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

THE STATE OF COLOMBIA

AL JAZEERA'S IMAGE

COLD WAR REVISITED


IN DEFENSE OF ENGAGEMENT

PREVENTIVE INTERVENTION



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CHIEN HONG PNG
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The Spring 2015 Journal is the culmination of a great semester for the Cornell International Affairs Review. We have experienced an increase in membership numbers, submissions to the journal, and contributors for the Diplomatist. This would not have been possible without the guidance of the previous executive board, our advisor, Professor Logevall, and the Einaudi Center's Head of Programming, Dr. Michelson.

It is with great sadness that we see our seniors leave us, off to the real world, and Professor Logevall heading off to the Kennedy School of Government. Congratulations to all!

We are deeply honored to have Dr. Michelson take on as our new advisor. We are also pleased to see an increase in the number of freshmen contributing to CIAR. Their energy is addictive.

The executive board has been a great group of people to work with. Each person was integral to the smooth operation of CIAR. From Jessie's caffeine-induced Journal editing binges, to Demetri's obsessive redesigns of the Diplomatist, and from Kwame's negotiations with the Statler to CIAR turning a budgetary surplus this semester thanks to Ryan, I have been humbled to work with such a great bunch of people.

Our publication's success would not have occurred without the generous backing of the Einaudi Center, the Student Assembly Finance Committee and the International Students Board.

I hope you enjoy reading through the journal as much as I did.



JESSIE WEBER
 Cornell University
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 Editor In Chief, CIAR

At the start of this semester, I didn't yet know that I would be the incoming Editor in Chief of this journal, however I can say now that it is a position I have thoroughly enjoyed having the opportunity to take on. Fortunately for me, I have a dedicated and brilliant team of editors who put up with every load of work I threw at them, without whom I would never have been able to finish sorting through and then working through our mountain of submissions.

Over the past couple of months I have had the opportunity to converse with countless bright minds, many of whom are pursuing degrees, working in the field, or training others to do the same. The topics vary but the passion remains the same and never fails to inspire me; the drive to more fully understand the world around us in order to better understand each other. Their work and their words have gone much farther than making me more knowledgeable of international affairs.

Ana Luquerna in our first article explains to us the ways that tensions between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia and the Patriotic Union have slowed the path towards transitional justice and reconciliation in the state.

Veering towards North, Audrey Carson explores the American branch of Al Jazeera and the way that it has sought to create itself in a more acceptable image to the general population. This freedom to evolve is starkly contrasted against the social constraints felt by many American Muslims, many of whom may follow the popular network.

Michael McFaul, who served for several years as the United States' ambassador to Russia, gave a speech this March on the evolving conflict between the West and Russia starting before the Cold War, and the continuous struggle both entities face in trying to trust the other while retaining power and autonomy.

Moving beyond the Russian border, Andreas Borgeas makes an eloquent argument outlining why the United States should resist the urge to retreat from and reduce our commitments to the region of Central Asia. I think you'll find his reasoning quite compelling.

Finally, Thomas Sutton II presents a thoughtful critique of Allen Buchanan's proposal for a modified form of intervention, raising questions on the justification of neutral interventions and the forms they take in times of revolution.

I thank my graduate and undergraduate editors, not only for the tremendous work you've put into this issue of the journal but also for putting up with me as I experienced the growing pains of taking on this role unexpectedly—your late-night, last-minute reviews and edits have not been forgotten. I would like to thank our authors, both those who weathered the rigorous revision process and those who submitted without being selected for this issue of the journal. It was a pleasure to read every article. I would like to thank Lucius Elliot, who put up with many late-night questionnaires about everything from copyright policies to the intricacies of design programs. Finally, I want to thank the Einaudi center and the SAFC, without whom none of this would be possible.

This issue is dedicated to my parents, who have moved mountains to support me so I may attend a university with opportunities such as this.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COLOMBIA'S OPPORTUNITY FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE Ana Luquerna Vanderbilt University	9
AL JAZEERA AMERICA Audrey Carson Harvard College	16
A NEW COLD WAR? EXPLAINING RUSSIA'S NEW CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST Michael McFaul Stanford University	27
SURVEYING THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL ASIA Andreas Borgeas San Joaquin College of Law	39
THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF EARLY, NEUTRAL INTERVENTION IN REVOLUTIONS BUCHANAN'S COMPELLING CASE FOR A SHIFT IN THINKING Thomas Sutton II University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill	52



COLOMBIA'S OPPORTUNITY FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

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INTRODUCTION

Colombia has had the longest internal armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere, which has delayed the development of a true democratic system where the government protects individual rights and liberties¹. The prolonged conflict is a consequence of opposing political ideologies, tremendous inequality, tension between the elites and the masses, scarce resources, and an unstable democratic government. Among the groups in conflict there are illegal armed groups, leftist groups, paramilitaries, drug traffickers, and the government. This paper will focus on the extreme tension between the Colombian government, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Patriotic Union (UP) political party. Even though Colombia has been labeled a democratic country since the 1970s, its failure to successfully participate in transitional justice has inhibited the growth of a full democracy. In addition to explaining the tensions between the FARC, UP, and the Colombian government, this paper will explain how elements of transitional justice, such as the integration/demobilization of armed groups back into society and a platform for accountability, would result in a stronger democracy. Since the 1970s, Colombia has experienced a civil war, guerrilla groups, violence, drug trafficking, and human

rights violations, which demonstrates weakness in the democratic system. In this paper, the aim is to demonstrate how these tensions have slowed democratic progress and to argue that even though there seems to be a promising chance of achieving transitional justice through current peace talks, Colombia's democracy remains bleak. I will begin by describing the background of the FARC and UP and the concept of transitional justice. This paper will conclude with the current state of the FARC, UP, and the outlook of Colombia's future.

FARC AND UP BACKGROUND

The longest and most persistent conflict in Colombia is between the Colombian government and the FARC, which is the oldest surviving and richest leftist rebel group in South America. As of 2006, the FARC supplied half of the world's cocaine, earning approximately \$500-600 million per year². After La Violencia, a violent civil war lasting from 1948 to 1958, Colombia's main two political parties agreed to the National Front Agreement, which stipulated that power would alternate between the parties every other election. This essentially shut out any participation from third parties. After the Communist Party realized it was shut out from political participation, they officially established the FARC as their military wing in 1966³.

EVEN THOUGH COLOMBIA HAS BEEN LABELED A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY SINCE THE 1970s, ITS FAILURE TO SUCCESSFULLY PARTICIPATE IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE HAS INHIBITED THE GROWTH OF A FULL DEMOCRACY.

COLOMBIA RANKS SECOND ONLY AFTER SUDAN IN NUMBER OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS... COLOMBIA IS NOT UPHOLDING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

In order to end the conflicts between the FARC and the government, former President Betancur proposed La Uribe Agreement in 1984, which called for a cease-fire and technically allowed the FARC to become involved in politics. In 1985, the FARC, along with other left-ideological groups such as the Communist Party, announced the start of their own political party, Union Patriótica (UP). UP wanted greater land redistribution, decreased media censorship, and a greater voice for the poor. UP was able to gain various governmental positions⁴. In 1986, they gained 350 local council seats, nine House seats, six Senate seats, and 5% of the presidential vote⁵. The growth of UP was halted by the beginning of systematic killings by the government. People feared UP's connections with leftist ideologies and wanted to suppress its growth. Since the creation of UP was in the midst of the Cold War and America's attempt to prevent the expansion of communism to the West, much of the Colombian public, and the government itself, feared that if UP grew as a political party this would lead to communism in Colombia. UP party members, as well as their families, were targeted and killed by governmental military groups and paramilitary groups. The paramilitary groups were extreme rightists. Because the social stigma with the UP party was that they were either communists or involved in the guerilla groups, there was no public scrutiny

of these murders. One survivor recalls that the Catholic Church did not even condemn the killings. After her husband's murder, the archbishop prevented any priest from conducting Mass for him because he was deemed a communist⁶. No accountability system existed for these killings. The systematic killings prevented progress on the peace talks that had begun to occur between the FARC and the government in the 1980s⁷. The remaining head figures of the UP party sought asylum in other countries in the mid 1990⁸. By the end of the 90s, UP membership was essentially nonexistent. Support diminished dramatically. At the height of its power in the mid 1980s, more than 320,000 votes were cast by UP supporters; yet by 2002 there were less than 50,000⁹. The irony of these massive killings is the fact that from an outsider's perspective, Colombia was a democratic government that withstood the 70s and the "lost decade" of the 1980s. However, Colombian democracy is an illiberal democracy that holds elections but does not uphold civil rights. Latin American countries faced dual transitions in their political and economic spectrums after the late 1970s. Achieving the dual transition in the political aspect means first, a shift towards democracy, and second, the deepening of that democracy itself¹⁰. Colombia never technically underwent this "dual transition" in the sense of shifting from a dictatorship to

a democracy, which occurred in many other Latin American countries. Colombia was already a democracy before the 70s. The possibility of a democratic deepening during the dual transition did not occur either. The state of Colombia's democracy was stagnant while other Latin America countries were changing from autocratic rule to democratic rule. The Polity Score, which scales democracy from 1-10 (with 6-10 indicating democracy) for Colombia was seven in the 70s, an eight in the 1980s, and a seven in 2014¹¹. A score of ten indicates a full democracy, and scores from six to nine indicate a democracy. Colombia's scores of seven and eight are expected because Colombia has been labeled a "democracy" since the 1970s. However, the quality of Colombian democracy itself did not significantly alter or improve in the last 50 years. The fact that Colombia emerged as the world's leading cocaine producer in the 1980s negatively affected its economy through the 1980s and 1990s. On the economic spectrum of the dual transition, since 1979, Colombia's annual GDP growth has been 2% lower than the annual growth between 1950 and 1980. In the 1970s, the growth had been 5.8% per year, which many economists deemed as an economic success at least compared to Latin American counterparts¹². Worker productivity also declined during the 1980s because more capital and labor was directed towards drug trade and illegal activities. This differed from other Latin American countries, which began to ameliorate their economic conditions after the "Lost Decade".

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Democratic states have the responsibility to prevent human rights violations and uphold the inherent human rights that are mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (a source of international law). The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) defines transitional justice as judicial and non-judicial actions taken in order to make amends for past human rights

abuses within countries. These amends and reparations for past abuses further the idea of democratic states as the gatekeeper of human rights. Colombia has had more than 5.5 million human rights violations in the past 50 years¹³. Due to these violations, Colombia ranks second only after Sudan in number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). These facts demonstrate that Colombia is not upholding its commitment to the protection of human rights. If Colombia were to make amends and reparations for past human right abuses, its commitment to human rights would be stronger not only within Colombia, but within the international community itself. Furthermore, addressing human rights violations is an importance step to building trust among the citizenry, an issue that Colombia continues to struggle with. Elements of transitional justice are not limited to but include criminal prosecutions, reparations, institutional reform, and truth commissions¹⁴. The difficulty of achieving this type of justice lies in the fact that guerilla groups like the FARC are not the only ones violating human rights. The government is also the perpetrator. Even though the government justified its targeting of the UP as a necessity in order to make Colombia a safer and stronger democracy, the killings they resorted to were blatant human rights violations. Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, people have the inherent right to life, liberty, and security. These rights are not protected for the Colombian people if joining a minority political party like UP ultimately means the possibility of death.

ATTEMPTS AT TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

The attempt to transition from war to peace can be observed in two parts of Colombian history. The first round of peace talks in the 1980s attempted to end the tensions of the FARC, UP, and the government. In 1982, former president Betancour proposed an amnesty law that allowed demobilization of guerilla groups without the need of disarmament¹⁵. Then a ceasefire

WHILE VICTIMS DO NEED A DECLARATION AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THIS LEGAL STATUS, LAW 1448 GIVES VICTIMS THE ABILITY TO BECOME A FORMAL PLAYER IN LEGAL PROCEDURES.

was supposed to occur from 1984-1987 between the FARC and government, but neither event was successful because the FARC refused to demobilize and also because the government lashed out and killed UP members in the 80s. Because the growth of a new political party was publicly stopped by systematic killings, tension was high between the FARC, the Colombian government, and UP. There was no trust between political parties, paramilitaries, or the government, which led Colombia to fail at their attempt of transitional justice. The second attempt at transitional justice has been occurring since former President Uribe's administration (2002-2010) and continues with the Santos administration. Uribe targeted his efforts toward the demobilization of paramilitary groups, specifically the United Self Defense Forces (AUC) that had become involved with narco trafficking. While some demobilization occurred, there are rumors that the AUC is still active in many parts of the country¹⁶. After their apparent demobilization, new criminal gangs with past paramilitary members emerged. In 2005, Law 975 was passed and gave demobilized group members alternative sentences and ways to reenter civilian life. Under this law, if perpetrators gave reparations, their sentences would be reduced¹⁷. However, the process could not begin unless the victim came first and reported a crime, which rarely occurred due to fear. By 2008, only 24 people had been given reparations¹⁸. In 2004 and 2010, the Constitutional Court reminded the government they had to provide land restitutions because the situations with the IPDs was unconstitutional¹⁹. In 2010, Law 1424 established non-judicial truth seeking organizations that helped members in il-

legal groups get legal help in exchange for pertinent information that could help the government uncover truths about past conflicts. However, it must be noted that this law does not apply to those organizations that have committed crimes against humanity, which include the FARC. President Uribe (2002-2010) differed from current President Santos because his approach was more aggressive in nature overall, while Santos really focused on peace talks with the FARC. Peace talks begun in 2012 in Cuba are still occurring today. The talks moved from its exploratory phase to formal phase, and the legal framework focuses on "(1) rural development and land policy; (2) political participation of the FARC; (3) ending the armed conflict including reinsertion into civilian life of rebel forces; (4) illicit crops and illegal drug trafficking; (5) victims' reparations, and (6) the implementation of the final ne-





CIVILIANS GATHER IN PROTEST AGAINST THE FARC.

gotiated agreement, including its ratification and verification”²⁰. While the end date to these peace talks is unclear, this is the first time in Colombian history where the FARC seems to be formally embracing a new structure of formal peace²¹. Within the legal sphere, Santos continued supporting laws that aid the achievement of transitional justice. In 2011, after receiving Congressional approval, Santos signed into law the Victim’s Law, Law 1448. This law gives victims reparations and land distributions as well as the right to restitution for those who have lost their land or been displaced. It also formally defines the term “victim.” While victims do need a declaration and supporting evidence in order to obtain this legal status, Law 1448 gives victims the ability to become a formal player in legal procedures. This law is the most serious attempt to achieve transitional justice because it recognizes victims’ rights and acknowledges an internal armed conflict, which had not been formally acknowledged in the past. Lastly, a constitutional amendment called the Legal Framework for Peace embraced other techniques of reaching transitional justice in order to achieve negotiations and peace²². The most significant effect of this amendment is the creation of truth commissions to investigate grave human rights violations. By 2013, the Justice and Peace Tribunals, created by Law 975, had tried more than 2000 past paramilitaries. However, only fourteen

had been sentenced²³. While these examples demonstrate advance for Colombia on its way to transitional justice, current facts demonstrate that in paper, progress seems to be occurring; yet in reality, implementation is a challenge.

THE FARC TODAY

The government has taken steps toward transitional justice over the past 15 years. Even though the FARC is still the largest rebel group in Latin America, its power has diminished since 2008. After the deaths of two major leaders, Marulanda in 2008 and Mono Jojoy in 2010, the FARC was severely weakened. Estimates suggest that their membership dropped more than half since 2001, with somewhere around 8,000 members²⁴. Former president Alvaro Uribe’s offensive attacks from 2002 on have only further weakened the FARC and included five high profile hostages who were rescued from the FARC. The most significant step towards achieving peace, however, is the peace talks that began in 2012. The Santos administration’s peace talks are the first attempt of this kind in a decade, and the fourth try in the last thirty years²⁵. According to the International Crisis Center, a transitional justice regime cannot occur until human right violators are prosecuted and victims gain reparations²⁶. In 2013, the agenda for negotiations still lacked several aspects of

EVEN IF THE TALKS INCLUDE MORE
ELEMENTS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
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TRUE IMPLEMENTATION.

a transitional justice regime, including reparations and accountability mechanisms for individuals²⁷. However, I estimate that a resolution between the FARC and the government will not be reached for a number of years. Both the Colombian government and the FARC have publicly admitted to the challenges of agreeing on a solution that both parties approve. The international community has indeed become involved in this conflict. A prime example is the United Nations Development Programme's Transitional Justice Programme, which not only assists the government in transforming itself but also provides education workshops to locals about their rights as victims²⁸. Venezuela, Chile, Cuba, Norway, and U.S. are among some of the countries that support the peace talks²⁹. The road to achieving transitional justice is not easy nor fast, and these peace talks will not necessarily signal the achievement of transitional justice. Even if the talks include more elements of transitional justice, there must be accountability for government and non-state actors in order to achieve true implementation. Mechanisms must be established in order to prevent the corruption that has impeded democratic stability in the past from continuing to keep the Colombian state as an illiberal democracy. The first step towards this goal is for both parties to lay out a road map for the future that ensures long-lasting effects for the country. The plan should not be too ambitious but instead remain possible to implement such as previous laws like the Justice and Peace Law of 2005.

UP TODAY

UP, the political party created by the FARC in

1985, grew in its beginning states, yet most of its members were killed by people who feared UP's leftist ideologies. Today, UP technically still exists, but it is very weak. One of the ways the government addressed the past political killings was by making an exception for UP and allowing them to be considered a political party even though their numbers were extremely scarce. In 2002, UP was banned from political participation, but in 2013, the Colombian Peace Commission allowed the UP to participate³⁰. The new UP party differs from the old UP party as its members do not have the strength to stand on their own. Instead of running as an independent party, UP members have merged with similar political parties who have more standing in today's politics. In 2014, UP party candidate Aida Avella, who had been an UP asylee in Switzerland for almost two decades, ran as the vice presidential candidate for the Alternative Democratic Pole, a more prominent leftist party in Colombia. Running as vice president gave her greater chance of succeeding in politics. This leftist party received 2 million votes, which is a significant increase from the 50,000 they had had in 2002. This election demonstrated that even though UP is pretty much non-existent today, its members are aligning themselves with other similar parties in order to continue being involved in politics.

COLOMBIA'S FUTURE

On October 20, 2014, the District Attorney stated that 34 of the UP murders in the 80s and 90s were considered crimes against humanity³¹. However, no prosecution decisions have been made so far. While progress is indeed being made,

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WHILE THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD CHANGING THEIR INSTITUTION THEMSELVES, OTHER FORCES HAVE NOT CHANGED THEIR PAST VIEWS ON HOW TO GET RID OF OPPOSING POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES.

it is important to note that violence and threats against UP members still continue today on a smaller scale. Around 200 members of UP disappeared or were killed during Uribe's term³². In 2012, leftist Congressman Ivan Cepeda and nine other related members received death threats from the paramilitaries. Since the attempts to disband the paramilitaries in 2006 were not successful, their goal of eliminating leftist ideals by violence and murder continues. The direct and clear threats of annihilation of the "guerilla groups," which they associate with these political leaders, demonstrate that the violence of the 1980s has not disappeared from Colombia. While the government might be making progress toward changing their institution themselves, other forces have not changed their past views on how to get rid of opposing political ideologies. The parallels to the 80s are daunting. In the 80s, peace talks were attempted, violence erupted, massive killings occurred, and a prominent leftist party was annihilated. Currently, peace talks are being attempted once again, yet the change is that the Colombian government is much stronger than before. However, what Colombian society refers to as the "dark forces" still remain. These dark forces, extreme rightists, paramilitaries, corrupt government officials, et cetera are still a clear threat to the transition to transitional justice today. The transition failed in the past, and if these "dark forces" overtake the system and once again commit crimes against humanity towards the newly emerging left, the current transition will fail. Colombia's situation differs from the 1980s by the fact that the FARC has made an attempt at formal peace talks, and all signs point to seeking a peace resolution now more than ever before.

CONCLUSION

Colombia's long history of democracy has never signaled a true democracy or respect of human rights. Due to the internal conflicts between the government, FARC, leftist political groups, and paramilitaries, thousands of people have fallen victim to human rights violations, which have not been prevented by the government. The thousands of murders of UP members by the government and other groups prevented the achievement of transitional justice and any attempts at peace talks during this time. Currently, internal conflicts are still very much alive within Colombia, but the chance of transitional justice is available to them once again. The different factor is that today, the FARC has finally showed an interest in a formal and more thorough framework for peace. Colombia is at a critical point in time: progress towards transitional justice is indeed an exciting possibility. Nonetheless, if the "dark forces" resort back to massive exterminations and genocide in order to suppress opposing political views, then the attempted transition to transitional justice will fail like it did in the 1980s.

WHAT COLOMBIAN SOCIETY REFERS TO AS THE "DARK FORCES" STILL REMAIN.

“AMERICAN THROUGH AND THROUGH”

AL JAZEERA AMERICA AND STRATEGIC
RESPONSES TO “THE PERCEPTION
PROBLEM”

On August 20, 2013, Al Jazeera America televised its first official broadcast amidst a frenzy of speculation about the Qatari-backed news channel’s viability in the American media market. Scores of media commentators, ranging from reporters to news executives, praised the fledgling channel’s stated commitment to uninterrupted, hard-hitting, and overlooked news as “something a journalism professor would imagine”¹. Conservative pundits, like Glenn Beck of Fox News fame, immediately meted out blistering condemnations of the channel, going so far – in Beck’s case – as to describe Al Jazeera as “interested in the promotion and protection of Sharia law” and “as close to being an enemy of the state as any media can get.”² Despite radical right reports to the contrary, Al Jazeera America is not a Muslim media source, nor does it produce any content that suggests it “speaks” for Islam. Since its inception, the channel has largely succeeded in establishing itself as an in-depth and unbiased news network along the lines of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) or CNN. A virtual “firewall,” says Al Jazeera America’s interim CEO Ehab Al Shihabi, ensures the editorial team’s independence from its Qatari patrons³. However, among the American public the perception persists of a sinister link between Al Jazeera America and radical strains of Islam. This is due to multiple factors: because Al Jazeera America’s parent company (the Al Jazeera Media Network) is headquartered in a Muslim majority country; because the channel is principally bankrolled by Qatar’s royal family; and because

the network’s flagship program – Al Jazeera Arabic – came under fire in the early 2000s for appearing to serve as a conduit for Al Qaeda⁴.

This essay traces the history of the Al Jazeera Media Network up to the birth of Al Jazeera America and discusses the nature of domestic opposition to Al Jazeera America using three distinct yet interrelated analytic perspectives: national security, public discourse, and globalization. The next question it asks follows logically: what tactics has Al Jazeera America used both to shake off the American public’s “perception problem” and to actively appeal to American audiences? This paper compiles the existing literature on the fledgling network and identifies four distinct areas – entry, principles, content, and branding– in which the management of Al Jazeera America has strategically attempted to make the channel appeal to American audiences and assimilate it into American culture. Observing that both Al Jazeera America and American Muslims have been similarly vilified for their perceived connections to radical Islam, the essay concludes its analysis by asking the following question: can we plausibly understand Al Jazeera America’s strategies as representative of the everyday tactics used by thousands of American Muslims to win greater recognition and respect from their fellow Americans? Ultimately, it concludes that while both Al Jazeera America and American Muslims are confronted by many shared biases, Al Jazeera America has employed an assimilatory paradigm that most American Muslims would deem unacceptably compromis-

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ing of their Muslim identity. Thus, while Al Jazeera America's media relations campaign is an interesting case study of corporate negotiations engaging with public opinion, the network's strategies are not viable solutions for American Muslims who find themselves rejected and alienated from their socio-political communities.

Critics of Al Jazeera may be surprised to learn that the Arab broadcaster's professional origins are built upon Western foundations. Prior to Al Jazeera's launch in 1996, Arab citizens had already received a crash course in Western journalism through BBC Arabic Television, a short-lived but highly influential joint venture between a Saudi investment group and the BBC⁵. Although the station only lasted two years, it produced a regiment of Western-educated and Western-trained Arab journalists, broadcast administrators and technical staff. They were quickly recruited when the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, launched Al Jazeera on November 1, 1996, with a \$137 million government grant⁶. As the network established itself as the first pan-Arab news and public affairs satellite channel broadcasting from the Arab world, its "BBC ethos" lived on. The network committed itself to serving as the lone credible outlet willing to criticize totalitarian regimes and air free and lively debates in a region long dom-

inated by government-owned propaganda machines⁷. Indeed, before September 11, 2001, Al Jazeera was a veritable darling of the Western press, hailed as "an unprecedented casting-off of censorship" and an agent of democracy.⁸

September 11, 2001, was a turning point for Al Jazeera. The network quickly drew harsh criticism from the West for expressing skepticism that Al Qaeda was responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, airing videotapes and images of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, and refusing to frame the American invasion of Afghanistan as a "War on Terror."⁹ Pundits and politicians stopped praising the network's "democratic" coverage and instead turned their wrath on its "fundamentalist" insistence on safeguarding the "social norms and traditions of the region."¹⁰ Other critics pointed scathingly to the television program "Sharia and Life," hosted by Egyptian Sheikh and Islamic theologian Yousuf Al Qaradawi, as evidence of Al Jazeera's "ideological affinity with Islamist" organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood¹¹. In short, Al Jazeera itself became "the story" as American news channels aired President George W. Bush's accusations of the network's anti-American sentiment on repeat and criticized its coverage on top-rated talk shows¹².

In recent years, the Al Jazeera Media Network



has recovered some of the esteem it lost in the Western world through the success of Al Jazeera English, its English-language branch. The Emir of Qatar established Al Jazeera English in 2006 because he wanted to “extend the credibility he has established with the Arab network to a broader, international audience,” explains former U.S. marine and Al Jazeera English correspondent John Rushing. The international news channel has quickly proven itself on par with BBC World and CNN International¹³. Rather than serving as an English-language translation of Al Jazeera Arabic, Al Jazeera English is a fully staffed and self-directed news channel that features content and vocabulary tailored to its English-speaking audiences around the world¹⁴. Its stated mission is to “give a voice to untold stories, promote debate, and challenge established perceptions,” particularly those regarding the “Global South.”¹⁵ Leon Barkho reports that though Al Jazeera’s Qatari patrons “occasionally deploy their power to nip at the network to force it to follow changes in their strategic political alliances,” employees assert they have not been forced to compromise their journalistic integrity. Instead, they boast that “the political order financing the network has steered away from meddling in their editorial decisions.”¹⁶ Despite quickly gaining popularity in the United States among the “internationally minded elite class,” Al Jazeera English has

been unable to convince U.S. cable companies that Americans won’t dismiss the channel as political propaganda and reach for the remote.¹⁷ Weary of relying on web streaming as their primary distribution method in the United States, the Al Jazeera Media Network finally decided to buy its way into the American media market by purchasing Al Gore’s Current TV for \$500 million in January 2013. The move effectively allowed the news network to replace the struggling channel with its own programming – Al Jazeera America – in the 48 million homes whose cable providers carried Current TV.¹⁸

It is important to understand why the American public might dislike and distrust Al Jazeera America because this analysis provides useful insight into the unique strategies that Al Jazeera America must employ to overcome preexisting biases that other American media outlets do not face. First, the facts: Al Jazeera America faces an uphill battle with American television audiences. Of Americans who do not watch Al Jazeera programming, 75% have a negative impression of it. When Time Warner Cable attempted to drop Current TV from its line-up after the channel was acquired by Al Jazeera, nearly a 2-1 plurality of Americans approved of the media conglomerate’s decision.¹⁹ Although no polls shedding light on the specific nature of Americans’ disapproval have been conducted, it would appear that many Ameri-

cans distrust Al Jazeera America either because they fail to differentiate the channel from Al Jazeera Arabic – which they continue to perceive as the de facto mouthpiece of Al Qaeda and other militant strains of Islam – or because they object to the ownership of the entire Al Jazeera franchise by the Emir of Qatar. These two justifications are often raised in tandem, resulting in a fairly hegemonic – and frequently xenophobic – block of opposition to the fledgling channel.

In order to clarify this paper's analysis and theoretical boundaries, the following sections briefly outline three analytic perspectives that help explain the mass mobilization of antipathy towards Al Jazeera America. The first perspective is national security. Since September 11, 2001, American government officials have played a pivotal role in positing the negative influence of Al Jazeera on United States' military power overseas. In 2003, for instance, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz accused Al Jazeera of "endangering the lives of American troops," and in 2004, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed that Al Jazeera had "damaged U.S. initiatives in the Middle East."²⁰ These proclamations, along with more contemporary worries that the Qatari regime boasts "terrorist ties" with clerics who call "for the murder of U.S. soldiers," has led many Americans to believe that Al Jazeera America – as an "extension" of Al Jazeera Arabic and the purported propaganda arm of Qatar – threatens U.S. national security interests.²¹ A second and interrelated perspective is public discourse. In addition to airing their criticisms of Al Jazeera's impact on U.S. defense personnel, American media outlets have also

broadcast their own, editorialized stances on Al Jazeera. In doing so, they have contributed to a black-and-white perception of Arab media in the public sphere. Edward Said sums up the current situation perfectly when he concludes "What we have...is a series of crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world presented in such a way as to make that world vulnerable to military aggression."²² In this context, both Bill O'Reilly's branding of Al Jazeera as a "terrorist outfit" and Glenn Beck's assertion that the mission of Al Jazeera is to protect and promote Sharia law reflect a larger trend in modern media: the simplification and sensationalization of news. Because so few Americans – less than 13,000 a day – are watching Al Jazeera America, these second-hand perspectives are particularly powerful and, in Al Jazeera America's case, destructive.²³ The third and final analytic perspective is globalization. One of the primary scholarly reflections on the Al Jazeera media empire is that, as a transnational news network, Al Jazeera has challenged the global North's long-standing cultural dominance in news flows, contributing to a "gradual deterritorialization" of the public sphere.²⁴ This paper proposes that one interpretation of Americans' distrust of Al Jazeera America is that Americans have come to see the news channel as an agent of globalization and, thus, an existential threat to their identity and culture.²⁵ The seemingly innocuous question that journalist Diana West uses to begin her column, "What does Al-Jazeera have to do with America?" can thus be interpreted as troubling evidence of what cultural theorist Stuart Hall calls "a regression to a very defensive and highly dangerous form of national identity."²⁶ Using these perspectives as an abstract framework

*MANY AMERICANS DISTRUST
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FLEDGLING CHANNEL.*

following section turns to a description of the tactics used by Al Jazeera America to seek to win over its seemingly implacable American audience. These tactics can be divided into four strategic areas: entry, principles, content, and branding.

Due to preexisting prejudices against the news network, Al Jazeera was forced to “break into” the American media by purchasing rather than “earning” entry in the cable television market. Soon after launching Al Jazeera English, international media directors at the Al Jazeera Media Network began looking towards the United States as a potential market. Attempts to court the country’s largest media providers – Comcast, AT&T, and Time Warner Cable amongst them – proved unsuccessful because media executives were unwilling to believe Americans wouldn’t click past what many regarded as a “terror network.”²⁷ At the end of 2012, only two cities – Toledo, OH and Burlington, VT – offered Al Jazeera English via cable television²⁸. So Al Jazeera changed tactics; in January 2013, the network announced its purchase of Current TV, a floundering news channel co-founded by former Vice President Al Gore, for \$500 million. The purchase would effectively allow Al Jazeera to replace the content on Current TV with its own programming, a new channel it named “Al Jazeera America,” thus circumventing the protests of cable providers that were bound by contract to continue

distributing Current TV to the roughly 48 million homes already subscribed to the channel. When AT&T and Time Warner Cable announced their intention to drop the new channel, citing “breaches of contract,” Al Jazeera America responded by threatening to sue the cable providers. The media conglomerates and Al Jazeera have since resolved their differences, and the news network is now available in 55 million American homes²⁹. In order to win American hearts and minds, it was first necessary for Al Jazeera America to get a foot in the door. The strategic maneuvers necessary to achieve this objective speak to the seriousness of the political obstacles hindering the channel’s expansion in the United States.

Immediately after announcing their purchase of Current TV, Al Jazeera went to work, strategically highlighting how the network’s impeccable journalistic principles would distinguish it from its American competitors and render it a beacon to other U.S. news outlets. In an ironic twist, the Qatari-based network has described itself as a revival of serious objective journalism grounded in fact and expertise, rather than in sensationalism and punditry. Turning the Western news media’s assumption of the network’s ideological radicalism on its head, Al Jazeera America has made it their mission to, in essence, beat U.S. news outlets at their own game. “Al Jazeera is coming to America to supply old-fashioned, boots-on-the-

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ground coverage to a country that doesn't have enough of it,” Al Jazeera America CEO Ehab Al Shihabi has proclaimed, pledging “there will be less opinion, less yelling and fewer celebrity sightings.”³⁰ Media gurus have, accordingly, rewarded Al Jazeera America with high praise. Leading up to the channel's launch in the summer of 2013, journalists peppered the network with compliments. Headlines on front pages across the nation read: “Al Jazeera America promises a more sober look at the news,” “Welcome, Al Jazeera America,” and “Al Jazeera aspires higher than cable competitors.”³¹ Excited about the prospect of a news channel actually putting its principles into practice, political and media elites – like Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel and Michigan senator Carl Levin – rushed to bestow their seal of approval on the rookie network³². Al Jazeera America's most successful “ingratiation strategy” to date thus appears to be its public insistence that it will maintain higher standards of journalistic integrity and expertise than its homegrown American counterparts.

In the meantime, Al Jazeera America has also comprehensively retooled its content and staff to suit its domestic audience. Initially, Al Jazeera America executives stated that the channel would be international in scope, with 60% of its news programming coming from the United States and the remaining 40% coming from Al Jazeera

English³³. A few months before the channel's launch, however, network executives announced that they had scrapped their previous plan, and now intended for virtually all of the channel's programming to come from within the United States³⁴. Additionally, in the months leading up to Al Jazeera America's first broadcast, the network chose to hire veteran American staffers from well-known U.S. news outlets like CNN, CBS, and ABC. Their intent, explained Al Jazeera executive producer Bob Wheelock, was to ensure the network could “broadcast stories about Americans by Americans.”³⁵ And in choosing where to position their twelve regional bureaus, Al Jazeera America deputy launch director Paul Eedle explains, locations like Detroit and Nashville were chosen because, “We were looking for heartland locations.”³⁶ These decisions make clear that Al Jazeera America intends to “build an American channel for an American audience.”³⁷ What is less clear is whether Al Jazeera will simultaneously be able to “Americanize” while maintaining its distinct identity as an internationally renowned purveyor of high-quality, hard-hitting news. Although network executives gush that they hope to operate much like CNN – without being as sensational – and Fox News – without being as opinion-driven – a recent study from the Pew Research Center suggests that, in its most recent coverage, Al Jazeera America's reporting differed little from its competitors' broadcasts³⁸.

IN SPITE OF ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN AN OBJECTIVE REPORTING FRONT, AL JAZEERA IS SOMETIMES CRITICIZED FOR FAILING TO DO SO.



“Americanization,” in content and tone as well as in name, thus functions as Al Jazeera America’s central strategy.

Alongside shifts in its content and staff, Al Jazeera America executives have launched a massive marketing effort to publicly rebrand “Al Jazeera” in the hopes of making the network more attractive to Americans. “Everyone acknowledges, all the way up to the top, that there’s a tremendous branding and image cliff to climb among a certain audience segment,” admits Al Jazeera America correspondent Paul Beban³⁹. To accomplish this daunting task, the network has hired well-established lobbying and consulting firms like Qorvis Communications, Siegel & Gale, ASKG Public Strategies, and DLA Piper to represent the network’s interests in the nation’s capital and advise the network on its media relations. Their goal is to convince both politicians and plebians alike of Al Jazeera America’s “Americanism.” These attempts to solve Al Jazeera America’s “perception problem,” however, have met with internal opposition from some employees. They feel that pressure from corporate advisers has already forced Al Jazeera America to compromise its mission. Glenn Greenwald of The Guardian laments that, rather than embracing the “traditional attributes that have made Al Jazeera...an intrepid and fearless news organization,” Al Jazeera America has caved to its consultants and instead

replicated the “inoffensive, neutered, voiceless, pro-US-government model...as a way of appeasing negative perceptions associated with the Al Jazeera brand in the US.”⁴⁰ Greenwald argues that the rebranding efforts of Al Jazeera America have done little but rob the channel of its vibrancy and edginess. He quotes Al Jazeera journalist Marwan Bishara to drive home his point: “How we have moved,” Bishara seethes, “from the main idea that the strength of Al Jazeera lies in diversity [and] plurality.”⁴¹ In order to distance itself from Al Jazeera’s flagship branch as well as Al Jazeera English, Al Jazeera America appears to be relying on corporate sponsors to enhance its public image as “American through and through.”⁴²

Because Al Jazeera in many ways represents to Americans “the culture, the perspectives and the news-editorial style of the entire [Arab] region”—a broad list of associations to which religion can also be added—it is tempting to describe the public opinion obstacles faced by Al Jazeera America as somehow prototypical, or at least illustrative, of the social and political challenges faced by American Muslims since September 11, 2001⁴³. This observation begs the following question: are the adaptive strategies Al Jazeera America has employed to overcome negative perceptions representative of the everyday tactics used by millions of American Muslims to win greater recognition and respect from their fellow

IN AN IRONIC TWIST, THE QATARI-BASED NETWORK HAS DESCRIBED ITSELF AS A REVIVAL OF SERIOUS OBJECTIVE JOURNALISM GROUNDED IN FACT AND EXPERTISE, RATHER THAN IN SENSATIONALISM AND PUNDITRY.

IN THIS CONTEXT, THE MOSQUE ACROSS THE STREET—A SYMPTOM OF THE TRANSNATIONAL SPREAD OF CULTURES, VALUES, AND PEOPLES—INDICATED NOT DIVERSITY, BUT CRIMINALITY.

Americans? In other words, can Al Jazeera America and American Muslims solve their common “perception problem” the same way? To answer this question, the following section turns to a comparative description of the biases faced by Muslims living in contemporary America.

In the post-9/11 world, both Al Jazeera America and American Muslims have borne the weight of the American mainstream’s distrust and disapproval. Since the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers, Muslims have endured hostility from many different corners of American public life. They have been labeled “the enemy within” by political pundits and conservative commentators, targeted in President George W. Bush’s demonizing “crusades-talks,” and attacked by the perpetrators of hate crimes⁴⁴. The disapprobation directed towards American Muslims can also be diagrammed along the three analytic axes of national security, public discourse, and globalization. To begin, federally mandated racial-religious profiling and raids on “extremist” mosques effectively implied to the American people that the Muslims who lived next door could potentially be “enemies of the state” intent on destroying the American way of life. After the 9/11 attacks, conditions of acute insecurity and fear contributed to increasing xenophobia and intolerance towards American Muslims.⁴⁵ Many – but not all – U.S. news outlets upped their vitriol, spreading damning stereotypes and misinformation

that equated Islamism with Arabism with terrorism. During this time, public discourse demonstrated an increased tendency to essentialize and isolate American Muslims by drawing upon existing narratives of “otherness” that sometimes went so far as to portray Muslims as “anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, [and] anti-rational.”⁴⁶ “No other world religion,” writes Karen Leonard, “has ever been attacked and rendered evil in the history of America.”⁴⁷ Finally, the antipathy for American Muslims that escalated after 9/11 continued to reflect certain realities of globalization. In the period of “existential insecurity” following the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, the news media contributed to the perception that American Muslims were “drowning out, washing out, or overpowering American citizens, and thus representing a threat to the American way of life.”⁴⁸ In this context, the mosque across the street—a symptom of the transnational spread of cultures, values, and peoples—indicated not diversity, but criminality. A 2008 public opinion poll in the Los Angeles Times serves as a fitting conclusion: the majority of Americans (66%) admit to having “at least some” prejudice against Muslims, one in five say they have “a great deal” of prejudice against Muslims, almost half do not believe American Muslims are “loyal” to this country, and one in four “do not want a Muslim as a neighbor.”⁴⁹ Clearly, American Muslims are suffering from an “image problem” that mirrors the negative perceptions



AL JAZEERA ARABIC'S HEADQUARTERS IN DOHA, QATAR.

Americans have of Al Jazeera.

In addition to facing similar obstacles in the realm of public opinion, Al Jazeera America and American Muslims also have the same abstract goal: “voice.” Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani directs the growth of his media empire not for profit, but rather to increase Qatar’s “soft power.”⁵⁰ By enhancing the size and credibility of the Al Jazeera Media Network – even if the expansion produces a financial loss – the Emir of Qatar stands to increase the relative “voice” Qatar can leverage on the global stage.⁵¹ Abstractly, American Muslims’ goal is also “voice.” As a minority population in a democratic polity, American Muslims are inherently at a greater risk of suffering political alienation, defined here as a sense of “powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement” derived primarily from an individual and collective inability to be heard and acknowledged in the majoritarian political processes.⁵² Achieving “voice” in a political system has both tangible and intangible benefits: it increases the likelihood that a government will pass policies responsive to the needs of the minority group, and it also enhances the sense of belonging minorities feel in their communities. To the extent that Al Jazeera America and American Muslims find that the accusations of anti-American sentiment lodged against them hinder the strength of their respective “voices,”

both entities will have powerful incentives to rectify the deficit.

Although Al Jazeera America and American Muslims face similar obstacles in the realm of public opinion and have the same abstract aim, this paper argues that because Al Jazeera America and American Muslims operate under very different procedural constraints for achieving their strategic goals, it would be unwise to assume their respective responses to prejudice are equivalent. Differences in these procedural restraints condition how Al Jazeera America and American Muslims attempt to acquire recognition and respect in the public sphere. Taking a certain level of “existential insecurity” in the American public as a given, this paper proposes that for groups distrusted in the public sphere, voice – which I define loosely as “popularity” – can only be amplified at the expense of principle (as long as that principle is the source of the “existential insecurity” at hand). Analysis of Al Jazeera America’s strategic responses to rectify their “perception problem” support this interpretation. In order to increase the network’s “popularity” and thus enhance its soft power, executives at Al Jazeera America have compromised on multiple aspects of its identity that might have risked the American public perceiving the network as having “terrorist ties.” Therefore, although the channel still “uses the well-known Al Jazeera logo,” Al Jazeera America

TO THE EXTENT THAT AL JAZEERA AMERICA AND AMERICAN MUSLIMS FIND THAT THE ACCUSATIONS OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT LODGED AGAINST THEM HINDER THE STRENGTH OF THEIR RESPECTIVE "VOICES," BOTH ENTITIES WILL HAVE POWERFUL INCENTIVES TO RECTIFY THE DEFICIT.

THIS OBSERVATION BEGS THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: CAN AL JAZEERA AMERICA AND AMERICAN MUSLIMS SOLVE THEIR COMMON "PERCEPTION PROBLEM" THE SAME WAY?

has distanced itself from its English and Arabic sister and parent networks and substantially altered its staff and content to reflect a relatively unquestioning American worldview.⁵³ Al Jazeera America, one insider noted, has lost the struggle for its identity; rather than operating as its own unique "critical movement that could speak for millions of people," the outfit is now essentially an imitation of mainstream U.S. news networks like MSNBC and CNN.⁵⁴

Given this, it can be seen that the most important difference between Al Jazeera America and American Muslims – what renders moot a comparison of the entities' strategic responses to prejudice – is that American Muslims are on the whole unwilling to compromise their principles – a key facet of their collective identity – to achieve popularity. While there must inevitably be exceptions to this rule, the enhanced rather than depressed expression of Muslim identity after September 11, 2001 provides evidence for

this claim. After 9/11, one might have reasonably expected American Muslims to respond to the public's "existential insecurity" by compromising on their "principles" and seeking to increase their relative assimilation in mainstream society. On the contrary, Lori Peek reports that during this period most Muslims "continued to publicly affirm their religious identities. Indeed, many participants reported that their religious identity became even stronger during this time."⁵⁵ Although American Muslims would like to amplify their influence in the public sphere, they are largely unwilling to compromise on certain facets of their identity and tenets of their beliefs to increase their "voice". And while many American Muslims are well integrated into American society, a post-9/11 renewed emphasis on Muslim identity demonstrates a dedication to principle over popularity. In contrast, Al Jazeera America appears to have dispensed quickly with some of its core principles in order to enhance its popularity, viewing this exchange as a favorable trade-off. For these reasons, it would



be

misguided to assume that the same strategic decisions made by Al Jazeera America to appeal to its American audiences might be applicable to the decision-making of American Muslims faced with similar public disapprobation.

*AL JAZEERA CHOOSES
TO COMBAT AMERICAN
SKEPTICISM BY CREATING
A PARTIAL COMPROMISE OF
ITS OWN IMAGE.*

In summary, this essay has outlined a brief history of the Al Jazeera Media Network and identified the conditions that produced its subject: Al Jazeera America. It employed three explanatory perspectives – national security, public discourse, and globalization – to analyze the American public’s skepticism and disapproval of Al Jazeera America. Based on existing literature about the rookie network, it identified four primary areas – entry, principles, content, and branding – in which Al Jazeera American has attempted to strategically combat its troublesome “image issues.” Finally, it engaged with a theoretical question: are the conciliatory strategies Al Jazeera America employs to overcome negative perceptions reflective of the everyday tactics used by American Muslims to address their own “perception problems”? It argued that while Al Jazeera America and American Muslims both aim to amplify their

“voice,” American Muslims are ultimately far less likely than the news network to compromise their principles for the sake of popularity. Therefore, Al Jazeera’s strategic responses to the “perception problem”, many of which are best characterized as assimilatory “identity concessions”, do not point towards viable solutions for American Muslims.

*AL JAZEERA AMERICA HAS
LOST THE STRUGGLE FOR
IT’S IDENTITY.*

A NEW COLD WAR?

EXPLAINING RUSSIA'S NEW
CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE WEST

AMBASSADOR MICHAEL McFAUL
STANFORD UNIVERSITY



What I want to do today is answer one really big question. If we have time maybe we'll get to the second question, but I want to answer one big question, because that's what we should do as academics. It comes from an experience I had right after I left government. I came home to Palo Alto, and one of my neighbors said, "Mike you should come over for lunch, we're interested in hearing about your experiences in Moscow." So I went over to lunch and we started talking, and my neighbor started telling some stories about his time in government. My neighbor is George Schultz.

George mentored me for three decades. Incredible career, fantastic person. Started telling me about his last two years in government. 1987, 1988: the

end of the Cold War. And he started to talk about this historic moment, the relationships he had with his counterpart in the Soviet Union: Edward Shevardnadze, Ronald Reagan, and Mikhail Gorbachev who was the leader of the Soviet Union, and he said "man we did some really good work in my last two years of government." And as I left, I thought to myself, "man what a disaster happened on my watch, my last two years of government." Because everything that George talked about, which we all thought, by the way, was going to be permanent. It's the end of history, it's the new era, it's the integration of Russia into the west. Suddenly, the last two years I was in government didn't seem so inevitable, on the contrary it represented the end of George's time. Think about the obvious facts about where we're at right now. Russia intervening in its neighborhood, annexing the territory, the United States portrayed as the enemy. I think we're up to 83% in terms of those who have a negative view of the United States.

To Putin, it's a zero sum struggle against the west, and it's not just about interests, but I would say it's about ideological things. And then our response also I think demonstrates that there's real sense of conflict, I won't go through the list: [Obama's U.N. Speech, Western Sanctions, NATO focused on Russia Threat again, Russia kicked out of G8, Debate of Arming Ukraine, Americans see Russia as enemy again, World (not just U.S.) views Russia

*STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS BASICALLY SAY
THAT INNATE FORCES MAKE HISTORY—
BALANCE OF POWER, CULTURE, GEOGRAPHY—
AND THAT INDIVIDUALS JUST REFLECT
THOSE BIGGER STRUCTURAL FORCES. THE
OTHER CARTOONIZATION IS THAT PEOPLE
MAKE HISTORY. THEY'RE SHAPED BY THESE
FORCES, BUT INDIVIDUALS MATTER.*

as threat]. Things were better in the Brezhnev era, I would even argue. I think you got to go deep into the Cold War to remember a time when there was so much confrontation between the United States and Russia. And I would argue as I do at the last bullet point here: Russia and the West.

So what happened? Why are we in this mess of learning? And I really do think this is a mess; a really serious one, a scary one. So what happened? That's all I want to do today. If you leave today with an understanding of my answer to that question, that's all I aspire to be, and I'm going to use a lot of ways to build the argument. My BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front) is that I'm going to veer to this third argument just so you know where I'm going. But I want to march you through these others to add force and to add explanation as to why I think. Ultimately, this is why I think this is about domestic politics in Russia. For the Social scientists in the room, you'll see that my argument starts with looking at what we call structural theories and then I move through different levels of analysis until I get to individuals. And just to be very simple about this, structural arguments basically say that innate forces make history—balance of power, culture, geography—and that individuals just reflect those bigger structural forces. The other cartoonization is that people make history. They're shaped by these forces, but individuals matter. Their ideas matter, and

that shapes history to a greater extent than these structures. Now of course, there's somewhere in the middle, that I'm going to really hone in to the point about the role that individuals play and why I don't think these structural arguments do not apply particularly to the Russian story. You're going to see that I really focus on change in Russia, not change in the United States. And I'm not just doing that because I'm an Obama hack, though I am. I worked for him for seven years actually. But I really do think that this story is mostly driven by what happens inside Russia, not inside our country.

So let's start with the first argument. This argument is about the nature of politics, that has to do with the balance of power in the international system [shows a time-lapse of Europe which begins with Kievan Rus]. This starts at 835 now, and we're scrolling through European history. What you're seeing is that the borders are changing, countries are getting powerful, and countries are getting weaker. And so one explanation for why you see Russia changing the borders in Russia right now is this. This is the history for international politics that is true for a thousand years. Why would it not be true in the year 2014? So the argument here applied to the current Russian intervention in Ukraine is that this is just the natural order of things. Russia was weak after the collapse of the USSR, it had this interim of weakness, but now Russia's back in this kind of normal way, like

OF COURSE NOT ALL COUNTRIES
RISE UP AND ACCUMULATE POWER
AND ATTACK THEIR NEIGHBORS.
THERE'S GOT TO BE MORE TO THE
STORY. WHY DID RUSSIA DO IT AT
THIS TIME?

you would expect. It is actually not a basket case country that you read twenty years ago, if you look at military capacity, or even economic capacity, Russia is not a super power, but a power, and is certainly rising in power, so we should expect these kinds of things to happen, when great powers rise up and press against weaker powers like Ukraine or Georgia or other countries in the neighborhood. So, I don't want to take on the burden of refuting those thousand years of history. What I'm about to say about Russia and other countries is not to say that I have one theory that explains all countries at all times. But, I have some problems applying that theory to the Russia that I knew, and the Russia that I worked with while at the White House and as ambassador.

First thing is of course not all countries rise up and accumulate power and attack their neighbors. There's got to be more to the story. Why did Russia do it at this time? Second one is counterfactual. Twenty years ago, one could imagine a more democratic Russia might have behaved differently. I want to focus on the third one. Does anyone remember Putin's speech, when he had to bring in all ethnic Russians from other countries and bring them into the Russian Federation? This is a trick question. He didn't give it in 2012, or 2002, or 2013. That's the point I want to make. He wasn't focused on that. He wasn't talking about the necessity for a great power to accumulate new

power and to bring in folks, [like] European leaders in the 20th century, before they came into power, that's not what Putin was talking about when I was ambassador. In fact, when I was ambassador, the most important foreign policy objective for Putin was probably something nobody has ever heard. Nobody was writing about it, nobody was thinking about it. It was the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union. Putin's response to the EU? He wanted to bring together all of the countries of the former Soviet Union into this economic union to balance the EU. Now some would say it's coercive, some would say it's not. That is not important to me. What was clear was that it was the focus of Putin's foreign policy. Not Iran by the way, not Syria, this was [the] big baby, this was his big project. To make it work, he wanted all of Ukraine, not just Crimea, all of Ukrainians to join the Eurasian Economic Union. Know why? Well, the other countries in the Union, Belarus and Kazakhstan, pretty small countries and small populations. Ukraine was the big prize in terms of having enough critical mass to lift off. Part of it by the way, is there's 40 million-plus consumers in Ukraine. And those consumers are actually some of the few consumers in the world who consume Russian products. They're [Russia's] not very good at that [producing], but there's one place in the world that'll buy made-in-Russia products; it's the Ukraine.

And therefore, Putin was ready to fight hard to get them in. In fact, in the struggle, In the EU and their accession agreement to Yanukovich, he [Putin] put on the table 15 billion dollars as an incentive for Yanukovich to join the union. So that's what he was focused on, not invading Crimea, not putting troops and proxies in the Ukraine, so something else has to be added to this story, to have a complete understanding of why this conflict is in the year 2014.

Two other small footnotes to remind you that even in 2012, 2013, and in the beginning of 2014, Putin was not talking about us [U.S.] being supporters of Nazis in Ukraine and an enemy of Russia. That wasn't part of his lexicon at the time. And even in a few small ways, he was still trying to signal that he wanted Russia to have some kind of working relationship with the West. When I was ambassador for example he let out Mikhail Khodorkovsky from jail, he was a Russian billionaire. I think he was worth 40 billion when he was arrested. Spent 10 years and jail. Finally let him out. And I asked his very senior official in the Kremlin why did you let him out now. And he said, we want to have a better working relationship with you guys, it was for you. You the United States. He let out [Pussy Riot], again "as a gift," as one of my colleagues at the minister of foreign affairs said for us. For me, most spectacularly was this party, this most fantastic party that Putin threw. He spent 50 billion dollars on it allegedly. I was there too [Sochi]. I toured your [Athletes] Facilities. I can't compare Olympics I confess. But it was a pretty spectacular event, a lot of money spent, and the messaging of that event to me, as a keen consumer of the message, was this is not your Soviet Union. We're different. Russia's back, we're part of the world today, we're not separated like we were last time where some countries attended back in 1980. There were 10,000 of these Russians in these incredibly colorful outfits running around, mostly college students, fluent English, and their job was to make you feel that you were in a friendly place. And I took 200 photographs with various kids like that, the U.S. ambassador,

the nasty West[ern] representative. That was the feeling here. And really strikingly, if you watch the closing ceremonies, you may remember there was one episode where in the stadium they had these placards or drawings of their writers flip up. How many stadiums in the World could flip up 50 or 60 writers and everyone in the stadium knew who they were? Pretty impressive culture and history that they have. Two of them jumped out at me, Brodsky and Solzhenitsyn: Dissidents. This was to say, we're reclaiming these people. We're back. This is for everybody for us to say this is not the Soviet Union. So why do you put in all that money and put on a show and a week later invade Crimea? There is something more we have to add.

Alright, second explanation: It's all our fault. This is popular in Moscow, in some circles in Washington, and most certainly some people in Ithaca that think this. Let me unpack two different arguments about U.S. policy, one of which, it's important to understand, is at least part of the explanation. I meant to say it on the first piece, it is a necessary condition that Russian power, this growing power, to the explanation. It's an important part of the story that Russia has new capability, but what I'm trying to get at is where does the intention come from to use that capability? Likewise, I would say that the U.S. policy story is part, at least of the post-facto narrative. And there's the standard arguments you'll hear Russian leaders make of U.S. foreign policy pushing on Russia to make democracy, doom markets, expand NATO and bomb Serbia, and invade Iraq, overthrow country's leaders that are friendly to Russia and we [did] the same thing in the Arab Spring, and in the Ukraine and Russia. That's the basic narrative today, to why finally Putin had to push back. He had to push back and reassert Russia and that's why you see what we see today in Ukraine. In other words, [because of] the expansion of NATO, Putin had to invade the Ukraine. I want to be clear, there's something to this narrative, and in fact I quote myself here.

"Failure [by the West] to embrace and defend the

PUTIN GREETS GÉRARD DEPARDIEU,
A FRENCH CITIZEN AND STAUNCH
SUPPORTER, DURING SOCHI.



upstart leadership [after the fall of Gorbachev] would provide the real opportunity for a counter-revolutionary backlash. If economic decline and civil strife were to continue under a new regime, calls for order and tradition flavored with nationalist slogans will resonate with a suffering people. At this future but avoidable stage in the drama of the Soviet revolution, the specter of dictatorship will be real.” (Dated August 19th 1990).

I was worried about this. I was worried that we weren’t going to help the transition enough. I was worried that we weren’t going to see that this was a pro-Western revolution and that we would be stuck in our Cold War ways and that there would be a reaction to it, just because we wouldn’t do enough. There was reason to be worried about that. I want to be clear, you understand, that I felt that way in real time about these debates including the debate about NATO expansion by the way. But there’s a problem with that explanation. And that’s something called the Reset. For better or for ill, I was the architect of the Reset or part of the team. We did this thing called the Reset and the essence of it’s pretty simple. We [Obama administration] came in to power, we won November of 2008, we had a transition period, we reviewed all of the policies, as every administration I’m sure does. I was in charge of the policy review for Russia. And as we walked through President-Elect Obama,

our thinking and our explanation for why U.S.-Russian relations were as difficult as they were back then (remember that the Russians had just gone into Georgia August of that same year), he kind of looked at all this and said “I just don’t get it. Why does Russia want Iran to have a nuclear weapon? Why does Russia want Al Qaeda to win in Afghanistan? Why does Russia not want to reduce our nuclear arsenals?” In other words, he marched through the big issues we later tackled for the next three or four years, and for him, leaving aside history and leaving aside personality, and just thinking about our national interests, he saw that there was more overlap in our interests, our security and economic interests, than confrontation, if we just looked at things from a dispassionate, rational, and with a fresh look.

And in particular, he had this fondness back then about win-win outcomes in international outcomes between states. Not zero sum, but if we work together we can achieve outcomes that are good for your country, and good for ours. And if you look at some of his early speeches about Russia, you’ll see that he used this quite a bit. And we got some stuff done. We got some pretty big stuff done. This [Picture of Obama and Medvedev] is in Prague, the signing of the new START Treaty, we got rid of 30% of nuclear weapons in our arsenals. We haven’t finished yet, but we were on our way. We got done what we called the Northern Distribution

THESE ARE CORE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AT THIS TIME, AND ON ALL OF THEM, RUSSIA WAS OUR PARTNER, NOT OUR ENEMY, NOT OUR COMPETITOR.

I WANT TO STRESS FOR YOU THAT THESE ARE NOT MARGINAL SYMBOLIC GESTURES.

Network: This is a supply network that goes to Afghanistan, part of which goes through Russia, through planes through trains, through trucks to supply our troops and other personnel fighting the war in Afghanistan. When we came to power, this [Northern Distribution Network] was just getting started, maybe 2% or 3%. By the time I left the White House this was over 50% of our supplies, including flying U.S. soldiers through Russian airspace. That hadn't happened since World War II. And suddenly, in this moment of the Reset, you had this cooperation against a common enemy in Afghanistan. By the way, that may not seem that important to you, there may be a lot of ways to get to Afghanistan, actually in 2009, over 90% of our supplies went through the Southern route through Pakistan. And you may recall, we were increasing our operations in Pakistan, some pretty hostile operations, including one very famous one against Osama Bin Laden. And we worried that if we did that, if we violated their sovereignty, the government of Pakistan was likely to close those supply routes, and we were right about that. They did, that's exactly what they did. But when they did it, they closed it at 45% levels rather than at the 90-95% levels that they were at. We [UNSC] put the harshest sanctions on Iran ever. That was primarily because of our cooperation with the United States and Russia.

And then dogs that didn't bark are also worth

remembering in this period. The Kyrgyzstani revolution that happened in 2010, there were 100 people who died, the regime fell, 300 people fled into Uzbekistan, on the verge of what we feared was going to be an ethnic civil war in Kyrgyzstan. I was still at the National Security Council at the time [and] without question it was the scariest period of my time in the U.S. government, because I worried that we were about to witness genocide and have very few means to try to stop it. But that worst-case scenario never happened because working with the Russians, the President called Medvedev and said it is not in our national interest for civil war in Kyrgyzstan and we had this base, the Manas air base renamed the Manas Transit center. We had some vital interests there, they had them, the story is a long one, but the essence of the story [is that] we managed that and the nightmare scenario never happened. I took some time on these things, because I want to stress for you that these are not marginal symbolic gestures we were doing with Russia. We weren't just holding hands and singing Kumbaya and talking about peace and understanding. These are core national security concerns for the United States of America at this time, and on all of them, Russia was our partner, not our enemy, not our competitor.

These were really big things. [Slides move on to show U.S. and Russian paratroopers training together]. Here are U.S. and Russian Paratroopers



IN 2001, BUSH CALLED PUTIN
“STRAIGHTFORWARD” AND
“TRUSTWORTHY,” BUT THEIR
RELATIONS DETERIORATED EVEN
AS THEIR TERMS IN OFFICE
PROGRESSED.

stuff done. We got a bunch of things done; we got them into the WTO, the PNTR (the Permanent Normalized Trade Relations with Russia), new Visa Regime. We had momentum even on the economic story, its modest, but moving in the right direction. Increased travel, I fought hard with homeland security and other agencies that get nervous with too many Russians in our country. We liberalized the visa regime and the numbers went the right way. This is just [Graph of opinion polls] Russian attitudes towards the United States and after hitting 17% after the Russian-Georgian war, at the peak of the Reset 60% of Russians had a positive view of the United States. And by the way, same thing in our country, over 60% of you all [Americans] had a positive view of Russia just 4 years ago. All of that happened after these events, after NATO expansion, after the Iraq War, after the Orange Revolution. So for me, you can't explain this or this [charts of opinion polls] by citing these factors. All that stuff happened, it was real. Believe me I was there and it felt genuinely that we were creating a different kind of cooperative relationship with Russia. All of that stuff, the Reset happened after the earlier events. So there's got to be something else to explain how we got to where we got. Now there's another argument of course, in the spirit of its all the west's fault, and that Obama's weak. Obama created the permissive conditions for Putin to go into Ukraine; he didn't deter Putin enough. This is what happens when

you have a weak leader in the White House. This is a little bit of an unfair quote. This is from the speaker of the house:

“When you look at this chaos that's going on, does anybody think that Vladimir Putin would have gone to Crimea had George W. Bush been president of the United States? No! Even Putin is smart enough to know that Bush would have punched him in the nose in about 10 seconds.”

That captures that argument. People say a lot of silly things before elections so let's give him a break, but just to remind you why I think that's a silly argument; first we did push back, but the second thing is that every time leaders in the Kremlin thought about using force in Eastern Europe, they talked about the American factor. In fact, I thought about this: so when I was in the White house, we would have these discussions about Iran or North Korea or Libya or Syria and at some point in the conversation, the President would turn to me and say “well what are the Russians going to do about this, what do the Russians think?”

There must be an equivalent in the Kremlin, let's call him Ivan Ivanovich. Every time Russia gets ready to use force in Eastern Europe, Brezhnev or Krushchev or Putin turns to Ivan Ivanovich, and asks “well what are the Americans going to do Ivan Ivanovich?” and the answer every time

*PUTIN SEES THE WORLD IN ZERO SUM TERMS; MEDVEDEV
SEES THE WORLD IN WIN-WIN TERMS.*

*OBAMA AND MEDVEDEV
FORMED A FRIENDLY
RELATIONSHIP EARLY IN
OBAMA'S PRESIDENCY.*



is: nothing. We haven't in all these historic times. Even Ronald Reagan hasn't been able to deter the crackdown against solidarity in 1981, I don't think anyone would accuse Ronald Reagan of being weak against the communists. I think the patterns [are] pretty clear. What's interesting about the pattern is not about our ability to deter aggression, and I would argue, and now I'm going to provoke you, that if you compare all of these cases [Bush with Georgia, Reagan with Poland, Johnson with Czechoslovakia, Eisenhower with Hungary, Obama with Ukraine, Barack Obama's response to Ukraine looks most like Ronald Reagan. Do you know how many Russians went on the sanctions list when Russia invaded Georgia? Zero. How many Russian companies? Zero. Even non-lethal assistance sent to the Ukrainians is already quite substantial. So I don't think the "Obama's weak" [argument] is that compelling, but I'm biased so I accept that.

So we've talked about the balance of the international system and Russia as a rising power. We've talked about U.S. policy and most certainly some of those elements of that U.S. Policy help the post-facto explanation that Putin provides for what Russia is doing right now. But as I talked about, there were these other moments in U.S.-Russia relations. There must be something else after this Reset period that helps us understand how we got into the mess we're in. And in my

view, it really does focus mostly in on Russian domestic politics. So I want to focus on two big changes. There are many more, but the first one is Putin to Medvedev. I remember this day very vividly: I was still in Washington, I had already been nominated, I was going through the process [of becoming ambassador] and a couple of days later, the president pulled me back and said, "Well what do you think of this?" And I said, "Well you've developed a relationship with Medvedev," and they had a pretty good working relationship, "but remember Putin's always been the big dog, always been the big decision maker." That was our analysis in government [and] I always thought that academics thought this as well: Medvedev's just the puppet right? There should be continuity. By the way, the Russians were also communicated this message of continuity at this time.

Turns out we were wrong about that. And it turns out we were wrong in thinking about Medvedev as doing only what Putin wanted. Because it turned out with more of our interaction with Putin, that they have different worldviews. Putin sees the world in zero sum terms; Medvedev sees the world in win-win terms. Putin saw the United States as a competitor, Medvedev saw the United States as a partner. And perhaps most problematic for us, as you'll see later, the United States for Putin uses its power to overthrow regimes that it doesn't like. [There is] a lot of empirical data to support that

*I THINK IN RETROSPECT, WE UNDERESTIMATED
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THESE TWO
GENTLEMEN*

*[THE PEOPLE] MOVED FROM INITIALLY JUST
PROTESTING THE VOTE AND EVENTUALLY...
THE ENTIRE RUSSIAN REGIME.*

hypothesis if you look over the last seven years. And he therefore has this paranoia, especially about the CIA, he's really fixated on the CIA. And he thinks that this is what the United States does irrespective of whether that president is Bush or Obama.

Obama, by the way, tried to one time push back on this analysis as Putin went through this litany of regime change. As he of course went through Iraq as well, when he got the chance he said, "Hey, you and I are on the same boat on that, Mr. President." Putin kind of implied [that] the military industrial complex runs your country anyway, you guys [presidents] come and go, but this continues in the tradition of U.S. foreign policy. So that challenges this vision of win-win outcomes. And I think in retrospect, we underestimated the differences between these two gentlemen [Medvedev and Putin]. I think we underestimated how far in Medvedev had leaned to make the Reset work.

Second thing. In between this announcement in 2011 [Putin's declaration to run for the presidency] and this election in March of 2012, there was a parliamentary election in Russia in December of 2011. By my estimates and our estimates as a government, it was stolen—falsified at the levels of previous elections. No big deal. It's the way Russian elections are. We've got our analysts inside the government and outside the government. This is normal falsification, nothing extraordinary. But between this election and the last one, something's changed in society. People got richer, people began thinking about their rights a little bit more, and technology helped. You had smartphones, V Kontakte, Facebook,

Twitter. And so this time, when this falsification happened, it got discovered, it got documented, it moved around the internet in the rapid way, and some folks—the urban rich educated folks, not everybody— but those folks [picture of Volodnaya square], they decided that they were going to protest this election, they said, "We don't like our votes being stolen," and they whipped themselves up and they moved from initially just protesting the vote and eventually to protesting the entire regime, the entire Russian regime.

Putin didn't like it. I heard him say, "These people, I made them rich. I'm the guy who turned Russia around. That Yeltsin guy brought the economic disaster, I'm the one that made them rich, how could they turn on me now?" The second response was how to deal with these protests, how to respond, and how to come up with a new argument for first the campaign, but then to come up with an argument for legitimacy; for Putin to just be in power. The economy wasn't growing in the way it was his first 8 years, and he was entering his third term. And so they debated it. It was not inevitable, but Putin decided that they needed to crackdown on these folks, and, as part of the crackdown and as part of the argument towards his electoral base, to resurrect the U.S. as an enemy, as the force that was creating this. Just like in Serbia, Ukraine in 2004, just like in the Arab spring, the United States was coming in and organizing this. And that was the argument that Putin was beginning to sell.

Over time, we learned that it wasn't just electoral politics; it was here to stay. I then became a part of it. Because of some of the things I've written as an academic, they cut and pasted some of things I've

*McFAUL WORKED AS
AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA FROM
2012 THROUGH FEBRUARY OF
2014.*



written to argue the fact that I was sent by President Obama to foment regime change in Russia. That was my assignment. Nevalny, one of the opposition leaders, he was my project. They even said one time that McFaul sent Nevalny to Yale for six months to get his revolutionary training. And I tweeted back, why would a Stanford guy send somebody to Yale?

But this was the new Russia. They put out a calendar: “McFaul Girls,” and every month had a different opposition leader in it—both in Russian and English by the way. This is a poster [poster with various opposition leaders] from the May 6th demonstration of 2012, one that actually turned violent and some of [whom] were arrested and [are] still in jail today. This just says the political circus is coming back to the arena. I’m called the artistic director. This other woman is Sobchak who announced that she was fleeing Russia at the advice of the FSB, which is the successor organization to the KGB, for fears that she’ll be assassinated. [Next picture is a Photoshop with Mcfaul’s face as a Nevalney supporter]. He ran for mayor when I was ambassador, won almost a quarter of the vote with almost no resources [and] no access to television. I’m photoshopped here. [Shows cartoon of him training the Russian opposition and association with Nazis]. Okay so you get the feel, those kinds of arguments about us being the enemy, supporting the opposition, all of

those domestic problems are caused by us. Make us the enemy, that’s how you mobilize the people. [Shows a picture of Obama being compared with the leader of ISIS]. Last piece on this, this is more recent, this is after Ukraine, but just to give you flavor for what’s on TV these days, this is their main talk show [Rossiya-1]. It is the equivalent of 60 minutes. This is comparing Barack Obama to the leader of ISIS. [Comparison includes disrespect for the rights of others, willingness to kill without trial, aggression, intolerance, messianism]. That’s where Putin decided to go.

Last two things I wanted to say. One, this was not inevitable, in my opinion. For my argument to work, leaders have to have choices, have to have options, and I would just remind you that President Medvedev, in response to the same demonstrations, had a different approach. [Shows picture of Medvedev meeting with officials] Here he is meeting with Boris Nemsov, and Udaltsov. This meeting took place out at Medvedev’s Dacha, and it was his attempt to negotiate a path to political reform moving forward.

By the way, the only time I ever met the opposition was in the cloakroom of Medvedev’s Dacha that day. I was coming into a meeting with the president and these guys were coming out grabbing their coats, they all freaked out when they saw me, especially Udaltsov who was not a

I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT THERE WAS AN ALTERNATIVE PATH. IT WAS NOT INEVITABLE THAT THE LEADER OF RUSSIA WOULD TAKE THE COURSE THAT PUTIN CHOSE.

I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE SUPPORTED A PACTED TRANSITION; WE SUPPORTED A NEGOTIATION BETWEEN YANUKOVICH AND THE OPPOSITION.

big fan of the United States. I think it's important to remember that there was an alternative path. It was not inevitable that the leader of Russia would take the course that Putin chose. And yet, even up to the events that happened in Ukraine, I would say that Putin was still struggling with these dual impulses. On the one hand, he thought we were

fomenting revolution. On the other, he thought that the Exxon Mobile Rosneft deal, allegedly for 500 billion dollars, was the most important event in U.S.-Russian relations. He told us one day that he deliberately chose an American company to build this kind of bridge with the United States.



It wasn't inevitable, he had this argument that he was developing, he had this suspicion about us, we stopped cooperating on a lot of things, but even up until February these dual impulses were in play; in fact I saw them in our interactions with him, including, very famously, when he and President Obama sat down in September 2013 and cut this deal to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria. Then the last straw that broke the camel's back was of course the fall of government in Kiev in February of last year [2014].

I want to make it clear that we supported a pact transition; we supported a negotiation between Yanukovich and the opposition. We didn't like it; Yanukovich had just killed 100 people. We debated it but we decided at the end of the day that that was a better outcome for both the stability in Ukraine and for our interests with respect to our relationship with Ukraine and Russia. And we worked it, we worked it hard. I think the Vice President called Yanukovich a dozen times to sit down and negotiate a deal with the opposition. When he did it I was in Sochi, we all did our high

VIKTOR YANUKOVICH WAS REMOVED FROM POWER IN THE SAME MONTH THAT McFAUL RESIGNED FROM OFFICE.


fives, we thought it was a breakthrough, and a few hours later Yanukovich left. He went to Kharkov and then to Crimea, and then he ended up in Rostov. I to this day do not totally understand why he left the way he did. He said his life was in danger, Putin's now said that, but his life was in danger in Kharkov or Crimea that was not our reading of this situation at all. So it's a little mysterious to why he left the way he did. But it wasn't portrayed mysteriously for Putin. For Putin, this was the CIA again. We double-crossed him. This was a giant smokescreen—this negotiating with him. This was another case in which the United States was fomenting regime change on his neighborhood. So he struck back. That's when he went into Crimea; he decided to support these fighters in Eastern Ukraine.

*THE DECADENT WEST IS A
BIG MESSAGE BACK HOME.*

So I'll end with good news and bad news. The good news is that, if you buy my argument, is that this is not some master design by Putin. I don't see that evidence. I think that he's overrated as a grand strategist. This was tactical and emotional, not strategic. And therefore, I think it's a question to where it goes. And more generally, if you buy my argument here, we are not destined forever, because of culture or history, or the balance of power in the international system, to have conflict with Russia.

The bad news is I don't see a way for Putin to back down from his position now. He's fighting a messianic, ideological struggle against Nazis, NATO, and the decadent West. The decadent West is a big message back home. We are evil, that's how we're being portrayed, we're ISIS. I think it's very difficult to negotiate with evil. I want to be

wrong, because I think this is a really bad scenario for us and Russia, but I don't see him changing. I think he's flipped to the other side and that this dual impulse is now a single impulse. And he's playing to the bitter end. Bad news is also that he can be in power until 2024 and perhaps even longer. And he works out 3 hours today. Aside from this 10-day disappearance, he looks in pretty good shape today. The real question to me is not where Putin has decided to go. It's about our response to this. Do we understand it in the way I've said, and do we have the willpower to deal with Russia for what I think will be years, if not more, to come?



*RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA
ARE EXPECTED TO RETAIN
PRECEDENCE IN FUTURE
PRESIDENCIES.*

SURVEYING THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL ASIA

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America's record of engagement in Central Asiaⁱ has been extensive during its post-9/11 era of adventurism. Between its vast military infrastructure and its explosive expansion of new commercial and security networks, the US has invested enormous resources in Central Asia in the last fourteen years. Consequently the US has financed repressive governments, ignited religious resistance groups, and exacerbated tensions with neighboring powers Russia and China. Indeed the US recalibrated its traditional foreign policy toward this region in order to pursue a forward operating position in the theater of Central Asia in support of the mission in Afghanistan.

Yet with the continuing withdrawal from Afghanistan and its more recent commitment to an Asia-orientated foreign strategy, the US is on track to dramatically decrease its investment in the region. Inevitably, competing agendas will be aggressively maneuvering in the vacuum for greater regional influence. In light of these realities it remains vital for the US to restrain the mounting momentum

for disengagement and for policymakers to more concretely identify the US' continued security, political and economic commitments to Central Asia. Failure to do so would, at best, undermine the stabilizing achievements the US has earned to date, or, at worst, render its investments worthless and further destabilize a strategically important region of the world.

This article examines the US' engagements in Central Asia and surveys a select number of challenges and opportunities ahead for US policymakers amidst the managed withdrawal from the region. This article goes on to selectively examine the US' record of investments and particular interests that warrant monitoring in individual Central Asian states, regional and state specific challenges, and tools that can help promote more regional stability. This article also provides the following policy recommendations: that to promote greater stability in Central Asia, US policymakers should continue to emphasize economic development through regional and global market integration, support regional cooperation alongside evolving notions of state sovereignty, and encourage policies to address the political, social and religious grievances that give rise to Islamic extremism.

Finally, this article recommends that for lasting stability the US should remain actively engaged in Central Asia by incorporating the republics as the western flank of America's pivot policy toward Asia.ⁱⁱ

SURVEYING US INVESTMENT IN THE NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

It was not until 2001 that significant US interests in Central Asia expanded beyond natural resources and the containment of nuclear materials left over by the former Soviet Union. By the end of 2001 the US was aggressively pursuing strategic alliances in Central Asia by offering significant financial incentives to secure military bases, air rights, and transit routes necessary to facilitate Afghan operations. These routes through Central Asia became known as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which included transit and other logistical operations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. One of the US' most significant tactical gains in the region was securing a lease to the Transit Center at Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. Because it had to outmaneuver Russian opposition the lease came at a significant financial cost to the US, which included hefty lease payments, landing fees, infrastructure upgrades, and hundreds of millions of dollars per year in related purchases. Kyrgyzstan allowed the US a terminal lease at Manas from 2010 through 2014, but the agreement included a substantial rent increase from \$17.4 million per year to \$60 million per year.¹

The US was also granted the use of the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base by the Uzbek government as a logistical base along the NDN that accommodated both air and land transport. US forces were similarly granted the use of the Dushanbe International Airport in Tajikistan for refueling purposes and the

Almaty International Airport in Kazakhstan for emergency landings in 2002. However, in 2005 the US lost its permission to use the base at Khanabad and was ordered to vacate in retaliation for US criticism over the Uzbek government's suppression of the Andijon demonstrations earlier that year. After the diplomatic rift in 2009 relations were partially repaired between the US and Uzbek governments after Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan all agreed (with some caveats) to allow US forces to transit materials via both air and land into Afghanistan along the NDN. While Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan agreed weapons could be transported by air they only allowed non-lethal supplies to be transported by land. The Tajik government also agreed to allow the land transit of goods and supplies into Afghanistan, which is off the main route of the NDN and serves as an alternative route for a small percentage of supplies. Corresponding with the 2009 agreements, Kazakhstan saw the most dramatic percentage increase in US foreign aid, followed respectively by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.² Additionally, the US has paid several hundred millions of dollars per year in related goods and transit fees.³

*BY THE END OF
2001 THE US WAS
AGGRESSIVELY PURSUING
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
IN CENTRAL ASIA BY
OFFERING SIGNIFICANT
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
TO SECURE MILITARY
BASES, AIR RIGHTS,
AND TRANSIT ROUTES
NECESSARY TO
FACILITATE AFGHAN
OPERATIONS.*

* 4 (see also endnote 5 for additional information on 2012-2015 US AID Foreign Assistance)

<i>(In millions)</i>	2009	2010	% Change (2009-2010)	2011	% Change (2010-2011)
Kazakhstan	91.98	316.8	244.4%	89.98	-71.6%
Kyrgyzstan	51.9	114.0	119.7%	59.75	-47.6%
Tajikistan	49.25	74.42	51.1%	35.92	-51.7%
Turkmenistan	11.99	19.26	60.6%	9.46	-50.9%
Uzbekistan	18.0	31.15	73.1%	18.7	-40.0%

Capitalizing on the financial benefits of the NDN, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan all agreed in 2012 to allow US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces reverse transit of cargo and personnel out of Afghanistan in anticipation of the US withdrawal.⁵ Throughout its involvement in Afghanistan the US has maintained direct military cooperation with Tajikistan; in contrast, Turkmenistan has only supported humanitarian efforts towards Afghanistan due to its close ties with Iran and the Taliban.

ENERGY, AID AND OTHER INTERESTS

Beyond military and security investments, US interests in Central Asia have primarily been in the areas of energy and aid. While its influence has been in decline due to increasing Chinese and Russian investment,⁶ US business interests still maintain a significant stake in Central Asian energy. The overarching issue for US energy activities has been how to get energy commodities out of landlocked Central Asia. The politics of pipelines seem as tangled as the routes themselves with each route presenting its own obstacles. US policy historically has been to cultivate opportunities in ways that bypass and isolate both Russia and Iran. The most significant US developments occurred in the 1990s with the unveiling

of the Eurasian Transportation Corridor, which reflected a policy decision to encourage multiple pipelines out of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan into Turkey without crossing Iran and giving Russia undue sway over the routes.

Power sharing agreements have since declined in Central Asia in favor of joint ventures, which enable the host country or host business to establish ownership interests and simultaneously develop expertise in the enterprise. One of the more prominent US company joint ventures in Central Asia includes the Chevron-led Tengizchevroil Consortium, in which Kazakhstan's state oil and gas company, KazMunayGas, has a twenty percent interest. Tengizchevroil output is exported through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and the Trans-Caspian Transportation network. Full development of the Tengizchevroil, Karachaganak and Kashagan fields is expected to double existing production by the year 2019. While Turkmenistan has the second largest gas reserves in the world, foreign direct investment (FDI) has been minimal due to strict government control, corruption and underwhelming economic reforms. In addition, Uzbek reserves have also largely been closed to FDI from western sources.

American trade with the Central Asian states has been greatest with Kazakhstan. In 2011 the US exported approximately \$826 million



in goods, mostly machinery and transportation equipment, and imported approximately \$1.7 billion, mainly in oil and minerals.⁷ US companies with notable trade investments in Kazakhstan include Boeing, FedEx, and a joint venture between GE and Kazakhstan. US trade with the rest of the four Central Asian states has been minimal in comparison.

Over the past decade US aid to Central Asia has declined from approximately \$328 million in 2002 to approximately \$96 million in 2013.⁸ Kazakhstan has been the largest recipient of US aid among the five republics from 1992 through 2010, followed respectively by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.⁹ A past focus of US aid to Kazakhstan had been the Comprehensive Threat Reduction program (CTR), which contained and eliminated post-Soviet nuclear materials. In contrast, US aid for 2014 emphasized peace and security, including anti-terrorism training and border controls, economic development and democratization.¹⁰ Previous US aid packages to Kyrgyzstan included humanitarian assistance, but future aid will be focused on supporting democracy and encouraging economic and governmental agency reforms.¹¹ Tajikistan also received US aid for humanitarian assistance in the past, but future aid now focuses on combating Tajikistan's serious drug trafficking challenges

as the country contains popular transit routes between Afghanistan, Russia and China.¹²

Uzbekistan is the largest Central Asian state by population and has the most advanced military of the five countries; it devotes ten percent of its GDP to defense.¹³ Prior US aid to Uzbekistan focused on the CTR program, humanitarian assistance and democratization. In recent years major human rights violations by the Uzbek government have triggered a withholding of US aid. However, the State Department has biannually waived the withholding determinations on national security grounds.¹⁴ In light of regional security concerns, the US' 2014 aid package to Uzbekistan was oriented toward security and anti-terrorism.¹⁵ Turkmenistan received the least amount of US aid in Central Asia and current appropriations focus on peace and security, government reforms, economic growth and combating drug and human trafficking.¹⁶

SURVEYING THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Regional stability is the primary US objective in Central Asia. However, stability can only be achieved with economic reforms in these former Soviet satellites, including greater economic integration with neighboring countries and world markets. Economic integration also

*IN ADDITION TO SECURITY
COUNTERMEASURES, STABILITY
WILL ALSO REQUIRE POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL REFORMS.*

*PICTURED IS KAZAKHSTAN'S
PRESIDENT NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV*



requires states to implement reforms that discourage corruption in both the public and private sectors, and build business infrastructure that encourages legitimate enterprise with foreign direct investment. In addition to security countermeasures, stability will also require political and social reforms to provide dissenting and minority groups with religious, social and political freedoms in order to mitigate extremism. Finally, all five countries face security threats from forces within and outside their borders that have resulted in border disputes, interethnic animosity and Islamic extremism.


Kazakhstan

The president of Kazakhstan is known to exercise near comprehensive political power, with democratic elections and voting procedures questioned by an assortment of international organizations. Kazakhstan has scored poorly with human rights groups due to its significant restrictions on freedoms of speech, assembly and religion, and for the recent use of deadly force in response to an energy workers strike in Zhanaozen in 2011.¹⁷ Other issues such as human trafficking and the use of child labor in agriculture have also been problematic. While the Kazak government has made inroads in these areas it has still not addressed government participation in these activities.¹⁸

Economic development has been stifled by corruption, banking system irregularities, modernization failures, inadequate business and trade laws, overly restrictive regulations, and a deficiency in social spending in areas such as health and education, especially in rural areas. Further evidence of government corruption surfaced in 2011 when the Karachaganak Petroleum Operating (KPO), an oil and gas consortium, was forced to give ten percent of its shares to the Kazakh government in exchange for lifting heavy fines and duties.¹⁹

Kyrgyzstan

The 2011 presidential election saw Kyrgyzstan's first peaceful transfer of power. While the US indicated that the election was a step in the right direction, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) still reported the results as questionable.²⁰ Government corruption remains epidemic; there is no independent judiciary and there are serious shortcomings in legal due process. Significant restrictions remain on freedom of religion and there are continued instances of arbitrary arrests, torture, and extortion against ethnic minorities, especially amongst Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan. The issues of human trafficking and child labor are national concerns. While the government has strengthened the laws on



THIS MAP SHOWS THE THREE TIERS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, WITH STATES IN RED FALLING INTO THE MOST SEVERE TIER 3.

human trafficking no one has been prosecuted, and there is substantial suspected involvement by government officials in these activities.²¹

Economic development in Kyrgyzstan has been stifled due to public unrest over foreign backed projects, wide spread power outages and high prices for energy and gas. Foreign investment has declined and organized crime is again on the rise. Gold production, agriculture, and foreign remittances from Kyrgyz laborers in Russia are suspected of comprising a significant portion of the country's GDP.²²

Tajikistan

Political freedoms in Tajikistan remain problematic. The OSCE reported Tajik elections offer no genuine choices for candidates and report seriously improbable voter turnout figures.²³ It is a felony to criticize the Tajik president and political opponents are prosecuted, including former minister Zayd Saidov who was arrested one month after establishing the New Tajikistan opposition party.²⁴ Without an independent judiciary, Tajik citizens have few if any due process rights. Arbitrary arrests, torture, and abuse of detainees by the police have been widely reported by third parties.²⁵ In addition, freedom of press and religion are highly restricted. For example, in 2009 the Tajik government

banned prayer in unregistered cities; restrictions were further tightened in 2011 when the Tajik government forbade children from participating in religious services and banned preaching without a permit.²⁶ In 2012 the government installed cameras in mosques and students are now required to obtain government permission to study abroad or have ties with foreign religious groups.²⁷ As a result of these religious restrictions, international observers are becoming increasingly concerned that Islamic extremism is appealing as the language of opposition.

Most Tajik citizens live in poverty. Human trafficking and forced labor during the cotton harvest remain issues. The country's economy relies heavily on drug trafficking, foreign loans, and remittances from migrant workers. Tajikistan is a main route for drug trafficking from Afghanistan where drug proceeds are linked to high-level government corruption. The Economist even reported that drug money is likely propping up the Tajik economy.²⁸ State ownership of land and major enterprises combined with a weak banking system serve to discourage private sector development. Other problems include a lack of spending on social programs, aging infrastructure, and a shortage of teachers, doctors and other core service providers.

In 2011 Uzbekistan was listed among the nine worst human rights abusers in the world.²⁹ Democratic elections are illusory because opposition parties are prohibited from naming candidates. There are virtually no freedoms of speech, press, religion or assembly. Opposition members, journalists, and those who worship outside of state guidelines are subject to state prosecution. The media is state owned and there is massive censorship of television, the internet, cell phones and social media.

In 2005 Uzbek troops reportedly killed hundreds of demonstrators protesting the prosecution of prominent businessmen accused of terrorism in the city of Andijon. The Uzbek government rejected international attempts to inquire into the circumstances of the jail break, the attack or the arrests of the individuals allegedly responsible. The Uzbek government even evicted the US from its military base in Khanabad following US criticism, which prompted the European Union to ban visas for those Uzbek officials perceived as responsible for the Andijon suppression.³⁰

In 2006 Uzbekistan was classified as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) by the US for severe religious and human rights violations, and, in 2009 the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) ranked Uzbekistan as among the worst countries for religious freedom.³¹ Like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan is also a source of human trafficking for the sex trade and forced child labor remains a national problem.

Economically, the Uzbek government controls all export industries, including cotton, gold, and natural gas. Government seizure of foreign assets since 2010, strict border controls, and corruption have all led to a steep decline in foreign investment.³²

Turkmenistan

Similar to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan is ranked by Freedom House as one of the worst countries

for human rights abuses.³³ Politically, Turkmenistan remains mostly closed to Western influences. There are no democratic elections and only government approved candidates are eligible to run. The president exercises near comprehensive power and the country's new constitution allows presidential rule by decree. Freedom of the press, assembly and religion are severely restricted, and torture or abuse by authorities is so widespread the US State Department estimates one in every two detained citizens has been subject to some form of government abuse.³⁴

Turkmenistan remains both a source and a destination for human trafficking, and the government has demonstrated little advancement in victim protection. Nearly one-third of the population lives in abject poverty and state ownership of industry, corruption, and inadequate market reforms have further dissuaded foreign investment.³⁵ Even though Turkmenistan has declared drug addiction a national catastrophe, the government has not developed an adequate response to these concerns and focuses its investments toward the military rather than social infrastructure.

SURVEYING CENTRAL ASIA'S

REGIONAL CHALLENGES

Beyond the internal issues facing each republic, a number of regional challenges exist that compromise stability efforts in Central Asia. Many of these regional challenges include border disputes, natural resource conflicts, ethnic minority mistreatment, drug trafficking and terrorism. Uzbekistan, for example, shares borders with four neighbors and is often at the center of regional disputes, by either its own actions or those of organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a terrorist organization which aims to topple the Uzbek government and is known to operate within the neighboring republics.

The worst problem of ethnic violence in the region has been between Kyrgyz and ethnic

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ACERBATED BY THE “WATER WARS” BE-
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STAN.*

Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan near the Uzbek border.³⁶ In June 2010 violent clashes reportedly resulted in 470 deaths with nearly 2,000 injured.³⁷ Most of these casualties were considered ethnic Uzbeks. While Uzbekistan did not become involved in the fighting it did host over 100,000 Uzbek refugees on a temporary basis. As a result of this violence, the IMU vowed retaliation against the Kyrgyz government and has successfully recruited ethnic Uzbeks from southern Kyrgyzstan to join their movement. Both countries blame the other for harboring terrorists. Since 2010 gunfire and violence at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border have resulted in tighter border crossings and a movement by the Uzbek government to seal and mine large portions of the border regions.³⁸

Tajikistan and Kazakhstan have also experienced reported terrorist attacks in their respective countries from perpetrators with links to the IMU and other Islamic extremist groups. In 2003 Kazakhstan established the Anti-Terrorist Center as part of its National Security Committee and claims to have convicted over 300 people of terrorism since 2005.³⁹ The 2010 terrorist attacks in Tajikistan, including a suicide car bombing and attack on a military convoy, have also been linked to the IMU.⁴⁰ Uzbekistan itself has been accused of

bombing the Tajik Supreme Court building in an effort to overthrow the Tajik government.⁴¹

Tajikistan also faces substantial threats from terrorism and drug trafficking activities arising out of Afghanistan, which have resulted in instability in the shared mountainous Badakhshan region. This region is a major transit corridor for drugs and other illicit goods smuggled into Tajikistan as well as weapons and financing being sent into Afghanistan. Making matters worse the Tajik government lacks the resources to properly secure the border, and border agents themselves have been reportedly participating in the trafficking enterprises.⁴² The Tajik government is also concerned about ethnic violence towards several million Tajiks in Afghanistan and the nearly one million Tajiks living in Uzbekistan.

Regional tensions are further exacerbated by the “water wars” between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and - to a lesser extent - with Turkmenistan. In an effort to minimize its energy shortages, Kyrgyzstan plans to build a hydroelectric power plant on the Naryn River despite fierce opposition by Uzbekistan, which claims that such a project will restrict its own water supply. Similarly, Tajikistan would like to build a dam for its own power plant on the Vakhsh River but it too faces Uzbek opposition on grounds it will alter the environment and harm

TURKMENISTAN HAS HAD THE LEAST AMOUNT OF STRIFE WITH UZBEKISTAN. HOWEVER, IT TOO HAS HAD TENSION WITH UZBEKISTAN REGARDING WATER SHARING AND ACCUSATIONS OF REGIONAL INTERFERENCE, ACCUSING UZBEKISTAN OF ATTEMPTING TO ORCHESTRATE A POLITICAL COUP IN 2002.

Uzbekistan's agricultural industries. In political brinksmanship, the Uzbek government restricted railway and road access to Tajikistan, boosted rail tariffs and cutoff gas supplies.⁴³ The international community has proposed a water-for-gas trade between the countries but so far this idea has not been successful.

Turkmenistan has had the least amount of strife with Uzbekistan. However, it too has had tension with Uzbekistan regarding water sharing and accusations of regional interference, accusing Uzbekistan of attempting to orchestrate a political coup in 2002. Another regional challenge is the border dispute in the Soviet apportioned Fergana Valley, with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan each vying for geographic control and regional influence in this Islamic heartland.

TOOLS HELPING ACHIEVE STABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA

Each Central Asian republic has aspirations extending beyond the US withdrawal, and they invariably include lucrative relations with Russia and China. Both Russia and China have established military alliances to secure against Islamic extremism and post U.S. withdrawal instability, oil and gas pipelines, trade links for commercial goods, and strategic partnerships to extend their respective influence. China also has acute security interests in the Xinjiang region near the Kazakh and Kyrgyz borders where ethnic Uighurs are considered a substantial security risk. While population numbers remain disputed, it is estimated over 350,000 Uighurs live in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.⁴⁴ Security disputes and accusations of mistreatment have at times caused tense relations between these neighboring nations.⁴⁵

The Central Asian countries, with the exception of Turkmenistan, belong to both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The SCO includes China and Russia and focuses on security and combating terrorism. The CSTO, however, is anchored by Russia only and is intended to provide military support to CSTO members in prevention of outside aggression. The CSTO requires members to obtain CSTO permission before it can host a foreign military bases. Perceiving the treaty terms as excessively interfering with its sovereignty, Uzbekistan suspended its membership from the CSTO in 2012.

The Central Asian countries have not focused their interests exclusively on Russia and China. All five states are members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has fifty-seven member states from Europe, Central Asia, and North America. The OSCE's focus is on security, democracy, human rights, economic development and integration, and environmentalism. Recent OSCE agendas have included promoting stability in Afghanistan and encouraging economic integration between Afghanistan and Central Asia.⁴⁶ Additionally, all five countries are members of NATO's Partnership for Peace and participate in Annual Bilateral Consultations with the US. These groups provide a forum for high level discussions on political and economic matters. On the economic side, Kyrgyzstan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1998, and Kazakhstan is expected to join in 2015 followed sometime thereafter by Tajikistan.⁴⁷ While still in its formative stage, Russia and Kazakhstan are working to formally



KYRGYZSTAN JOINED THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DURING ASKAR AKAYEV'S (PICTURED ON LEFT) TIME AS PRESIDENT.

establish the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015.⁴⁸ This economic trade zone will likely seek to include the other nations of Central Asia.

Each nation has also made known its own policy goals for beyond 2015. As identified in the Strategy Kazakhstan 2050, Kazakhstan's priorities are upgrading and diversifying its energy infrastructure, promoting regional security, attracting foreign direct investment and strengthening the Customs Union to establish the Eurasian Economic Union.⁴⁹ In addition, Kazakhstan will maintain its existing multi-vectored approach toward economic, security and political relations with Russia, China and the United States.

Kyrgyzstan aims to fight internal corruption and attract FDI to repair and upgrade its electrical system and agricultural infrastructure. It also supports a new railway proposed by China through Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan and another north-south railway. Kyrgyzstan currently leads Central Asia in the privatization of business and industry and would also like to continue to encourage foreign capital and investment.⁵⁰

Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are seeking foreign investment to expand their hydroelectric stations that would accommodate sales in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additionally, Tajikistan has agreed to cooperate with Afghanistan and Iran to build rail, electric,

and water pipeline links for greater regional opportunities. Other major goals for Tajikistan include battling drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. This includes encouraging regional cooperation and strengthening security in Central Asia. Additionally Tajikistan claims to have put forth a new effort to target government officials and authorities involved in drug trafficking.⁵¹

One of Uzbekistan's political objectives is strengthening its regional influence amongst the republics, maneuvering against heavyweight Kazakhstan, and limiting interference in Central Asia from outside influences, especially Russia. This includes expanding its own hydroelectric facilities to prevent Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan from expanding their facilities and weakening Uzbekistan's position in the region.⁵²

While Turkmenistan has significant cultural and economic ties with Iran, one of its stated goals in 2011 was to diversify gas routes via a trans-Caspian pipeline in hopes of accessing European markets.⁵³ Additionally, it has agreed to construct the TAPI pipeline pending financing that will connect Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR US POLICY

In order to establish lasting stability in the region

THE US SHOULD REMAIN ENGAGED IN CENTRAL ASIA BY CONTINUING TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH REGIONAL AND GLOBAL INTEGRATION, IMPROVING REGIONAL COOPERATION ALONGSIDE EVOLVING NOTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY, AND ENCOURAGING POLICIES AND REFORMS TO UNDERMINE THE APPEAL OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM.

the US should remain engaged in Central Asia by continuing to promote economic development through regional and global integration, improving regional cooperation alongside evolving notions of sovereignty, and encouraging policies and reforms to undermine the appeal of Islamic extremism. In this context, the following recommendations are made to US policymakers:

Promoting Economic Development

Economic development is essential to improving stability in Central Asia and the means by which the “New Silk Road” strategy can be accomplished. The New Silk Road is a generic title for an organically unfolding strategy that is intending to further open the markets of Central Asia to the larger markets of South Asia. Building upon ancient precedent, the Silk Road strategy is a natural exchange system for Central Asia, and China has already established itself as a powerful trading partner with most of the Central Asian states. Furthermore, promoting the New Silk Road strategy will further encourage Chinese foreign investment in Central Asia that can be directed towards strengthening the inadequate and aging infrastructure in each state.

In order for this strategy to be successful for all of Central Asia, as opposed to primarily benefitting China, US policy should remain oriented toward creating more conducive environments for FDI. This would include decreasing government

corruption and organized crime and reforming business and banking laws that promote private industry. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan all have significant oil and gas reserves, but inadequate infrastructure, inefficiencies, corruption, and general instability have inhibited the FDI necessary for their natural resource industries to reach their potential and promote diversification. If they can achieve the reforms necessary to attract FDI to better develop their respective resource industries, markets in Afghanistan, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and even Europe will serve to further integrate Central Asia into global markets.

Improving Regional Cooperation Alongside Evolving Notions of Sovereignty

US policy should remain oriented toward promoting economic development through regional cooperation. One of the largest causes of tension is the “water war” between Uzbekistan and both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over hydroelectric power plants in the upstream countries. While the global community has encouraged a “water for power” trade, which has so far been rejected by the parties, the US should more strongly encourage the countries to open discussions for a sustainable regional solution. Giving them the opportunity to resolve their regional differences on a global stage may allow them the prestige and respect they desire, and the opportunity to emerge as regional leaders

WHILE THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY HAS ENCOURAGED
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SUSTAINABLE REGIONAL SOLUTION.

apart from the *ad hoc* jockeying that currently exists with Russia and China. While the US may not have the political gravitas to insert itself directly into such discussions, it remains in a position to help facilitate discussions before any number of international forums. Success in this area may give these countries the credibility and confidence to undertake bolder reforms within Central Asia, including establishing the ever elusive Central Asian political block.

While the US should continue to promote economic cooperation in Central Asia, it should also simultaneously support respective notions of state and regional sovereignty. While these notions may appear initially to be in conflict they exist regularly in the dynamic tension of statecraft; encouraging policymakers to evaluate under which circumstances regional cooperation or political independence is more beneficial. Promoting sovereignty will help increase the maneuverability of each country to develop alliances with Russia, China, the West, as well as among themselves in order to advance their respective interests, thereby creating a balance of power that will favor no one country and maintain buffers with neighboring powers Russia and China. A multi-polar dynamic will serve to further increase stability in the region that would not be available from any one power alone.⁵⁴

Undermining Religious Extremism

US policy should continue to encourage reforms and adjustments that undermine the allure of Islamic extremism by focusing on the political, economic, educational and religious challenges giving it rise as an opposition force. In particular, US policy should support the following:ⁱⁱⁱ

1) Encourage the Republics to Legalize Political Parties Associated with the Islamic Faith. Circumstances indicate that political activism

premised on the Islamic faith could achieve traction in Central Asia. While the republics are essentially secular, they need not deny registration to political parties associated with the Islamic faith. Already outlawed parties, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir,⁵⁵ are cultivating support in Central Asia. The continuation of these ultra-secular policies risk disenfranchising moderate forces from the political process. These current practices force political expression underground and increase the appeal of more extreme and often foreign-based strains of Islamic thought. If these Central Asian states were to grant limited recognition to faith-associated parties, which disavow revolutionary or Sharia ambitions, they could help marginalize the appeal of Hizb ut-Tahrir and similar political groups in favor of more moderate political activism, thus drawing more into an approved political outlet.⁵⁶

2) Encourage the Republics to Sponsor the Study of Islam by Financially Supporting Officially Sanctioned Islamic Educational Institutions. Central Asia is known for having a shortage of formal faith-based educational and community institutions. This has encouraged a significant amount of underground, study abroad and foreign-financed activities, the consequences of which remain questionable but predictably dangerous.⁵⁷ As a practical matter, when faith-based institutions are highly dependent on foreign donors, from such places as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, foreign elements are brought into the equation that may bear on the type of instruction and curricula provided. In effort to maintain the moderate practice of Islam in Central Asia, to which its common religious traditions are already oriented, it would seem prudent for the Central Asia republics to moderate their policies and invite a more transparent religious infrastructure and endowment process to be created for which these republics could temporarily provide financial support.

SEVERAL YEARS AGO, OBAMA ANNOUNCED HIS BOTH LAUDED
AND DECRIED INTENTION TO REMOVE MANY U.S. TROOPS
FROM AFGHANISTAN.

3) Encourage the Republics to Implement More Preventive Tactics in Effort to Combat Terrorism.

Like those of Russia and China, Central Asian security practices are more suppressive than they are preventative, in contrast to those promoted by the US and NATO. Suppression policies are oriented toward eliminating the opportunity for terrorists to carry out attacks, while prevention is oriented toward mitigating the social, religious or economic factors that give rise to Islam as an opposition force. Strict suppressive countermeasures such as religious registration requirements and obtrusive monitoring compound the sentiments of extremism by exacerbating the underlying grievances. It is unlikely that terrorism will ever be eradicated by solely suppressive or preventative policies, but gains would likely be enhanced if a comprehensive approach were used that incorporates both types of policies. Repressive state tactics that target religious groups and freedom of expression often alienate moderate elements, which are the very segments that can effectively marginalize extremism. As such, Central Asian security policies should hone in on the underlying causes of radicalism, which are known to be unemployment, limited professional and educational opportunities, religious and social repression and an exclusionary political process.^{iv}

CONCLUSION

Last year marked the beginning of a systematic withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and the declared advent of America's recalibrated Asian orientation. As the US decreases its investment in the region, it remains vital for the US to restrain the mounting momentum for disengagement and for policymakers to more concretely identify America's continued commitment to Central Asia. The US' foreign policy agenda may not always be as concerned with the region in the decades to come, but there is a unique opportunity occurring for the US to be instrumental in building a more stable region as the aging strongmen of Central Asia transition out of power. This forthcoming leadership changeover is indeed a rare opportunity. If the US disengages too abruptly it risks forfeiting the opportunity today to help forge the Central Asia of tomorrow. Therefore, in order to assure its participation in and relevance to the region, the US should incorporate the republics as the western flank of America's pivot policy toward Asia. In this way America's reputed containment policy toward China engages and affects not just Eastern Asia but Western Asia as well.



THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF EARLY, NEUTRAL INTERVENTION IN REVOLUTIONS

BUCHANAN'S COMPELLING CASE FOR A
SHIFT IN THINKING.



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This paper discusses Allen Buchanan's proposed shift in intervention found in his essay, "The Ethics of Revolution and its Implication for the Ethics of Intervention," and posits that it successfully calls into question other popular principles of intervention. The overall contention of the paper is that Buchanan's form of intervention can theoretically prevent much more harm than the popular Mill's Principle and the Consent Principle and seems to overcome the challenges plaguing those principles.

In the latter half of his essay, *The Ethics of Revolution and Its Implications for the Ethics of Intervention*, in addition to the widely accepted rationale for early, neutral foreign intervention into revolutionsⁱ—that early intervention by a third party into crises prevents many casualties—Buchanan provides two compelling arguments for the potential benefits of early intervention. He proposes that it can be used both to mitigate the continuous "cycle of coercion" that usually accompanies revolutions, and to establish suitable conditions for the free expression of the will of the people in revolutionary states. In doing so, he faces the task of overcoming two popular principles meant to determine when intervention is an acceptable form of action—Mill's Principle and the Consent Principle. In order to do so, Buchanan first notes that there are many problematic features

of these principles, especially when considering them in the context of some common features of contemporary revolutionary struggles. This paper will first show that while Buchanan's theory is not, and does not try to be, a complete moral theory or argument for early intervention, it does seem to adequately consider and resolve many of the problems he associates with Mill's Principle and the Consent Principle. It will also present the case of NATO's intervention in Kosovo in order to show how Buchanan's form of intervention could be more effective than other forms, and to bring to light some potentially unforeseen aspects of Buchanan's form of intervention. It will then explain why Buchanan's argument is a convincing and good one by considering the benefits of such an argument, such as that it would be preventative of violence rather than reactive, that it would provide more accurate information that would be helpful in understanding the situation, and that it would resolve many of the problems plaguing contemporary intervention debates.

The first of the two arguments Buchanan presents in favor of early intervention is based on his observation that revolutions often occur in states in which the current regime in powerⁱⁱ has made revolutionary success unlikely without the aspiring revolutionary leadership (ARL) being forced to resort to "the use of morally impermissible coercion against the people they seek to liberate."¹ While Buchanan does not argue that these actions are morally permissible, he does note that they are

THIS CYCLE, WHICH LEADS TO THE PERPETRATION OF WRONGDOINGS COMMITTED BY THE ARL AGAINST ITS FELLOW VICTIMS OF TYRANNY, IS UNDESIRABLE FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS

PROFESSOR ALLEN BUCHANAN



often necessary in order for the revolutionary party to have a reasonable expectation of successⁱⁱⁱ, and that they are also fairly common during revolutions². Buchanan also notes that “much of what occurs [in revolutions] can be explained as a result of the fact that revolutions typically feature a struggle over the conditions under which the ARL attempts to solve the widespread participation collective action problem.”³ The widespread collective action problem about which he speaks, roughly summa-



rized, is the set of problems that arise as a result of the fact that there are often incentives for individuals to refrain from participating in group/collective action that compete with the incentives one has for participating. Buchanan refers to that which is often created by this struggle between the regime and the ARL as “cycles of coercion”, and these

cycles are created when the ARL and the regime interact strategically as a result of the collective action problem⁴. This strategic interaction is summarized in that while the ARL is already forced to overcome the general collective action problem that revolution is similar to a public good—where everyone can benefit but not everyone has to pay—the regime can exacerbate the problem and make it less likely for the revolutionary movement to succeed by making the costs of participating higher. It can do so by punishing revolutionary association or action in an increasingly harsh manner as revolutionary activity increases or prevails over time. The ARL is then generally forced to raise the costs of nonparticipation in order to ensure the success of the revolution, often forcing them to employ violent measures, and the repetition and escalation of these events can lead to coercion and abuse by both parties⁵. This cycle, which leads to the perpetration of wrongdoings committed by the ARL against its fellow victims of tyranny, is undesirable for a number of reasons that Buchanan mentions; it can contribute to the corruption of the ARL and the revolution itself, it can increase the probability that the ARL will mistreat citizens once it comes to power, and it can foster a general culture of brutality in the post-revolutionary society⁶. Buchanan proposes methods that could be used in early intervention—such as reducing the military capability of the regime—which would not only reduce casualties, reduce the risk of a spiral of coercion, and reduce the risk of the ARL becoming corrupt, but would also do so without necessarily



THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THESE METHODS WOULD BE TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT AND TO PROTECT PEOPLE THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE ENDANGERED BECAUSE OF A CYCLE OF COERCION, AND WOULD EXPLICITLY NOT BE TO GIVE EITHER THE REGIME OR THE ARL AN ADVANTAGE IN THE REVOLUTION.

AN A-10 PROVIDING SECURITY AS PART OF OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

taking a stance and influencing revolutions in one way or another. This works only if the violence by the ARL is merely a reactive component of resistance, or merely the result of a lack of legitimate non-violent avenues for fighting for revolution⁷. Similarly, Buchanan proposes other possible ways to prevent the cycle of coercion that focus specifically on reducing the ARL's ability to coerce the people, such as monitoring its behavior and threatening to withhold support if they engage in coercive behavior, or limiting their access to arms⁸. The main objective of these methods would be to provide humanitarian support and to protect people that would otherwise be endangered because of a cycle of coercion, and would explicitly not be to give either the regime or the ARL an advantage in the revolution.

The second argument in favor of early intervention—that it can help establish the conditions for free expression of the people about their stance on the revolution—is relevant because in many instances of revolution the regime makes it nearly impossible for the people to express a desire for revolution without significant cost to them or their families. Buchanan proposes that with early intervention, the intervener could impose a ceasefire, physically separate the two sides, and then investigate the attitudes of the population toward the revolutionary struggle under conditions where there is little to no cost of freely expressing one's honest views⁹. This would be a form of intervention that would not be an unjustified paternalism^{iv},

because it would not allow the intervener to substitute its own judgment for the people's judgment, and would not inherently support either the revolution or the regime; it would rather create "conditions under which [the intervener] could determine whether [or not] to support the revolution."¹⁰ In other words, this type of intervention would be a mission to stop violence before any sort of stance is taken on whether or not the revolution is justified, with the purpose of being able to ascertain that more clearly later. This avoidance of paternalism is an important aspect of this form of early intervention, because unjustified paternalism is one of the features which invites the criticisms of the Consent Theory to be discussed later.

One historical case which could be used to criticize these two arguments for Buchanan's proposed form of intervention is the case of NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which by most measures would be considered a failure. After all, NATO intervened fairly early in the conflict, attempting to impose a ceasefire late in 1998 almost immediately after Serbian forces launched an offensive against the KLA. The conflict was between two clear opponents—Serbian authorities and ethnic Albanians which sought independence—and the intervention was at least ostensibly pursuing the objective of protecting the Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing and genocide. Despite these facts, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which claimed to represent and defend the oppressed Albanians (and which would be considered the ARL

ALSO DESPITE NATO'S INTERVENTION, BY THE END OF THE 11 WEEK BOMBING CAMPAIGN AN ESTIMATED 10,000 PEOPLE HAD DIED VIOLENTLY IN THE KOSOVO, MOST OF WHICH WERE ALBANIAN CIVILIANS MURDERED BY SERBS—A SOBERING STATISTIC.

THE KLA WAS CONSIDERED A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LONG BEFORE NATO'S INTERVENTION, AND THEREFORE WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE TURNED BACK FROM TERRORIST TACTICS AFTER THEY HAD ALREADY BECOME CUSTOMARY.



in this case), often resorted to terrorist tactics and was considered a terrorist organization up until the point of NATO intervention. Also despite NATO's intervention, by the end of the 11 week bombing campaign an estimated 10,000 people had died violently in the Kosovo, most of which were Albanian civilians murdered by Serbs—a sobering statistic considering that there had only been 2,500 deaths before the intervention¹¹. In order to show how this particular example relates to Buchanan's form of intervention, it is important to first understand how this intervention is different from the one that Buchanan proposes. Once understood, we can use it both to see the potential for Buchanan's method to be more effective than some other forms of intervention and to critique and improve Buchanan's form of intervention.

One difference we see between this example and Buchanan's form of intervention is that, for Buchanan's intervention, interveners would seek to prevent revolutionaries from participating in behavior that is violently coercive; the KLA was considered a terrorist organization long before NATO's intervention, and therefore was not likely to be turned back from terrorist tactics after they had already become customary. Despite this difference, NATO's intervention in Kosovo began very much like the kind which Buchanan proposes. Its early attempt to enact a cease-fire was on track to follow Buchanan's intervention, and it seemed to have the primary interest of protecting the people of Serbia, regardless of their stance on the conflict. However, NATO's intervention failed through its inability to effectively enforce the cease-fire, and when it broke down, NATO departed from the role of neutral protector of the people, choosing instead to pursue the role of the overall manager of the situation. NATO summoned both the KLA and the Serbs to the French Chateau of Rambouillet, and demanded that they agree to a detailed plan for political autonomy in Kosovo, threatening military action if either refused¹². Initially, both parties found the terms to be unacceptable and refused, but after more negotiation the KLA assented to the agreement while the Serbians continued to refuse the proposal, and this was the reasoning upon which NATO began its bombing campaign. Because no national interests of NATO countries were at stake, the only military operations that



BECAUSE THE CEASE-FIRE WAS NEVER ADEQUATELY ENFORCED, THE POSSIBILITY OF INVESTIGATING THE ATTITUDES OF THE POPULATION TOWARDS THE REVOLUTION NEVER TOOK PLACE.

IT APPEARS THAT INTERVENTION BEFORE THE CYCLE OF COERCION HAS BEGUN MAY NOT BE AS PRACTICAL IN REALITY AS IT IS IN THEORY.

NATO was willing to take was bombardment from high altitudes which didn't risk the lives of soldiers from member countries, limiting NATO's "humanitarian intervention" to bombing campaigns targeting Serbian infrastructure, violating an agreement of the Geneva Convention not to target "objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population."⁶ Thus, in the long run, this form of intervention was neither neutral, nor primarily devoted to protecting people from violence, or at least not everyone equally. Because the cease-fire was never adequately enforced, the possibility of investigating the attitudes of the population towards the revolution never took place.

Despite the differences in the Kosovan situation and Buchanan's proposed intervention, one can glean some valuable lessons about the possibly unforeseen costs of Buchanan's intervention. For starters, it appears that intervention before the cycle of coercion has begun may not be as practical in reality as it is in theory. This does not mean that the cycle of coercion should not be slowed or halted at the earliest possible time, but it does call for a need to at least consider what to do in the event that a cycle of coercion has already begun. Next, we can see that in order for Buchanan's intervention to be effective, the intervening party must be dedicated enough to the cause of humanitarian intervention that it is willing to risk endangering the people it sends in to enforce a cease-fire. Otherwise, interveners are less able to limit violence and are ultimately less effective peacekeepers. Intervening parties must also be committed to the

cause of being a peacekeeper/cease-fire enforcer no matter how long it takes, as opposed to seeking a speedy resolution of the situation on their own terms. These sorts of critiques would certainly be relevant and necessary to consider if one were to consider the possibility of a Buchanan-style intervention in the ongoing Syrian Civil War, where a cycle of coercion already exists and there seems to be little international commitment to endangering neutral soldiers to attempt to de-escalate the violence.

Buchanan summarizes Mill's Principle as a principle which proposes that "intervention in support of a revolution should not occur until and unless there is widespread domestic participation in the revolution."¹⁴ This would obviously preclude intervention that was exceptionally early, because one would have to ascertain whether or not widespread domestic participation existed before intervening in order to fulfill this requirement. According to Buchanan, this principle seems to focus on the Reasonable Likelihood of Success requirement of just war theory, with the reliable prediction of successful intervention in support of a revolution being nearly impossible without "a broad, deep, and stable commitment to revolution on the part of a substantial portion of the population."¹⁵ Buchanan argues that his principle is flawed, in that it underestimates the obstacles to widespread participation, particularly in the cases in which most people agree that intervention is justifiable, such as cases with extreme tyranny and state brutality¹⁶. With the advancement in technology and weapon-

*MUCH CONTROVERSY REMAINS OVER NATO'S 1999 DECISION
TO INTERVENE IN KOSOVO.*

ry that the world has seen, revolution is no longer a matter of pitting one's own muskets against a trained army equipped with similar muskets—now revolution is a competition of hunting rifles and AK-47s vs fighter bombers and long-range, laser-guided artillery¹⁷. Because of this incredible disparity in firepower, the risks associated with participating in revolutionary actions are much greater now than they once were, and “at least in the early stages of revolution, the decision to participate may require not just a deep and stable commitment to revolution, but also a zealous motivation bordering on the sacrificial.”¹⁸ Another flaw of this principle is that it assumes that all revolutionary participation is equal. Buchanan argues that there could be a large portion of participation that is the result of coercion and the manipulation of the people's emotions by the ARL, and that this participation is not necessarily a reliable source for determining a deep and stable commitment to the revolution—the manipulation of oppressed people by way of harsh treatment by the ARL or by the propagation of false atrocities committed by the regime could lead to false impressions of the actual will of the people¹⁹. With the form of early intervention that Buchanan proposes as a possible solution, whereby the two sides are separated and the conditions for free expression are ensured, both the problem of the disparity in firepower and the problem of participation as a result of coercion could be alleviated. The people of the state could be free to either participate as part of the revolutionary party without fear of being destroyed by advanced state firepower, or free to support the current regime without fear of being coerced by the ARL through violence or other brutal means.^v

Buchanan summarizes the Consent Principle as a principle which proposes that “intervention in support of a revolution should not occur without the consent (or approval) of the people who are

the intended beneficiaries of the intervention.”²⁰ He recognizes that the attraction of this principle comes from the underlying assumption that one should avoid unjustified paternalism and that intervention without consent would “impose on them [the people of the state] the risks that intervention entails without consulting their own judgment as to whether those risks are worth bearing.”²¹ Intervention without consent would also serve to “substitute the intervener's judgment for the people's judgment as to whether the expected benefits of the intervention exceed the expected costs.”²² Buchanan argues that the obvious flaw with this logic is that it would be difficult to justify intervention without unanimous consent, which would virtually never exist. After all, he argues, “how could the fact that some consent make the intervention any less disrespectful toward those who do not consent?”^{23vi} Regardless of the moral requirement of and/or near impossibility of unanimous consent, Buchanan notes that in situations of severe tyranny, it is generally unlikely that one can ascertain whether or not the people actually consent to intervention or not. Oppressive regimes rarely offer opportunities for the expression of political views, and even despite that initial barrier to political opposition, Buchanan notes that expressions of discontent or animosity against the current regime does not necessarily express an explicit consent or desire for foreign intervention²⁴. Buchanan also remarks that in situations where the moral case for revolution is strongest, the ARL is “under formidable pressure to utilize coercion and manipulation to mobilize the masses.”²⁵ Thus, even if one were able to demonstrate that there is a legitimate level of consent for revolution, it would be difficult to know if the consent actually reflects the will of the people or rather if it is merely a result of coercion²⁶. If these circumstances are proven to exist in most revolutionary situations,

whereby there is an inability to acquire information and/or the information about consent that is acquired is unreliable, Buchanan shows not only that the Consent Principle is flawed, but that it seems to set requirements that are unlikely to be fulfilled, and even more unlikely to be fulfilled legitimately. Without reliable knowledge of the level of consent for intervention, Buchanan argues that one could not avoid entirely the possibility of an allegation of unjustified paternalism²⁷. Despite this fact, Buchanan argues that his proposed form of early intervention is not actually unjustifiably paternalistic, because it does not substitute its own judgment for the people's about who wins in a revolution, and it does not inherently support the revolution or the regime. Instead, it creates conditions under which an intervener could determine whether or not it should support the revolution²⁸.

Now that Buchanan's argument has been explained, it is important to explore exactly why his stance is a good one. The first reason his argument is so compelling is its preventative nature rather than the reactive nature that accompanies many other theories of intervention. Buchanan notes early in his article that a popular stance on humanitarian intervention is that, "[humanitarian intervention] is not justified unless there is large-scale violence," and that this has been understood to apply to both revolutionary conflicts and ethnonational conflicts in humanitarian literature²⁹. This suggests that there is a broad understanding and acceptance of the importance of large-scale violence in determining the legitimacy of interventions. This important consensus was exemplified in the UN's unanimous adoption of the "Responsibility to Protect" principle at its 2005 World Summit, which authorized the international community for the first time, "to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from [genocide and mass atrocities]," even at the expense of violating national sovereignty. Though the UN stipulated that it was the primary responsibility of sovereign nations, and that the international community's primary responsibility is to "encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility," this was a major international achievement in terms of the protection of human lives, in that it placed more value in the importance of human life than in the formerly resolute

notion of complete sovereignty. I contend that if actively occurring large-scale violence is enough to legitimize humanitarian intervention in order to put an end to it, then impending large-scale violence should also be enough to legitimize intervention to prevent it, and possibly an even more worthy end to pursue. Buchanan mentions many ways in which early intervention is preventative, rather than reactive. As mentioned before, early intervention is intended to prevent the cycle of coercion, characteristic of many revolutions, which leads to both sides continuously raising the costs to participate and/or not participate in the revolution. Preventing this cycle would not only prevent many casualties on both sides, but it would also prevent further undesirable immoral actions by ke-

I CONTEND THAT IF ACTIVELY OCCURRING LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE IS ENOUGH TO LEGITIMIZE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN ORDER TO PUT AN END TO IT, THEN IMPENDING LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE SHOULD ALSO BE ENOUGH TO LEGITIMIZE INTERVENTION TO PREVENT IT

eping both the regime and the ARL from becoming habituated to making morally unacceptable choices³⁰. Buchanan focuses particularly on the benefits this would have for the ARLs because, when they are forced to take morally impermissible actions, it can contribute to corruption, it can increase the probability of future mistreatment of citizens, and it can help create a general culture of brutality³¹. The reactive nature of other theories of intervention, including those that subscribe to the Mill's Principle and the Consent Principle, would not allow intervention until many of these events have already occurred, possibly tainting the revolution.

Another reason that Buchanan's argument is compelling is that it promotes an environment where accurate information gathering can take place, and judgments about the causes and/or legitimacy of the revolution can more accurately be made. A key aspect of Buchanan's proposed intervention is that

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THE INTENTION OF
LIMITING VIOLENCE.

it will require neutrality by the intervener and will allow free expression of the people before deciding whether or not to support the revolution. This type of intervention, where the two fighting parties are separated and allowed to express their opinions, not only prevents violence, but it gives the citizens a free choice to make about whether or not they want the proposed change to their society. While some would argue that this desire to ascertain the will of the people and allow them to govern themselves is a promotion of Western values of democracy, I would argue that Buchanan's form of intervention merely allows for decisions about what to do next to be made with more complete information, and does not actually advocate one particular set of beliefs about governance over another.

Both of the previous reasons show some of the ways in which problems of existing theories of intervention are resolved by Buchanan's proposed form of intervention. One of the questions raised by both the Mill's Principle and the Consent Principle is: What counts as consent for and/or participation in a revolution? This is a very difficult question to answer when both oppressive regimes, who wish to discourage participation, and ARLs, who wish to encourage participation, are restricting people in their free expression. Not only would this type of intervention allow for people to more freely express their opinion, but it would be in ways that provide much more clarity than most options that are available to people in revolutions. Though one

can rarely guarantee a perfect freedom to express one's opinions, a vote in a free election or referendum for a new government would seem much easier to understand than something like the murder of a corrupt government official which could be the result of a number of things; the individual committing the murder could have been forced by the ARL to do it in order to save his family, the individual actually could have been an unforced participant in the revolution, or the individual could have been merely settling a personal matter with the government official—there are even more possibilities than just those three, but they serve to show the lack of clarity associated with individual actions, especially in situations of limited information. Another question of both the Mill's and Consent principles is: How widespread must the participation/consent be in order to justify support of a revolution? Though Buchanan's argument does not answer this question, it is not important to justify neutral intervention with the intention of limiting violence. This is certainly a question that needs to be answered in order to determine what to do after violence has been stopped, however, regardless of that answer, free and fair expression (which would most likely occur through voting/elections) would allow for interveners to understand more clearly and more accurately exactly how widespread participation and consent actually are. This would hopefully allow for a more morally correct action to be taken than when those who

*WHERE DOES ONE DRAW THE LINE FOR
JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION?*

*WHAT SHOULD ONE DO IF THE REVOLUTION
TURNS OUT NOT TO BE JUSTIFIED?*

*WHO SHOULD BE THE ONE INTERVENING IN
THIS PROPOSED FORM OF INTERVENTION?*

wish to either support or put down revolutions are just shooting in the dark, as the expression goes, in judging the sentiments of the people.

Buchanan's argument does not answer all the questions it raises, however. There are at least three key questions that come to mind when considering Buchanan's argument for early intervention: Where does one draw the line for justified intervention? What should one do if the revolution turns out not to be justified? And finally, who should be the one intervening in this proposed form of intervention? Buchanan does not answer these questions, however I think they are worth attempting to answer within the framework of Buchanan's intervention, given the potential benefits of considering such a form of intervention. When considering when the line must be drawn for intervention, though Buchanan's form of intervention may be seen as premature by many, the preventative aspect of it would allow for the prevention of an incredible loss of life and further immoral actions. This prevention of massive moral transgression seems to justify the possibility of intervening a little prematurely in some cases, and seems to be deserving of slightly more discretion than other reactionary forms of intervention. Obviously there have to be some limits on intervention, but Buchanan's early intervention seems to suggest that when opposing factions have been identified

and violence is beginning to occur, action is most useful earlier rather than later. If the intervention were truly neutral and only in humanitarian interests, it would not be hard to consider this as a humanitarian action, which is widely accepted as the morally correct thing to do when humanitarian crises occur. When considering what to do if the revolution is determined to be unjustified, one has to consider whether or not it would be better to have that information before large-scale violence has occurred or after. If a revolution is not justified and it is determined sooner rather than later, interveners can do everything in their power to aid the regime in restoring order to the society, ensuring that humanitarian principles are observed in the process. As for the question of who should legitimately be an intervener in these situations, I believe that this is the hardest question to answer, and I do believe that this is an important question for Buchanan to consider if he wants his theory of intervention to have any credence. Buchanan does however call for neutral intervention that would not benefit outside parties and would serve merely to prevent future moral transgressions, giving some idea as to how he would answer that question. I think the most obvious answer to this question would be that the UN is the only organization that could claim any sort of legitimate authority on neutral intervention. One of the primary criticisms of NATO's intervention in Kosovo was that it was an illegitimate intervention and that it was in direct



opposition to the more legitimate UN decision which officially stated that Kosovo was within the sovereign territory of Serbia. Because of its veto rules, the UN does face a historical problem of gridlock when it comes to controversial decisions such as when intervention is acceptable. Despite this, if Buchanan's form of intervention were used as a template for UN intervention, I believe that it could be viewed as more of a humanitarian action than anything, which the UN is much more amicable towards.

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Though Buchanan's argument is not without flaws, it does present a compelling argument for the potential benefits of early intervention, including the prevention of a cycle of coercion and the establishment of conditions for more clearly understanding the will of the people in a revolution. In considering the historical case of Kosovo, one might think that Kosovo demonstrates how this form of intervention can fail, however I have shown that the case of Kosovo was not handled in a way that fits into the framework of a Buchanan-style intervention, and so cannot be used to measure its success. Buchanan's argument for intervention also counters popular existing principles that seek to govern intervention, Mill's Principle, and the Consent Principle, and provides solutions to many of the problems that inhibit those principles. This type of intervention is morally desirable both because of its preventative nature, which would

allow much less moral transgression than reactionary forms of intervention, and because of its promotion of an environment which will allow more clarity in revolutionary situations generally riddled with obscurity. While it still leaves some to be desired, Buchanan's form of intervention has the potential to bring us closer to making morally permissible decisions in the midst of a revolution while simultaneously preventing many casualties and many more morally impermissible actions from occurring along the way.




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²⁹Genocidio de la UP
³⁰Center for Justice and International Law
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³²Ibid.

Endnotes

i Appendix 1.1.

Anti-restitution Threat:

Latest Communiqué – Order for Battle

The failed and dishonourable demobilisation process of the AUC (the United-Self Defence Forces of Colombia), the current war decreed by this government, led by Juan Manuel Santos, and his entourage of traitors and guerrillas and the loss of tranquility and calm in areas, because of the weakness of this government, have led us to rearm and form the anti-restitution army which maintains some [of the same] principles of struggle, decision and fidelity; the extermination of the Colombian guerrillas and the social, political and economic reorganization of our country.

[The regions of] Bolívar, Sucre and Córdoba have already seen our actions where our central objective is the total annihilation of all those that are guerrillas or have affinities with these terrorist organizations and to avoid at all cost the theft of land from the honorable people of these regions who ask that we don't leave them in this struggle. The expansion of our struggle is almost complete in Meta, Putumayo and Antioquia our strength without doubt comes from the weakening of this government in the struggle against the guerrillas.

After months of research we have decided to begin cleansing the Montes de Maria area of the FARC's attempts to take it back and we will begin with the helpers of these groups, who disguise themselves as human rights defenders and are no more than defenders of guerrillas disguised as victims and displaced campesinos. These people should not think they can save themselves from us getting even with them, we will go to any part of the country to look for them, and it doesn't matter if they have protection, they can protect them, but it will not be enough to protect their families, snitch sons of bitches. This is not a warning, it is an order for our army.

IVAN CEPEDA.

INGRID VERGARA .

GUATAVO ARRIETA

FRANKLIN TORRES.

MARIBEL VAZQUEZ

ROBISON CASTILLA

PEDRO GENEY

JEISON PAVA REYES

JUAN DAVID DIAZ.

RONALD CASTILLA.

These people will be the first we will be getting even with and we will continue with all those who help, are ideologues or figureheads of the guerrillas.

We will not allow the guerrilla to return to our Montes de Maria.

Anti-restitution Army

Here to stay.

AMERICAN THROUGH AND THROUGH":
AL JAZEERA AMERICA AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO "THE PERCEPTION
PROBLEM

16

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By Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class McNeeley, Chad J. "Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is interviewed by Al Jazeera's Abderrahim Foukara in Washington, D.C., Dec. 3, 2009." 2009. Via Wikimedia Commons.

"Activists camped out in front of Benghazi's main courthouse, the rallying point for the opposition in Libya's second-city, thank Al Jazeera." 2011. JPEG Via Wikimedia Commons.

Al Jazeera building in Doha, Qatar. 2008. JPEG Via wikimedia Commons.

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SURVEYING THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL ASIA

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Endnotes

ⁱ For purposes of this article Central Asia includes the Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

ⁱⁱ An earlier version of this article was originally published as America's Managed (Dis)Engagement Policy Toward Central Asia in the Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations (Vol. XV, Summer 2014).

ⁱⁱⁱ Portions of this recommendation section were originally published in the following articles: Islamic Militancy and the Uighur of Kazakhstan, by Andreas Borgeas, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Winter 2013, <http://www.yalejournal.org>; Security Relations Between Kazakhstan and China: Assessments and Recommendations on the Transnational Uighur Question, by Andreas Borgeas, Columbia Journal of International Affairs, April 10, 2013, <http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/security-relations-between-kazakhstan-and-china/>.

^{iv} Proposing a “western flank” of America's so-called pivot policy toward Asia is premised on the intuitive engagement agenda whereby the US endeavors to improve political, military and economic relations with those countries surrounding China and are foreseeably within its future sphere of influence. See Obama Heads to India to Revive ‘Pivot to Asia Policy’ by Christi Parsons and Shashank Bengali, LA Times, January 24, 2015, <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-obama-india-trip-20150125-story.html>. While such a policy has had punctuated developments (i.e. normalizing relations with Myanmar, expanding the ASEAN Free Trade Area, efforts to curb the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and an assortment of new military policies), it remains unclear whether the proposed policy is more of a directional rebalancing as opposed to a formal policy of Chinese containment. See What Exactly Does it Mean that the U.S. is Pivoting to Asia? And Will it Last?, by Matt Schiavenza, The Atlantic, April 15, 2013, <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/what-exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-is-pivoting-to-asia/274936/>; see also Why the US Effort to Curb the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Will Fail, by Erik Voeten, Washington Post, March 19, 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/19/why-the-u-s-effort-to-curb-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-is-doomed-to-fail-and-why-it-doesnt-matter-all-that-much/>. The notion put forward in this article is that the Central Asia Republics would appear to be natural candidates under this pivot agenda for enhanced relations with the US.

THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF EARLY, NEUTRAL INTERVENTION IN REVOLUTIONS: BUCHANAN'S COMPELLING CASE FOR A SHIFT IN THINKING

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Endnotes

ⁱ Hereinafter referred to as “early intervention” or simply “intervention.”

ⁱⁱ Hereinafter referred to as “regime”

ⁱⁱⁱ The Reasonable Likelihood of Success requirement is a Jus Ad Bellum requirement recognized by most just war theorists which states that there should be a reasonable likelihood of success in order to justify any war.

^{iv} Buchanan characterizes unjustified paternalism as a form of intervention that is “disrespectful to people regarded as autonomous agents with their own values and reasons for acting” (Buchanan, 317).

^v While this proposed solution does help to solve the problem of violent coercion’s effects on mass participation, it is important to note that Buchanan’s early intervention does nothing to assuage the problem of the propagation of false atrocities committed by the regime or other forms of nonviolent coercion. However, this seems to be more a result of the incompleteness of Buchanan’s theory rather than an ineptitude of his theory to counter the problems he identifies with Mill’s Principle.

^{vi} This argument does not seem very convincing, considering the moral weight and power people generally grant to the majority opinion, however it does not seem to be an integral part of Buchanan’s overall argument for early intervention, so a refutation does not seem necessary.

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