women might be living in constant fear, and their lives would likely be severely limited by the conflict. Instead, they became active agents of their own survival, strength, and empowerment.

CONCLUSION

Although the Sri Lankan Civil War has left thousands of Tamil women in a position of helplessness and vulnerability at the hands of the state, there are many others who grew stronger and more empowered as a result of their participation in the violent and decades-long conflict. Today, in post-war Sri Lanka, this newfound sense of inner strength and empowerment has radically shifted the way that many Tamil women approach everyday life and societal issues. As militarization post-2009 reaches extreme levels, many Tamil women face a “desperate lack of security” and continue to “live in fear of violence” from the state (International Crisis Group, i).⁵³ Although many ex-female combatants continue to face economic constraints, limited mobility, and imminent displacement by the state, their experience in the war led to the reconstruction of gender identities and subsequent empowerment. These women were, in turn, able to cultivate high levels of commitment to a violent resistance movement and a nationalist cause.⁵⁴ The issue remains, however, that enduring militarization under the Sri Lankan government continues to dictate what avenues are available to them and whether or not they will ever feel secure again.

Considering how recent this phenomenon of post-war militarization policy is, there is still a considerable amount of research needed to fully grasp the social and psychological impact of state militarization. On the one hand, Tamil activists have used this militarization in instrumental ways to further delegitimize the Sri Lankan state. Political

analysts, on the other hand, continue to monitor the state’s activity in the northern and eastern Tamil provinces, in hopes of preventing the recurrence of violent conflict.⁵⁵ Until the state acknowledges the oppressed situation of these ex-combatant Tamil women and takes action to address it, there will always be a “latent potential for a resurgence in violent forms of resistance – particularly amongst Tamil women.”⁵⁶ These female fighters’ experiences fighting in the Civil War enabled may to attain personal liberation and continues to fuel their desire to liberate the Tamil people.

U.S. POLICY OF ENGAGEMENT TOWARD NORTH KOREA

NORMALIZING THE BALANCE OF TERROR

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INTRODUCTION

The balance of terror created by the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) on the Korean peninsula has escalated the sense of uncertainty in East Asia, jeopardizing both the region’s security and progress towards political and economic cooperation. The persistent efforts of North Korea in the development of nuclear weapons present a blatant challenge to the United States’ strategic leverage in East Asia, international hegemonic influence, and global disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives. In this paper, I outline and evaluate three approaches to addressing the international threat posed by North Korea: 1) Hostile isolation through economic sanctions, intimidation, and aggressive military posturing to instigate denuclearization 2) Containment by impeding vertical and horizontal proliferation of North Korean missiles that emphasizes the maintenance of status quo over a policy of denuclearization 3) Engagement through multilateral efforts to offer political and economic incentives in exchange for gradual dismantlement of nuclear weapons production, backed by guarantees of international retaliation for failure to reciprocate. I essentially argue that isolation and containment measures have already been tried by the previous administrations and ultimately failed to secure cooperation or denuclearization because they refused to recognize nuclear weapons as the

silver bullet to ensuring the regime’s survival. Thus, resolving regional instabilities entails the pursuit of a strategy of engagement and gradual normalization over an extended timetable that precedes a policy of denuclearization through economic incentives in exchange for gradual denuclearization. Consequently, dismantlement becomes a process of weaning North Korea from its military dependence on nuclear weapons for survival to economic dependence on the international community, the sustained contact leading to greater transparency and interaction with international norms.

UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITY DILEMMA

The nature of the North Korean threat fundamentally stems from transformative changes in the international system over the last half century that has resulted in a regional imbalance of power unfavorable to North Korea. In an international system of anarchy, the capabilities and intentions of surrounding states remain unclear. While this uncertainty of the capability of states and the certainty of the outcome of nuclear war in the form of mutually assured destruction sustains the logic of nuclear deterrence, it simultaneously obfuscates the ability to distinguish “offensive from defensive capability, which lie[s] at the core of [...] the ‘security dilemma’” on the Korean peninsula.¹ Conventionally viewed as an irrational aggressor,

*INTENDED TO COERCE NORTH KOREA TOWARDS
OPENNESS ABANDONMENT OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM
UNDER UNILATERAL MILITARY PRESSURES OF
THE UNITED STATES, THE ISOLATION APPROACH
PURSUED BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION MERELY
EXACERBATED NORTH KOREA'S SENSE OF
VULNERABILITY*

North Korea, in its political isolation following the fall of the Soviet bloc, “failing economy, lagging conventional military capabilities, and a keen desire for international acceptance and recognition” rationally turned to “asymmetric power advantages” derived from long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction” as a means of defense to ensure regime survival in the face of South Korea’s economic and conventional military superiority, which is further enhanced by American military support.² Intended as a defensive strategy to counter the South’s conventional advantage, the WMDs have increasingly taken on the appearance of offensive weapons as North Korea responded to escalating economic sanctions and diplomatic ostracism during the Bush administration with “coercive bargaining strategy” as the only course of action in deterring external threat.³

Hostile Isolation Approach

Yet, this “‘irrationality’ of the DPRK [...] and the perceived recklessness and unpredictability of its leadership” in reaction to growing pressures served as a rallying cry for Washington to take a hawkish stance of coercive denuclearization over cooperative engagement during the Bush era that continues to sour United States-North Korean relations today.⁴ Proponents of isolation policy towards North Korea argue that Pyongyang’s “contacts with the outside world reflects a change in diplomatic tactics for the purpose of obtaining the food and economic aid [...] needed[ed]

to stay afloat” and has not reciprocated with subsequent denuclearization nor indicated a move toward “fundamental change” in foreign policy, committing the United States to an irrational, no-exit strategy of unending concessions.⁵ The rationale behind engagement, they argue, thus rewards North Korea for nuclear belligerence that weakens the “credibility of U.S. security commitments in the region” and stands as a “model for other potential nuclear aspirants.”⁶ In response to “North Korea’s imperviousness to international pressures and sanctions,” opponents of engagement propose a “hostile isolation” approach that combines intimidating military presence with diplomatic ostracism in the form of economic sanctions, threats, and intimidation to achieve denuclearization.⁷ Intended to coerce North Korea towards openness and abandonment of its nuclear program under unilateral military pressures of the United States, the isolation approach pursued by the Bush administration merely exacerbated North Korea’s sense of vulnerability and ironically encouraged North Korea to turn inward to frame survival in terms of further development and enhancement of its existing nuclear capabilities.⁸

My main criticism of the isolation approach lies in its failure to address North Korea’s legitimate security concern as a lone state defying what it perceives to be internationally-concerted hostility through aggressive measures by the United States that leaves no room for

*LOCATION OF NUCLEAR TEST. NORTH
KOREA’S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
HAS CREATED A HEIGHTENED SENSE OF
INSTABILITY IN THE REGION*

North Korea to maneuver without losing credibility. Subsequent antagonistic reaction by North Korea reinforces its image as a bellicose, rogue regime that creates a “vicious cycle” of misunderstanding and escalating tension.⁹

Furthermore, isolation provides no guarantee of preventing further horizontal (dissemination of WMD to rogue and nonstate actors) and vertical (enhancement of existing nuclear capabilities); rather, the “continuation of a comprehensive sanctions regime against North Korea may ironically strengthen the regime’s capacity to maintain political control” by trading the window of opportunity for a two-way transparency for opacity.¹⁰ Increasingly bereft of allies to mitigate economic and strategic constraints placed by international sanctions and diplomatic alienation, the regime will turn to what Cha terms, “coercive bargaining” as the only strategy for survival after careful calculation of expected costs of inaction and belligerency. Evidence of Pyongyang’s willingness to make “plain the volatility of confrontation” became evident following South Korean president Lee Myung Bak’s policy of disengagement to which North Korea retaliated by allegedly sinking South Korean warship, Cheonan, and shelling Yeonpyeong Island in the contested maritime zone near the West Sea Islands.¹¹

CONTAINMENT APPROACH

The Obama administration inherited

the foreign policy dilemma of a belligerent North Korea shaped by a decade-long strategy of isolation and subsequently adopted an outdated policy of Cold War-era containment as the simplest strategy to deal with North Korea, sacrificing denuclearization for a weak policy of counter-proliferation. The Obama administration’s policy of containment involves impeding further proliferation and “sophistication of [North Korean] nuclear arsenal and missile delivery capacity [...] through implementation of UN resolutions [...] by negotiating a missile moratorium or [...] ensuring that the scope of international sanctions expanded in retaliation.”¹² This “‘manage and contain’ approach [that] focuses on risk reduction first” guarantees the maintenance of status quo in the region, but fails to resolve the asymmetric terror balance, which is “inherently volatile.”¹³

Pursued by the Obama administration, the containment approach proved to be an anachronistic strategy to deter nuclear proliferation, already determined to be ineffective in the strategic arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. The policy of containment based on the strategy of mutual deterrence during the Cold War contradictorily led to a massive arms buildup despite both the United States and the Soviet Union attaining the minimum requirement for effective deterrence. Sharing a mutual distrust towards the other’s intentions and

*THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, IN ITS
DISREGARD FOR THE NATURE OF NORTH
KOREAN AGGRESSION, SACRIFICED
REGIONAL STABILITY AND COOPERATION
FOR AN UNVIALE POLICY OF
DENUCLEARIZATION*

capabilities, each sought to overcome the security dilemma through the unchecked sophistication and production of existing arsenals weapons that ultimately escalated the costs of war but did little to change the status quo. While North Korea presents a minor threat compared to the former Soviet Union in terms of nuclear stock, it has similarly attained the minimum requirement for deterrence to effectively maintain the status quo without further proliferation - a stumbling block to ending the stagnant balance of terror on the Korean peninsula.

INTEGRATIVE ENGAGEMENT APPROACH

The failures of the isolation and containment approaches stem from their inability to recognize North Korea's legitimate security concerns: what it perceived as aggressive, American military posturing, coupled with economic and political disengagement from North Korea that holds the key to international integration and mechanisms of transparency crucial to regional stability. The isolation policy outlines ambitious goals toward rapid denuclearization of the Korean peninsula through military threats and intimidation with no indication of reciprocal concessions by the United States. With no initial guarantees of security from the United States, North Korea responded to military aggression with reciprocal threats and subsequent policy disengagement, rescinding its former commitments toward peace

and resorting to radicalization of its foreign policy. The Bush administration, in its disregard for the nature of North Korean aggression, sacrificed regional stability and cooperation for an unviable policy of denuclearization. The containment approach, on the other hand, stagnates the progress towards de-escalation of tension by purposely engaging in a patient game of checkmate with North Korea in hopes that the regime would eventually collapse on its own. Examining the containment policy pursued during the Cold War, the waiting game may indeed prove to be successful when weighing in the triumph of capitalism over socialism attained through sheer endurance; however, the timetable for self-collapse is measured in decades. Is an asymmetric balance of terror sustainable on the Korean peninsula for another 20 years? The persistence of the North Korean regime for over half a century indicates that we may be faced with a vastly different situation. The objective of containment is to prevent further proliferation in North Korea, yet there is no guarantee that this immense task can be achieved, especially as growing hostility drives North Korea towards greater opacity. The containment approach is thus, a no-end-game strategy, in which prospects can only improve for North Korea. Both approaches have merely emphasized North Korea's capacity to effectively defy international sanctions, thereby undermining international standards of behavior and driving neighboring states to

*THE DMZ AT PANMUMJEOM WITH SOLDIERS STANDING GUARD.
SINCE THE CEASEFIRE WAS SIGNED IN 1953, THE 38TH
PARALLEL MARKS THE BORDER BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS*

consider nuclear capabilities to balance North Korea's asymmetric advantage, which shows no indication of weakening in the foreseeable future.

The integrative engagement approach, however, provides an alternative to regression and stagnation of relations with North Korea by encompassing international coordination and consensus in offering "conditional diplomatic and economic inducements" that normalize relations and reduce the mutual threat through increased contact. To be successful, three points must converge on this policy approach: Normalization

The United States must recognize that the "threat is not unilaterally posed but mutually produced" and that it must first provide reciprocal concessions in security guarantees by reconfirming political and economic commitments made in past agreements "in exchange for Pyongyang's termination of its WMD programs" before pursuing an agenda of denuclearization.¹⁴ Addressing security concerns entails "fundamental decisions to respect [North Korea's] sovereignty" that acknowledge the legitimacy of the regime and a mutual peace treaty outlining a maritime border and a framework of agreement.¹⁵

Examining the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Soviet bloc resulted from internal decay as gradual introduction of capitalism eroded the fundamental basis of socialist politics and economy. As increasingly

liberal leaders captured state politics and opened the Soviet bloc to Western influence through policies, such as perestroika, the socialist system faltered as it grew steadily dependent on Western norms and economy. North Korea, the last defiant reminder of the Cold War, poses the same challenges the United States faced in confronting the Soviet Union. The solution, as history shows, relies not on a combination of military posturing and nuclear arms escalation, but the pervasion of Western soft power that gnaws away at the very basis of socialism through increased contact and dialogue. The solution to North Korea then relies solely on instilling the roots of soft power - economic assistance, free trade, and economic cooperation - in the region through a policy of engagement that resets a short timetable of rapid and risky policy of denuclearization to a long horizon of gradual, peaceful economic collaboration that would slowly open North Korea to international influence.

Economic assistance would plant the seeds of progress and revitalization of the North Korean economy and provide a future strategic leverage as cooperation and mutual concession increasingly outweigh the benefits of coercive bargaining. Once this option becomes available and progress initiated, North Korea, recognizing the possibilities brought by cooperation, would feel increased pressure to cooperate as engagement prevents the "crystallization of conditions under which

THE OBJECTIVE OF CONTAINMENT IS TO PREVENT FURTHER PROLIFERATION IN NORTH KOREA, YET THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THIS IMMENSE TASK CAN BE ACHIEVED

Pyongyang would calculate aggression as a 'rational' course of action."¹⁶ Engagement not only improves transparency by providing insight on the degree of change in DPRK intentions, but would also "lay the groundwork for punishment if the regime fails to fulfill its obligations."¹⁷ Moreover, increased contact would provide North Koreans with exposure to "international norms and standards" that could facilitate "grassroots-led marketization and the spread of capitalism" to undermine North Korean leadership and political control over the populace.¹⁸ Engagement thus gradually adjusts the asymmetric advantage North Korea currently exercises and tilts the balance of power in the direction of the United States.

Denuclearization

The move towards denuclearization can only be made upon the initial guarantee of economic and political security by the United States, as the North Koreans increasingly recognize the incentives for cooperation that outweigh the benefits of isolation brought by aggressive foreign policy measures. Denuclearization, more importantly, must occur at a steady but gradual pace with the premise that as North Korea grows more dependent on international aid, the "forward momentum will make it more and more difficult for the North to turn back."¹⁹ Because complete denuclearization entails a long process of incremental dismantlement, I suggest a process of converting nuclear arms production to energy

resources that North Korea can export to the international community, which would provide economic benefits and a much-needed energy source to the North Korean population. Thus, the success of denuclearization is thus tightly coupled to the success of economic inducements that convince Pyongyang the advantages of integration over nuclear proliferation.

Multilateral Coordination

Learning from the Bush administration, the Obama administration adopted a multilateral approach to North Korea over bilateral negotiations but failed to secure regional cooperation with North Korean neighbors who preferred regional stability over possible costs of "violence, flows of refugees, spillover," and absorption.²⁰ China, a traditional ally of North Korea, exercises heavy influence over the direction of international foreign policy towards North Korea and has been effectively impeding an international push for aggressive measures towards addressing nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. Previously, foreign policy experts, who recognized the immense Chinese influence over enforcing international sanctions and punishment, prioritized convincing China that "denuclearization is necessary for long-term regional stability."²¹ However, China's recent pivot towards a more aggressive and critical view of North Korea is a window of opportunity for regional cooperation towards denuclearization that must immediately be seized. The failures of isolation and containment to deter further

CHINA, NORTH KOREA'S NEIGHBOR AND ALLY, HAS RECENTLY SHIFTED ITS STANCE TOWARDS THE COUNTRY, CREATING A POSSIBLE OPENING

experimentation on and proliferation of North Korean weapons of mass destruction relay the lack of clout in reinforcing the consequences of defying international standards and agreement. Thus, it is crucial to utilize the common current of distrust and discontent towards North Korea's belligerent stance following the rise of its new leader, Kim Jong Un, to coordinate and secure an international decision framing a multilateral agreement for retaliation. The engagement approach, in which the United States first addresses the North Korean security concerns by making the initial motion for compromise, relays American willingness towards cooperation and places the burden of proof on North Korea in mutual reciprocation. With international normative frameworks and constructed identities defining international behavior, North Korea's failures to uphold its end of the bargain would indicate that "non-confrontational manner has been exhausted" and signal the need for a concerted, international response that effectively retaliates and disincentivizes uncooperative measures made by North Korea.²²

Normalization and eventual dissolution of tension ultimately rests on translating North Korea dependence on nuclear weapons for economic survival to dependence on international integration and mutual transparency, achieved by multilateral coordination that enforces an agreed set of framework in addressing the threat of North

Korea.

STRATEGY FOR DENUCLEARIZATION

The critical questions to ask are: Would engagement be enough to build trust? Would North Korea trust US declarations towards normalization and transparency? What makes engagement credible in regards to both the benefits of cooperation and the consequences of belligerence?

The success and credibility of the engagement approach hinges critically on regional integration and cooperation at the security and economic level that remains largely absent in Asia. Up until the recent decade, the United States has pursued a post-World War II "hub-and-spokes" model in East Asia that consists of individual bilateral ties with Asian nations over regional network of multilateral ties and institutions. This "hub-and-spokes" model dampens the drive to build a regional network of multilateral ties by (1) creating bilateral security and economic ties with South Korea and Japan that intentionally serve as a balancing strategy against China's rise and regional hegemonic aspirations and (2) creating few institutional means or political necessity to resolve the historical memory of Japanese colonialism that remains raw in the national psyche of Asian nations - particularly those of South Korea and China - and continues to deepen hostilities and mistrust in the region.

*DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA
RESTS ON COHESIVE ACTION UNDER REGIONAL
MULTILATERALISM THAT HINGES UPON EAST
ASIAN COOPERATION*

The consequent lack of regional cohesion in security, political, and economic multilateral ties significantly undermines the US leverage in a hypothetical engagement approach as North Korea can reliably turn to its regional neighbors, particularly China, in the event of failed unilateral negotiations and agreements with the United States. Denuclearizing North Korea ultimately rests on resolving the historical tensions between various nations in East Asia, establishing cooperation at the regional level that lays the foundation for a cohesive multilateral action, and securing a regional multilateral policy towards North Korea that aligns with a US policy of engagement. This would not only strengthen the US strategic and diplomatic leverage in North Korea but also heighten the sense of guarantee that the US would follow through on its actions as a result of deep multilateral networks in the region. Essentially, US leverage in North Korea can only be made real by creating regional leverage over North Korea. The 1994 agreed framework largely failed as a result of failures of both the United States and North Korea to follow through on the steps of the agreements in lieu of growing mistrust of each other's intentions. The United States largely acted on the assumption that North Korea will collapse upon the death of its leader Kim Jong Il. North Korea in turn doubted the intentions behind the United States' sudden turn in foreign policy as well as the lack of guarantees that it would meet its end

of the bilateral agreement in the absence of international action or backing.

Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula rests on cohesive action under regional multilateralism that hinges upon East Asian cooperation. The linchpin to this cooperation is China, which has exercised extensive political, economic, and diplomatic influence on North Korea and remains its last regional "ally." Deepening security and economic links between China, South Korea, and Japan will either further isolate North Korea as China establishes ties with its other neighbors or in the more unlikely scenario, bridge South Korea and Japan to North Korea through ties with China. In either possibilities, deepening regional ties between North Korea's neighbors narrows North Korea's foreign policy options towards cooperation as the traditional hostilities that it had once manipulated and utilized as leverage in regional and international affairs become rendered effectively useless. Moreover, as a new Asian political and economic region emerges, North Korea faces the option of either hopping on the wagon of an increasingly powerful region – perhaps in the future, another European Union or North Atlantic Trade Organization – or incurring the wrath of a regionally cohesive Asia.

Already, the South Korean government has initiated what the current Park administration calls "trustpolitik strategy" for improving and stabilizing relations with its closest neighbors -

*OBAMA, AT THE 2011 STATE
OF UNION ADDRESS, AFFIRMED
THE COUNTRY'S COMMITMENT
TO STAND BY ITS ALLY OF
SOUTH KOREA AND URGE THE
ROK TO ABANDON ITS NUCLEAR
WEAPONS*

North Korea, China, and Japan. Such strategy involves "laying the groundwork for the reduction of tension and peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula" through 1) strong US-Korea alliance 2) trilateral cooperation between Korea, US, and Japan 3) development of close ties of cooperation and partnership with China and Russia and 4) enhancing cooperation with Europe and ASEAN nations and 5) "continuing efforts to persuade North Korea to comply with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations through inter-Korean dialogue channels."²³ The Park administration has realistically "proposed greater cooperation on 'softer issues'" of the environment, nuclear safety, and disaster relief as the first step to establishing trust, which would enable greater trilateral cooperation in addressing the more complex political, economic, and social issues. Since this proposal was first announced, the talks on the China-ROK-Japan Free Trade Agreement has been initiated and trilateral "dialogue and cooperation on issues such as the environment, culture, nuclear safety and cyber security" have made significant headway even as political relations deteriorate.²⁴

The foreign policy approach of the United States in addressing a nuclear North Korea then, should involve laying the foundations for a regionally cohesive Asia. The United States must recognize China's rise and its place as the regional power as both inevitable and acceptable, and cut back

on bilateral agreements with South Korea and Japan, allowing the region's major powers to forge cooperative security and economic ties that were largely discouraged by bilateral ties with the United States. Paradoxically, the United States must take a step back from its roles as a hegemonic power in Asia and a balancing force against China in the region in order to foster regional cooperation necessary for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. While some may argue that this policy recommendation fundamentally suggests that the United States sacrifice its leverage in Asia for leverage in North Korea, the reality is that increasing challenges to US hegemony and reductions in its leverage in Asia is inevitable as China and the region as a whole "rises." From several paradigmatic viewpoints, we ask: Is the United States willing to voluntarily reduce its influence and power in the region? Will it allow for regional alignment economically and politically? Does it value international peace and cooperation over regional power and interests? But realistically, the United States cannot stop the inevitable rise of regional multilateralism and cooperation in Asia. While achieving regional cohesion inevitably reduces the US leverage in Asia in the short-term, it would secure the continued existence of that very leverage in the future if the United States spearheads the movement for multilateral cooperation and peace today. The essential question to ask then is: "Will

the United States lead the charge for regional cohesion and thereby secure and sustain its leverage? Or will it resist the inevitable and continue to proliferate means for continued North Korean nuclear weapons development while also risking its place at the Asian table in the future?

CONCLUSION

North Korea remains the last vestige of the Cold War era of nuclear power balancing, which has shown itself to be unsustainable and detrimental to international peace and cooperation. The policies of isolation and containment have been tried by past administrations but have ultimately failed to deter further proliferation of weapons in North Korea due to their failure to ensure multilateral action and recognize North Korea's security dilemma. A foreign policy approach of integrative engagement, however, extends conditional diplomatic and economic benefits over immediate denuclearization. Engagement serves as a method of gradually integrating North Korea into the international economy and institutional norms that advances transparency, creates leverage to shape North Korean behavior, and eventually end the balance of terror on the Korean peninsula. But this denuclearization hinges upon the United States' willingness to lead the creation of a cohesive regional force in Asia, which would inevitably challenge its influence and power in the region in the short-run.

AN UNCERTAIN BELONGING

PERMANENT RESIDENCY ID CARDS AND EAST JERUSALEM'S IDENTITY CRISIS

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INTRODUCTION

Rimaz Kasabreh is Palestinian. Because of her Israeli-issued green identification card, she is considered a legal resident of the West Bank but an illegal immigration within nearby East Jerusalem – the historically Palestinian-controlled half of Jerusalem until its annexation from Jordan following the Six Day War in 1967. During the war, Israel preemptively attacked its Arab neighbors and captured the Golan Heights from Syria, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the West Bank (which encompassed East Jerusalem at the time) from Jordan. Although Israel withdrew from the occupied territories following United Nations Resolution 242, it explicitly annexed East Jerusalem into a united capital city. It is in this half of Jerusalem – which had been under Palestinian leadership – where Kasabreh has lived with her family since 1996.

Kasabreh currently lives in East Jerusalem with her three children and husband, all of whom are considered permanent residents and hold special blue identification cards that entitle them to most benefits offered by the Israeli government. Years ago, Kasabreh applied for the same card under Israel's family unification program, but, permanent residency has become almost impossible to obtain through unification claims, especially since the enactment of a restrictive 2003 law, and she has yet to hear back from the authorities. According to a family

lawyer, the Ministry of Interior has stopped processing applications altogether. For now, she remains with her family in East Jerusalem by applying for yearly temporary residency permits – which take months to obtain – and living a highly immobile lifestyle. Because of her liminal and uncertain status, she does not have access to the same Israeli government benefits as East Jerusalem ID holders, including adequate health care, and she cannot apply for a job to help support her family. As a result, she spends most of her time in her family's home, unable to fully integrate into Palestinian society in East Jerusalem.¹

Kasabreh's story is not unique – in fact, she claims that many of her friends are in similar situations, victims of a bureaucratic approach to Palestinian residency rights in East Jerusalem. Even obtaining a permanent residency card does not guarantee the right to live indefinitely in the city. The Israeli government has retracted over 14,000 residencies since 2011 – most from Palestinians who travelled abroad for some period of time.² These restrictions on mobility, however, do not apply to the city's Jewish population.

Prior to the Six Day War, Jerusalem was divided into halves: West Jerusalem, under Israeli control, and East Jerusalem, which was brought under de facto Jordanian control following the 1948 war establishing the state of Israel.³ This divide was formalized in 1949 with the drawing of the 'Green Line' – an armistice line – through