HEARTS AND MINDS: A COMPARISON OF COUNTER-RADICALIZATION STRATEGIES IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

ADRIENNE OU¹

ABSTRACT

Bataclan. San Bernadino. One need not read any further to understand how radicalization is crucial to counterterrorism and national security. Some states have implemented counter-radicalization strategies to cull terrorism at its root. These tactics fall within two broad groups: the North American method, which emphasizes behavioral radicalization, and the European method, which stresses cognitive radicalization. This paper compares the two methods by examining counter-radicalization strategies in the United States and in the United Kingdom. Case studies explain the social ramifications and the effectiveness of the US' Countering Violent Extremism policy and the UK's Prevent strategy, and the roles they play in abolishing or inadvertently incentivizing social divisions that lead to radicalization and terrorism. While the US strategy emphasizes the role of law enforcement, the UK strategy focuses on the role of community in preventing terrorism, including those of universities and healthcare providers. This difference is crucial in how Muslim communities view their place in the broader context of society, which makes up a fundamental precept of political alienation. Consequentially, this paper brings radicalization studies out of the ivory tower and into its broader sociopolitical context and effects.

INTRODUCTION

On 11 November 2015, Antoine Leiris lost his wife in the Bataclan attacks. In the following days, he wrote a Facebook post that went viral:

¹ Adrienne Ou is a fourth-year undergraduate at UCLA, majoring in political science with a focus in international relations. Her research interests include terrorism, national security, and East Asian politics.

I will not grant you the gift of my hatred. You're asking for it, but responding to hatred with anger is falling victim to the same ignorance that has made you what you are. You want me to be scared, to view my countrymen with mistrust, to sacrifice my liberty for my security. You lost.²

Responses to the post on *The Independent's* website were divided. The first commenter acknowledged Leiris' bravery and wished that he or she could be so brave in similar circumstances. In a sharp contrast, the second comment read: "Exactly the sort of appeasing, apologist response which terrorist would crave. In part, they despise the West because we are so weak."³ The questions on how to best combat terror in Western states remain unanswered. More importantly, they remain central to national security discussions following the Brussels airport bombing on 22 March 2016. Nevertheless, this paper seeks to comparatively analyze two methods of radicalization as a way of furthering our understanding of what good counter-radicalization programs can achieve, and how such programs can inadvertently create terrorists.

HYPOTHESIS

People are mortal, but ideas are immortal. The European method of stressing cognitive radicalization in preventing jihadi extremism is founded in the belief that this form of radicalism is akin to the rise of fascism in the 1930s.⁴ This is not the case. Hitler's rise was founded on the basis of racial supremacy, while radicalization in Western states comes from a place of political marginalization, as evidenced by the case studies in this paper. Furthermore, the idea of labeling certain types of speech as "dangerous" establishes a precedent for the erosion of free speech and could lead to more backlash than actual cognitive cohesion. As

² Rose Troup Buchanan, "Paris terror attack: Husband pays touching tribute to 'love of his life' in defiant message to attackers," *The Independent*, 19 November 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-terror-husband-pays-touching-tribute-to-love-of-his-life-in-defiant-message-to-attackers-a6737231.html>.

³ Commenters "KField" and "oldwease," in response to Buchanan's "Paris terror attack" piece in *The Independent*, 19 November 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-terror-husband-pays-touching-tribute-to-love-of-his-life-in-defiant-message-to-attackers-a6737231.html>.

⁴ Peter R. Neumann, "The trouble with radicalization," *International Affairs* 89:4 (2013): 887.

such, the North American method⁵ of preventing behavioral radicalization is more effective. By not publicly labeling a social group as “likely to become terrorists” and delineating the threshold for government intervention at terrorist acts rather than radical statements, the American government is able to better maintain social cohesion in a way that the UK’s method seeks to achieve, but fails in reality.

A Tale of Two Methods

The director of the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), Peter R. Neumann, details a fragmentation in radicalization studies in a 2013 article. Radicalization has come to mean multiple things. One definition of radicalization emphasizes cognitive radicalization, in which an individual has extremist beliefs but might not act upon them due to social and legal norms. They are the individuals at the zenith of McCauley and Moskalenko’s opinion radicalization pyramid, as shown in Figure 1.2. The other definition is behavioral radicalization, in which an individual expresses extremist beliefs and will do anything to see those beliefs imposed onto society or brought into reality.⁶ These are the individuals atop both the opinion radicalization and action radicalization pyramids. To summarize, all behavioral extremists are cognitive extremists, but not all cognitive extremists are behavioral extremists.

This academic debate has influenced policymakers, as the US and UK have pursued counter-radicalization strategies based on different definitions of radicalization. In accordance with the First Amendment, which protects free speech, the United States’ counter-radicalization strategy is targeted at behavioral radicalization. It has the effect of clearly demarcating a line between what is legal versus what is illegal. Neumann describes the American society as having a deep belief in the freedom of speech and an abiding faith in the strength of its republican institutions. The result is that divisive and anti-democratic speech, such as that used by the Westboro Baptist Church, is allowed despite being frowned upon by the vast majority of American society. Since it clearly demarcates what is legal and not, this strategy relies on law enforcement to prevent what is already illegal from happening and prevents citizens from acting upon their implicit biases. This is important

⁵ Peter Neumann calls this method the “Anglo-Saxon method.” However, the term “Anglo-Saxon” has traditionally referred to people of British origin, which is confusing in this context because the UK represents the European method. Hence, I have renamed “Anglo-Saxon” to “North American” for clarification purposes.

⁶ Peter R. Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization,” *International Affairs* 89:4 (2013): 873.

to Americans, as the country is commonly referred to as a melting pot of cultures and ethnicities. According to Neumann: “[North Americans], in fact, do not like using the term ‘counter-radicalization’, which they believe smacks of ‘thought police’, preferring to talk of ‘countering violent extremism’.”⁷

In contrast, the European approach stresses the importance of preventing cognitive radicalization. This belief stems from the long shadow Hitler’s Germany left over the continent. It posits that extremist beliefs, if widely held, can manipulate and transform democracies into authoritarian regimes. Hence, terrorism is not illegal action in the pursuit of political goals but rather the result of failing to prevent cognitive radicalization.⁸ He invokes Karl Popper: “If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.”⁹ Even though it muddles the law by drawing increasing shades of illegality on certain types of thought, counter-radicalization is about promoting democracy and social cohesion.¹⁰ In other words, the European method is about promoting the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people.

Unfortunately, combating fascism and combating jihadism are not alike. Hitler detailed how he would make Germany a great empire again in the form of the Third Reich. He seized political control by taking advantage of severe economic and political malaise and turbulence caused by the ravages of World War I. On the other hand, jihadists claim that the global Muslim community is under attack by intolerant Western societies that would happily burn the Qu’ran. The methods to counteract the two cannot be the same, because their goals are not the same. Consequently, to implement a policy that would allow for implicit intolerance to turn from thought into action is exactly what the terrorists would use as fodder for their propaganda. The rest of this paper will detail what it takes to combat the jihadist narrative, and what it really means to effectively counter radicalization.

⁷ Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization,” 885-886. Quote from page 886.

⁸ Ibid. 887.

⁹ Karl Popper, *The open society and its enemies*, vol. 1: *The spell of Plato*, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 293.

¹⁰ Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization,” 888.

The Theory of Radicalism

To best understand how counter-radicalization works, it is important to understand how people reach a state where they are classified as violent fundamentalists. The vast majority of Muslims will never become fundamentalists, and even fewer of them are socialized in a violent manner that leads to terrorism. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko describe radicalization as a pyramid with three overarching stages. The three main stages of radicalization are: individual, group, and mass. The base of the pyramid represents the broad social movement, whereas the apex of the pyramid represents the few that are terrorists.¹¹

At the base of the pyramid, the broad social movement encompasses all sorts of people who vaguely align with the cause the terrorists are supporting. In the case of jihadism, it can mean anyone who does not believe that the Iraq or Afghanistan wars were warranted and that Muslims are demonized in the media. Such is the individualistic and petty nature of personal grievance. When personal grievances mobilize people because the issue affects a large swath of people, it turns into political grievance. From there, individuals enter radical groups, and become pressured to think alike and conform for the sake of the group and the cause they are representing. The group competes with other radical groups to be the main or the sole group representing the cause; for example, al-Qaeda and Daesh competed throughout 2014 to see which group would become the face of the jihadi movement. The large movement also experiences fissioning, as members compete for authenticity and recognition as “true believers.”¹² To illustrate, Daesh was once a faction of al-Qaeda before getting expelled by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of al-Qaeda, for being too radical in their beliefs.¹³

At the apex of the pyramid, the group turns into a mass that uses fear to achieve its political goals. Dehumanization of the enemy occurs; with Daesh, they label anyone who does not believe in the jihadist ideology as a *kafir*, or infidel.¹⁴ The radicalized viewpoint, no matter what ideology or time period, tends to follow

¹¹ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 3 (2008): 418.

¹² Ibid. 422-427.

¹³ Liz Sly, “Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq,” *Washington Post*, 3 February 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/al-qaeda-disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html.

¹⁴ McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization,” 427.

the same trend: “We are a special or chosen group (superiority) who have been unfairly treated and betrayed (injustice), no one cares about us or will help us (distrust), and the situation is dire – our group and our cause are in danger of extinction (vulnerability).”¹⁵ This explains how people become part of terrorist groups, but does not fully explain homegrown terrorism.

*Figure 1.1: Pyramid of radicalization*¹⁶

Since 9/11, there has not been an attack on US or UK soil that has been orchestrated by a group like al-Qaeda. Homegrown terrorists have all been lone wolf terrorists, or radicals inspired by the actions of groups like al-Qaeda and Daesh. However, they have not been in contact with terrorists in the Middle East, which makes it more difficult for law enforcement to detect their plans. Equally perplexing is how such people became radicalized without direct contact with the terrorist groups they glorified. According to McCauley and Moskalenko, though, the radicalization occurs in a bifurcated process: opinion radicalization and action radicalization. Opinion radicalization is the metric by which

¹⁵ Ibid. 416.

¹⁶ McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008.

people either are neutral or agree that the jihadists are justified. For example, a sympathizer may agree that a war on terror equals a war on Islam, but a justifier believes that jihadists are right to detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at American troops in Iraq.¹⁷ At the very apex of the pyramid, a person holds the same *Weltanschauung* as a terrorist in an organized group. Having radical opinions does not mean that all radicals are violent, though.

Figure 1. Opinion radicalization pyramid.

Figure 2. Action radicalization pyramid.

Figure 1.2: Opinion vs. action radicalization pyramids¹⁸

Psychological studies show a massive variation exists in how beliefs influence actions. The gap between beliefs and actions is small in voting choices, but large when strong social and legal norms run counter to the person's attitude. That is why it is difficult to determine who is a peaceful radical and who is a terrorist, because some radicals are deterred from acting upon their violent words by sheer fact that murder and mayhem are illegal. As such, they may be at the apex of the opinion radicalization pyramid, but only rank amid the bottom two tiers of the action radicalization pyramid. Meanwhile, some individuals with criminal histories do not see the law as a deterrent, and pursue terrorism for the thrill, status, and the ability to act out their personal grievances.¹⁹ Conversely, they may rank lowly on the opinion radicalization pyramid, but represent the top of the action radicalization pyramid.

McCauley and Moskalenko's research shows that three factors are import-

¹⁷ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual From Radical Opinion to Radical Action," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (2014): 71.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid. 72.

ant in bridging the gap between radical opinions and actions: 1) inability to cope with perceived hypocrisy, or the internal need for consistency between words and actions, 2) strong identification with perceived victims, and 3) opportunity and means to carry out violence. While terrorists in a group tend to have a normal psychological profile and are pushed towards radicalism by groupthink, lone wolf terrorists have greater instances of psychiatric problems. In that sense, lone wolves are akin to school shooters and assassins. The latter two categories of people also carry out attacks based on personal grievances, albeit generally not linked to any “higher cause.” Among school shooters and assassins, four characteristics are common: grievance, depression, unfreezing (situational crisis of personal disconnection and maladjustment), and prior experience with weapons. In many cases, lone wolves display one or more of these characteristics. Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood terrorist, for example, experienced all four characteristics before carrying out his attack. He was unsettled and depressed by the death of his parents, viewed the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as a war against Islam, and had prior experience with weapons due to his career in the US Army.²⁰

Extant literature on comparative counter-radicalization

The vast majority of counter-radicalization literature bears titles like: “Online De-Radicalization? Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: Message, Messenger and Media Strategy,”²¹ or “Terrorist Drop-outs: One Way of Promoting a Counter-Narrative.”²² They are solution-oriented, designed to provide a solution to the homegrown terrorism problem. They center on a few key policy recommendations:

1. Engage, engage, and engage: Central to al-Qaeda and Daesh’s philosophy is the idea that Muslims are under attack from the world, led by Western states. Western states should not ostracize their Muslim populations by subjecting them to increased scrutiny or background checks, as it feeds into the jihadist

²⁰ Ibid. 80-82.

²¹ Omar Ashour, “Online De-Radicalization? Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: Message, Messenger and Media Strategy,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4, no. 6 (2012): 15-19.

²² Michael Jacobson, “Terrorist Drop-outs: One Way of Promoting a Counter-Narrative,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 3, no. 2 (2009): 12-17.

narrative.²³

2. The need for a moderate narrative: Jihadists seek to impose a politicized narrative that demonizes the West and glorifies the jihadists as some sort of amalgamation between holy crusaders, anti-colonialists, and freedom fighters. Western states need to work with local Muslim communities and organizations to promote a moderate counter-narrative.²⁴
3. Take the fight online: al-Qaeda and Daesh's social media savvy have made its message publicly available to vulnerable citizens living in the West. Jihadists post about their lives on Twitter and Tumblr, romanticizing such a lifestyle. Not only should Western governments work with social media companies to shut down these accounts, governments should use social media and technology to expose jihadists' hypocrisy and the brutality inherent in the jihadist lifestyle.²⁵

Because counter-radicalization scholars are mainly focused on how to counter online terrorism and combat jihadist propaganda, comparative studies of extant counter-radicalization studies have been given short shrift. Noted counter-radicalization scholar Lorenzo Vidino briefly discusses the choice between targeting cognitive radicalization versus behavioral radicalization in a single paragraph in his U.S. Institute of Peace report: "Policymakers need to decide whether to target only violent radicalization or, more broadly, cognitive radicalism. ... Such intervention would take very different forms, depending on whether it sought to tackle cognitive or behavioral radicalism."²⁶ While Vidino loosely suggests considering a strategy that includes cognitive radicalization as its target, it is not the aim of the study. This gap is evidenced in other papers, where the comparison between cognitive and behavioral radicalization as well as the programs resulting from each strategy is overlooked. In comparing the US's CVE tactics to the UK's Prevent strategy, this paper seeks to rectify this gap in the literature.

²³ Ashour, "Online De-Radicalization?" 15 & 17.

²⁴ Ibid. 15-19.

²⁵ Ibid. 15.

²⁶ Lorenzo Vidino, "Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 262, November 2010, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR262%20-%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf. 10.

US' Countering Violent Extremism strategy

The United States' Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy is an umbrella term for broad group of strategies and programs designed to supplement the US's robust counterterrorism program. Programs include the "If You See Something, Say Something" campaign and the Building Communities of Trust Initiative, both developed by the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative. The Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) is under the dual jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice.²⁷ The White House has also published a Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) to coordinate this strategy among the plethora of federal, state, and local agencies.

The White House describes its method as "community-based" and centered around different forms of violent extremism, including religious, right-wing, and anti-Semitic terrorism. The strategy is focused on establishing connections between law enforcement and Muslim communities. The SIP stresses engagement as a main objective, in order to counter the "us vs. them" narrative that Daesh and other radical groups perpetuate. It also explicitly notes the dangers that misinformation can present, and the concern that it may cause anti-Muslim sentiment and terror attacks.²⁸ However, the centerpiece of the CVE strategy is the lack of government intervention in personal affairs:

Countering the ideologies and narratives that legitimize violence is central to our effort, but it also is the most challenging area of work, requiring careful consideration of a number of legal issues, especially those related to the First Amendment. In many instances, it will be more effective to empower communities to develop credible alternatives that challenge violent extremist narratives rather than having the Federal Government attempt to do so.²⁹

In doing so, the SIP acknowledges the role of civil society in rejecting radicalism itself and the distrust that a government-sponsored message might

²⁷ Building Communities of Trust Initiative, *Building Communities of Trust: Fact Sheet*, January 2014.

²⁸ Office of the White House, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, August 2011.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 18.

foster. It concludes by noting that opportunity and meritocracy comprise the core of the American dream, and that those values are central to combating violent extremism.

UK's Prevent strategy

In contrast to the brevity of the American strategy documents, which number no more than thirty pages combined, the single Prevent strategy document is over a hundred pages. Its contents describe the many ways the British government and its people will challenge terrorism. Its themes include the necessity for all British citizens to combat terrorism and to protect British values, maintaining freedom of speech and social cohesion, and the use of social channels to achieve this. These themes resonate in the three objectives of the Prevent strategy: challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it, protecting vulnerable people, and supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization.³⁰ In sharp contrast to the CVE strategy, the Prevent strategy is designed to identify vulnerable individuals during their road to radicalization during either the individual (bottom) stages or the group (intermediate) stages of McCauley and Moskalenko's pyramid of radicalization. By having Prevent-trained school officials and healthcare providers reporting vulnerable officials to authorities, the strategy seeks to "pre-empt and not facilitate law enforcement activity," as labeling Prevent as an avenue for police to arrest people can "create suspicion of Prevent and a reluctance to engage with it."³¹ It is not designed to punish vulnerable citizens but rather to teach them the error of their ways.

The Prevent strategy document explicitly mentions that terrorists are overwhelmingly under the age of thirty. A substantial number received post-secondary education. Hence, the cornerstone of Prevent falls on secondary and post-secondary school officials, because they are most likely to recognize when a peer is being radicalized. Schoolchildren are not encouraged under the belief that some too immature to understand and recognize the patterns of behavior involved in radicalization. The second pillar of prevention is with the healthcare system. Nearly every British citizen encounters the National Health Service (NHS) at some point in their lives; hence, healthcare providers are likely to recognize the "signs that someone is vulnerable to radicalisation, interpret those signs correctly and access

³⁰ HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, June 2011.

³¹ *Ibid.* 8 & 36.

the relevant support.”³²

METHODOLOGY

First, I will use four case studies to study whether the strategy has been successful or not. Each strategy will have one “success” and one “failure” case study. The first metric is numeric. While complete statistics are unavailable due to the clandestine nature of most national security operations, there are a number of sources that track radicalization instances since 9/11.³³ I will provide quantitative data outlining the general success of law enforcement in preventing radicalization or terrorist plots when it is available.

The second metric is success. A criterion for a successful counter-radicalization strategy should take into consideration criticisms of counter-radicalization programs. It should prevent terrorist activity while not causing further sociopolitical marginalization of the Muslim community in the country (see the “Extant literature” section). The case studies should illuminate in what ways the strategy succeeds, and in what areas it fails. The second criterion is that it should address the root concerns of homegrown terrorism in Western states, namely political marginalization.

The third metric is time. The study will be bounded from 2011 to the end of 2015, when this paper was first written. As previously described in the formation of the CVE and Prevent strategies above, both strategies were implemented in 2011. Hence, case studies that take place before the implementation of these strategies are irrelevant; this study only uses case studies that take place after the counter-radicalization strategies are implemented to examine the hypotheses. Nevertheless, this study integrates statistics from before the implementation of the counter-radicalization strategies in order to show relevant longer-term terrorism and radicalization trends that may not be immediately apparent when examining a four-year time period.

Methodological difficulties

³² Ibid. 85.

³³ For an example of the incompleteness of counter-terrorism statistics and how confidential information affects terrorism studies, note the number of detections that were labeled as “unclear/unknown” in Figure 1.5.

For most Americans, homegrown terrorism and radicalization has never been as major a concern as terrorism abroad. The reason is clear, as the number of attempted terror attacks in the United States never number more than ten per year. Out of all the incidents described above, only five succeeded,³⁴ resulting in thirty-four casualties total.³⁵ The rest ended in arrest and law enforcement intervention. Attacks dating back to 2001 are shown below in order to depict the unusually high level of jihadist terrorist activity from 2009 to 2011. Moreover, this graph does not show the numbers of Americans going abroad to serve as foreign fighters for Daesh; in late October, the FBI detained nearly seventy people who had alleged connections to Daesh.³⁶ Two conclusions can be drawn from these data. First, this paper does not include radicals who go abroad to fight for Daesh and other jihadist groups, although they construe a major part of the modern terrorist threat to Western states. Second, this explains the lack of data regarding counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization in Western states in prior years, as a majority of scholarly attention was focused on terrorism in the Middle Eastern region throughout the 2000s.

Figure 1.3: Jihadi terror attacks and attempts in the United States since Sept. 11,

³⁴ Here, New America lists four jihadi terrorist attacks not included in Mueller's compendium. In order to keep the paper consistent, these attacks and their casualties have not been included here. However, the San Bernadino shooting casualties on 2 December 2015 have been included.

³⁵ The International Security Program, "Homegrown Extremism: Deadly Attacks Since 9/11," *New America*, <http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html>.

³⁶ "FBI, Homeland Security Arrest Some 70 ISIL-Related Persons in US," *Sputnik International*, 21 October 2015, <http://sptnknk.ws/Wva>.

2001³⁷

Moreover, even though the UK and the US suffer the second and third highest rates of terrorism among OECD countries (see Appendix A), it is important to note that the United States does not face the same threat from radicalization that its European allies face. By August 2015, an estimated 350 Daesh foreign fighters originate from the United States and Canada combined. Meanwhile, over 700 foreign fighters are from the United Kingdom alone. The UK ranks among the world's top ten countries from which foreign fighters originate; among European countries, only Russia and France outrank it.³⁸ As such, radicalization is a much more immediate concern to the British than to the Americans. The case studies cannot be separated from the environmental and political contexts in which they took place.

Figure 1.4: Foreign fighters in Daesh³⁹

Thirdly, this study is limited in the sense that counter-radicalization is

³⁷ See Appendix B.

³⁸ Ashley Kirk, "Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are fighting for ISIL?" *The Telegraph*, 12 August 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11770816/Iraq-and-Syria-How-many-foreign-fighters-are-fighting-for-Isil.html>.

³⁹ Kirk, "Iraq and Syria," *The Telegraph*, 12 August 2015.

inherently difficult to measure: its successes is defined by its absences, not its incidents. As explained by Vidino, a successful counter-radicalization strategy can only be measured by the number of people who would have gone on to commit terrorist attacks but opted not to or were stopped by authorities due to the counter-radicalization strategy.⁴⁰ The latter is measurable, the former nearly impossible. Moreover, Lorenzo also raises a serious quandary about assessing failure: “If, for example, one hundred individuals go through a deradicalization program and only a handful of them revert to terrorism, how is the program to be assessed?”⁴¹ Those questions are difficult to answer and far beyond the purview of this paper. Hence, this study will use the metrics described above, but they are in no way comprehensive metrics of success.

SUCCESESSFUL PREVENTION EFFORTS

Pipe bombs in Manhattan

Noted terrorism scholar John Mueller published a book of case studies of US radicalization since 9/11.⁴² Out of sixty-one documented cases, twenty take place after 2011. Most of these cases end in arrest, either by local law enforcement or the FBI. One such case is that of Jose Pimentel. Pimentel started reading the Qu’ran in 2001, and converted to Islam in 2004. In 2010, following divorce and personal failure, he was worrying relatives with his increasing obsession with Islam. Around that time, he started to post online about his radical beliefs, praising Osama bin Laden for perpetrating the 9/11 attacks. By this time, law enforcement had been tailing Pimentel for over two years. Initially, Schenectady police tipped the NYPD off when Pimentel moved to New York City, because Pimentel had expressed a desire to undergo terrorist training in Yemen. NYPD informants later befriended Pimentel and accompanied him as he purchased materials for his pipe bombs. On 19 November 2011, Pimentel was arrested by the NYPD after being videotaped making pipe bombs, which he intended to send to American military personnel returning from abroad. The timing of the plot came soon after Anwar al-Awlaki, an American radical Islamic cleric hiding in Yemen, was killed by drone strike.⁴³

⁴⁰ Lorenzo Vidino, “Countering Radicalization in America.” 9.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² John Mueller, *Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases* (2015), 688-690, <http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/since.html>.

⁴³ Ibid.

It is suspected that he was so easily caught because of the freeness with which he would discuss his radical opinions, especially online. The NYPD is considered to be the most prepared in the nation regarding possible terrorist attacks. Police departments across the nation emulate their tactics, especially the use of agent provocateurs, in detecting and preventing homegrown terrorism.⁴⁴

Bristol's failed suicide bomber

Andrew Ibrahim frequently smoked marijuana, spent the vast majority of his time on Internet games, got expelled from a series of private schools, and frequently researched Osama bin Laden and explosives on his father's computer while growing up. After drug abuse, he failed out of his college courses, and experienced numerous other personal failures. By this time in 2007, he had found Islam and converted, changing his name to Isa; he started to wear the traditional white robes, headscarf, and sandals. He briefly returned to drugs and studying for his A-levels as he was more interested in the politics than the religion, but quickly became obsessed with suicide bombers and the ongoing war in Iraq.⁴⁵ After failing his exams in early spring 2008, he started to purchase suicide bomb equipment. He then researched the history and the process of making a suicide bomb vest. On 16 April 2008, his suspicious activities were reported to the police. They quickly arrested him and removed the explosives from his council flat in Bristol.⁴⁶

Analysis

The CVE strategy has been considered a success in apprehending and preventing dozens of would-be terrorists via the use of agent provocateurs, so the strategy remains in place. That Pimentel was noticed and followed by the NYPD the moment he returned to New York shows careful observation, and the fact that he was arrested the moment he entered the hardware store to purchase bomb

⁴⁴ Rohan Gunaratna and Cleo Haynal, "Current and Emerging Threats of Homegrown Terrorism: The Case of the Boston Bombings," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 7, no. 3 (2013): 55.

⁴⁵ Duncan Gardham, "Andrew Ibrahim: How a public schoolboy became a terrorist," *The Telegraph*, 18 July 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/5850765/Andrew-Ibrahim-How-a-public-schoolboy-became-a-terrorist.html>.

⁴⁶ Duncan Gardham, "Terrorist Andrew Ibrahim was turned in by the Muslim community," *The Telegraph*, 18 July 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/5851168/Terrorist-Andrew-Ibrahim-was-turned-in-by-the-Muslim-community.html>.

supplies is evidence of law enforcement assiduousness in taking reported threats seriously and moving to prevent violence effectively. Speaking more broadly, what is noticeable about Mueller's documented case studies is just how few of them result in violence. In the wake of the San Bernadino attacks, it may not seem as if Americans are safe from terrorists armed with guns. However, out of sixty-two incidents, only five failed to be caught by police or the FBI (see Appendix B). Americans are more likely to hear about the terrorist attacks that do occur instead of the plots that failed, but the evidence shows just how assiduous law enforcement is in monitoring individuals with radical tendencies. Pimentel's case study is the most typical instance of homegrown terrorism in the US.

Figure 5: Key investigative methods used to detect terror suspects⁴⁷

Out of 317 jihadist suspects since 9/11, 182 of them were foiled by tra-

⁴⁷ Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Emily Schneider, and Bailey Cahall, "Do NSA's Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?" New America Foundation, January 2014. 5.

ditional investigative measures. Traditional investigative measures include six categories: community/family tip, informant, non-NSA intelligence (provided by the CIA, FBI, etc.), routine law enforcement, militant self-disclosure, and Suspicious Activity Reports. Pimentel's case study falls underneath the routine law enforcement category, but it also has an element of militant self-disclosure, as Pimentel posted his sentiments online prior to his arrest.

Pimentel's case study exposes how little the CVE strategy relies on signals intelligence (SIGINT), the kind of intelligence popularized by public perceptions of the NSA. NSA data collection counts for very few case studies; to be exact, only eighteen of the 317 suspects were caught via SIGINT. The vast majority of domestic terror suspects are detected through traditional human intelligence (HUMINT) methods. HUMINT typically uses informants and agent provocateurs to collect enough evidence to indict suspects.⁴⁸ This has raised a great level of controversy among Americans, because nonviolent radicals may be incited to do something illegal via an agent provocateur's goading. It sounds eerily like the plot of 1984, which is enough to scare the majority of American citizens. However, it is worth noting the sheer number of Mueller's case studies that have been foiled; the vast majority of them were achieved via the use of agent provocateurs, so no one can deny that it actually succeeds in bringing out violent terrorists and preventing them from turning their violent deeds from aspirations into operations.

Meanwhile, Ibrahim was identified via community tip by a number of people in Bristol's Muslim community who had attended a Prevent awareness workshop.⁴⁹ As such, it shows the importance of raising awareness about radicalization and its threats to the public at large, especially Muslim communities. However, the case study still results in arrest, which belies the intention of Prevent being used to preempt police activity and prevent young Brits from being jailed. Nevertheless, the importance of community participation in preventing terrorism remains paramount, as civilians are far more likely to come into contact with a would-be terrorist than a law enforcement officer on duty. That the British have mobilized their public and promoted safety regarding radicalization is also commendable. In this case study, that awareness has saved countless lives.

⁴⁸ "Intelligence Collection Disciplines (INTs)," Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed 2 April 2016, <https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/disciplines>.

⁴⁹ HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, 2011, 56.

The Ibrahim and Pimentel case studies are quite similar. Both men were under thirty years of age and were not socialized in strict Muslim households. They lived in urban environments that promoted a sense of isolation being separated from society. They ran against social norms with their criminal activity, which moved them up the action radicalization pyramid. Pimentel and Ibrahim both studied Islam and were part of the religion, enjoying the social structure that entered their lives, which moved them to the base of the opinion radicalization pyramid. The combination of the two made them incredibly vulnerable to the jihadist narrative; that narrative invited both men to become part of a special group who had been unfairly treated by society and whose situation was dire – they had to act or face extinction.⁵⁰ Both men disengaged from the religious nature of Islam and gravitated towards the political events involving the Middle East, which is what made them shift to the apex of the opinion radicalization pyramid. Jocelyne Cesari describes the social shift: “The temporary loss of embeddedness [in the Tabligh, or the apolitical movement whose goal is to increase Muslim orthodoxy, commonly called the ‘Jehovah’s Witnesses of Islam’] made these jihadis vulnerable to Salafi interpretations ... It provides an alternative to the isolation and estrangement of an urban environment that caters to the affluent and culturally dominant citizen.”⁵¹ Because both had lower thresholds to breaking the law due to prior criminal histories, it allowed both to bridge the gap between believing in jihadism and attempting it.

However, an interesting twist emerges at the end of the Ibrahim case study. By the time authorities raided Ibrahim’s flat, he had already purchased suicide bomb materials. For all of the case study similarities, Pimentel was arrested before he could complete purchasing suicide bomb materials. I argue that Ibrahim would have never completed the suicide bomb had this case taken place in the US. Prevent was less effective than CVE in terms of how quickly authorities were able to determine the existence of a national security threat in this case study comparison.

⁵⁰ Narrative borrowed from McCauley and Moskalenko.

⁵¹ Jocelyne Cesari, “Muslims in Europe and the US: A Shared but Overrated Risk of Radicalism,” in *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences*, 2nd ed., ed. Rik Coolsaet (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 106 & 111.

FAILED PREVENTION ATTEMPTS*Tragedy in Boston*

Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev are the two brothers who gained notoriety for carrying out the Boston Marathon Bombing. Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the elder brother, also experienced personal failure; during this time, Zubeidat encouraged him to turn to religion. In January 2012, Tamerlan visited Chechnya in order to renew his Russian passport; it is thought that he made contact with Chechen insurgents at this time. Meanwhile, the younger brother Dzhokhar admired his elder immensely, and became embedded in Tamerlan's increasing radicalism. The brothers originally plotted to bomb the Charles River area in Boston on July 4, but when incendiary devices proved easy to procure, they modified their plans. On 15 April 2013, the Tsarnaev brothers set off two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at the Boston Marathon finish line, killing four and wounding over 200 people. They had originally planned to commit a suicide bombing in Times New Square with six other IEDs, but were intercepted by police.⁵² Tamerlan was killed in a police shootout and Dzhokhar was apprehended less than a day later. Two years later, he was sentenced to death in a jury trial.⁵³

Not a surveillance state, but a suspicious one

In this case study, names have not been released to the public. As such, each person will be designated with an initial in order to help identify the plethora of characters in this case study. A twelve year-old schoolboy ("A") was also reported to the Prevent authorities on suspicion of being radicalized. A was doing a home economics lesson, and the teacher ("B") had instructed his or her students to procure a chicken. At the time, there was a news story about halal slaughterhouses being shut down. A told his teacher that he would not be able to procure a halal chicken. When asked by B as to why, A responded, "It's because the government hates Muslims." B told the preteen's mother ("C"), who agreed to talk to her child. C said that she was careful about the material she showed her son. However, child services still rang a week later. Because A was being bullied

⁵² Gunaratna and Haynal, "Current and Emerging Threats of Homegrown Terrorism," 46-47.

⁵³ Jennifer Levitz, "Boston Marathon Bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Sentenced to Death, Apologizes to Victims," Wall Street Journal, 24 June 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-apologizes-before-being-sentenced-to-death-for-boston-bombing-1435170191>.

at his school, he was frequently tardy. The tardiness, though, was attributed to praying at a mosque, not because he was reluctant to go to a school where he'd be bullied. Furthermore, C went on holiday and left A and his brother ("D") with her husband ("E"). A was ill during this time, and E called his school to excuse his absence. Since A and D did not attend the same school, A's school called D's school to check whether D was in class or not. A's school was under the presumption that C had taken her children off to the Middle East, presumably to join Daesh. This is but one case study among many reports of Muslim schoolchildren finding themselves being reported to Prevent authorities as a result of teachers being mandated to report any suspicious activity to Prevent.⁵⁴

Analysis

Most noticeably, Tamerlan Tsarnaev had been placed in an FBI database following a notification from the Russian security services (FSB); however, after an interview, the FBI was unable to declare him an important enough threat to national security to warrant close observation. Later that year, the FSB warned the CIA of the threat that Tamerlan posed to US national security. Unlike the Pimentel case study, the Tsarnaev brothers did not post their beliefs or plans online, as the former did. Moreover, neither of the Tsarnaev brothers had any connection with al-Qaeda or any other radical group, although al-Qaeda's *Inspire* magazine was quick to claim responsibility for the attack. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies failed to detect the Tsarnaev brothers until it was too late for the first set of bombings, but acted quickly and effectively to prevent the second set of bombings.⁵⁵

The Boston Marathon Bombing case study shows the limitations of relying so heavily upon HUMINT. Even though traditional surveillance methods have caught so many individuals, they failed to catch 7.6% of the perpetrators. SIGINT requires few personnel; the bulk of expenses are for sophisticated technology and equipment. By comparison, HUMINT requires several personnel to serve as agent provocateurs and analysts. Technology is still at the stage where a human can detect a terror plot better than a machine, but it is also a weakness because the US does not have the financial means and the time to investigate every suspected terrorist. Law enforcement individuals need to be lucky all the time, but terrorists need to

⁵⁴ Homa Khaleeli, "You worry they could take your kids': is the Prevent strategy demonizing Muslim schoolchildren?" *The Guardian*, 23 September 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/23/prevent-counter-terrorism-strategy-schools-demonising-muslim-children>.

⁵⁵ Gunaratna and Haynal, "Current and Emerging Threats of Homegrown Terrorism," 55.

be lucky just once in order to strike fear into the heart of a nation. Even though 1.3 million people die in car crashes annually, the fear and public discourse that goes into terrorism versus car crashes is much greater.

By contrast, the effects of over-reporting are much less newsworthy as they do not cause casualties. There are noticeable consequences of mandating that teachers and other private citizens report suspicious activity to the government, but they are not detrimental to society in the short-term, as the Tsarnaev case study was. Nonetheless, in a socially and economically stratified society that results from centuries of a land-based aristocracy, the suspects for radicalization are inevitably from the Muslim minority subject to heightened scrutiny ever since the 7/7 tube bombings. That is not to say that people will impose certain Islamophobic biases upon their reporting of radicalization, but Homa Khaleeli's article makes it clear that no one has reported a young Caucasian student for white supremacist statements like those made by Anders Breivik, who shot and killed twenty-nine Oslo children in 2009.⁵⁶

Those reported to Prevent are all Muslim schoolchildren with ethnic Arab backgrounds, one of them three years old. The title of the article reflects the fear the parents have: that the British government will take the children to properly instill "British values" into them. It reeks of targeted political repercussions instead of social cohesion. A large part of this phenomenon is that the Prevent strategy likens radicalization to other anti-social behavior and psychiatric issues akin to those exhibited by assassins and school shooters. While homegrown terrorists and school shooters do exhibit some similarities (as noted in "The theory of radicalism" section), stronger indications of radicalization are the inability to endure perceived hypocrisy and the personal connection with alleged victims, which allows homegrown extremists to connect with terrorists outside of an organized group. As such, the Prevent strategy may be telling its citizens to look for the wrong signs and to misinterpret them. The schoolchild in the halal chicken case study should have been referred to a counselor or psychologist, not counterterrorism authorities.

There is a real problem in creating such a public and visible strategy with a simple moniker as Prevent. The word "prevent" alone has a massive range of

⁵⁶ Brian Masters, "Anders Breivik isn't mad – he was a man on a mission," *The Telegraph*, 16 April 2012, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/9206958/Anders-Breivik-isnt-mad-he-was-a-man-on-a-mission.html>.

interpretation. Among the general public, it might evoke a sense of “preventing violent extremism,” but among English Defence League members, it might imply a legal pretext for bigotry. This is a group that promotes xenophobia as a matter of public policy. It explicitly labels radical ideas and statements as a problem, and this can result in overreaction when a citizen does not know the difference between depression and radicalization. The Prevent strategy chips away at civil society by mandating that citizens report on each other on the basis of suspicions, which targets Muslims in practice because of the larger sociopolitical context in which this policy takes place, exacerbated by the twenty-four-hour news cycle that brings fresh news of Daesh’s barbaric tactics every day when the sun dawns.

Every citizen, even Prevent-trained, will have a different education level when it comes to political science and counterterrorism studies and a different threshold of what constitute or does not constitute radicalization. By not taking into account citizens’ political identity and upbringing, the British government implies that all citizens are treated equally in society, which is not true. The delay in a moderate Muslim countermovement, epitomized by Twitter hashtags such as #NotInMyName, has harmed the perception of Muslims in Western countries, which allows Islamophobic demagoguery to gain traction. By assuming that citizens are effectively unbiased and always able to discern between an actual case of radicalization and potential overreaction, the British government is in effect allowing citizens to act upon any implicit biases, which can lead to further political radicalization from Muslims who feel that they are being targeted by the government and non-Muslim Brits. Of course, with that being said, this is a society that created and popularized the #YouAintNoMuslimBruv hashtag, which was applauded by Prime Minister Cameron.⁵⁷ Suffice to say that Islamophobia is not a popular sentiment in the UK as it is among presidential candidate Donald Trump’s xenophobic supporters. With that being said, policies like Prevent that attempt to cull cognitive radicalization would likely lead to several problems in America.

The questions raised by this comparison reveal the crux behind the debate as whether to focus on cognitive or behavioral radicalization. Should a country only focus on behavioral radicalization, its law enforcement capability may be limited by the influx of simultaneously monitoring many would-be terrorists, since

⁵⁷ Yanan Wang and Niraj Chokshi, “‘You ain’t no Muslim, bruv’: David Cameron champions rallying cry against Islamophobia,” *Washington Post*, 7 December 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/12/07/you-aint-no-muslim-bruv-brits-champion-rallying-cry-against-islamophobia/>.

there is no single path of radicalization. As evidenced by the three case studies of radicalization, all three connected to radical Islam via different methods: Internet, controversial political actions taken by the US, and connections with Chechen terrorists. This has been borne out by other studies as well, as noted by other scholars.⁵⁸ This can result in another Boston Marathon Bombing again, where authorities may not be able to effectively detect a serious terror threat until it is too late. On the other hand, if one includes measures against cognitive radicalization from the outset, then it can potentially deter some of these threats, but at an additional cost of alienating a segment of the population that feels unfairly targeted. That resentment can incite violence, which is the opposite of its goal. Conversely, by including the First Amendment as priority in its counter-radicalization strategy, the American method is very clear and explicit about its goals. It does not brand the strategy with a simple moniker that can be misrepresented; it labels itself as countering violent extremism only, not permitting inadvertent bigotry, and separating itself from bigoted statements.

The CVE strategy is much more downplayed and utilizes a number of existing frameworks rather than establishing a new program entirely. The White House justifies this by saying: "This reliance, however must not change the nature or purpose of existing relationships. In many instances, our partnerships and related activities were not created for national security purposes but nonetheless have an indirect impact on countering violent extremism (CVE)."⁵⁹ It is careful to utilize existing law enforcement methods and frameworks so that it is not perceived as breaking the law in the name of national security but rather maintaining the law to defend Americans from what would already be considered illegal. It does, however, court controversy through its use of agent provocateurs and its use in inspiring a small cabal of citizens towards further radicalism instead of dissuading them from extremism. Nevertheless, its success cannot be understated in an era of increasing identity-driven divisions in the American political atmosphere.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Vidino, "Countering Radicalisation in America," 10-11.

⁵⁹ Office of the White House, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, December 2011. 1.

⁶⁰ For a more detailed analysis of this phenomenon, see: Bill Bishop and Robert G. Cushing, *The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America is Tearing Us Apart*, Boston: Mariner Books, 2009.

AVENUES FOR FURTHER STUDY

As previously mentioned, the UK and the US suffer some of the highest rates of terrorism among developed nations. In fact, among the nations that comprise the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the UK and the US rank second and third on the 2014 Global Terrorism Index, surpassed only by Turkey.⁶¹ While focusing on jihadi terrorism is of greatest import, an important finding emerged from studying instances of US radicalization: the growing right-wing terror movement. Up until December 2, right-wing terrorists killed nearly twice as many Americans as homegrown jihadists had. Even now, the International Security Project at New America says that homegrown jihadists have killed forty-five individuals since 9/11, whereas right-wing terrorists have killed forty-eight individuals in that same time span.⁶² Even as the intelligence community combats today's terror threats, Western states' eyes should always be looking forward in preventing future terror attacks regardless of the ideology it springs from.

CONCLUSION

We would like to believe that combating terrorism is as easy as catching perpetrators. Unfortunately, the reality is that so long as there are people who value their beliefs over human lives and there is a social movement that allows these people to be mobilized together in an absolute willingness to achieve their goals irrespective of the horror their tactics inspire, there will be a threat of terrorism. David Rapoport, the father of modern terrorism studies, describes four waves of modern terrorism reaching back to the anarchist movement in the late nineteenth century. Almost 2,000 years prior to Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination, the Zealots stabbed fellow Jews to protest Roman occupation of Judea in the first century CE.⁶³ Fear is encoded in humanity's hindbrains; it is universally felt. As such, history is often written in blood and terror. Terrorists take advantage of this by exploiting vulnerable individuals and inspiring them to carry out the attacks like the midday shooting in San Bernadino. As such, counter-radicalization strategies

⁶¹ Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index*, 2014.

⁶² International Security Project, "Homegrown Extremism: Deadly Attacks Since 9/11," *New America*, <http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html>.

⁶³ Richard A. Horsley, "The Sicarii: Ancient Jewish 'Terrorists,'" *The Journal of Religion* 59 no. 4 (1979): 435-458.

will never completely succeed as new threats and forms of extremism emerge and evolve over time. That raises the question: why attempt something impossible?

This research paper shows the crucial importance of political alienation in the creation of homegrown terrorism. It also shows the strengths and weaknesses of utilizing various strategies. Most importantly, it shows how counter-radicalization strategies can be either a unifying or dividing factor that either mitigates or exacerbates the shadow that terrorism leaves on society. The CVE strategy seeks to target a small selection of individuals and allows law enforcement to be mostly effective, albeit with questions raised about the use of agent provocateurs. The Prevent strategy casts a wide net over the land of Great Britain, calling not only law enforcement but also the everyman to prevent radicalization. It does prevent terrorism, but it also catches schoolchildren in its snare. In an Orwellian twist, it has already raised questions about its social repercussions and its likelihood to foster resentment instead of culling said sentiment at its root.

This should inform administrations present and future how to proceed with counter-radicalization policies. Moreover, it should be a personal guide in understanding how to treat others in this era of courage and fear. Policy is the expression of sentiment into legislation. The US and UK need to be careful what political sentiments they encourage, just as we citizens need to be careful about how we include and exclude people from civil society through our words and actions. Our lives and wellbeing depend on it.

APPENDIX A**TERRORISM IN OECD COUNTRIES**

The following data set is excerpted from the *2014 Global Terrorism Index*, prepared by the Institute for Economics & Peace. Countries here are ordered in the ranking from most likely to suffer from terrorist attacks to least likely. It does not reflect any attack that happened in 2015; as such, the rankings for France and Belgium are not updated to reflect current events.

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2014 SCORE (0-10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (2012-2013)
17	Turkey	5.98	-0.12
27	United Kingdom	5.17	+0.72
30	United States	4.71	+0.85
=32	Israel	4.66	-0.46
=32	Mexico	4.66	+1.53
44	Norway	3.57	-0.68
47	Ireland	3.09	+0.15
56	France	2.67	-0.17
=58	Chile	2.59	+0.33
62	Italy	2.55	-0.09
69	Spain	1.84	-0.53
77	Switzerland	1.34	+0.87
83	Germany	1.02	-0.70
84	Canada	0.95	0
85	Czech Republic	0.81	+0.55
=89	Netherlands	0.58	-0.71
93	Belgium	0.53	-0.68
=95	Australia	0.41	-0.62
=103	Austria	0.24	-0.43
=105	Portugal	0.23	-0.24
=107	Denmark	0.19	+0.11
=109	Estonia	0.16	-0.15
=113	Iceland	0.08	-0.08
116	Hungary	0.07	-0.11
=121	Japan	0.01	-0.05
=124	Finland	0	-0.03
=124	New Zealand	0	-0.05
=124	Poland	0	0
=124	Slovakia	0	0
=124	Slovenia	0	0
=124	South Korea (ROK)	0	0

Source: Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2014. http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf.

APPENDIX B**LIST OF AMERICAN CASE STUDIES**

This is the data set used to determine statistics in the “Combating Terrorism in Our Backyards” section and chart the “Jihadi Terror Attacks & Attempts in the US since 9/11” graph. It is a combination of the efforts of John Mueller and New America’s International Security Program. Boldfaced and italicized case studies indicate that the terror plot succeeded and killed individuals. The number of casualties is included in brackets at the end.

YEAR	CASE STUDY DESCRIPTION
2001	Shoe Bomber
2002	Padilla
2002	Mount Rushmore
2002	<i>El Al at LAX [2]</i>
2002	Lackawanna
2003	Kahn and the Parachas
2003	Abu Ali in Saudi Arabia
2003	Columbus and the Brooklyn Bridge
2004	Barot and the financial buildings
2004	Albany
2004	Nettles
2004	Herald Square
2005	Grecula
2005	Lodi
2005	JIS
2005	Pipelines and the terrorist hunter
2006	U of North Carolina
2006	Hudson River tunnels
2006	Sears Tower
2006	Bombing transatlantic airliners
2006	Rockford Mall
2006	<i>Seattle Jewish Federation [1]*</i>
2007	Fort Dix
2007	JFK Airport
2008	Vinas
2009	Bronx synagogues
2009	<i>Little Rock [1]</i>
2009	Boyd and Quantico
2009	Zazi
2009	Springfield
2009	Dallas skyscraper
2009	Mehama
2009	<i>Killings at Fort Hood [13]</i>
2009	The underwear bomber
2010	Times Square
2010	Alaska
2010	Parcel bombs on car planes
2010	DC Metro – bomb plot

2010	Oregon
2010	DC Metro – Facebook
2010	Baltimore
2011	Texas
2011	Manhattan's pair of lone wolves
2011	Pentagon shooter
2011	Seattle
2011	Abdo
2011	Model planes
2011	Iran and Scarface
2011	Pimentel's pipe bomb
2012	Tampa
2012	Capitol bomber
2012	Chicago bar
2012	Bombing the Federal Reserve Bank
2012	The brothers plot
2013	<i>Boston Marathon bombing [4]</i>
2013	Wichita airport
2014	Rochester
2014	<i>Oklahoma beheading [1]*</i>
2014	<i>Washington and New Jersey killing spree [4]*</i>
2015	Cincinnati
2015	Aurora
2015	Two women in Queens
2015	Fort Riley
2015	Ohio returnee from Syria
2015	<i>Chattanooga military shooting [5]*</i>
2015	<i>San Bernadino shooting [14]</i>

** These cases were included in the list of lethal jihadi attacks in New America's list, but were not included in Mueller's list of case studies. They have been excluded from the paper's statistics.*

Sources: (1) International Security Program. "Homegrown Extremism: Deadly Attacks Since 9/11." New America. <http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html>.

(2) Mueller, John. Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases (2015). <http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/since.html>.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ashour, Omar. "Online De-Radicalization? Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: Message, Messenger and Media Strategy." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4 no. 6 (2012): 15-19.

Buchanan, Rose Troup. "Paris terror attack: Husband pays touching tribute to 'love of his life' in defiant message to attackers." *The Independent*, 19 November 2015. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-terror-husband-pays-touching-tribute-to-love-of-his-life-in-defiant-message-to-attackers-a6737231.html>.

Building Communities of Trust Initiative. *Building Communities of Trust: Fact Sheet*. Published January 2014.

Gardham, Duncan. "Andrew Ibrahim: How a public schoolboy became a terrorist." *The Telegraph*, 18 July 2009. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/5850765/Andrew-Ibrahim-How-a-public-schoolboy-became-a-terrorist.html>.

Gardham, Duncan. "Terrorist Andrew Ibrahim was turned in by the Muslim community." *The Telegraph*, 18 July 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/5851168/Terrorist-Andrew-Ibrahim-was-turned-in-by-the-Muslim-community.html>.

Gunaratna, Rohan and Cleo Haynal. "Current and Emerging Threats of Homegrown Terrorism: The Case of the Boston Bombings." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 7 no. 3 (2013): 44-63.

Her Majesty's Government. *Prevent Strategy*. June 2011.

Institute for Economics & Peace. *Global Terrorism Index 2014*. http://www.vision-ofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf.

International Security Program. "Homegrown Extremism: Deadly Attacks Since

9/11.” *New America*. <http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html>.

Jacobson, Michael. “Terrorist Drop-outs: One Way of Promoting a Counter-Narrative.” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 3 no. 2 (2009): 12-17.

Khaleeli, Homa. “‘You worry they could take your kids’: is the Prevent strategy demonizing Muslim schoolchildren?” *The Guardian*, 23 September 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/23/prevent-counter-terrorism-strategy-schools-demonising-muslim-children>.

Kirk, Ashley. “Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are fighting for ISIL?” *The Telegraph*, 12 August 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/islamic-state/11770816/Iraq-and-Syria-How-many-foreign-fighters-are-fighting-for-Isil.html>.

Levitz, Jennifer. “Boston Marathon Bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Sentenced to Death, Apologizes to Victims.” *Wall Street Journal*, 24 June 2015. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-apologizes-before-being-sentenced-to-death-for-boston-bombing-1435170191>.

McCauley, Clark and Sophia Moskalenko. “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20 no. 3 (2008): 415-433.

McCauley, Clark and Sophia Moskalenko. “Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual From Radical Opinion to Radical Action.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26 no. 1 (2014): 69-85.

Mueller, John. *Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases* (2015), <http://political-science.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/since.html>.

Neumann, Peter R. “The trouble with radicalization.” *International Affairs* 89 no. 4 (2013): 873-893.

New York Times. "Obama's Oval Office Speech." 6 December 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/us/obamas-oval-office-speech.html>.

Office of the White House. *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. August 2011.

Office of the White House. *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. December 2011.

Popper, Karl. *The open society and its enemies*, vol. 1: *The spell of Plato*, 4th ed., 293. London: Routledge, 1995.

Roy, Olivier. "Al-Qaeda: A True Global Movement," in *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences*, 2nd ed., edited by Rik Coolsaet, 19-25. Surrey: Ashgate, 2011.

Sly, Liz. "Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq." *Washington Post*, 3 February 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/al-qaeda-disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html.

Sputnik International. "FBI, Homeland Security Arrest Some 70 ISIL-Related Persons in US." 21 October 2015. <http://sptnkne.ws/Wva>.