U.S. Engagement and the Conditions for China’s Socialization into the Liberal International Order: The Case of U.S.-China Engagement on Global Climate Governance

A long-standing narrative in U.S. engagement policy toward China draws a tacit causal link between engagement and Beijing’s socialization into the U.S.-led liberal international order (LIO).1 Amid recent decreasing faith in engagement, this article constructs a framework tailored to explaining the conditions for China’s state socialization into the hege-monic order when the U.S. tries to engage China. It contends that the socialization of a still-rising China is an arduous cause that hinges on four conditions: the accommodation of China’s interests in international institutions, the existence of a problematic situation, status recognition, and the absence of obstacles to domestic internalization. To test the socialization premise, the article applies the framework to a theoretically most-likely case of China’s socialization—U.S. post-2009 engagement with China on global climate governance. It finds that despite some ambiguous signs of state socialization, China’s adoption of the U.S.-pro- moted co-leader identity was primarily rooted in domestic changes in interest perception and was thwarted by domestic obstacles—economic development and energy security—to the internalization of the idea of Chinese climate leadership.

interests, ignores those that do not, and reshapes or subverts those that undermine the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) legitimacy.7This dynamic highlights the challenge of finding which policies of engagement will induce Beijing's socialization into the institutions of the LIO.
The objective of the article is thus to examine the validity and conditionality of the socialization premise underpinning U.S. engagement with China under "Wendtian constructivism".8 The premise implies that engagement with China can produce China's compliance with, and eventual socialization into the LIO through the development of a shared identity between the two countries.For Wendtian constructivism, this shared identity is necessary for the cultivation of collective identity among states and progress in an anarchic international system.To test the socialization premise, the study relies on a most-likely case study research design, namely the examination of a case most likely to conform to a hypothesis/theory.The approach is "based on the assumption that some cases are more important than others for the purposes of testing a theory."9 If one's expectations are likely to fit the theory, but if data conflicts with these expectations, the "result can be quite damaging to the theory."10 U.S.-China engagement on climate change is singled out as a most-likely case for China's state socialization in the LIO on two grounds.First, the U.S. adopted a proactive approach, persuading China into accepting a legally binding international climate agreement and global climate co-leadership.Second, engagement with China from 2009 to 2015 ensured China's accession to the legally binding Paris Agreement; China has post hoc articulated a leader-like identity in global climate gover-nance, shifting from a long-standing defensive approach to a more proactive diplomatic posture in global climate governance.The transition is not to be read as evidence of China's complete socialization into the co-leader role, yet it signifies not only Beijing's unusual compliance with U.S. expectations after close engagement, but also the development of a seemingly shared identity between Washington and Beijing.
The next section develops a theoretical framework that underscores four conditions under which socialization may be a valid premise in the case of U.S.-China engagement: the accommodation of China's interests in international institutions, the existence of a problematic situation, status recognition, and the absence of obstacles to domestic internalization.Status recognition applies the framework to the case of U.S.-China global climate governance to test the validity of the socialization premise with a focus on the four hypothetical conditions.It finds that although China's climate diplomacy underwent a pro-environment shift after close engagement with the U.S., the rise of a new leadership-oriented identity intimately coincided with China's increased desire to assert international status after its leadership succession in 2013.However, this newfound identity is hindered by domestic obstacles to internalization, such as economic development and energy security.Thus, socialization can be attributed as secondary to domestic origins of such an identity.The final section summarizes the findings and suggests that the association between engagement and China's state socialization into the LIO exaggerates the transformative power of socialization.As China's domestic interests continue to shape its interaction with the LIO, an engagement policy that aims to persuade China into the LIO is sure to be challenging, the success of which needs to be based on a realistic assessment of the conditions for socialization, especially China's domestic politics.Thus, the U.S. 's engagement policy may need to switch to a pragmatic form that employs diverse policy instruments aimed at different objectives in different situations.
The theoretical section first justifies why there needs to be a framework tailored to the conditions for China's state socialization into the LIO through U.S. engagement in relation to international relations (IR) literature on the conditions for socialization.This body of scholarship predominantly revolves around hegemonic socialization of secondary states and institutional socialization in highly normative environments, yet it falls short of a framework to explain hegemonic socialization of an emerging power.The second part defines the concept of state socialization as an elite-driven process of inducting China into ideas that originate elsewhere.The third part explicates the four conditions conducive to China's state socialization.

The Conditions for Socialization in IR Literature
Literature on the conditions for socialization can be divided into two major strands.The first strand is inspired by realist research and focuses on the conditions for state socialization when the hegemon tries to ensure commitments from lesser states.Ikenberry and Kupchan noted three conditions for the socialization of secondary states in a hegemonic international order: the coincidence between international change and domestic crisis, elite support, and power coercion.11Similarly, Wang also contended that secondary states would be socialized into hegemon-promoted ideas only if their ruling elites are motivated to propagate these ideas out of self-interest and when external events gradually shape public opinions in favor of hegemonic ideas.12By contrast, the second strand on institutional socialization suggests many hypotheses, which can be divided according to a revised version of Checkel's differentiation: properties of the context of socialization; properties of the political systems and agents that become socialized, properties of the issues and norms, and the properties of the interaction between socializing and socialized agents.13 In the first cluster, Johnston noted that individual state agents' proneness toward socialization is shaped by their autonomy.14Certain organizational characteristics such as organizational function, specification, and identity will have different effects on socialization.Novel and crisis situations are also presumed to be conducive to socialization, as state agents are cognitively motivated to digest new information when faced with uncertain events.15 In the second group, Checkel's,16 Schimmelfennig's,17 and Hooghe's18 research drew attention to the characteristics of domestic political structures and domestic party constellations.Checkel theorized that countries with liberal domestic structures are more likely to be socialized through subnational, societal pressure, whereas elite learning is the pri-mary pathway to socialization in more authoritarian countries.19Examining domestic politics, Schimmelfennig's research on European Union (EU) membership conditionality showed that states tend to be socialized primarily out of strategic calculation.20Furthermore, countries with a more liberal or mixed-party arrangement tend to support democratic reforms, while countries with a nationalist-authoritarian arrangement are generally skeptical of liberal reforms.21Similarly, Hooghe's research found that domestic institutions also shape state agents' propensity to supranational socialization, with representatives from federal countries favoring supranationalism but representatives from non-federal countries favoring national interests.22Nevertheless, the inclination to defend national interests can be mediated when states crave international legitimacy, as pro-socialization elites rationally align their values with international ideas to obtain the benefits of international legitimacy.23 Regarding the qualities of issues and norms, Finnemore and Sikkink hypothesized that prominent, clear and specific norms are more likely to trigger socialization and spread internationally.24Hooghe's study also confirmed that large and diffuse issues are conducive to state agents' supranational socialization because such issues entail uncertain and wide-ranging consequences that cannot be evaluated through rational cost-benefit calculation.25Explicit and sizable material stakes also encourage socialization because the internalization of international norms provides clear material outcomes that can be measured with some accuracy.26However, when national representatives in the EU encounter unclear norms, the instability of norms will weaken socialization because such norms discourage socializees' preference formation.27 The final category of hypotheses addresses the properties of the interaction.In this literature, a widely examined claim posits that socialization is more likely when socializing and socialized agents share a high degree of trust, which is contingent on at least three factors.First, the actor undergoing socialization should have few prior beliefs inconsistent with the persuader's message.28 The second draws from social identity theory, postulating that a sufficient degree of mutual trust between the socializer and socializee is a function of the socializee's desire to be recognized by the socializer as a rightful member of a community.29Consequently, elites from the to-be-socialized country engage in constant ingroup social categorization with external socializers aligning their prior beliefs and conduct with group standards.30 The third factor concerns the credibility of the socializer: the socializer should be an authoritative member of a community.31Additional variables are the iteration of interaction32 and insulation from domestic politics that allows national representatives sufficient autonomy to internalize international ideas in an environment uninfluenced by domestic politics.33 In summary, the existing literature underscores the conditions for either hegemonic socialization of secondary states or micro-level socialization of state agents in institutionalized environments.China, however, presents a rather sui generis case.Beijing has been traditionally averse to external influence, and also possesses a growing capacity to deflect hegemonic socialization.While the applicability of the conditions for micro-level socialization drawn from EU experiences is also questionable, as China's socialization into the LIO occurs in an anarchical setting characterized by both the lack of we-ness and the potential for a power transition.Therefore, what is missing in the existing literature is a framework that specifically addresses the conditions for the socialization of a rising great power that can both resist hegemonic socialization and hold tight to its domestic interests.

China's State Socialization
Kai Anderson defines state socialization as "the process by which states internalize norms originating elsewhere in the international system."34 The content of state socialization is therefore limited to norms defined as "explicit beliefs or implicit assumptions about what actions are possible, permissible, or advisable…in interaction with other entities."35 Internalization is a normative, political, and institutional three-stage process.36State officials first change their personal beliefs; socialized officials try to persuade other domestic actors to comply with international expectations through a process of bureaucratic politics.At the deepest level, the state institutionalizes norms by creating corresponding legislations, establishing bureaucratic actors to enforce them, and spreading norms to the entire polity and society.Following Anderson's definition, China's state socialization is treated as an elite-driven process as China is inducted into the U.S.-articulated norms by recalibrating certain aspects of its identity, interest, and behavior.The reasons are twofold.First is that the objective is to explain the absence or occurrence of the socialization process, not to comprehensively measure China's degree of domestic internalization.Second is that despite facing challenges from vertical and horizontal contestation, CCP elites are the primary gatekeeper between international ideas and domestic internalization.Because first-hand materials concerning Chinese leaders' beliefs change and domestic bureaucratic deliberation on international ideas are inaccessible, the study cannot address China's domestic deliberation on international ideas.Instead, it concentrates on scrutinizing whether U.S. engagement can induce change in belief and to what extent belief change is able to trigger behavioral and institutional adjustments.

How China May Be Socialized in the LIO through U.S. Engagement
As the hegemonic socializer, Washington would strategically interpret international institutions to suit its interests, while China's elite-driven socialization is rooted in a realistic assessment of the CCP's legitimacy and the nation's interests.Chinese elites would be open to international ideas when they could profit from costly domestic changes.
First, China may be socialized when relevant international institutions accommodate China's interests in the LIO.International institutions are often celebrated for their ability to mediate international anarchy and induce states' compliance with international arrangements.Their constraining effects stem from two sources: they provide self-interested states with the incentives to temporarily rein in their appetite for power and security in exchange for limited certainty and stability;37 they re- structure states' fundamental beliefs by normalizing international cooperation.38 In the case of a rising great power, the provision of material incentives for compliance and socialization into international institutions is epiphenomenal to power transition.From a structural point of view, when existing international institutions are incompatible with the rising power's international ambition, non-compliance with and revisionism toward the hegemon-led international order will result.39Thus, only when relevant international institutions do not fundamentally contradict China's domestic interests and international ambitions will China be willing to evaluate international ideas, as the country would stand to gain from participating in the existing institutional architecture.
Second, China may be socialized when there exists a domestic problematic situation that calls for a recalibration of the existing identity.The concept of problematic situations originates from social psychology and is used here as a metaphorical device.As defined by Mead, a problematic situation refers to a disjuncture between the long-held goals, strategies, and instruments of an individual and the external environment.40 The disequilibrium arises when the actor realizes that the existing identity and routines no longer serve its interests, as the external environment evolves in unpredictable ways.To restore equilibrium, the actor would question the previous identity and creatively construct a new one.In other words, one's identity change is preceded by utility change, as the newly arising situation problematizes previous routines.The sources of the new identity could either be the actor's endogenous social knowledge or exogenous behavioral norms expected by others.
In IR, moments of instability, such as unforeseen events, regime changes, and international norm diffusion that call into question an existing policy or identity, are analogous to problematic situations described by Mead.When a state is faced with a disjuncture between its old routines and a new internal or external environment, it is prone to search for policy alternatives, either domestic or international, to cope with the situation.If a state chooses to internalize international norms, it is then state socialization that allows the state to overcome the problematic situation.Without a stable identity, a nation would be in a state of ontological security-seeking; it cannot effectively relate ends to means and thus does not know how to pursue its ends.41The analogy is pronounced in the Chinese case.This is because, due to the country's suspicious attitude toward external ideational influence, the momentum for socialization is most likely to originate from an internal utility change that demands a new identity to optimize China's interests in a new situation.Thus, Beijing would be prompted to either explore a new alternative from within or internalize international ideas articulated by trusted socializers to stabilize a new identity.
Third, China may be socialized when U.S.-promoted norms give social recognition to China's rising status, as status recognition would drive China to categorize the U.S. as a situational in-group member.The concept of social categorization is derived from social identity theory, which suggests that actors attach high value to the social group that they belong to and derive their self-esteem from social comparisons with other groups.42If group membership generates consistent positive feelings, actors are prone to identify with and organize their behavior around the norms and rules laid down by their group identity.Thus, a sense of weness is a condition conducive to socialization.Socializers whom actors classify under the we-category become significant others in social interaction, as agents are more likely to take group norms articulated by socializers with whom they have positive affinities.
The self-and other-categorization hypothesis as a precondition for so- cialization also has implications for understanding socialization in IR.A state's various identities connote which social categories that state belongs to.The famous democratic peace theory is an ideal case in point.Adherents of this paradigm endorse the argument that democratic states maintain amiable relationships due to their shared democratic identity that withholds them from slipping down a course of hostility; presumably, democratic states are less suspicious of each other's intentions and more willing to share the views of their peers.For a rising authoritarian power like China, the primary utility shaping how it categorizes the socializer is not the pursuit of legitimate statehood as a democracy but international prestige arising from status recognition.43When its rising status is acknowledged, China is more likely to categorize external socializers positively and consider norms articulated by these actors.
Fourth, China may be socialized if there are no salient domestic obstacles to its domestic internalization.When domestic elites socialized into international norms begin to promulgate these ideas in the domestic realm, the internalization process requires them to take "the role of others by using symbols to put oneself in another's place and to view the world as others do."44 An actor's ability to empathetically relate to others' feelings is crucial to the social construction of a new identity expected by others.This is because when an actor's perspective-taking ability is adequate, it can come to terms with how others locate itself and expectations for its behavior, thereby acquiring a new identity.Consequently, the community exercises control over the socializee by teaching it the proper ways of conduct.When there exist salient obstacles to domestic internalization, the socializee is overburdened with social demands, and socialization is undermined.
Because internalizing a new behavioral norm is costly for states, salient domestic constraints would prevent policymakers from revising a policy.Institutions, elite politics, and ideas-the three main domestic sources of foreign policy-may hinder domestic internalization.45In the case of China, regime security is China's main institutional barrier to domestic internalization because CCP elites with policymaking privileges want to preserve fundamental political and economic institutions to maintain the CCP's power.Elite politics is comparatively more volatile.The fragmentation within the Chinese bureaucratic system originates from the contestation among Chinese elites at the horizontal level.If domestic contestation over international ideas is high, domestic internalization would be discounted.As for ideas, entrenched ideational traditions in China's identity can also obstruct domestic internalization.As Shih notes, socialism, peaceful coexistence, and anti-hegemony are the three traditions central to China's foreign policy.46After China's economic reforms, regime legitimacy and economic development have evolved from anti-hegemony and ideological socialism.These developments reflect Beijing's desire to project a responsible image.If international norms are compatible with Beijing's self-conceived regime security, Beijing may take the perspective of others to improve its international reputation.However, entrenched ideas may undermine China's role taking if international norms are considered threatening to China's ontological security.show that participation in the UNFCCC did not contradict China's fundamental interests.The second part draws attention to China's domestic problematization of its conventional defensive approach to global climate governance.It argues that the existence of a domestic problematic situation arising from the interplay between critical junctures, namely a domestic realization of the seriousness of climate change and the pursuit of international status, laid the groundwork for U.S.-China interaction on climate change and China's proactive diplomatic posture in global climate governance.The third part traces the process of U.S.-China interaction to show that status recognition by the U.S. facilitated the transmission of the idea of climate co-leadership to Beijing.The last part explains China's limited socialization by highlighting two salient domestic obstacles that undermine China's domestic internalization, which are economic development and energy security.

China's Pre-2009 Attitude toward the United Nations (UN) Climate Regime
Since the politicization of climate change, Beijing's attitude toward the issue has been a process of passive adaptation in response to international developments.The country's stance on global climate governance was opaque throughout the negotiations leading up to the creation of the UNFCCC in 1992.At the 1979 First World Climate Conference, several Chinese scientists submitted a paper discussing methods of exploiting climate resources to boost agricultural development.Partly due to a lack of knowledge about climate change, they showed little interest in recognizing global warming and its environmental consequences as an existential threat.In the 1980s, Chinese scientists organized numerous research efforts in collaboration with the international scientific community.Unfortunately, limited scientific activism was watered down by domestic constraints, such as economic modernization, demands for cheap energy, and political conservatism.47  principles for international environmental negotiations: environmental protection should not come at the expense of economic development; developed countries hold historical responsibilities for climate change and environmental degradation, whereas China does not; developed countries should provide resources for implementing international agreements to compensate for their historical responsibilities; developed countries should develop mechanisms and programs to address environmental issues; the sovereignty of natural resource rights must be respected.48China's climate diplomacy thus followed two lines: upholding the common but varied responsibilities principle enshrined in the UNFCCC and emphasizing China's status as a developing country to reject legally binding commitments that require China to undertake international responsibilities, and emphasizing developed countries' historical responsibilities and calling on them to take the responsibility of providing financial and technological support.In hindsight, the UNFCCC-centered global climate regime was not in fundamental conflict with China's interests, but rather provided some benefits needed for China to alleviate domestic climate issues.Through China's socialization into the idea of global climate governance, Beijing gradually recognized the repercussions of global warming for its domestic development and security.Consequently, Beijing organized a national response to international negotiations and realized the need to create a domestic climate regime, as its unrestrained development model became increasingly unsustainable.It also drove China to adapt to evolving international negotiations.Despite the normativity of global climate governance, China's domestic development agenda evidently determined the extent of its international activity.The centrality of economic development belied Beijing's skepticism and rejection of legally binding international commitments.

The Problematization of China's Participant Identity
Although China's negotiation stance was widely perceived as defensive, the country had already emerged as a major participant in global climate governance after years of engagement in the UNFCCC.Its participant identity was characterized by reluctance in international negotiations but incremental climate actions at home.However, the identity was gradually called into question starting in 2007; a change attributable to the interplay between critical junctures-a policy recognition of the importance of climate change for China's interests, and a growing need to assert international status.Therefore, a conservative approach no longer served China's international and domestic interests in an ever-changing environment.
The first critical juncture was China's newly acquired status as the world's largest national source of greenhouse gasses (GHG) after it surpassed the U.S. in 2006.51This pivotal development put China under the global spotlight.To fend off negative attention and prevent climate change from derailing China's economy, Beijing engaged in a series of domestic actions.52Meanwhile, Chinese policymakers also began to acknowledge the adverse impacts of climate change on China's core interests, especially political and economic stability, leading to urgency for tougher climate actions.In the 2007 China's National Climate Change Program, the NDRC openly admitted that the country was not only vulnerable to climate change due to its reliance on coal, population size, low level of economic development, and other natural fragilities, but also could suffer from the impacts of climate change in a number of sectors, such as agriculture, animal husbandry, and water security.53However, China's climate diplomacy had yet to catch up with its domestic activism.In interviews, the heads of the China Meteorological Administration, Qin Dahe and Zheng Guoguang, acknowledged that while global warming is a real threat, China should prioritize pursuing domestic adaptation and mitigation instead of simply reducing GHG emissions.54Thisview was soon incorporated as one of six principles of China's official stance on global climate governance.At the 78th ministerial meeting of Group 24 in 2007, China's Vice Minister of Finance Li Yong reiterated 6 principles of China's international climate policy: sustainable development, the common but differentiated responsibilities principle, attaching equal importance to mitigation and adaptation, organically combining climate policy and other policies, relying on technological advancement and innovation, and active participation and wide cooperation.55The principles indicated a mild departure from China's conventional negotiation stance.Nonetheless, it showed that Beijing was willing to engage in some voluntary domestic actions but refrained from assuming any diplomatic leadership.
China's new stance persisted into the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, but the failure of the Summit to create a successor treaty to the Kyoto regime again put China under a negative spotlight.China and other major developing countries vigorously defended their rights to economic development.China in particular rejected a legally binding post-Kyoto climate regime that would require it to make reduction commitments, which was criticized by leaders of developed nations and Western media.56Although China did not officially relax its stance in response to negative international attention, some signs of Chinese international climate activism emerged after the Summit, as international status began to surface as a new factor in China's approach to global climate governance.Some policy advisers openly debated China's new identity in global climate governance, and there were notable disagreements over the extent of China's future international climate activism.For example, Hu Angang and Guan Qingyou, professors at Tsinghua University, argued that China should not only actively shape the norms and rules of global climate governance but also make reduction commitments in order to rise 'greenly' ( ).57On the other hand, Wang Jisi, a senior 'U.S. hand, ' stated that "China should actively participate in international climate cooperation, but China's role is a guiding role ( , added by the author), not a leadership role."58 In Jisi's view, China adopting a 'guiding role' meant coordinating divergent interests and putting

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forward new proposals before an international binding agreement..59 During this time, Beijing's identity conceptions were under transition, with priority for both the realization of the potential impacts of climate change and the tactical preference to insulate Chinese national interests from international pressure, while international status was a secondary consideration.
Starting in 2013, projecting China's international status and image has been gradually elevated to the center of Beijing's climate diplomacy.The Xi Administration has introduced three distinctive shifts to China's foreign policy: from an emphasis on economic development to building a favorable external environment, from avoiding leadership to undertaking international responsibilities, and from a monolithic emphasis on economic benefits to prioritizing international status and image.6061 The rationale behind the rhetorical identity change was attributed to the need to establish China's "discourse power" in shaping international norms.62Clearly, international status was elevated from a contested scholarly issue to a concrete component in China's climate policy after 2013.

U.S.-China Interaction (2009 to 2015)
The compatibility between the UNFCCC and China's domestic interests and the problematization of China's long-upheld international climate policy that called for more active Chinese involvement prepared the ground for U.S. engagement with China.When the Obama administration assumed power, the U.S. climate leadership image had been tarnished due to the Bush administration's approach suspicious of global climate governance.To rescue the U.S. 's global climate leadership, the Obama administration devised a bold domestic and international climate agenda; the international part of the agenda required persuading China into accepting a legally binding post-Kyoto climate agreement and playing a co-leader role.As the 2009 Copenhagen Summit was scheduled to convene in December 2009, the Obama administration hastened its engagement in the hope of securing meaningful commitments on the part of Beijing.A month before the Summit, U.S. President Obama made a 'last-minute' state visit to Beijing to meet with his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, with climate change being one of the major issues of bilateral discussion.However, the visit fell short of producing any qualitative progress.Aside from issuing a joint statement and agreeing to expand bilateral and mul- tilateral cooperation, both sides merely reiterated the importance of the earlier Bali Action Plan and domestic mitigation actions based on respective national circumstances without specifying any goals or ways to achieve a legally binding agreement in Copenhagen.

The first area of cooperation between the two sides started with the establishment of a clean energy research center after Commerce Secretary Gary Locke and Energy Secretary Steven
The subsequent three years of interaction progressed along a business-as-usual trajectory with some headway in bilateral cooperation but no qualitative shift in multilateral negotiations.Bilaterally, the 2010, 2011, and 2012 S&EDs revolved around the implementation of the 2009 Memorandum of Understanding and the 2008 Ten-year Framework.Multilaterally, both sides reiterated their willingness to support the UN-centered negotiation process, but no detailed roadmap was devised to set out how to contribute to a new legally binding agreement.In particular, the 2011 COP-18 launched the Durban Platform, which initiated a process for the negotiation of a new legally binding international climate agreement.The new objective received only marginal and rhetorical mention in bilateral negotiations throughout 2012.The 2012 joint statement of the S&ED vaguely stipulated that both countries "decided to work together constructively to implement the outcomes reached in Cancun and Durban and to achieve a positive outcome at the UN Climate Conference in Doha."64 The absence of meaningful bilateral cooperation over UN climate negotiations implicitly indicated that accepting a binding treaty was a contentious issue in bilateral interaction, as Beijing was not yet ready to accept a co-leader role.
Major breakthroughs occurred in 2013 and 2014 after the leadership succession in early 2013.The Xi Administration formally brought forward a new foreign policy agenda for China.The second internal change that facilitated the post-2013 breakthroughs was the advent of the New Type of Major Power Relations (NTMPR) notion, which was specifically meant to characterize U.S.-China relations as a great power relationship based on trust and mutual respect rather than confrontation.The two internal changes that grew out of the leadership succession created a brief moment of trust that nourished a cooperative atmosphere.The Chinese side started to frame U.S.-China climate cooperation as a practice of building an NTMPR due to the compatibility between the U.S.-promoted co-leader identity that recognized China's status, the elevated importance of international status in China's foreign policy, and the need for a new international climate policy.In Xi's meeting with Obama at Sunnylands in 2013, Xi summarized the idea of the U.S.-China NTMPR with three points-mutual respect, win-win cooperation, and neither a confrontation nor a conflict.65Climate change was regarded as a new niche to be tapped into in the construction of a U.S.-China NTMPR.
These new changes on the part of China soon translated into new breakthroughs in U.S.-China climate cooperation.In April 2013, a joint statement on climate change that announced their intention to establish a Climate Change Working Group (CCWG) at the upcoming 2013 S&ED was issued after John Kerry's visit to Beijing as newly appointed Secretary of State.66Additionally, Washington and Beijing also decided to promote climate change from the ministerial level to a higher level at the 2013 S&ED.As a result, the following Xi-Obama meeting at Sunnylands reaffirmed the need to upgrade bilateral ties in climate change to the top level.During the S&ED in July 2013, the CCWG led by Todd Stern, U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, and Xie Zhenhua, the Vice Chairman of the NDRC, was established with a focus on both implementing bilateral proposals and developing recommendations for both countries' domestic and international climate policy.67 The cause of persuading China into a post-2020 legally binding agreement made a breakthrough after the Xi-Obama Summit in 2014.The Summit led to a joint announcement where both countries agreed to collaboratively reach a legally binding international treaty in 2015, a historic departure from China's defensive approach to global climate governance.68During the 2014 S&ED, the CCWG held a special session on enhanced policy dialogue to coordinate both countries' plans for the post-Kyoto treaty negotiations.It was reported that the historic 2014 joint announcement that signaled China's adoption of a legally binding agreement arose from a personal letter by Obama to Xi in the spring of 2013.69In the letter, the idea of setting joint reduction targets to facilitate international efforts to combat climate change was brought up for the first time.His proposal began to materialize when Kerry visited Beijing in February 2014, during which he floated the idea of setting joint reduction targets to several Chinese officials.The visit spurred a wave of diplomatic interactions and culminated in an encounter between Obama and Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli at the 2014 UN Climate Summit.Zhang told Obama that Xi was receptive to the idea of moving bilateral cooperation forward, which led Obama to send a team of negotiators to Beijing in November 2014.
During the 2015 S&ED and Xi's subsequent state visit to Washington, both countries reassured each other about their commitments to working together to support a new international climate treaty and strengthening policy coordination.The Xi-Obama meeting also produced a third U.S.-China joint statement on climate change that further specified goals and steps to achieve a binding agreement at the Paris Summit, including the importance of a transparency mechanism, adaptation, financial and technology support, and so on.70Beijing also decided to put aside 20 billion yuan ($3.2 billion USD) to set up the China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund to support other developing countries to combat climate change, a crucial component of its yinling zhe ( or the one that takes the lead) identity.Additionally, the Paris Climate Summit in November 2015 was attended by both Obama and Xi.
As suggested by the above discussions, the U.S.-China bilateral interaction was a major contributing force to China's agreement to a legally binding international agreement that requires it to make GHG reduction commitments and advances the idea of global climate co-leadership.The outcome was possible because of co-leader expectations that recognized China's status, the bolstered importance of international status in China's foreign policy, and the pursuit of a harmonious and equal U.S.-China relationship based on the concept of NTMPR after the problematization of the participant identity.

Domestic Obstacles to Internalizing the Climate Leader Identity
To give a visual presentation of China's evolving official rhetoric on climate change, this study ran a structural topic model71 on 418 People's Daily climate change-related commentary articles published from 2007 to 2021 and organized the topics into three major categories.Figure 1 illustrates the changing prevalence of the three categories.The discussion on responsibility allocation centered on the common but differentiated responsibilities principle, which constituted the core of China's previous defensive approach to global climate governance.As shown in the graph, its prevalence declined after 2009, while the emphasis on China's The attention devoted to China's international role in global climate governance was constant during the period, but the content shifted from participation in the UNFCCC to a more yinling zhe identity.Nevertheless, it is believed that Xi's formal pledge to take the driving seat in global climate governance was part of a strategic response to Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in order to fill the power vacuum left by the U.S.73 Moreover, China's role dropped in prevalence after 2019.
[72] "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, " transcript, Xinhua News, October 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping%27s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf, 4.
[73] Roselyn Hsueh, "Why Is China Suddenly Leading the Climate Change Effort?It's As the CCP's most authoritative mouthpiece newspaper, the sudden drop in propagandistic attention to such a high-profile proclamation is unusual.This suggests that the shift of attention is not a simple diversion of attention to the global pandemic, but rather a subtle reflection of Beijing's temporary withdrawal from international climate leadership.In Xi's speech to the 20th CCP National Congress in 2022, he made no mention of yinling or taking the driving seat in global climate governance.Instead, he merely stated that China will "get actively involved in global governance in response to climate change." 74 The inconsistency between Xi's speech last year and his high-profile redefinition of China's role in global climate governance in 2017 is an obvious sign of toning down China's newfound climate leadership, implying that there may be domestic impediments constraining its internalization.
Instead of offering a thorough causal analysis of the specific institutional, bureaucratic, and ideational obstacles to China's internalization of the co-leader role, the following analysis outlines two major issueseconomic growth and energy security-as motivation for the prevention of China's domestic internalization.
A foundation of the CCP's legitimacy, economic development is both a facilitator of and a constraint on China's nascent global climate leadership.The slowdown of economic development prompts the Chinese government to regard domestic economic interests as an overriding priority in climate policy.The tendency is particularly salient after the outbreak of COVID-19.
China usually relies on carbon-intensive industries to recover from previous economic shocks.75But due to the economic downturns starting in the 2010s, exacerbated by the pandemic, there have been ambivalent developments in China's climate policy.According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China experienced increases in cement, steel, aluminum, and total energy consumption in 2020, a sign that China has turned to non-environmental infrastructure projects to recover its economy from the pandemic-caused slump.76 The total new coal-based power generation capacity approved by the NDRC skyrocketed from 8,530 megawatts in 2018 and 13,911 megawatts in 2019 to 46124 megawatts in 2020.77 The newly approved projects are concentrated in a few coal-producing/reliant provinces.78Nevertheless, the figure declined to 18,550 megawatts in 2021 after the Chinese government imposed the measure in April 2021 to curtail the building of new coal-fired power plants.79 Although the correlation between recent economic downturns and the reliance on 'dirty' projects to rescue the economy in no way announces the end of China's nascent climate leadership, it showcases the paradox of delivering domestic material benefits and claiming international climate leadership simultaneously.It also indicates the potential constraining effects that China's decelerating economy could have on the country's further internalization of Chinese climate leadership.
Intimately associated with economic growth, energy security is also a constraint on China's nascent climate leadership.Since the mid-1990s, China's booming economy has placed a considerable strain on China's energy supply.China's overall energy production and consumption con-figuration is heavily coal-reliant.Despite years of efforts to reduce dependence on coal, domestic production and consumption of coal-generated energy respectively accounted for 67.4% and 56.2% of the country's total energy production and consumption in 2022.80 The steadily growing gap between domestic total energy consumption and production compounds the problem: from 2013 to 2022, the gap gradually widened from 58129 to around 75000 units of standard coal.81 Although oil, natural gas, and other non-fossil fuel energy can potentially help the country reduce its reliance on coal, reducing the energy demand-supply gap, the current reality does not suggest that China can achieve sufficient production of oil and gas.China's domestic consumption of oil and natural gas grew respectively from around 20.7 to 30.9 Quadrillion BTUs (Quad) and from around 5.3 to 13.4 Quads during 2012-2021, while production of those energy sources only saw slight increases, with oil production decreasing from about 8.8 to 8.6 Quads and gas production rising from about 3.8 to 7.5 Quads during the same period.82 Looking forward, nuclear and other renewable energy sources are two promising candidates to satisfy the gap left by decreasing reliance on coal and insufficient domestic oil and natural gas supplies.Particularly, the renewable energy supply in China climbed from approximately 9.6 Quads in 2012 to 20.7 Quads in 2021.83However, their significance in the total energy structure are comparatively small and fail to catch up with the domestic consumption.In 2021 alone, domestic consumption of nuclear and renewable energy was roughly 4.2 and 20.5 Quads respective-ly; approximate to the production figures.84 In 2020, Xi further announced the dual carbon goals as China's flagship climate policy, vowing to achieve carbon emissions peaking in 2030 and neutrality in 2060.The two objectives were incorporated into China's updated nationally determined contributions for 2030 as part of Beijing's commitments under the Paris climate regime.The 2030 plan includes 5 new commitments: peaking emissions before 2030 and making efforts to peak earlier, lowering carbon emissions per unit of GDP by over 65% in 2030 compared with 2005 levels, increasing the share of non-fossil fuels in energy consumption to around 25% in 2030, increasing forest stock volume by around 6 billion cubic meters in 2030 from 2005 levels, and increasing wind and solar power capacity to over 1.2 billion kilowatts by 2030.85Realizing these commitments requires Beijing to substantially restructure its coal-reliant energy sector and hasten the transition to less carbon-intensive energy.
The foregoing analysis suggests a dilemma for China's domestic internalization.That is, to deliver international commitments and global climate leadership, Beijing must simultaneously reduce dependence on coal and find alternative energy to meet the increasing energy demand-supply gap in the next few decades.However, because the demand-supply gap in oil and gas is increasing and other non-fossil fuels can barely satisfy domestic demand, China must increase dependence on exports of oil and gas as an immediate measure to guarantee energy security crucial to domestic economic activities.In 2021, the country's net natural gas imports reached 162 billion cubic meters, a figure over three times greater than 2012.86Net imports of crude oil also exceeded 500 million tons in 2021, a 90% increase over 2012.87Nevertheless, recent statistics point to the country's strong path dependence on coal.As reported by Global Energy Monitor, China's coalfired power capacity has surged from nearly 0 megawatts in 2019 to over 10,000 megawatts in the first few months of 2023, though this may be due to the delay in the construction of projects previously approved.88By 2022, most new projects will be concentrated in industrial provinces, especially Guangdong, which ranks first in terms of new coal-fired power capacity89 and is known as China's industrial and economic hub, with a GDP of $1.74 trillion in 2022.90 The annual per-person power consumption is over 6 megawatt-hours, which is close to the level in developed nations such as Germany.91These developments appear to be signs that local governments have allowed coal power to secure local energy supply and boost the local economy.
Although China maintains friendly relationships with its major energy suppliers, China's dependence on external energy is on the rise, creating more concerns over energy security.Such a dilemma was stressed by Xi during a recent meeting on the implementation the dual carbon goals: The construction of China's ecological civilization has entered a critical period with carbon reduction as the key strategic direction.We need to improve the regulation of total energy consumption and intensity and gradually shift to the dual-control system of total carbon emissions and intensity…We should...push forward the revolution in energy production and consumption and safeguard the country's energy security.92 Given the continuity of the current trends and the time needed for China to switch to a less-coal reliance energy structure, it is unrealistic that Beijing will have a strong incentive to further its leadership in global climate governance in the near term.

CONCLUSION
Though the study developed a China-specific theoretical framework that considerably emphasizes domestic factors in conditioning the likelihood of China's state socialization in the LIO through U.S. engagement, only the first three conditions for socialization were satisfied.The assumed socialization effects of U.S. engagement with China were at best marginal compared with the domestic origins of the yinling zhe identity.The congruence between the UNFCCC and China's core interests, along with the problematization of the participant identity to accommodate China's pursuit of international status prepared the ground for U.S.-China interaction that contributed to the transmission of the U.S. 's expectations, including accepting an international climate agreement and undertaking a co-leader role.Chinese leaders' views on global climate governance indeed underwent a transition after bilateral engagement in 2009-2015, but the transition coincided with domestic utility change: the Xi leadership wanted to leverage global climate governance and U.S.-China cooperation to peacefully elevate China's international status.Consequently, China's international climate policy and new identity began to emerge only after the leadership succession in 2013.Furthermore, the concerns over economic development and energy security are still contentious issues that constrain Beijing from internalizing climate leadership and making relevant adjustments to realize its international commitments in the near future.
Although the article did not attempt to separate the assumed socialization effects of U.S. engagement and domestic factors or to compare the two types of force, evidence tends to suggest that an explanation based on China's domestic politics better accounts for change in Beijing's identity, interest, and behavior than top-down state socialization.
In light of the domestic characteristics facilitating and constraining China's acceptance of a legally binding international climate treaty and a co-leader role desired by the U.S., an engagement policy toward China that assumes Beijing linear socialization into the U.S. 's social expectations rests on flawed logic-that the inclusiveness of the LIO and America's material and ideational appeal can single handedly ensure China's socialization into the LIO without considering China's domestic interests.This is because even in an uncommon case where engagement appeared to work, engagement was subordinate to China's domestic considerations in determining China's activeness in global climate governance.Therefore, persuading a rising China into the LIO through engagement is sure to be grueling and protracted, the success of which depends on both international interaction and more importantly a careful evaluation of China's domestic politics.Though the conditions for adequate state socialization are not present in reality, the equation between engagement and socialization exaggerates the transformative power of socialization at the expense of neglecting the miscellaneous nature of world politics.An engagement policy that implicates China's linear socialization may need to make way for a more adaptable and pragmatic engagement policy that utilizes diverse policy instruments tailored to various policy objectives under varying circumstances.

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37] Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
This position persisted throughout the 1990s and early 2000s without any qualitative shift.However, the evolution of the UN climate regime gradually induced China's socialization into the idea of climate change.The process resulted in China's expanding domestic climate policy portfolio and Beijing's integration into the global climate regime.At the grand strategy level, climate change was elevated to the center of Beijing's domestic development policy.In 1994, the State Council approved the Chinese ' Agenda 21' in response to the UN ' Agenda 21' program, a non-binding action plan concerning sustainable development, announced at the Rio Summit.This Chinese plan included climate change as a priority for attention and guided China's 9th and 10th five-year plans.Chinese President Hu Jintao also put forward the notions of Scientific Outlook on Development and Building Harmonious Society in 2003 and 2005, respectively.Domestic climate governance then became an important means for achieving human-centered and sustainable development.At the institutional level, the Chinese government sought to fill the domestic legal loopholes exposed by the growing global attention to climate change by introducing new legislation throughout the late [48] Ibid., 32.
1980s and 1990s.In 1999, the State Council approved the establishment of the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NC-CCC) as the internal coordinating body for climate change policy.Along with institutional building, Beijing also adopted some secondary measures to restructure the coal-dependent energy sector, experiment with clean energy, and engage in reforestation and carbon sequestration.2007 was a watershed year of China's domestic climate policy.49The NCCCC was upgraded to the National Leading Group on Climate Change chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao as the new coordinating body among different ministries.In the same year, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) released the 2007 China's National Climate Change Program ( ).This was Beijing's first domestic initiative to combat climate change with clear measures and goals.The realization of the detrimental impact of climate change on China was accompanied by some noticeable but merely utilitarian international compromises.Particularly, the three flexible mechanisms-Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation, and Emission Trading-under the Kyoto Protocol (KP) raised concerns for China, as the country lagged far behind in climate science and was unfamiliar with these new policy instruments.Beijing eventually accepted these new mechanisms on the condition that new policy instruments did not hinder its economic development.The country also ratified the KP in 2002 and showed interest in small-scale Clean Development Mechanism and Emission Trading.Another Chinese concession was on 'nationally appropriate mitigation actions.' Guided by China's overall negotiation stance, Beijing rejected proposals encouraging developing countries to make mitigation commitments multiple times at the Conferences of Parties (COP).However, China agreed to a proposal submitted by India that required developing countries to make mitigation efforts on the [49] Wei Liang, "Changing Climate?China's New Interest in Global Climate Change Negotiations, " In China's Environmental Crisis: Domestic and Global Political Impacts and Response, 61-84, ed.Joel J Kassiola and Sujian Guo, New York, Palgrave Macmillan (2010), https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230114364. condition of technological and financial support by developed countries at the 2007 COP-13 in Bali.50
Real changes in China's identity in global climate governance took place in 2015.The term yinling ( or take the lead) appeared in People's Daily in 2015.A People's Daily commentary article outlined three areas of climate change where China was taking the lead: China facilitated the negotiations at the Paris Summit; China provided new impetus for South-South cooperation on climate change; China set a global example of domestic energy conservation and emission reduction.
Chu's visit to Beijing in July 2009.Despite agreeing to jointly put $15 million into creating the research center, Beijing seemed to be ambivalent about Chinese climate leadership, as Xinhua News made only a passing mention of the Secretaries' messages and China's role in global climate change.63The Secretaries' visit was closely followed by the first U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Washington.On July 28, 2009, both sides issued the Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation in Climate Change, Energy, and the Environment to establish a mechanism for cooperation and dialogue.

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Figure 1: Topic Prevalence of Climate Change-related Commentary Articles in People's Daily (2007 to 2021) This section puts the four hypotheses to a qualitative test by analyzing the U.S. 's post-2009 engagement with China on global climate governance.The global climate regime is centered on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).The first part examines China's pre-2009 interaction with the global climate regime to [45] Juliet Kaarbo, "A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory, " International Studies Review 17.2 (2015): 189-216, https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12213.[46] Chih-yu Shih, "National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psychocultural Bases of Chinese Diplomacy, " Political Psychology 9.4 (1988): 603, https:// doi.org/10.2307/3791530.
In 1990, Beijing created five [47] Elizabeth Economy, "Chinese Policy-making and Global Climate Change: Twofront Diplomacy and the International Community, " In The Internationalization of Environmental Protection, 21-32, ed.Miranda Schreurs and Elizabeth Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.