I

	Female Activism	No Female Activism
Quota Before 2012	Angola Botswana Burundi Cameroon Democratic Republic of Congo Ethiopia Kenya Lesotho Malawi Niger Rwanda South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Uganda <i>Quota & Activism, N = 15</i>	Burkina Faso Congo-Brazzaville Cote D'Ivoire Eritrea Guinea Mali Somalia Sudan <i>Just Quota, N = 8</i>
No Quota Before 2012	Gambia Ghana Liberia Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal Zimbabwe <i>Just Activism, N = 10</i>	Benin Central African Republic Chad Equatorial Guinea Gabon Guinea-Bissau Madagascar Sierra Leone Togo Zambia <i>No Quota & No Activism, N = 10</i>

Table I: This table indicates the placement of all 43 Sub-Saharan countries in the database into one of four categories based on the independent variables of quota implementation and female activism.

Table II

COUNTRY	LAWS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	LAWS, RAPE	LAWS, SEXUAL HARRASMENT
ANGOLA	0	0.25	1
BENIN	0.25	0.5	0.25
BOTSWANA	0.25	0.5	0.5
BURKINA FASO	1	0.5	0.5
BURUNDI	0.25	0.25	0.25
CAMEROON	1	0.75	0.75
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1	0.75	0.5
CHAD	1	0.75	1
DRC	1	0.5	0
CONGO	1	0.25	0.5
COTE D'IVOIRE	1	0.5	0.25
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	0.75	0.5	0.5
ERITREA	1	0.75	0.5
ETHIOPIA	0.25	0.5	0.75
GABON	0.5	0.5	0.75
GAMBIA	1	0.25	1
GHANA	0.25	0.5	1
GUINEA	0.5	0.5	1
GUINEA-BISSAU	0.75	0.25	1
KENYA	0.75	0.5	0.25
LESOTHO	1	0.25	0.5
LIBERIA	1	0.5	0.75
MADAGASCAR	0.5	0.5	0
MALAWI	0.25	0.5	0.5
MALI	1	0.5	1
MAURITANIA	1	0.75	1
MAURITIUS	0.25	0.5	0.25
MOZAMBIQUE	0	0	0
NAMIBIA	0	0.25	0.5
NIGER	1	0.5	0.25

NIGERIA	0.5	0.5	1
RWANDA	0.25	0	0
SENEGAL	0.5	0.5	0.25
SIERRA LEONE	0.25	0.25	0.5
SOMALIA	1	0.75	1
SOUTH AFRICA	0.25	0.25	0.25
SUDAN	1	0.75	1
SWAZILAND	0.75	0.5	0.75
TANZANIA	0.5	0.25	0.5
TOGO	0.75	0.25	0
UGANDA	0	0.5	0.25
ZAMBIA	1	0.5	0.5
ZIMBABWE	0.25	0.5	0.5

Table II: This table displays the 2014 **domestic violence, rape, and sexual harassment legislation scores** for the 43 Sub Saharan-African countries in the dataset, as collected by the Social Institutions and Gender Index.

Table III

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Domestic Violence	No Quota & No Activism	10	.6750	.28988	.09167	.4676	.8824	.25	1.00
	Just Activism	10	.4750	.39878	.12611	.1897	.7603	.00	1.00
	Just Quota	8	.9375	.17678	.06250	.7897	1.0853	.50	1.00
	Quota & Activism	15	.5000	.37796	.09759	.2907	.7093	.00	1.00
Total		43	.6163	.36738	.05602	.5032	.7293	.00	1.00
Rape	No Quota & No Activism	10	.4750	.18447	.05833	.3430	.6070	.25	.75
	Just Activism	10	.4250	.20582	.06509	.2778	.5722	.00	.75
	Just Quota	8	.5625	.17678	.06250	.4147	.7103	.25	.75
	Quota & Activism	15	.4000	.18420	.04756	.2980	.5020	.00	.75
Total		43	.4535	.19099	.02913	.3947	.5123	.00	.75
Sexual Harassment	No Quota & No Activism	10	.5000	.35355	.11180	.2471	.7529	.00	1.00
	Just Activism	10	.6250	.37731	.11932	.3551	.8949	.00	1.00
	Just Quota	8	.7188	.31161	.11017	.4582	.9793	.25	1.00
	Quota & Activism	15	.4333	.29073	.07507	.2723	.5943	.00	1.00
Total		43	.5465	.33743	.05146	.4427	.6504	.00	1.00

Table III: This table identifies the **descriptive statistics** of domestic violence, rape, and sexual harassment scores for each of the four groups in the dataset.

Table IV

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Domestic Violence	Between Groups	1.262	3	.421	3.724	.019
	Within Groups	4.406	39	.113		
	Total	5.669	42			
Rape	Between Groups	.151	3	.050	1.419	.252
	Within Groups	1.381	39	.035		
	Total	1.532	42			
Sexual Harassment	Between Groups	.513	3	.171	1.561	.214
	Within Groups	4.269	39	.109		
	Total	4.782	42			

Table IV: This table displays the results of the **One-Way Anova test**. The difference in the domestic violence legislation score between the four groups of countries in the dataset is statistically significant (p-value = .019).

Table V

			Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
Dependent Variable (I) Type		(J) Type				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Domestic Violence	Quota & Activism	No Quota & No Activism	-.17500	.13722	1.000	-.5564	.2064
		Just Activism	.02500	.13722	1.000	-.3564	.4064
		Just Quota	-.43750*	.14716	.030	-.8465	-.0285

Table V: This table displays the results of the Bonferonni **Multiple Comparisons test**. The difference in means between the Activism & Quota group and the Just Quota group is statistically significant (p-value = .030).

Table VI

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	Domestic Violence	.6163	43	.36738	.05602
	Rape	.4535	43	.19099	.02913

Table VI: This table displays the **Paired Samples Statistics** between domestic violence and rape legislation scores for the 43 Sub-Saharan African countries in the database.

Table VII

		Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference				
					Lower	Upper			
Pair 1	Domestic Violence - Rape	.16279	.32221	.04914	.06363	.26195	3.313	42	.002

Table VII: This table displays the **Paired Samples T-Test** between domestic violence and rape legislation scores for the 43 Sub-Saharan African countries in the database. The difference in means between rape and domestic violence scores is significant (p-value = .002).

Table VIII

		Activism		Total
		.00	1.00	
Domestic Violence	.00	0	4	4
	.25	2	9	11
	.50	3	3	6
	.75	3	2	5
	1.00	10	7	17
Total		18	25	43

Table VIII: This table displays the **Domestic Violence * Activism Cross tabulation counts**.

Table IX

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.263	4	.082

Table X: This table displays the **Domestic Violence * Quota** Cross tabulation counts.

Table X

		Quota		Total
		.00	1.00	
Domestic Violence	.00	2	2	4
	.25	5	6	11
	.50	4	2	6
	.75	3	2	5
	1.00	6	11	17
Total		20	23	43

Table X: This table displays the **Domestic Violence * Quota** Cross tabulation counts.

Table XI

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.230	4	.694

Table XI: This table displays the Chi-Squared Test between **Quota and Domestic Violence** as displayed in Table X above. p-value = .694 and is not statistically significant.

Table XII

		Quota & Activism		Total
		.00	1.00	
Domestic Violence	.00	2	2	4
	.25	5	6	11
	.50	5	1	6
	.75	3	2	5
	1.00	13	4	17
Total		28	15	43

Table XII: This table displays the **Domestic Violence * Quota & Activism Cross tabulation** counts.

Table XIII

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.174	4	.383

Table XIII: This table displays the Chi-Squared Test between **Quota & Activism and Domestic Violence** as displayed in Table XII above. p-value = .383 and is not statistically significant.

Table XIV

		Quota		Total
		.00	1.00	
Domestic Violence	.00	2	2	4
	.25	5	5	10
	.50	4	2	6
	.75	3	2	5
Total		1.00	6	12
			20	37

Table XIV: This table displays the **Domestic Violence * Quota Cross tabulation** counts after dropping Sudan, Somalia, Botswana, Eritrea, DRC, and Cote d'Ivoire from the dataset.

Table XV

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.628	4	.960

Table XV: This table displays the **Chi-Squared Test** between Quota and Domestic Violence as displayed in Table XIV above, after dropping 6 cases. p-value = .960 and is not statistically significant.

Table XVI

		Party Quotas		Total
		.00	1.00	
Domestic Violence	.00	3	1	4
	.25	7	4	11
	.50	5	1	6
	.75	5	0	5
Total		1.00	10	14
			30	40

Table XVI: This table displays the **Domestic Violence * Party Quotas Cross tabulation** counts after dropping Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea from the dataset.

Table XVII

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.741	4	.602

Table XVII: This table displays the **Chi-Squared Test** between Party Quotas and Domestic Violence as displayed in Table XVI above, after dropping 3 cases. p-value = .602 and is not statistically significant.

Table XVIII

		Legal Quotas		Total
		.00	1.00	
Domestic	.00	2	2	4
	.25	9	2	11
Violence	.50	4	2	6
	.75	3	2	5
Total	1.00	9	5	14
		27	13	40

Table XVIII: This table displays the **Domestic Violence * Legal Quotas Cross tabulation** counts after dropping Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea from the dataset.

Table XIX

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.782	4	.776

Table XIX: This table displays the **Chi-Squared Test** between Legal Quotas and Domestic Violence as displayed in Table XVIII above, after dropping 3 cases. p-value = .776 and is not statistically significant.

Table XX

		Lower House Quotas		Total
		.00	1.00	
Domestic Violence	.00	2	2	4
	.25	9	2	11
	.50	4	2	6
	.75	3	2	5
	1.00	9	5	14
Total		27	13	40

Table XX: This table displays the **Domestic Violence * Lower House Quotas Cross tabulation** counts after dropping Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea from the dataset.

Table XXI

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.782	4	.776

Table XXI: This table displays the **Chi-Squared Test** between Lower House Quotas and Domestic Violence as displayed in Table XX above, after dropping 3 cases. p-value = .776 and is not statistically significant.

Table XXII

		Upper House Quotas		Total
		.00	1.00	
Domestic Violence	.00	4	0	4
	.25	9	2	11
	.50	6	0	6
	.75	3	2	5
	1.00	13	1	14
Total		35	5	40

Table XXII: This table displays the **Domestic Violence * Upper House Quotas Cross tabulation** counts after dropping Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea from the dataset.

Table XXIII

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.5782	4	.233

Table XXIII: This table displays the **Chi-Squared Test** between Upper House Quotas and Domestic Violence as displayed in Table XX above, after dropping 3 cases. p-value = .233 and is not statistically significant.

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