

HOW TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE INSTITUTIONS: QUANTIFYING CHINA'S INFLUENCE ON THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

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INTRODUCTION

Following the People's Republic of China's "Reform and Opening Up" (*gaige kai-fang*) ushered in by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China's participation in international organizations has dramatically increased.² These organizations cover a range of issues, and include institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank. However, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a notable departure from these aforementioned institutions. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in June 2001 by the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.³ The SCO, created and led solely by Asian countries, is the first case in which the PRC has independently developed a multilateral organization.

Though China's active participation in this organization is apparent given the PRC's emphasis on the organization in its biennial defense strategies, how Chinese foreign policy priorities affect the policies of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has yet to be fully explored. Given the PRC's historical tendency to

¹ Abigail Grace wrote this paper as a Senior at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service while majoring in International Politics: Security Studies. This piece was written to fulfill the Asian Studies Certificate's thesis requirement.

² Ann Kent, "China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations." *Global Governance* 8, no. 3 (2002): 343-64.

³ Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Shanghai, China. 2001.

eschew foreign involvement in domestic security matters, China's decision to enlist the support of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to combat domestic terrorism within Xinjiang (China's westernmost territory which borders other SCO member states) raises interesting questions about how China views the SCO in comparison to other Asian regional multilateral security organizations. Based on a quantitative analysis of official Chinese Defense White Papers and counterterrorism treaties ratified by the SCO and ASEAN+1, it is clear that Chinese foreign policy objectives ultimately drive the SCO's policy goals.⁴ Contrary to the claims of equality among states within the SCO, the following findings indicate that Chinese foreign policy objectives play a large role in how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization frames controversial issues such as regional prosperity and cooperation, domestic terrorism within the PRC, and shared regional challenges.

Establishing that the PRC has an outsized influence on the SCO's policy objectives is critical for two primary reasons. First, if China does drive the SCO's priorities, then it is fundamentally violating its own, self-constructed goal of "cooperation...and seeking consensus instead of imposing one's own will on others," outlined concurrently with the SCO's establishment in the White Paper *China's National Defense in 2000*.⁵ Given that the SCO is primarily comprised of states that have only gained independence within the past 25 years, a China-driven agenda would eliminate key venues for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to advance their own respective policy objectives. Secondly, the SCO likely represents a model for future Chinese-led multilateral organization. Given the recent establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the SCO's recent proposals on cyber-sovereignty to the United Nations, it is increasingly likely that the PRC will use similar platforms when engaging with the international community in the coming years. Quantifying the degree to which the SCO is a tool of Chinese foreign policy will have telling implications for future Chinese multilateral engagement not just with Central Asia, but with the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

⁴ At times, ASEAN+1 can refer to dialogue between ASEAN and either China, India, South Korea, or Japan. However, all references to ASEAN+1 in this piece solely refer to ASEAN/China dialogue.

⁵ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2000*, Beijing, China. 2000.

Methodologically, this paper utilizes a frequency analysis of ten key phrases. Each of these phrases not only has strictly definitional meanings (e.g. peace, harmony, terrorism) but also carries policy connotations. For example, when CCP officials refer to harmony they are not only implying that the region has an absence of direct conflict, but also invoking traditional Confucian ideas on the international order.⁶ Phrases included in this analysis were directly selected from a review of official Chinese Defense White Papers. Chinese Defense White Papers are published by the State Council Information Office, and their content is overseen by the Central Military Commission, the Ministry of National Defense, and the State Council. These White Papers are regarded to be the most authoritative sources of Chinese defense policy.⁷ The implication of this quantitative analysis is that when regional multilateral organizations such as ASEAN+1 and the SCO choose to employ one of these ten phrases, they are accepting the Chinese connotations associated with the phrase in addition to the base definition of the word itself. Following the quantitative results, which demonstrate that SCO documents have dramatically higher rates of identified key phrases, a qualitative review of corresponding passages is employed to support the initial findings.

This analysis overwhelmingly supports the hypothesis that Chinese foreign policy objectives shape official SCO doctrine far more than ASEAN+1 doctrine. Key phrases such as good neighbor (睦邻, *mulin*), harmony (和谐, *hexie*), and separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*), occur at dramatically higher rates in SCO treaties than in ASEAN+1 treaties, despite the fact that the selected documents were written within months of one another and address relatively similar objectives. Further qualitative analysis reveals that these phrases are associated with politically sensitive topics, such as countering Western influence in Asia, collective regional security, and domestic separatism within the PRC—thus incentivizing China to frame these issues in a way that is favorable to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The SCO's decision to utilize nearly identical language to official PRC defense white papers clearly demonstrates that CCP foreign policy objectives play an outsized role in determining SCO priorities. Therefore, it is apparent that the PRC is able to leverage its influence on the SCO to ensure that sensitive issues

⁶ Gilbert Rozman, "Invocations of Chinese Traditions in International Relations." *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 17, no. 1, (2012): 111-24.

⁷ Caitlin Campbell, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. "Highlights from China's New Defense White Paper, 'China's Military Strategy.'" Washington, DC. 2015.

are framed in line with CCP objectives.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The PRC has pursued multiple strategies for global engagement since the state's initial founding in 1949. Maoist China, characterized by isolationism and its relative pariah status within the international community, rarely engaged with foreign powers. This provided a critical window of opportunity for the United States to develop alliances with states throughout the Pacific, and for the original founding states of ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) to form a collective security organization in part based on resisting communism's spread.⁸ Throughout China's isolationist period and Deng Xiaoping's tenure, present-day Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were still governed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Therefore, the United States and other Western nations were able to exert little, if any, substantive influence on the region.

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, newly independent Central Asian states had not yet been brought into the West's sphere of influence. This provided the PRC with a window of opportunity to engage with the region prior to the entry of any other geo-political power. In April of 1996, the Shanghai Five was founded by the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Tajikistan to demilitarize and clearly delineate borders within Central Asia. This initial multilateral engagement represented a crucial first step for the PRC to engage meaningfully with its newly formed neighbors. Due to the relative success of the Shanghai Five, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was subsequently founded in June 2001 by members of the Shanghai Five and the Republic of Uzbekistan.⁹ The SCO is unique in that the relatively recent emergence of a distinct

⁸ For information on US maritime dominance in the Pacific, see: George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. For information a general overview of ASEAN and the ARF, see: Alice D. Ba, "China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-century Asia." *Asian Survey* **43**, no. 4 (July/August 2003): 622-47.; also, Hiro Katsuma, *ASEAN's Cooperative Security Enterprise: Norms and Interests in the ASEAN Regional Forum*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

⁹ Shanghai Five. *Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions*. Shanghai, China.

Central Asian political region allowed post-reform China to shape the structure of the SCO in a way that inherently favors a Chinese view of international organizations. This view is best exhibited by the PRC's *New Security Concept*, a 2002 document outlining China's vision of regional and international security in the 21st century. The *New Security Concept* is rooted in five key tenets which state that states should:

- 1) Cooperate on the basis on the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, and other widely accepted norms.
- 2) Resolve territorial disputes through peaceful negotiation.
- 3) Reform and improve existing international economic and international financial institutions for mutual benefit and common development.
- 4) Place emphasis on non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and transnational crime. Oppose foreign invasion and safeguard territorial integrity.
- 5) Promote disarmament, the elimination of WMD, and adhere to non-proliferation standards.¹⁰

Significant academic debate surrounds China's relative influence within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In part, this debate stems from the fact that the charter of the SCO emphasizes equality among member states regardless of the relative power of the state in question.¹¹

ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. ASEAN's initial key objectives were to resist the spread of communism and accelerate economic growth among member countries. The remaining member states: Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia ascended between 1984 and 1999 as the Cold War thawed. In sharp contrast with the SCO, ASEAN's organizational framework was in place decades before all member states reinstituted diplomatic relations with the PRC. Therefore, though the SCO and ASEAN have relatively similar aims of regional security cooperation and economic

1996. Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Shanghai, China. 2001.

¹⁰ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept*, Beijing, China. 2002.

¹¹ Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Shanghai, China. 2001.

empowerment, the creation of rules of engagement prior to instating diplomatic ties with the PRC and absence of a hegemon within ASEAN create a notably different dynamic between the two regional organizations. ASEAN's nearly fifty-year history has enabled the organization to build relatively robust institutions capable of translating ministerial-level decisions to operational action. Additionally, ASEAN's historic ties with the West also provide an interesting point of comparison. From ASEAN's founding until the early 1990s, ASEAN member states enjoyed the support of America's military to protect its territorial claims and aid its suppression of internal communist factions. However, with the end of the Cold War, American military aid to organizations such as ASEAN decreased, creating a relative power vacuum within the region.¹² With this shift, China-ASEAN relations have grown; in fact, China's active participation in Sino-ASEAN bilateral dialogues and the ASEAN Regional Forum (a regional dialogue that includes ASEAN nations as well as China, the United States, Japan, and South Korea, among others) has closely mirrored its rate of overall engagement levels with other international organizations.¹³ By 1991, all ASEAN nations had normalized relations with China, thus laying the groundwork for the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum and additional ASEAN+1 engagement. As such, ASEAN+1 treaties and documents have been selected as a comparative case to analyze the PRC's influence on the SCO.

CURRENT POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Today, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN are at relatively divergent points within their organizational life-cycle. The SCO is undoubtedly on a trajectory of organizational growth, adding India and Pakistan as member states in June 2016. With this expansion of their mandate, the organization is now better positioned to address the severe economic needs of relatively resource-rich but industrially under-developed member states, such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Since its founding, the SCO has been characterized by the stark dividing line between SCO states with regional hegemon aspirations, such as

¹² Alice D. Ba, "China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-century Asia." *Asian Survey* 43, no. 4 (July/August 2003): 622-47.

¹³ Ann Kent, "China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations." *Global Governance* 8, no. 3 (2002): 343-64.

China and Russia, and smaller member states such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that do not have the political or economic capital to substantively alter the relatively stagnant post-Soviet geo-political landscape of Central Asia. In contrast to multilateral organizations such as ASEAN that also seek to strengthen member states' domestic institutions, SCO treaties and agreements remain focused on either promoting broad-based regional economic growth or collective action against non-state actor security risks, such as transnational terrorist threats. However, there is still much room for institutional diversification and strengthening, and the expansion of operational-level initiatives. Though the SCO will host international cultural symposiums and annual ministerial-level meetings, there is little evidence of organizational initiatives tricking down to an operational level and altering the status quo within any member states' domestic operating procedures.

In contrast, no clear regional hegemon exists among the ASEAN member states. Though industrialization and economic modernization in Southeast Asia has been well underway throughout the organization's existence, as time has progressed, ASEAN has attempted to remain relevant and serve as a conduit to foster agreement on relatively complex economic and political issues. ASEAN member states have diligently worked to adopt policies encouraging regional integration, such as a free trade zone among all member countries. Additionally, the organization has sought to diversify the range of issues addressed by ASEAN, devoting resources to distinct initiatives designed to improve regional human rights, humanitarian assistance, and raise the standard of living for all individuals residing in ASEAN member states.¹⁴ Undoubtedly, ASEAN's long-standing institutional history, demonstrated capacity to address regional issues, and relative success integrating Southeast Asia's economy has enabled the organization to grow and diversify. Despite this relative organizational success, Southeast Asian member countries are facing notable geopolitical challenges. China's increased bellicose action in the South China Sea, Cambodia's continued advocacy for Chinese positions within ASEAN internal discussions, and Duterte's recent ascension to the Philippine's presidency have contributed to international speculation of factionalism emerging within the region. Some have begun to question if ASEAN's nearly fifty-year history of successful multilateral engagement is threatened by an increasingly assertive China. Though the PRC is in no means an official member of ASEAN, its inter-

¹⁴ Association of Southeast Asian Nations. *ASEAN Community 2016 Fact Sheet*. Jakarta, Indonesia. 2016.

ests and policies remain a large shadow over the comparatively smaller ASEAN states.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The People's Republic of China's Regional Security Objectives

Through a review of China's stated regional security goals and previous scholarly analyses of China's influence on the SCO and ASEAN, a greater understanding of the PRC's influence on the SCO can be gained.

In order to ascertain whether or not the PRC is successfully influencing the SCO to adopt policy positions favorable to China, it is important to understand what China's regional security objectives are. China's regional security goals are well documented throughout its biennial white papers issued under the title *China's National Defense*. A cursory review of the papers issued from 2000 to 2015 reveal five key reappearing policy priorities relevant to an analysis of regional multilateral security organizations.¹⁵ This analysis will focus on these five regional security objectives that appear within SCO and ASEAN+1 treaties and documents:

1. Maintaining regional stability within Asia
2. Championing the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"
3. Countering Western influence within the region
4. Obtaining "regional hegemon" status, especially in the maritime arena
5. Eliminating separatism, extremism, and terrorism within China's borders

Maintaining regional stability within Asia is undoubtedly a key priority of the PRC. In the latest white paper, PRC officials write that, "a prosperous and stable world would provide China with opportunities," underscoring the country's commitment to collective development among regional partners.¹⁶ Additionally, China pledges adherence to the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" in ev-

¹⁵ See *China's National Defense in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2015*. cited throughout this work.

¹⁶ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2015*, Beijing, China. 2015.

ery defense strategy issued from 2000 to 2010, and alludes to it in the 2015 strategy. These principles champion non-interference on all levels—internal matters, issues of sovereignty, and territorial integrity.¹⁷

China's commitment to countering Western influence within the region is both recurrent and thinly veiled. In 2015, CCP leaders wrote, "China will... pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, [and] oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms."¹⁸ However, the PRC's own attempts to attain regional hegemonism, especially within the maritime arena, are readily apparent. PRC depictions of rival territorial claims to disputed zones within the South China Sea are especially bellicose. PRC leadership in *China's National Defense in 2015* writes:

On the issues concerning China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied...It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests.¹⁹

This intense focus on safe-guarding China's regional hegemonism is coupled with the PRC's determination to eliminate domestic terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Combatting the terrorism, separatism, and extremism (also referred to as "three evils") is a heavily prioritized objective in all of China's defense strategies issued from 2000 to 2015. In the most recent strategy, these three evils are categorized as "rampant threats."²⁰

Analysis of China's Influence on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The successful chartering of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was largely a result of Chinese diplomatic initiatives in Central Asia. The PRC, realizing that the

¹⁷ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept*, Beijing, China. 2002.

¹⁸ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2015*, Beijing, China. 2015.

¹⁹ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2015*, Beijing, China. 2015.

²⁰ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2015*, Beijing, China. 2015.

Shanghai Five was limited by its concrete objectives of resolving border disputes, saw an opportunity to expand the initial collective to a more robust, formalized international organization. Given the PRC's active role in the SCO's creation, many onlookers have viewed the SCO as an instrument for the PRC to advance their own foreign policy objectives within Central Asia.

The PRC's decision to proactively forge multilateral ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a departure from the PRC's status quo in the 1990s of avoiding formalized multilateral commitments when possible.²¹ This has Bates Gill, among others, to speculate that China's engagement with the SCO was not representative of the country embracing multilateral norms, but rather a calculated move to advance China's interests in Central Asia.²² Wu Guoguang and Helen Lansdowne posit that China's embrace of multilateralism within Central Asia is indicative of the PRC's goal (first outlined in the 2002 *New Security Concept* White Paper) to engender multipolarity within the international system and counter potential Western influence in Central Asia.²³ Chien-peng Chung outlines a similar rationale for the PRC's decision multilaterally engage with Central Asia. He attributes China's engagement with the SCO to their attempts to pilot a form of "new regionalism" based on partnerships rather than alliances.²⁴ Wu and Lansdowne, Gill, and Chung all utilize a qualitative approach, relying upon their own readings of PRC and SCO strategies to reach these conclusions. Joel Wuthnow et. al concludes that China is likely to select "high engagement" and "institution shaping" postures that allow the PRC to engage in multilateral interactions that are not only accepted by the international community, but also

²¹ Bates Gill, "China's New Security Multilateralism and Its Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region." In *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, 210. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2004.

²² Bates Gill, "China's New Security Multilateralism and Its Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region." In *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, 208. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2004.

²³ Guogang Wu and Helen Lansdowne. "International Multilateralism with Chinese Characteristics: Attitude Changes, Policy Imperatives, and Regional Impacts." In *China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security*, 3-18. New York, NY: Routledge, 2008.

²⁴ Chien-Peng Chung, "The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China's Changing Influence in Central Asia." *The China Quarterly*, 2004, 989-1009.

allow it to advance its own policy priorities.²⁵

In contrast to the Wu and Lansdowne, Gill, and Chung, CCP-aligned scholars wholly reject the assertion that the SCO is an instrument for China to advance its objectives within the region. Zhao Huasheng, Professor and Director for the Center of Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, writes:

China helps maintain the political balance and coordinate member countries' interests. China cares about maintaining equality in the SCO, especially between large countries and small ones. When dealing with internal problems, China tries to avoid exerting pressure and consults with other member countries to reach consensus. These measures strengthen the solidarity of the SCO.²⁶

Zhao's view, representative of the CCP's general response to allegations of exerting undue influence on the SCO's policies, highlights the PRC's belief that the SCO is ultimately a consensus-building organization. Zhang Yunling, Director of International Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, also emphasizes that SCO-led initiatives, such as the recent "One Belt, One Road" economic project, are not created solely to benefit the PRC. Rather, he insists that these initiatives equally benefit all member countries.²⁷ The emphasis on equality between larger and smaller states directly contradicts Wu and Lansdowne, Gill, Wuthnow, and Chung's readings of China's influence on the SCO.

METHODOLOGY

While the Western scholars discussed above have identified the SCO as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy, China-based academicians and the CCP have denounced this viewpoint. Little has been done to quantify Westerners scholars' assertions and draw comparative conclusions between China's involvement in the

²⁵ Joel Wuthnow, Xin Li, and Lingling Qi. "Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies in China's Multilateral Diplomacy." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 17, no. 3 (July 20, 2012): 269-90.

²⁶ Huasheng Zhao, "China's View of and Expectations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization." *Asian Survey* 53, no. 3 (2013): 436-60.

²⁷ Yunling Zhang, "One Belt, One Road: A Chinese View." *Global Asia* 10, no. 3 (October/November 2015): 8-12.

SCO and its involvement in other regional multilateral organizations. Therefore, in an effort to provide more robust and conclusive evidence supporting Wu and Lansdowne, Gill, Wuthnow et al, and Chung's claims that China influences the policy of the SCO, this study takes a quantitative approach to understanding China's influence on the SCO's policies and objectives. A frequency analysis of ten "key phrases" reappearing within *China's National Defense* White Papers will be conducted on four key SCO documents. In an effort to compare the PRC's influence on the SCO versus other regional multilateral security organizations, three ASEAN+1 documents will also be examined for the frequency of these phrases. When regional multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN+1 and the SCO choose to employ one of these ten phrases, they are accepting the connotations associated with the phrase. The acceptance of the phrase's connotations also can be viewed as an implicit endorsement of related PRC policy. After results from the frequency analysis are obtained, this study will examine which phrases have the highest occurrences in SCO documents and ASEAN+1 documents.

These ten "key phrases" were not selected at random. All phrases are explicitly tied to the list of previously identified Chinese regional security objectives. As evidenced in the data shown in Figure 2, these phrases appear at extremely high rates in foundational Chinese governance documents. Their high-levels of repetition across decades of official defense policy documents demonstrates that policymakers within China deem them to be unique and critical to Chinese interests. Furthermore, this study's methodology is grounded in the premise that the inclusion of a particular policy-oriented phrase does not just reflect the adoption of the PRC's policy, but also whatever connotations are associated with the phrase. The below chart lists all phrases that this analysis will search for, their English translations, and the connotations associated with the phrase. Connotations associated with the below phrases were derived from a review of these phrases usage within *China's National Defense* White Papers issued from 2000-present.²⁸ Eleven documents indicative of the PRC, SCO, and ASEAN's positions on regional security issues were selected for analysis. These documents are grouped into three over-arching categories: *China's National Defense* White Papers, a biennial publication documenting China's military and defense priorities; Shanghai Cooperation Organization statements and treaties; and ASEAN+1

²⁸ All translations are the work of the author. Both the original Chinese documents and English translations provided by the PRC were utilized to determine phrases' connotations

treaties and statements. All selected documents have a general emphasis on regional defense and security cooperation. Examined documents were either originally published in Mandarin, or a translation in Mandarin was produced concurrently with the treaties' signing. A complete listing of documents, their respective publication dates, and their associated categorization is located in Appendix One.

Skeptics of this approach could argue that these terms, such as peace (和平, *heping*) mutual trust (互信, *huxin*), and struggle (挑战, *tiaozhan*) could be as highly valued by other member states as they are by the PRC. However, the concluding qualitative portion of this review seeks to demonstrate why these ten phrases carry an outsized influence for the Chinese government. Therefore, the final component of this study will put these findings in conversation with the examined document as a whole. What objective was the identified phrase advancing within the treaty or statement? How does this priority correlate to the PRC's key regional security objectives? Does the occurrence of this word lend credence to the overall argument that the PRC is shaping the policies and priorities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? While the frequency of these phrases demonstrates that Chinese interlocutors are able to exert discursive influence on treaties issued by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, qualitative analysis shows the policy implications of these phrases generates significant gains for Chinese government positions on contested issues. Conversely, the absence of these phrases in ASEAN+1 documents alludes that, though China might seek to influence ASEAN and its member states, ASEAN's relatively robust institutional framework does not enable China to substantively alter member states positions on controversial security issues.

Figure 1: Selected Phrases, Their Translations, and Their Connotations

Phrase	Translation	Connotation
睦邻 mulin	Good neighbor	This phrase is generally associated with China's "good neighbor" policy. China's "good neighbor" policy is associated with the <i>Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence</i> which call for a new form of state-to-state relations (see above description on pg. 10.)
互信 huxin	Mutual Trust	This phrase is generally associated with the <i>Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence</i> which include a call to eliminate external international influences on domestic matters.
互尊 huzun	Mutual Respect	This phrase is generally associated with the <i>Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence</i> which call for a new form of state-to-state relations that falls outside of pre-established Western standards.
和平 heping	Peace	This phrase is generally associated with maintaining regional stability.
和谐 hexie	Harmony	In addition to being associated with maintaining regional stability within Asia, this phrase is also associated with countering Western hegemony within the region.
恐怖主义 kongbu zhuyi	Terrorism	This phrase is associated with the PRC's efforts to combat domestic terrorism, separatism, and extremism (also known as the "three evils.")
分裂主义 fenlie zhuyi	Separatism	This phrase is associated with the PRC's efforts to combat domestic terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Selecting this phrase also has a connotation of opposing Taiwanese, Tibetan, and Xinjiang independence from the PRC.
极端主义 jidian zhuyi	Extremism	This phrase is associated with the PRC's efforts to combat domestic terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Selecting this phrase also has a connotation of Islamic influence within Xinjiang.
挑战 tiaozhan	Struggle	This phrase is closely associated with actions subject to military influences. When used in a multilateral setting, it has connotations of all parties opposing similar forces of hegemony and regional instability.
威胁 weixie	Threat	This phrase is closely associated with actions subject to military influences. When used in a multilateral setting, it has connotations of all parties opposing similar forces of hegemony and regional instability.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The below findings overwhelmingly support the hypothesis that key foreign policy phrases used by the PRC within their own domestic documents occur at dramatically higher rates in SCO documents than in ASEAN+1 documents. Each key phrase identified within *China's National Defense* White Papers occurred within at least one, if not all, of the three selected SCO documents. The same did not hold for ASEAN+1 documents. Phrases that are notably omitted from all ASEAN+1 documents include mutual respect (互尊 *huzun*), separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*), extremism (极端主义, *jiduan zhuyi*), and threat (威胁, *weixie*). The phrase good neighbor (睦邻, *mulin*) only makes one appearance throughout examined ASEAN+1 documents. This stands in stark contrast to SCO documents, which, when taking into account the vast differences in length between *China's National Defense* White Papers and SCO documents examined, had similar usage rates for most key phrases. The below table lists key phrases' rate of appearance within each of the eleven selected documents.

Figure 2: Key Phrases Frequency Within Selected Documents

	Good neigh- borliness	Mutual Trust	Mutual Respect	Peace	Harmony	Terrorism	Separatism	Extremism	Struggle	Threat
China's National Defense in 2000	2	5	1	62	0	3	1	1	3	14
China's National Defense in 2006	3	4	0	22	4	3	3	3	4	11
China's National Defense in 2008	3	10	0	31	3	5	2	2	6	14
China's National Defense in 2010	3	20	0	53	5	5	1	1	8	16
Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2	4	2	3	0	1	1	1	1	2
Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	4	1	2	5	1	2	2	2	1	2
The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism	0	0	0	2	0	5	5	5	0	2
Statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	2	10
Joint Statement of the China-ASEAN Commemorative Summit	0	1	0	10	0	0	0	0	2	0
Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues	1	1	0	3	0	2	0	0	1	0
2010 Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-AN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity	0	2	0	10	1	1	0	0	1	0

The preceding table demonstrates that phrases of political importance to the PRC appear at dramatically higher rates in SCO documents than in ASEAN+1 documents. The above findings' impact is made even clearer when looking at which key phrases appear within SCO and ASEAN+1 documents. The below chart indicates that SCO documents contain key phrases that span the entire spectrum of regional security objectives. SCO documents discuss common threats and struggles. The signing parties frequently invoke language on their mutual respect and trust for one another. Quite notably, the SCO documents include numerous references to combatting separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*) and extremism (极端主义, *jiduan zhuyi*). Inclusion of these phrases indicates adherence to the belief that China is facing serious challenges to its sovereignty in Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet—a contentious position in the international sphere. In the selection of SCO documents, parties also included references to harmony (和谐, *hexie*), previously identified as a term that can harken back to Confucian conceptions of the world order. Overwhelmingly, SCO states affirm their commitment to be a good neighbor (睦邻, *mulin*) to one another.

Notably, the key phrase most frequently reappearing in ASEAN+1 documents is peace (和平, *heping*). This phrase is most closely associated with the PRC's desire to retain regional stability within Asia. Undeniably, this is one of China and ASEAN's largest shared priorities. A primary objective of ASEAN is to support peace within Asia.²⁹ Regional turmoil, such as a violent escalation of territorial disputes within South China Sea, would present large costs to both China and ASEAN. Their collective cooperation on this issue only stands to benefit both actors. Thus, the recurrence of peace (和平, *heping*) should not be read entirely as ASEAN submitting to Chinese policy objectives and priorities. Rather, it should indicate that both actors recognize that their strongest collective interest is peace. Accordingly, references to maintaining regional piece within Asia are quite prevalent throughout ASEAN's treaties and documents.

²⁹ "Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)." Nuclear Threat Initiative. October 21, 2015. Accessed March 13, 2016.

Figure 3: Frequency of Key Phrases in SCO & ASEAN+1 Documents





Figure 4 provides interesting insight on the relative frequency of key phrase utilization between selected SCO documents and *China's National Defense White Papers*. The first two selected SCO documents, “*The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism*” and “*Statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime*,” predictably have much higher utilization of phrases characteristically used within strictly military and counter-terrorism contexts: terrorism (恐怖主义, *kongbu zhuyi*) and threat (威胁, *weixie*). However, both the “*Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*” and the “*Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*” have similar usage rates of phrases such as peace (和平, *heping*) harmony (和谐, *hexie*), mutual trust (互信, *huxin*), struggle (挑战, *tiaozhan*), and threat (威胁, *weixie*). These phrases are connected with Chinese regional security objectives as diverse as maintaining regional stability within Asia, championing the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” and the PRC’s quest to obtain the status of “regional hegemon.”

The quantitative evidence provided not only demonstrates that “key phrases” appear more frequently within SCO documents than in ASEAN+1 documents, but further analysis also indicates that the phrases that do appear within ASEAN+1 documents are not solely Chinese foreign policy objectives. Rather, ASEAN+1 documents emphasize key phrases that advance the objectives of both actors, while SCO documents relative frequency of key phrases closely mirrors key elements of many *China's National Defense White Papers*.

Figure 4: Relative Frequency of Key Phrases in SCO Documents and *China's National Defense White Papers*



QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The quantitative figures clearly suggest that SCO treaties are subject to a greater degree of influence from the PRC than ASEAN+1 documents are. However, similarities between *China's National Defense White Papers* and SCO treaties are even more dramatic when viewed side-by-side. The following three cases represent examples of near identical language in *China's National Defense White Papers* and SCO treaties.³⁰ While it is reasonable to assume that there might be some parallels among these documents, these cases transcend mere similarity and, when viewed in conjunction with the above results, create a compelling argument that the SCO is an instrument of Chinese foreign policy rather than a wholly independent international organization composed of equals.

Case One: Countering Western Influence in the Region

The PRC has a clear interest in countering Western influence in East and Central Asia. Continued erosion of American power enables China to position itself as a regional hegemon within the larger Asia-Pacific region. Language within *China's National Defense in 2000* and *The Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization* includes clear condemnations of heavy-handed external influences, which are thinly-veiled references to the United States' quest to influence Asian domestic policies (for example, the United States' continued support of Taiwan.) Furthermore, the documents' prioritization of "mutual respect" indicates that both signatories claim to prioritize weaker states' rights to independently devise policies. Finally, both documents heavily prioritize cooperation among states. This reinforces previous conclusions that Chinese multilateralism in Central Asia is primarily devised to increase interaction and solidify bonds among included countries.

China's National Defense in 2000

China maintains that the multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region should be oriented toward and characterized by mutual respect instead of the strong bullying the weak, cooperation instead of

³⁰ To maintain consistency in translation, all documents below are the official English translation of the original Chinese documents. Translations were obtained from the PRC's State Information Council and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Secretariat.

confrontation, and seeking consensus instead of imposing one's own will on others.³¹

Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Unity and cooperation [is] realized through mutual respect and confidence by countries with different civilization backgrounds and traditional cultures...The SCO adheres to the principle of non-alignment, does not target any other country or region, and is open to the outside. It is ready to develop various forms of dialogue, exchanges and cooperation with other countries, international and regional organizations.³²

When reading these two paragraphs in tandem, it is clear that the 2001 *Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization* has heavily borrowed many of its objectives and theories from *China's National Defense in 2000*. Ideas of mutual respect (互尊, *huzun*), non-alignment, cooperation, consensus, and collective dialogue are readily present in both documents. In fact, it is fairly apparent that the two paragraphs seek to advance one consistent approach to multilateral engagement. This approach, at face value, prioritizes collective consensus building and incorporating the contributions of all involved parties. This inclusion is particularly notable, given that the findings of this analysis support the hypothesis that the SCO's policies and priorities are heavily influence by Chinese foreign policy initiatives. It is particularly fitting and rather ironic that China's claim to prioritize consensus-building, equal interaction among all states is replicated within the SCO's founding document.

Case Two: Maintaining Regional Stability and Territorial Sovereignty

China's National Defense in 2006 and the SCO's *Treaty on Long-term Good Neighborliness*... show striking similarities when outlining states' commitment to maintaining territorial sovereignty. Even more notable, the below definition

³¹ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2000*, Beijing, China. 2000.

³² Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Shanghai, China. 2001.

of territorial sovereignty and subsequent adherence to the CCP point-of-view that Taiwan is unequivocally a part of China, runs counter to the vast majority of non-Chinese depictions of the Taiwanese territorial dispute. In addition to the below depiction of territorial sovereignty leaving no room for Taiwanese independence, it also safeguards Chinese territorial control of Tibet and Xinjiang.

China's National Defense in 2006

The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their activities remains a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for "Taiwan independence," the Taiwan authorities aim at creating "de jure Taiwan independence" through "constitutional reform," thus still posing a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

The United States has reiterated many times that it will adhere to the "one China" policy... But, it continues to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan, and has strengthened its military ties with Taiwan. A small number of countries have stirred up a racket about a "China threat," and intensified their preventive strategy against China and strove to hold its progress in check.³³

Treaty on Long-Term Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation among member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The Contracting Parties, respecting principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, shall take measures to prevent on their territories any activity incompatible with these principles.

The Contracting Parties shall not participate in alliances or organizations directed against other Contracting Parties and shall not support any actions hostile to other Contracting Parties.

The Contracting Parties shall respect the principle of inviolability of borders and make active efforts to build confidence in border regions in the military sphere, determined to make the borders with each other borders of eternal

³³ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2006*, Beijing, China. 2006.

peace and friendship.³⁴

The SCO's *Treaty on Long-term Good Neighborliness...* insistence that member states respect the "inviolability of borders" also carries interesting implications for Xinjiang—China's westernmost region. Xinjiang borders numerous SCO member states, and has long been plagued by the Uyghur ethnic group's separatist activity. That the SCO's *Treaty on Long-term Good Neighborliness...* binds signatories to oppose Uyghur, Taiwanese, and Tibetan separatism within their own borders represents a stunning commitment to PRC policies on the part of SCO member states. Furthermore, the recurrence of the key phrases: good neighbor (睦邻, *mulin*), peace (和平, *heping*), and separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*) are indicative of overarching policy similarities between official CCP and SCO policies.

Case Three: Opposing Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism

In addition to containing similar language when describing states' obligation to counter Western influence within the region and the importance of safeguarding states' territorial sovereignty, official Chinese White Papers and foundational SCO documents contain similar language on combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Grouping these three phrases together is a distinctly CCP creation. Referred to as "the three evils" (三股势力, *sangu shili*) within Chinese documents, using the phrases terrorism (恐怖主义, *kongbu zhuyi*), separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*), and extremism (极端主义, *jiduan zhuyi*) in tandem allows the CCP to brand separatism in Xinjiang province as extremist Islamic terrorism that's closely connected to the resurgence in global terrorism seen post-9/11.³⁵ Many pro-Uyghur human rights groups based in America and other

³⁴ Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Treaty on Long-Term Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 2007.

³⁵ For examples of CCP-led connections between Uyghur separatism and Islamic extremism, see:

"Beijing Inflicts a Defeat on Al-Qaeda." *South China Morning Post*, January 25, 2007.

"Chinese FM Calls for United Front to Fight Terrorism." Xinhua. November 15, 2015. Accessed February 06, 2016.

Western nations find the connection between Uyghur separatism and Islamic extremist terrorism to be inauthentic and opportunistic.³⁶

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning primarily the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of friendly relations and cooperation among States; aware of the fact that terrorism, separatism and extremism constitute a threat to international peace and security...recognizing that these phenomena seriously threaten territorial integrity and security of the Parties as well as their political, economic and social stability³⁷

China's National Defense in 2002

China opposes all forms of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Regarding maintenance of public order and social stability in accordance with the law as their important duty, the Chinese armed forces will strike hard at terrorist activities of any kind, crush infiltration and sabotaging activities by hostile forces, and crack down on all criminal activities that threaten public order, so

"Shanghai Cooperation Organization Official: Terrorism in Xinjiang Is a Close Variant of International Terrorism." Xinhua. June 09, 2014. Accessed March 2, 2016.

³⁶ For examples, see:

Amnesty International. *China: Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region*. Publication. 018th ed. Vol. 17. London: Amnesty International, 1999, 10.

Amnesty International. *People's Republic of China China's Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region*. Publication. 010th ed. Vol. 17. London: Amnesty International, 2002.

FIDH—International Federation for Human Rights, Antonie Bernand, Michelle Kissenkoetter, David Knaute, and Vanessa Rizk, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Vehicle for Human Rights Violations*. Paris, France, August 2012).

³⁷ Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism*. June 15, 2002.

as to promote social stability and harmony.³⁸

The above paragraphs both acknowledge that threats derived from terrorism, separatism, and extremism harm member states' internal stability. While the notion that terrorism harms a states ability to preserve "political, economic, and social stability," is hardly controversial, the SCO's willingness to use all three phrases: terrorism (恐怖主义, kongbu zhuyi), separatism (分裂主义, fenlie zhuyi), and extremism (极端主义, jiduan zhuyi), together is notable. In all ASEAN+1 documents, only the more internationally-accepted phrase, terrorism (恐怖主义, kongbu zhuyi), was included within the *Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues*, which was also written in 2002. The SCO's utilization of separatism (分裂主义, fenlie zhuyi) and extremism (极端主义, jiduan zhuyi) represents a tacit endorsement of PRC official policies connecting Uyghur separatism to the broader phenomenon of Islamic extremism. Furthermore, it demonstrates adherence to the CCP point-of-view, that one is not solely a "separatist," "terrorist," or "extremist"—but by definition, all three in tandem.

CONCLUSION

Presently, there is no comprehensive and universally accepted framework that enables observers to parse out the relative influence of state actors within multilateral organizations. Given that many of these organizations' dialogues and official meetings are closed to onlookers, researchers are primarily left with documents produced during meetings to ascertain the inner workings of multilateral organizations. Though difficult, discerning which state influences the policies and priorities of a multilateral organization can yield great benefits to those seeking to understand not only the organization's behavior, but also member states' approaches to participating in multilateral organizations. Given that China has only within the past few decades begun to meaningfully engage with multilateral organizations, and that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the first multilateral organization that the PRC has spearheaded, it is important to understand how China will approach its role as the leader of a multilateral organization. This

³⁸ The People's Republic of China's Ministry of Defense. *China's National Defense in 2002*, Beijing, China. 2002.

analysis has used quantitative and qualitative approaches to demonstrate that contrary to claims of state equality within Chinese-led multilateral organizations, PRC policies are more heavily represented within official SCO treaties and documents than in other, comparable regional multilateral organizations.

Quantitatively, a frequency analysis was conducted on the occurrence rates of ten key phrases within eleven selected documents. The eleven selected documents represented a sampling of ASEAN+1, SCO, and *China's National Defense* official treaties and White Papers. Additionally, all documents were originally written (or concurrently signed) in Mandarin. Evidence demonstrated that, while non-controversial terms such as peace (和平, *heping*) occurred at similar rates in all three document categories, terms that were more politically charged, such as separatism (分裂主义, *fenlie zhuyi*), and extremism (极端主义, *jiduan zhuyi*), occurred at dramatically higher rates in SCO documents than in ASEAN+1 documents. Furthermore, phrases such as good neighbor (睦邻, *mulin*), and mutual respect (互尊 *huzun*), that require a higher degree of cooperation and engagement, appeared at drastically higher rates in SCO documents than in ASEAN+1 documents. Additionally, SCO documents were more likely to emphasize shared struggles (挑战, *tiaozhan*), and threats (威胁, *weixie*) than ASEAN+1 documents were. This indicates that SCO member states can more readily identify shared challenges to the stability of states within the organization. Holistically, quantitative evidence indicates that SCO documents have an unquestionably higher utilization rate of the ten identified key phrases. This, in turn, signals that the PRC has a greater ability to insert their policy initiatives into official SCO documents.

Qualitatively, this analysis utilizes three case studies to provide in-text evidence of the overwhelming similarities between SCO documents and *China's National Defense* White Papers. Three relatively controversial topics were selected: countering Western influence in the region; maintaining regional stability and territorial integrity; and opposing terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Within each case study, an excerpt from *China's National Defense* advocating for a point-of-view not commonly held within the international sphere, was excerpted and compared to a similar excerpt from an official SCO document. In all three cases, SCO documents unquestionably advocated for controversial positions, including: eschewing alignment with the United States, opposing self-determination for Taiwan, and branding political separatists in Xinjiang radical Islamic extremists. This qualitative support for the quantitative findings revealed in the first portion of the analysis underscore that the PRC is driving the policy initiatives of the SCO.

The findings of this analysis have broad implications for future study of the SCO and Chinese behavior in multilateral organizations founded by the PRC. Presently, the SCO has not been conclusively shown to be primarily a tool of Chinese foreign policy. However, the evidence outlined above should give pause to those who hold the opinion that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russia have equal say in determining the SCO's policy objectives. The degree to which the SCO's treaties and declarations are binding should also be further considered. If the PRC has an outsized influence on the writing of treaties that require other member states to take certain courses of action, are they unduly coercing smaller, neighboring states? How does this affect the PRC's bid to establish itself as the unchallengeable regional hegemon? Given that India and Pakistan recently acceded to SCO as full member states in June 2016, this raises questions about whether or not the PRC will still be able to exert as much influence on SCO policy. If they are able to retain this level of influence, will India and Pakistan agree to take on relatively controversial positions? Furthermore, the SCO's joint submission of new standards for international cyber sovereignty to the United Nations should be further examined at a later date. Will the PRC continue to use the SCO as a platform to advocate for its preferred course of action within the larger international community?

Given current regional dynamics within Southeast Asia, it is also important to note that the PRC was unable to exert substantive discursive influence on ASEAN+1 documents. Part of this is likely attributable to the fact that China was key broker of the SCO's creation and institutional framework while it is only an occasional participant in ASEAN's internal discussions. However, the fact that the PRC has designed the SCO to be an effective mouthpiece for Chinese positions is notable in and of itself. Onlookers concerned about potential Chinese efforts to replicate this effort within the Southeast Asian political landscape could review official ASEAN+1 treaties and agreements to identify tangible indicators of increased Sinification. More importantly, observers should pay close attention to any attempts to alter norms or operating procedures within ASEAN in a way that could preference PRC interests. Resolutions blocked by Cambodia and the Philippines should be heavily scrutinized by other member ASEAN states. If Chinese influence inhibits the organization from taking collective action to advance the majority of member states' interests, then ASEAN's overall effectiveness could significantly decrease, potentially harming member

states' economic outlook and the rights of individuals living within member states. Outside of the SCO and ASEAN, the PRC has recently formed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It remains to be seen whether or not the PRC will pursue a similar strategy within that multilateral organization, or if Chinese officials will allow for greater input from member states. Given the United Kingdom and Australia's membership in the AIIB, it is likely that China will not be able to pursue a strategy as aggressively anti-Western as seen in the SCO. However, to what extent other revisionist positions and methods are employed is yet to be determined.

However, perhaps the most fascinating conclusion derived from this analysis is the PRC's readily visible hypocrisy in their categorization of the SCO as an organization comprised of equals. Perhaps the PRC's shift away from overtly pledging to adhere to the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* within issues of *China's National Defense* from 2010-present indicates that the it no longer intends to maintain a status equal to other, smaller participating states in multilateral organizations. Though the PRC claims that their form of "democratized international relations" allows for equal input from all actors, the analysis above has demonstrated that the SCO's policy agenda is driven by the PRC. When evaluating the future of Chinese multilateral engagement, it is important to distinguish between differing forms of Chinese multilateral engagement. The nature of their engagement should be evaluated based on which organization they are engaging with and what member states are represented within the group. Contrary to Chinese claims, the SCO's objectives are largely influenced by Chinese policy objectives. Evidence demonstrates that the PRC is able to leverage its influence on the SCO and ensure that sensitive issues are framed in line with CCP objectives.

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APPENDIX 1: DOCUMENT CATEGORIZATION

Document	Year Published	Categorization
China's National Defense in 2000	2000	Official PRC White Paper
China's National Defense in 2006	2006	Official PRC White Paper
China's National Defense in 2008	2008	Official PRC White Paper
China's National Defense in 2010	2010	Official PRC White Paper
Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2002	Official SCO Document
The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism	2002	Official SCO Document
Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2007	Official SCO Document
Statement and Plan of Action by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime	2009	Official SCO Document
Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues	2002	Official ASEAN+1 Document
Joint Statement of the China-ASEAN Commemorative Summit	2006	Official ASEAN+1 Document
2010 Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity	2010	Official ASEAN+1 Document