The War Lovers (Again): What the Foreign Policy Advisers of Presidential Candidates May Tell Us About Future U.S. Foreign Policy

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*Evan Thomas's recent book, *The War Lovers*, chronicles the "monumental turning point" of the U.S. declaration of war against Spain in 1898, and the small circle of men who pressed for war, and for an American empire. The central figures, for Thomas, were Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; his friend Henry Cabot Lodge, hawkish senator and foreign policy adviser to President McKinley; and William Randolph Hearst, editor of the *New York Journal*, whose paper did its utmost to fan war fervor in 1897-8. These men were inspired by, and had the strong support of Alfred Thayer Mahan a naval officer, history professor, and influential author of *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. Though President McKinley hesitated about war with Spain, Roosevelt and Lodge had long dreamed of a war that would establish the United States as a major player on the world stage. When another prominent politician, Speaker of the House Thomas Reed, opposed substantial increases in naval funding that he thought "invited conflict," Lodge promptly accused him of harboring "extreme pro-Spanish prejudices."*

The U.S. did declare war on Spain in 1898, won a six-months war, and then became bogged down for 14 years in a war against Philippine insurgents who had expected independence after Spain's defeat. In the process of "pacifying" the insurgency, the occupation officers developed methods of surveillance and torture that Americans would use again, both in the U.S. and abroad.² The episode calls up obvious analogies. In other times there have been enthusiastic, often romantic war advocates who discounted the risks and costs of wars--wars that seldom turned out as the "war lovers" intended.

Three Varieties of Engagement with the World

From at least 1898, one finds in U.S. foreign policy three distinct threads of argument and action propagated by presidents and their circles of advisers: unilateralist expansionism (as in the Roosevelt-Lodge argument for the Spanish American war); isolationism (represented by, among others, Speaker of the House, Thomas Reed); and the more recent liberal internationalism

enunciated (if not always practiced) by Woodrow Wilson. The three doctrines are not always easy to label and disentangle, of course.³

Nevertheless, the point cannot be missed that small circles of advisors, chosen by presidents precisely because they share with him fundamental perspectives on the world, often become very influential sources of foreign policy advice. And whether or not the president subscribes overtly to unilateralist principles, presidents since 1946 have engaged in many wars, most without congressional declarations, and many without any real consultation with allied democracies or even the U.S. Congress. These facts draw our attention to the advice groups that support presidential foreign policy stances.

The most notable since WWII have been the group of well-educated and urbane "Wise Men" who guided the post-war transition to U.S. superpower status and Cold War in the 1940s;⁴ the architects of the Vietnam War in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations,⁵ and the George W. Bush advisors (including the Vice President) who

planned and executed the “global war on terror.”⁶

From the beginning of American world power to the most recent stage of hegemonic dominance, these four groups were all men (with the exception of Condoleezza Rice in the Bush advisory group) who aspired to make their country powerful, and who themselves clearly relished the power that came with designing a new world. But there are critical differences.

The first group of architects (the 1898 empire builders around TR) and the fourth (the 2001 Bush advisors, or “Vulcans” as the core group called themselves), represent episodes of nationalist unilateralism in Republican administrations. The second

Former Governor Mitt Romney of Massachusetts

group of advisers, The Wise Men (as historians have dubbed them) were different, internationalists of a more cooperative bent, whether because they had just seen a cataclysmic war won by a determined alliance of democracies, or because the years after 1945 were clearly both transitional and critical (if war focuses the mind, so does

making a lasting peace amid the rubble). They served a Democratic administration in which the Wilsonian commitment to multilateral, institution-centered internationalism was still a constraint on unilateralism.

In addition, the two aggressively unilateralist advisory groups (of 1898 and 2001) saw the *military* as the central institution of American foreign policy. The Wise Men of 1946 who constructed (with a lot of help) the post-war world saw alliances, diplomacy and new international institutions as the central mechanisms of U.S. influence in the world. If the first and last advisor groups were War Lovers, the Wise Men were not. They were not dewy-eyed pacifists, by any means. They were tough-minded, hard-eyed calculators of national advantage at a time when U.S. economic interest and the goals of rebuilding Europe, integrating the world economy, creating new rules to deter war, and democratizing the defeated Axis nations were all quite compatible.

But, however suspicious they were of the communists who by late 1946 were morphing into designated national enemies, and however narrow the vision developed in their mostly privileged families and toney universities, the 1946 cohort of foreign policy advisors were far more flexible in their strategic calculations, and the end-states they worked toward, than the 1898 empire builders, the Vietnam architects of 1964-68, or the Bush Vulcans of 2001. Even by the time they became, in the most fundamental way, anticommunists, the Wise Men differed from the first group by being less motivated by capitalist exigencies, and from the last group, by being less *ideological*. As Isaacson and Thomas describe the 1940s group, “ideological fervor was frowned upon; pragmatism, realpolitik, moderation, and consensus were prized. Nonpartisanship was more than a principle, it was an art form.”⁷

Thus it seems accurate to say that the Wise Men, though they served a Democratic president, were less partisan than the two

unilateralist groups, which contained few if any members from the other party and did not value pragmatic non-partisan collaboration. The words “partisan,” and “ideological” have different implications. While partisanship may lead to policy gridlock (IF it strongly coincides with ideological fervor, which is not always the case), and may have other unfortunate consequences, ideologues make more worrisome foreign policy advisors. Or so argues political scientist Thomas Langston.⁸

Why Ideologues Make the Most Dangerous Foreign Policy Advisers

Langston has constructed an insightful typology that distinguishes partisans, ideologues, and other “people with ideas” who fall in neither of those camps. Many people interested in policy find a place in government because they have ideas for programs, usually centered on a set of goals that are valued by their party, and they have a set of logical means to achieve them. Many of these people are academics, technocrats, or simply pragmatists who have worked in real-world settings, in experimental ways, and want to carry those lessons and methods to the national level.

But ideologues are more than just people *with* ideas. They are people *of* ideas. And that is the characteristic that can make them dangerously inflexible and close-minded, certain that the ends they insist upon justify whatever means can accomplish them.⁹

Regular partisans are seldom as inflexible as ideologues; they want to win elections. Ties to the general electorate give partisan officials a grounding in popular politics that ideologues in think tanks usually lack. Academics, whose numbers in government increased after the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, usually plan to return to their universities after government service, and, one might suggest, want to protect their scholarly reputations from charges of extremism; tenure demands may also act

to moderate extremism, as do classes full of questioning students. Ideologues, on the other hand, live their lives surrounded by other ideologues, often in think tanks that are far more insulated than universities or campaigns and elected offices.

In Langston’s definition, “ideologues” are people of ideas who:

1. Claim absolute certainty about truth; have a comprehensive explanation of current and past reality. Explanation flows from a set of first principles or a priori assumptions. Their policy preferences are thus very predictable.
2. Ascribe value to a particular state of being, rather than a process, like democracy.
3. Have a historical consciousness (sense of historical evolution).

President Reagan and the Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev at a morning meeting in the Oval Office during the Washington Summit in December of 1987.

4. Have an epistemology -- a way of learning.
5. Are affiliated with like-minded persons, in clubs, organizations, journals of opinion, think tanks, or similar institutions.¹⁰

Thus, ideologues value end-states above process, and adhere closely to those end-state values, even in the face of changing circumstances and new information. They are not very open-minded, in part because they do not have to be. They spend much of their time in think tanks and media outlets with

like-minded people, and are clever enough to insinuate themselves, in a kind of “chain migration” into presidential administrations where they may achieve great influence.

The Expansion, Defeat, and Return of Ideology

The number of ideologues in the executive branch has grown remarkably since the late 1970s.

The essential cause is probably found on the supply-side: the growth of think tanks funded by a new breed of strongly ideological foundations. The total number of independent think tanks increased by over 400 percent between 1970 and 2001.¹¹ Favorable tax incentives for contributions to nonprofits, dissatisfaction with the Carter administration, and particular unhappiness among businessmen and hawkish intellectuals about increasing regulation and taxes, post-Vietnam military cutbacks, and rising criticism of Israel after 1967-- all these developments facilitated the expansion of conservative think tanks.¹²

The new think tanks differed from earlier ones by their overt political advocacy, according to the author of the major recent study of think tanks. Rather than focusing on the scholarly research and policy analysis encouraged by earlier funding sources (particularly the older Ford and Rockefeller foundations), the new breed of think tanks were aggressively ideological. As Andrew Rich reports, the large majority of think tanks in 1996 were “avowedly ideological” (165 of the 306 in his study, or 54%), and two thirds of those were conservative. Furthermore, “the rate of formation of conservative think tanks (2.6 each year) was twice that of liberal ones (1.3 each year).¹³ As the older foundations began to decline funding requests from think tanks with a political cast, the new conservative foundations—like the Bradley, Smith Richardson, and Sarah Scaife foundations--demanded active promotion of conservative economic and foreign policy ideas. And the difference in orientation to political advocacy

(“aggressively promoting their ideas”) is what has made the conservative think tanks so much more influential, according to Rich.¹⁴

By the 1990s, the largest think tanks, measured by annual budgets, included the Heritage Foundation, The American Enterprise Institute, and the Brookings Institution, all with budgets of around 20-25 million dollars, and the Urban Institute, with a budget of over \$55 million. The first two were categorized by Congressional Quarterly’s *Public Interest Profiles* as “conservative,” the Brookings Institution as liberal. The Urban Institute last was classified by PIP as “politically balanced” or “non-partisan.”¹⁵

Arguably the largest think tank of all is the Rand Corporation, founded in 1946 (and made independent of the Defense

South Carolina State Treasurer Curtis Loftis campaigns with Gov. Mitt Romney during a September 2011 event in North Charleston, South Carolina.

Department two years later) to produce technological and strategic policy studies for the armed services. It is still (like the Urban Institute) a major recipient of government contracts.¹⁶ If Rand were classified as a think tank, it would be listed on the conservative side, based on its policy orientations and funding sources; indeed, several prominent hawkish ideologues have been affiliated with Rand, as was an important neoconservative mentor, Albert Wohlstetter, a mathematician and strategic analyst.¹⁷ But even without Rand, growth in the 1980s and 1990s was robust for the 11 wealthiest conservative think tanks,

leaving them with significantly more assets than the 11 wealthiest liberal institutions by the early 2000s.¹⁸

The Reagan administration was the first to reflect the surge in conservative think tanks. Langston describes it as the most ideological presidency in American history.¹⁹ Its closest competitor, the administration of Franklin Roosevelt (the previous realignment leader), was leavened with partisans, social workers, and competing ideologues, making its “ideological density” less notable. It is not surprising that a president with little experience in foreign policy would be willing to rely on a network of ideologues that could furnish ideas and rationales for his hawkish foreign policy orientation. One may perceive a pattern in the reliance of inexperienced presidents on ideologues, one that connects the Reagan and G.W. Bush administrations but skips the administration of the more experienced and assured George H. W. Bush.

The Reagan administration, then, on taking office, reflected the “supply side” growth of available conservative ideologues from the new aggressively conservative think tanks. He also recruited heavily from a group of Cold War hawks that came together to protest cuts in the defense budget (The Committee on the Present Danger).²⁰ Prominent among them were Richard Perle, Fred Ikle (both in Reagan’s Defense Department), Eugene Rostow (an opponent of arms control appointed to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), and John Lehman, Jr. (Secretary of the Navy), all colleagues from the CPD; and William Casey, heading the CIA. All were, to put it mildly, “opponents of détente.” Casey, according to his executive assistant, Robert Gates, saw his purpose there as “primarily to wage war against the Soviet Union.”²¹ The administration did have its share of divergent ideologues and traditional partisans, but the Iran-Contra scandal illustrated the potential for disaster when weakly supervised ideologues run amok.

In the last years of his administration,

however, Reagan abandoned the strident bellicosity and brinksmanship of the first three years and entered negotiations with the Soviet leader that led, in 1987, to the most important nuclear arms control treaty of the Cold War. The new Reagan posture allowed Gorbachev the maneuvering room to introduce dramatic reforms without fear of attack from the U.S., and then to dismantle the Soviet empire itself. But before that

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happened, the most inflexible foreign policy advisers left the Reagan administration in disgust, allowing relieved pragmatists to do their momentous work unimpeded.²²

The end of the Cold War removed the major rationale for a highly militarized foreign policy, leaving the Reagan-era hawks rather at sea. They returned to their think tanks to regroup and await a new opportunity.²³ That opportunity arrived in 2001.

The George W. Bush administration was a second act for the extreme hawks. The modalities and apocalyptic discourse of the Cold War were easily adapted to a long-term war on terror. The neoconservatives, brought into the administration by Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and Cheney’s former DOD colleague, Paul Wolfowitz, recruited scores of like-minded people to manage the administration’s foreign policy. President Bush wryly apologized to AEI for stripping its ranks of over 20 conservative thinkers for his administration.²⁴ Bill Kristol boasted that every week one of the Vice President’s aides dropped by the *Weekly Standard* offices to pick up 30 copies.²⁵

The results of the ideological occupation of the executive branch in 2001 are well known. The Bush administration mismanaged two costly wars, each longer than any before 2001; launched a final surge of deregulation that freed financial institutions to take excessive risks; and cut

taxes sharply during war (for the first time in American history). The U.S reputation abroad fell dramatically, debt mounted, and deaths rose.²⁶

One might have thought that the conservative ideologues would quietly return to their think tanks after 2008 and keep a low profile. But surprisingly, they began to reappear in 2010. The Republican Party, grown even more conservative, surged back in the low-turnout midterm elections as the economy recovered too slowly and the health care, financial reforms, and economic stimulus policies angered conservatives. The ideologues who had guided a disastrous foreign policy and presided over an economic debacle again appeared in policy debates, and on university lecture circuits. In 2012, the Republican primary contenders were anything but contrite about the Bush record. The war lovers were back.

The Foreign Policy Advisers of Mitt Romney

On foreign policy, the 2012 Republican contenders exhibit few differences. All but Ron Paul favor expanding, rather than contracting, military budgets, bases, troops, and weapons systems. The three major candidates (Romney, Santorum, and Gingrich) would slow withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce cooperation with international institutions, cut foreign aid, and offer uncritical support for Israel. The candidates (except for Paul) express no hesitation about the possibility of a new war with Iran, and criticize President Obama for pursuing diplomacy.

But the resurgent hawks have apparently pinned their hopes on Mitt Romney. His team of foreign policy advisers announced in 2011 abounds with hawks from the Bush and Reagan administrations.²⁷

In introducing the group, Romney appeared to consciously use language that echoed the 1990s Project For The New American Century, whose grand plan, first proposed in 1992, would assure U.S. global dominance with reliance on an

unchallengeable military able to preempt any competitors: “I am deeply honored to have the counsel of this extraordinary group of diplomats, experts, and statesmen. Their remarkable experience, wisdom, and depth of knowledge will be critical to ensuring that the 21st century is another American Century.”²⁸

Table I lists the affiliations and experience of Romney’s most notable advisers. Almost all are linked to the most conservative think tanks—PNAC, AEI, Heritage, and PNAC’s successor, The Foreign Policy Initiative; some have multiple affiliations. In view of the biographies of the Romney foreign policy team, and the Republican consensus on major issues, it seems reasonable to conclude that if he is elected, his administration will be predisposed to return to the foreign policy ideas and policies of the Bush administration. As a candidate with little foreign policy knowledge or experience, Romney may follow the Reagan-Bush pattern of relying on ideological networks for administration staffing and policy development.

Most contemporary foreign policy hawks have not engaged in war themselves, but show the same enthusiasm for military prowess, and the same lack of attention to costs as earlier ideologues. It has been common among the Bush administration advisers to defend war expenditures and deaths as quite modest in comparison to previous wars.

In an NPR debate on U.S. foreign policy in 2011, Romney’s most prominent advisor, Eliot Cohen, noted that “The United States today spends something on the order of about five percent of Gross Domestic Product on defense, maybe a little bit more. During the Kennedy administration, that figure was over eight percent, during the Eisenhower administration, over 10 percent.” He argued that domestic social spending was a far greater budgetary concern than military spending.²⁹

Cohen’s debate partner, Elliott Abrams, argued that the military budget had

already taken “great hits” and that further cuts would benefit U.S. enemies and threaten its role in the world, making the entire world less safe. And, he argued, “there are hundreds of millions of people around the world who rely on American power for their safety.” He defended the moral purpose of the war in Iraq, and referenced the nation-building successes in Germany and Japan after WWII as analogies.

As for the human costs of war, Eliot Cohen noted that “Using force is a terrible thing. You’re going to kill innocent civilians. You’re going to make mistakes. You’ll probably get some of your own people killed. And those are real people. Are you going to avoid something worse? That’s really the fundamental reason why we do go to war,

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Mike Mullen listens to Commanding Officer of Riverine Squadron One, Cmdr. William J. Guarini Jr., explain the features of the combat vest during a visit of Riverine Group One (RIVRON-1) and Riverine Squadron One on board Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek.

and we should go to war.”

Cohen has criticized the deficiencies of counterinsurgency policy in both the Bush and Obama administrations and suggested that a better model for the occupations that follow American wars can be found in the most controversial policy of the Reagan administration. Applied in Central America to shore up right wing dictators and fight insurgencies through surrogates—American-trained and armed soldiers and paramilitaries--this strategy has been dubbed the “El Salvador Option” by Cohen and others. It has suggested to some critics the resurrection of a policy

that supported conservative, pro-American dictatorships, terrorized civilians and political dissidents in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, and lead to the deaths of thousands, from entire peasant villages to Archbishops murdered while saying mass.³⁰

“We did counterinsurgency very well in Salvador,” Cohen has said;³¹ In a late-2009 article featured on the AEI web site, Cohen continued to tout the Salvador Option as a promising strategy for dealing with insurgencies.³²

War hawks now press for preventive war on Iran, either on U.S. initiative, or in the course of U.S. backing for an Israeli strike. Their war campaign again suggests over-optimistic assumptions about the speed and efficacy of bombing to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, and little concern for the risks and costs of war.³³ Their arguments, and the drumbeat of exaggerated threat echoed in the media, recall similar arguments made for the Iraq war in 2002-3. In the present Iran case, as in Iraq, there is insufficient intelligence about the nuclear program, and insufficient examination of what it would mean for the United States or Israel (the principle advocate of such an attack) if Iran DID develop nuclear weapons. Diplomatic initiatives are again given too little weight by war advocates. If Iran’s nuclear program is a response to prolonged threats from Israel and the United States, then non-aggression pledges and moves toward a de-nuclearization of the Middle East (including Israel) merit serious consideration. At the least, multilateral diplomatic negotiations-- of the sort that were successful in persuading Libya to abandon its nuclear and chemical weapons programs—should be undertaken as alternatives to war.³⁴

But is there reason to fear that the bellicose rhetoric of a presidential candidate with a team of very hawkish foreign policy advisers will inevitably, if elected, lead the country into more unnecessary wars, and favor military force over “soft power” in foreign

policy? Should campaign rhetoric be taken seriously as an indication of foreign policy strategies and goals? Political science theory suggests that there is.

First, there is the consistent finding that presidents do devote their first two years (at least) to the achievement of the policy platforms on which they run.³⁵ That may well be, as Rahul Desai has argued, a major reason for midterm losses.³⁶ And the prospect of midterm and presidential year losses at the polls tempts presidents to “diversionary war.”³⁷

But Benjamin Fordham adds plausible complexity to his study of diversionary war: party difference. Democratic presidents, he shows, are more likely to go to war when inflation is high; Republicans, when unemployment is high. The rationale rests on left-right party differences in democracies around the world. The left party is more concerned with unemployment, which its constituents experience more than the affluent constituents of the right party. If unemployment is high, Democratic presidents will meet it with stimulus and social welfare programs. However, if inflation is high, that won't be as feasible. Shorn of opportunity to enact its favored domestic policies, Democratic presidents will then go to war to distract the public from economic woes and elicit a rally effect. Republican constituents do not favor stimulus policies; So, if unemployment is high, they will instead go to war. Different economic problems carry different risks of war, depending on the party of the President. The evidence shows that there is, in fact, evidence of such patterns in the many wars presidents initiate.³⁸

If Romney wins, adopts stringent deficit-cutting policies and cuts social spending to pay for the large military he and his foreign policy advisers have pledged to support, a slide back into recession would be an occasion for diversionary war.... which would doubtless have the approval of the hawkish advisers, who would wrap ideological goals in electoral interest. The

neoconservative Iraq war initiative was, in fact, justified by President Bush's political adviser and GOP leaders as a way to forestall midterm election losses in 2002.³⁹

Stephen Skowronek's theory of the presidency⁴⁰ seems to predict that an “articulator” (a president who is affiliated with the “regime” (dominant) party—clearly the Republicans now—will be more warlike than presidents in other “political times.” These post-realignment presidents face increasing tensions within their party coalitions and also personal frustrations with the obligations of the “faithful son” to the regime founder. They are anxious to break out and make a record for themselves, while uniting their increasingly restive party. War serves both purposes. Romney would be an articulating president, in Skowronek's scheme.

Finally, my own concept of “novice macho” argues that new presidents, especially those who have no military experience, will, in their first year, initiate a military attack to prove their mettle. For Obama, it was a dramatic obliteration of a group of Somali pirates. For Clinton, it was bombing Iraq early in 1993. For George W. Bush, of course, it was war in Afghanistan. For Romney, the most likely pre-election target, given his advisors and his own statements on Iran and Israel, would be an attack on Iran: unilaterally, or by backing up an Israeli attack.

If, on the other hand, Obama is reelected and Israel does not initiate an attack on Iran, he will be unlikely to start that war. Its risks are great; his foreign policy advisers, both civilian and military, do not favor a third war, and a spiking oil price will slow recovery—which is his main ticket to reelection.

A careful 1993 study of presidential war-making, in another honors thesis at this university, demonstrated that if presidents are going to make war in their own reelection year, it will likely be in the first six months of the year, becoming less likely in the six months before the election. The later restraint seems to arise from fear of provoking opposition

from Americans suspicious of a politically-motivated war. Should Obama be reelected without involvement in a third war, which is probably his preference, war becomes steadily less likely in the second term. The last two years of an eight-year presidency are the most peaceful of all. Presidents no longer have electoral incentives to make diversionary wars, and are likely to be concerned with leaving a positive legacy.⁴¹ This is probably the reason that George W. Bush resisted entreaties from Israel to attack Iran during his last two years. Instead, he pursued new foreign aid programs and diplomatic negotiations with North Korea and Libya.⁴²

Conclusion: Breaking the Habit of War

The use of the Evan Thomas phrase “war lovers” to describe both the late 19th century imperialists and the Bush era defenders of a robust, military-centered foreign policy might seem a bit reductionist, but in fact both groups of empire advocates have revealed little hesitation about war making, or acknowledgement of its costs-- in deaths (both to American soldiers and foreign soldiers and civilians), life-changing injuries, forced population migrations, institutional collapse, huge financial commitments, growing national debt, and environmental devastation.

Teddy Roosevelt and the 1898 war hawks embraced war with the enthusiasm of schoolboys. Roosevelt himself delighted in his brief war adventure, and urged his sons to be warriors. He “abhorred weakness, in himself or anyone else,” and “craved dangerous adventure in an almost pathological way.” He “felt blessed to send his sons to war,” remarking that he would prefer that his children “die than have them grow up weaklings.” His son Archie reported, to apparent paternal approval, “the sensation of shooting a German and then, in a rage, stomping on his face, staining his boot with blood up to the ankle,” all the while

feeling “like a creature of the stone age.” When his younger son Quentin shot down a German plane in WWI, and was himself wounded, TR delighted that “The last of the lion’s brood has been bloodied!” He was not, however, prepared for Quentin to die in the war. When it happened, writes Thomas, “The romance of war, at long last, gave way to heartbreak.”⁴³

In the 21st century, war threatens to become an American addiction, despite abundant evidence of the toll that extended war takes on the human mind and body, and the lessons of past occupations.⁴⁴ The human toll has been tragically underlined in the killings of civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq, at the hands of Americans who, but for long participation in a war of occupation, would probably have lived normal lives.

Speaking of an Army sergeant accused of killing 16 Afghan civilians in a small village in March, 2012, a military psychiatrist told the *New York Times* that “With his multiple deployments and wounds, [he] seems emblematic of bigger problems: an overstretched military battered by 11 years of combat; failures by the military to properly identify and treat its weary, suffering troops; and the thin line dividing ‘normal’ behavior in war from what later is deemed ‘snapping.’ This is equivalent to what My Lai did to reveal all the problems with the conduct of the Vietnam War,” Dr. Xenakis said. “The Army will want to say that soldiers who commit crimes are rogues, that they are individual, isolated cases. But they are not.”⁴⁵

Is it not time for the United States to find more positive ways to develop its human resources and exert its influence in the world than in the endless military conflicts envisioned by the war lovers? Should we interrogate our presidents and their foreign policy advisers before elections, to discern exactly how they view the world, the benefits of peace, and the costs of war?

Table 1 Romney Foreign Policy Advisers: Positions and Affiliations (think tanks in bold)

Name	Positions, Affiliations
Cofer Black	CIA, State Department Counterterrorism (2002-2004); an executive at the private security firm Blackwater in 2005; then founded his own intelligence company. (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/bushswar/interviews/black.html#ixzz1mlyeeV4x)
Christopher Burnham	Burnham served at the United Nations under President Bush, closely associated with US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton. (<i>The Atlantic</i> , http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/10/romney-foreign-policy-bench-impreses/246450/)
Michael Chertoff	Bush administration Secretary of Homeland Security and strong defender of Bush administration anti-terror policies. (Michael Chertoff, "Make No Mistake: This Is War," <i>Washington Post</i> , April 22, 2007)
Eliot Cohen	<p>Founding Signatory of PNAC (<i>Project for The New American Century</i>, http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm); member of the American Enterprise Institute's Council of Academic Advisors (<i>American Enterprise Institute</i>, http://www.aei.org/about/council-of-academic-advisers/). Cohen teaches at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. He was a protégé of Paul Wolfowitz in the early 1990s, and served as counselor to the State Department during the last two years of the George W. Bush administration.</p> <p>After 9/11, Cohen referred to the new era as "World War IV" in the <i>Wall Street Journal</i>. "The analogy with the Cold War does, however, suggest some key features of that conflict: that it is, in fact, global; that it will involve a mixture of violent and nonviolent efforts; that it will require mobilization of skill, expertise, and resources, if not of vast numbers of soldiers; that it may go on for a long time; and that it has ideological roots." (Eliot Cohen, "World War IV," <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, November 20, 2001.)</p> <p>He strongly supported the Iraq war, though later criticized the execution of the occupation as "incompetent." Cohen signed a PNAC letter to President Bush on 9-20-2001, joining 40 other PNAC activists, which urged that, after Afghanistan, the next goal should be regime change in Iraq, which country was led by "one of the leading terrorists on the face of the earth," Saddam Hussein. "Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism." In addition, the letter argued, "any war against terrorism must target Hezbollah. We believe the administration should demand that Iran and Syria immediately cease all military, financial, and political support for Hezbollah and its operations. Should Iran and Syria refuse to comply, the administration should consider appropriate measures of retaliation against these known state sponsors of terrorism." The letter also urged strong support for Israel and a hard line on Palestinian attacks, as well as a large increase in the defense budget to prosecute the war on terror while remaining "capable of defending our interests elsewhere in the world." (PNAC, http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm)</p>

	<p>Cohen has disparaged the Obama administration's focus on diplomacy in an August 2, 2009 <i>Wall Street Journal</i> op-ed: "It has also committed itself to the fantastic notion of abolishing nuclear weapons. It took the first step along that path to nowhere by starting an arms control process with Russia, without any evidence that doing so would produce Russian cooperation on anything at all, although it would further degrade America's nuclear arsenal.... The Iranian policy shows a faith in diplomacy that might be understandable coming from process-obsessed diplomats who live for <i>démarches</i>, talking points, working groups, back channels, dialogues and summits.... Abhorring Bush's freedom agenda, it will avoid anything of the kind until, of course, being Americans, the president, the vice president or the secretary of state blurt out their faith in universal ideals, and their indignation at the behavior of thugs, dictators and tyrants." (Eliot Cohen, "What's Different About the Obama Foreign Policy?" <i>Wall Street Journal, Opinion Journal</i>, August 2, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203946904574300402608475582.html)</p> <p>Cohen is a prominent hawk on Iran. ("There are only Two Choices Left on Iran," <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, September 27, 2009).</p>
Paula Dobriansky	<p>Signatory of 1998 PNAC letter to President Clinton advocating removal of Saddam Hussein. (http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm)</p> <p>Dobriansky serves on the board of Freedom House, National Endowment for Democracy (Vice Chair), American Council of Young Political Leaders, and the American Bar Association Central/East European Law Initiative. (<i>Harvard</i>, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/experts/1979/paula_j_dobriansky.html)</p>
Eric Edelman	<p>Advisor to Dick Cheney (Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs); Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2005-9.</p> <p>In 1992, Edelman was appointed by then Defense Secretary Cheney to draft, with Paul Wolfowitz and Scooter Libby, the 1992 Draft Defense Planning Guidance, a document meant to serve as a post-Cold War framework for U.S. military strategy. A precursor of the Project for the New American Century, and the Bush National Security Strategy of 2002, the 1992 strategy document advocated that the U.S. tolerate no competition for global dominance. (Patrick Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," <i>NYT</i>, March 8, 1992 (http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/us-strategy-plan-calls-for-insuring-no-rivals-develop.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm); Nicholas Lehman, "The Next World Order," <i>New Yorker</i>, April 1, 2002).</p> <p>Edelman serves on the Board of the conservative Foreign Policy Initiative think tank with William Kristol, Robert Kagan, and Dan Senor, and is also on the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace. He is currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a senior associate of the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, and a visiting scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, directed by Elliot Cohen.</p> <p>(United States Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/experts/eric-s-edelman)</p>

Aaron Friedberg	<p>Founding Signatory of PNAC http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm)</p> <p>Professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton; Deputy assistant for National Security Affairs and Director of Policy planning for VP Cheney 2003-5. (Princeton, http://lapa.princeton.edu/people/detail.php?ID=305)</p>
Nile Gardiner	<p>Director of The Heritage Foundation's Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom; former aide to PM Thatcher. (<i>Heritage Foundation</i>, http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/g/nile-gardiner)</p> <p>An advocate of “rebuilding America’s defenses,” he accuses the Obama administration of “overseeing and implementing the biggest decline in American global power since Jimmy Carter.” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/the-decline-of-us-leadership-threatens-americas-position-as-the-worlds-superpower)</p>
Michael Hayden	<p>CIA Director, 2006-9; Joined other directors of the CIA in opposition to a proposed investigation of interrogations by the Obama administration. He was said to have been the principle architect of VP Cheney’s NSA eavesdropping plan. (NYT, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9407E5DB1439F93AA2575AC0A96F9C8B63&ref=michaelvhayden; and http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/14/washington/14nsa.html?pagewanted=2&adxn1=1&ref=michaelvhayden&adxn1x=1329595253-UacgMq44XyJKbP80YGYzMg)</p>
Kim Holmes	<p>Heritage Foundation Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, (http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/h/kim-holmes)</p>
Robert Joseph	<p>Joseph holds the position of Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy. (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, http://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/web/page/703/sectionid/574/pagelevel/3/interior.aspx).</p> <p>He served on President Bush’s National Security Council and as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security in 2005-7. In May 2010, Joseph wrote a <i>National Review</i> article with Eric Edelman arguing against President Obama’s new START Treaty with Russia (http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/229704/new-start-weakening-our-security/robert-joseph?pg=4).</p> <p>In 2002, Joseph was aligned with the hawkish Cheney-Perle-Edelman faction in the Bush administration http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2002-05-26/news/0205260165_1_perle-foreign-policy-scowcroft), and was involved in the insertion of a disputed claim (about an Iraq attempt to purchase uranium in Africa) into the president’s State of the Union speech. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/18/world/after-the-war-cia-uproar-new-details-emerge-on-uranium-claim-and-bush-s-speech.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm</p>
Robert Kagan	<p>Leading PNAC activist, <i>Weekly Standard</i> columnist, and author of numerous books on foreign policy, including <i>Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in America’s Foreign and Defense Policy</i>, with William Kristol, which laid out the concerns of neoconservatives on the eve of the Bush administration (2000); and “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” (with William Kristol), <i>Foreign Affairs</i> July/August, 1996. Kagan is now a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Bookings Institution</p>

	<p>http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/experts/kaganr/kaganr_bio.pdf</p> <p>Kagan, like other PNAC activists, insists that the U.S. must remain the preeminent superpower, with “a number of roughly equal but lesser other powers.” http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2012/0215_america_power_kagan.aspx</p>
John Lehman	<p>Secretary of the Navy under Ronald Reagan. Led Paine Webber, Inc. Aerospace and Defense Group. Signatory of PNAC 2001 letter to President Bush. http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm.</p> <p>Served on the board of the Committee on the Present Danger, a hardline defense advocacy group that worked to roll back détente policies with the Soviet Union and increase defense spending in the 1970s. http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=committee_on_the_present_danger_1</p> <p>Lehman served as president of the Abington Corporation, a lobbying firm that employed <u>Richard Perle</u> and received subcontracts from large defense contractors such as Northrop Corporation, Boeing, and TRW. (Philip H. Burch, <i>Reagan, Bush, and Right-Wing Politics</i> (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1997), pp. 19, 123, 72-73; Jeff Gerth, “Aide Urged Pentagon to Consider Weapons Made by Former Client,” <i>New York Times</i>, April 17, 1983.</p> <p>Member of the Center for Security Policy http://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/Home.aspx?CategoryID=47&SubCategoryID=50); the Board of Trustees of the Foreign Policy Research Institute; and the Partnership for a Secure America http://psaonline.org/userdata_display.php?modin=51&uid=18).</p> <p>Advocate for expansion of the Navy and harsh critic of “detentists” in the 1980s. (David Isenberg, “<i>The Illusion of Power: Aircraft Carriers and U.S. Military Strategy</i>,” Cato Institute, June 8, 1990).</p>
Walid Phares	<p>Currently on the advisory board of a pro-Israel film group that creates controversial documentaries on “Radical Islam,” the Clarion Fund. (<i>Clarion Fund</i>, http://www.radicalislam.org/content/about-clarion-fund (shown to NYC police trainees, among others). In the 1980s, Phares was a high-ranking official in a right-wing Christian Lebanese militia allied with Israel. It was accused of massacring Palestinian refugees (Adam Serwer, “Top Romney Official Tied to Militia that Massacred,” <i>Mother Jones</i>, Oct. 27, 2011. http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/10/walid-phares-mitt-romney-lebanese-forces; http://politics.salon.com/2011/10/07/romneys_scary_middle_east_advisor/</p> <p>Phares is associated with the neoconservative Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/walid-phares-testimony-before-house-subcommittee/)</p>

Dan Senior	<p>A Fox News analyst and author of <i>Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle</i>, Senior was a founder of the conservative think tank, <i>the Foreign Policy Initiative</i>, with prominent neoconservatives, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, and Eric Edelman (http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/node/79)</p> <p>Senior served in the Bush administration White House and Defense Department, but his most high-profile position was as spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority and adviser to its director, L. Paul Bremer. (<i>The Jewish Daily Forward</i>, March 24, 2010. http://www.forward.com/articles/126843/)</p>
Jim Talent	<p>Distinguished Fellow at the Heritage Foundation (Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/t/jim-talent); a former GOP Senator from Missouri, specialist on military affairs, and an opponent of reductions in the defense budget. (http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/06/obamas-2010-defense-budget-top-five-worst-choices-for-national-security)</p>
Vin Weber	<p>Signatory of PNAC letter to Bush in 2002 (http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm).</p> <p>Weber was Republican Representative from MN, 1981-93, and then president and co-director with Jack Kemp, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Bill Bennett, of Empower America, a public policy advocacy group. He has recently been described by Washingtonian magazine as no. 5 of the country's 50 top lobbyists. (http://www.clarkandweinstock.com/our_team/id.32/staff_detail.asp)</p>
Dov Zakheim	<p>Adjunct Scholar at the Heritage Foundation (<i>Defense Business Board</i>, http://dbb.defense.gov/bios/Dov_zakheim.html) Zakheim contributed to a 2000 PNAC paper, "Rebuilding America's Defenses," which "proceeds from the belief that America should seek to preserve and extend its position of global leadership by maintaining the preeminence of U.S. military forces." (http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf).</p> <p>In 1998, he signed a PNAC open letter to Clinton about the crisis in Kosovo. (http://www.newamericancentury.org/balkans_pdf_04.pdf)</p> <p>From 2001-2004 he was Under Secretary of Defense and Senior Financial Officer at the DOD. He also served on a number of government boards in the Bush administration. <i>DOD</i>, http://dbb.defense.gov/bios/Dov_zakheim.html</p>

Endnotes

1 *The War Lovers* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2010), 188. Warren Zimmerman presents a slightly different cast of characters (though all historical accounts show great overlap in these identifications). For Zimmerman, the Five Americans who "Made their Country a World Power" were TR, Lodge, John Hay, and Elihu Root (the latter two both Secretaries of State under TR; and Root was Secretary of War before, New York Senator after holding that post). Zimmerman, *First Great Triumph* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002).

2 Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); Gregg Jones, *Honor in the Dust* (NY: New American Library, 2012).

3 In one example of the controversy around "Wilsonianism," Tony Smith, a prominent historian of Wilsonian liberal internationalism, proclaimed Ronald Reagan a Wilsonian democracy promoter. To most critics, Reagan failed the test of multilateralism and collective security advocated by Wilson, and represented more clearly the unilateralist internationalism that relies on force rather than diplomacy. However, it is true that, toward the end of his administration, Reagan dramatically reversed his early bellicose style in favor of bilateral negotiation with Mikael Gorbachev. (Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994]). For one critical review of Smith's book, see

David C. Hendrickson in *Foreign Affairs*, November-December, 1994).

4 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World they Made* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1997). The group chronicled were Dean Acheson, Charles Bohlen, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Robert Lovett, and John McCloy, Jr.

5 On presidents and their Vietnam policy advisors, see in particular Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999; David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (NY: Ballantine Books, 1992); Gordon M. Goldstein, *Lessons in Disaster* (NY: Henry Holt and Co., 2008); David Milne, *America's Rasputin* (NY: Hill and Wang, 2009); John Acacia, *Clark Clifford* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009); and Andrew Preston, *The War Council* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

6 On the George W. Bush advisers, see, for example, Jane Mayer, *The Dark Side* (NY: Doubleday, 2008); Justin Vaisse, *Neoconservatives: The Biography of a Movement* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2006); and James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans* (NY: Viking, 2004).

7 *The Wise Men*, 29. See also Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter 7.

8 Thomas Langston, *Ideologues and Presidents* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), xii-xx.

9 *Ibid.*, 4-10; see also, Thomas Langston and Elizabeth Sanders, "Explaining Ideological Intensity in the Modern Presidency: The Case of George W. Bush," unpublished conference paper, 2005, especially tables 1-4.

10 Langston, *Ideologues and Presidents*, 1-2.

11 Andrew Rich, *Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4. Rich, writing in 2005, identifies 306 "independent" think tanks not affiliated with universities or government, 81 percent of them formed since 1970 (pp. 13-16).

12 This discussion draws on John Ehrman, *The Rise of Neoconservatism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Langston, *Ideologues and Presidents*; and Langston and Sanders, "Explaining Ideological Intensity."

13 *Ibid.*, 20.

14 Andrew Rich, "War of Ideas: Why Mainstream and Liberal Foundations and the Think Tanks they Support are Losing in the War of Ideas in American Politics," *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, Spring 2005 http://www.ssireview.org/pdf/2005SP_feature_rich.pdf, 18-24. "Think tanks on the left tend to be organized by issue area – around women's issues, poverty, or the environment – rather than taking on the broad range of issues with which Congress and the president deal," the author writes (22). A research director at a new progressive think tank told Rich, "If you're on the left, you have to go to the foundations and say you're neutral, unbiased – not politicized. You're certainly not liberal. If you're ideological, they don't want to support you. It's frustrating – because, by contrast, if you're on the right, the foundations will only fund you if you toe the ideological line, if you want to do battle for the conservative cause." (24).

15 Foundation for Public Affairs, *Public Interest Profiles*, 1988-89, and 1998-99 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1989, and 1999). Henceforth cited by year of publication and page number.

16 Donald E. Abelson and Evert A. Lindquist, "Think Tanks in North America," in James G. McCann and R. Kent Weaver, *Think Tanks and Civil Societies* (Piscataway, New Jersey: Transaction), table 46-47.

17 Fred M. Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983). AEI has a 12th floor conference center named for Wohlstetter.

18 Langston and Sanders, table 4. By our calculations, using data from *Public Interest Profiles*, conservative think tank net assets were about \$480 million in 2002, compared to 350 million for the liberal think tanks.

19 Langston, *Ideologues and Presidents*, xi-26.

20 Thirty two members of the CPD (including the president himself) served in the Reagan administration. Lawrence Wittner, "Reagan and Nuclear Disarmament," *Boston Review*, April/May, 2000. <http://bostonreview.net/BR25.2/wittner.html>

21 Frances Fitzgerald, *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Touchstone, 2000), 108-109, 156-57.

22 The remarkable story is told compellingly by Beth Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2000); Francis Fitzgerald, *Way Out There in the Blue*, 416-17; and Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Warriors: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). The extreme hawks who left the Reagan administration in 1987 were Richard Perle, Kenneth Adelman, and Frank Gaffney. Among the "relieved pragmatists" were Secretary of State George Schultz, National Security Adviser

23 The role of conservative think tanks in providing a home and income for ideologues when the times are not propitious for them calls up Verta Taylor's term, "abeyance structures," in her article, "Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement in Abeyance," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 54, no. 5 (Oct. 1989), 761.

24 White House release, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070215-1.html>.

25 http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/weekly_standard.

26 On the fatal errors made by Defense Department ideologues in Iraq, see, for example, Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco* (New York: Penguin Press, 2007).

27 Josh Rogin, "Romney Creates Shadow National Security Council," *The Cable*, October 6, 2011 (http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/06/romney_creates_shadow_national_security_council); "An American Century: A Strategy to Secure America's Enduring Interests and Ideals." A Romney for President White Paper, with a Foreword by Eliot Cohen, October 7, 2011 <http://www.mittromney.com/sites/default/files/shared/>

- Stephen M. Walt, "Romney Flunks Foreign Policy—Again," *Foreign Policy* online , November 1, 2011 (http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/01/romney_flunks_foreign_policy_again).
- 28 Rogin, "Romney Creates Shadow National Security Council." Conservative think tanks are among the strongest voices in opposition to cuts in the defense budget, according to Josh Rogan. See his "Conservative Think Tanks oppose Republican Efforts to Trim Defense Budget," *Foreign Policy*, Oct 4, 2010. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/04/conservative_think_tanks_oppose_republican_efforts_to_trim_defense_budget
- 29 (Transcript) NPR Staff, "Is It Time to Clip America's Wings?" Intelligence Squared U.S. Debate at New York University, April 5, 2011. On the left in the debate were Peter Galbraith and Lawrence Korb. Elliott Abrams, one of the most controversial of the Reagan hawks, was convicted in 1991 of two misdemeanor counts for withholding information from Congress in the Iran-Contra investigations; he was pardoned by the first president Bush, and went on to serve in the administration of George W. Bush. Abrams was apparently too controversial for formal inclusion in the Romney team, but he has contributed to the campaign with an aggressive, and (other conservatives claimed), misleading, attack on Newt Gingrich in the *National Review*. (Jeffrey Lord, "Elliott Abrams Caught Misleading on Newt," The Spectacle Blog, <http://spectator.org/blog/2012/01/27/elliott-abrams-caught-mislead/print>).
- 30 Jonathan D. Tepperman, "Salvador in Iraq: Flashback," *Foreign Affairs* April 5, 2005 <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/salvador-iraq-flash-back/p7988>. Writes Tepperman, "During El Salvador's bloody twelve-year civil war, which ended in 1992, the United States had used American trainers and vast amounts of cash to strengthen the Salvadoran military in its battle against leftist guerrillas. It had also allegedly supported the use of right-wing paramilitaries and death squads to liquidate the leaders of the rebellion. And it was this latter policy, the [New York Times] articles claimed, that was now being contemplated for Iraq: the creation of elite commando units, trained by American Special Operations Forces, and made up of Shia militiamen and Kurdish *peshmerga*, to hunt down leaders of the Sunni insurgency. When asked, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stopped short of categorically denying the Salvador option, but refused to comment further."
- 31 Ibid, 2.
- 32 Eliot Cohen, "Obama's Coin Toss," AEI, December 6, 2009. <http://www.aei.org/policy/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/india-pakistan-afghanistan/>
- 33 Mark Mazzetti and Thom Shanker, "Pentagon finds Perils for U.S. if Israel Were to Strike Iran," *New York Times*, March 19, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/world/middleeast/united-states-war-game-sees-dire-results-of-an-israeli-attack-on-iran.html?_r=1&hp; John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "Why Mr. Obama Must Take a Stand Against Israel over Iran," *Financial Times*, March 5, 2012.
- 34 After Moammar Gaddafi announced in December of 2003 his willingness to negotiate, "inspectors from the United States, United Kingdom, and international organizations worked to dismantle Libya's chemical and nuclear weapons programs, as well as its longest-range ballistic missiles. Washington also took steps toward normalizing its bilateral relations with Tripoli, which had essentially been cut off in 1981," Arms Control Association, "Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States," <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronolog>
- 35 Gerald Pomper, with Susan S. Lederman, *Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Longman, 1980).
- 36 Rahul Desai, "Midterm Loss: Examining the Relationship between Presidential Agendas and Midterm Election Outcomes." Unpublished Honors Thesis, Department of Government, Cornell University, 2010.
- 37 One of the most comprehensive and persuasive studies confirming this sort of political war making is Benjamin Fordham, "Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (August 1998), 418-39.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Dan Balz, "Rove Offers Republicans a Battle Plan for Elections," *Washington Post*, January 21, 2006. According to the Post, the same war-focused campaign was planned for the 2006 midterms. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/20/AR2006012001853.html>
- 40 Stephen Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997).
- 41 Mark Kesselman, Rally Around the Calendar, unpublished honors thesis, Department of Government, Cornell University, 1993.
- 42 Jonathan Steele, "Israel asked Bush for Green Light to Bomb Nuclear Sites in Iran," *The Guardian* (UK), September 25, 2008. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/25/iran.israelandthepalestinians1>
- 43 Thomas, *The War Lovers*, 404-6.
- 44 David M. Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). Edelstein finds only 7 successes in 26 military occupations by single or multiple nations since 1815.
- 45 James Dao, "Town Asks How 'Our Bobby' Became War Crime Suspect," *New York Times*, March 18, 2012 (Quoting Dr. Stephen Xenakis). <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/19/us/sgt-robert-bales-from-small-town-ohio-to-afghanistan.html?hp>.

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